{"id":279,"date":"2024-10-19T17:33:08","date_gmt":"2024-10-19T15:33:08","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.droitangloamericaindespi.com\/brevets\/?post_type=chapter&#038;p=279"},"modified":"2025-03-23T16:41:09","modified_gmt":"2025-03-23T15:41:09","slug":"essai-2","status":"publish","type":"chapter","link":"https:\/\/www.droitangloamericaindespi.com\/brevets\/chapter\/essai-2\/","title":{"raw":"Le brevet aux Etats-Unis d'Am\u00e9rique","rendered":"Le brevet aux Etats-Unis d&rsquo;Am\u00e9rique"},"content":{"raw":"&nbsp;\r\n\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<strong>352._ Pr\u00e9sentation_<\/strong>Les \u00c9tats-Unis sont un acteur majeur du monde des brevets, uniquement d\u00e9pass\u00e9s par la Chine en termes de d\u00e9p\u00f4ts et de d\u00e9livrance. Sur les 1,7 million de brevets d'utilit\u00e9 accord\u00e9s dans le monde en 2020, les \u00c9tats-Unis en ont accord\u00e9 377 170 (597 000 demandes), contre 695 946 pour la Chine (1,59 million de demandes), e<span style=\"font-size: 1em;\">t 184 372 pour le Japon (288 000 demandes)[footnote]Source statistiques OMPI, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.wipo.int\/en\/ipfactsandfigures\/patents\">IP Facts and Figures<\/a>.[\/footnote].<\/span>\r\n\r\nUne grande partie de ces brevets sont d\u00e9pos\u00e9s dans les secteurs des technologies de l'information, des t\u00e9l\u00e9communications et des produits pharmaceutiques. Une majorit\u00e9 de ces demandes provient d'entit\u00e9s \u00e9trang\u00e8res[footnote]54 % de toutes les demandes de brevets d\u2019utilit\u00e9 en 2020.\u200b Source: statistiques <a href=\"https:\/\/www.uspto.gov\/learning-and-resources\/statistics\/patent-statistics\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">USPTO<\/a>.[\/footnote].\r\n\r\nContrairement \u00e0 la situation qui pr\u00e9vaut pour d'autres droits de propri\u00e9t\u00e9 intellectuelle, les \u00c9tats-Unis sont signataires de toutes les conventions internationales en mati\u00e8re de brevet[footnote]Sur les textes internationaux et leur int\u00e9gration aux \u00c9tats-Unis, v. Tome 1, n\u00b041.[\/footnote]. En dernier lieu, les dispositions pertinentes du Trait\u00e9 sur le droit des brevets (PLT) de 2000 ont \u00e9t\u00e9 transpos\u00e9es par le Patent Law Treaties Implementation Act de 2012[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.govinfo.gov\/content\/pkg\/PLAW-112publ211\/html\/PLAW-112publ211.htm\">Patent Law Treaties Implementation Act<\/a>, Pub. L. 112-211, 126 Stat. 1527 (2012).[\/footnote].\r\n\r\nLes \u00c9tats-Unis ont adopt\u00e9 assez t\u00f4t des solutions innovantes dans le domaine des brevets et des cr\u00e9ations techniques : contr\u00f4le de l\u2019activit\u00e9 inventive d\u00e8s 1836, loi sur les obtentions v\u00e9g\u00e9tales (<em>plant patent<\/em>) d\u00e8s 1930, etc. La loi f\u00e9d\u00e9rale a \u00e9galement longtemps maintenu des solutions techniques originales ou abandonn\u00e9es dans les autres syst\u00e8mes de brevet<em>, <\/em>et notamment une dur\u00e9e de protection plus courte (17 ans), et un syst\u00e8me du premier inventeur. Ces particularit\u00e9s, et d'autres, ont \u00e9t\u00e9 abandonn\u00e9es \u00e0 partir des ann\u00e9es 1990 (au 16 mars 2023 pour le syst\u00e8me du premier inventeur). Cependant, certaines particularit\u00e9s subsistent. L\u2019absence, dans le <em>Patent Act<\/em> de 1952, d\u2019exclusions du domaine de la brevetabilit\u00e9 similaires \u00e0 celles \u00e9tablies par la Convention de Munich en est une. La loi pr\u00e9voit \u00e9galement un d\u00e9lai de gr\u00e2ce d'un an absent (ou abandonn\u00e9 par) de nombreuses l\u00e9gislations en mati\u00e8re de brevet, et des exceptions originales. D'autres particularit\u00e9s sont proc\u00e9durales, comme la possibilit\u00e9 de demandes provisoires (<em>provisional patent application<\/em>), ou les possibilit\u00e9s de <em>continuation in part;<\/em> ou encore des possibilit\u00e9s d'extension de la p\u00e9riode de protection (<em>patent term adjustments<\/em>) en raison de d\u00e9lais d'examens des demandes par l'USPTO ou de m\u00e9canismes d'autorisation de mises sur le march\u00e9 par la Food and Drug Administration. Par ailleurs, aux \u00c9tats-Unis les sanctions pr\u00e9vues en mati\u00e8re de brevets sont uniquement civiles[footnote]V. Tome 1, n\u00b066.[\/footnote]. Enfin, on notera que le droit des brevets US ne pr\u00e9voit pas de protection des mod\u00e8les d'utilit\u00e9s[footnote]V. cependant, dans le domaine du design, le Vessel Hull Design Protection Act, T. 1, n\u00b0297.[\/footnote].\r\n\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<strong>353._ Plan_ <\/strong>Apr\u00e8s une introduction historique (I), nous aborderons les r\u00e8gles li\u00e9es \u00e0 l'obtention (II) et \u00e0 la propri\u00e9t\u00e9 et \u00e0 l'exploitation (III) du brevet.\r\n<h2>1.<strong>\u00a0Introduction historique<\/strong><\/h2>\r\n<strong>354._ La protection des inventions avant le Patent Act de 1790_<\/strong> Le Statute of Monopolies anglais[footnote]V. <em>supra<\/em>, n\u00b0307.[\/footnote] n\u2019a jamais \u00e9t\u00e9 applicable dans les colonies am\u00e9ricaines. Cependant les gouvernements locaux ont attribu\u00e9 tr\u00e8s t\u00f4t des droits commerciaux exclusifs sur certaines inventions ou importations utiles. Le premier de ces \u00ab brevets \u00bb fut accord\u00e9 en 1640 au Massachusetts, pour une dur\u00e9e de dix ans, sur un proc\u00e9d\u00e9 de production de sel. Pendant la p\u00e9riode conf\u00e9d\u00e9rale, plusieurs \u00c9tats adopteront des lois sur les brevets, sur le mod\u00e8le du Statute of Monopolies[footnote]La premi\u00e8re sera la Caroline du Sud en 1784.[\/footnote]. Ces lois assez sommaires pr\u00e9voyaient notamment une protection pour quatorze ans aux inventeurs de \u00ab machines utiles \u00bb.\r\n\r\nPour r\u00e9pondre notamment \u00e0 des conflits relatifs aux brevets d\u00e9livr\u00e9s dans plusieurs \u00c9tats [footnote]Affaire des brevets concurrents sur les bateaux \u00e0 vapeur (<em>steamboat patents<\/em>), d\u00e9livr\u00e9s respectivement \u00e0 John Fitch et James Rumsey, qui se disputaient l'invention. A. Sutcliffe, Steam: The Untold Story of America's First Great Invention. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. Les deux recevront des brevets f\u00e9d\u00e9raux en 1791.[\/footnote], la Constitution f\u00e9d\u00e9rale, adopt\u00e9e le 17 septembre 1787, transf\u00e8rera au Congr\u00e8s le pouvoir d\u2019adopter des lois en mati\u00e8re de brevet, au travers de la clause de brevet et de copyright de la Constitution (Article I, section 8 : \u00ab Le Congr\u00e8s aura le pouvoir\u2026 de favoriser le progr\u00e8s de la science et des arts utiles[footnote]L\u2019expression vise de mani\u00e8re g\u00e9n\u00e9rale les technologies.[\/footnote], en assurant, pour un temps limit\u00e9, aux auteurs et inventeurs le droit exclusif sur leurs \u00e9crits et sur leurs d\u00e9couvertes respectifs \u00bb)[footnote]V. Tome 1, n\u00b038 et s. (cadre constitutionnel).[\/footnote]. Ce texte, qui permettra l\u2019adoption de la premi\u00e8re loi f\u00e9d\u00e9rale sur les brevets, \u00e9tablit plusieurs concepts fondamentaux dans ce domaine (\u00ab arts utiles \u00bb, \u00ab temps limit\u00e9 \u00bb, \u00ab inventeur \u00bb, \u00ab d\u00e9couvertes \u00bb) et suscitera une jurisprudence qui fa\u00e7onnera le droit des brevets aux \u00c9tats-Unis[footnote]<em>Ibid<\/em>.[\/footnote].\r\n\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<strong>355._ Du Patent Act de 1790 au Patent Act de 1952_<\/strong> La premi\u00e8re loi f\u00e9d\u00e9rale sur les brevets fut adopt\u00e9e en 1790[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.ipmall.info\/sites\/default\/files\/hosted_resources\/lipa\/patents\/Patent_Act_of_1790.pdf\">Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109<\/a>.[\/footnote]. Cette loi tr\u00e8s courte ne contenait que sept articles. Elle permettait au Secretary of State (Thomas Jefferson \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9poque), au Secretary for the department of war et \u00e0 l\u2019Attorney General of the United States (ou \u00e0 deux d\u2019entre eux), d\u2019accorder au \u00ab premier et vrai inventeur \u00bb un brevet sur \u00ab tout art utile, toute fabrication, machine ou tout appareil, ou leur am\u00e9lioration, auparavant inconnu ou non utilis\u00e9 \u00bb[footnote]Section 1.[\/footnote]. Le texte pr\u00e9voyait n\u00e9anmoins que le brevet ne pouvait \u00eatre accord\u00e9 que si l\u2019invention \u00e9tait consid\u00e9r\u00e9e comme \u00ab suffisamment utile et importante \u00bb[footnote]<em>Ibid.<\/em>[\/footnote]. La loi contenait donc d\u00e9j\u00e0 en germe le crit\u00e8re d\u2019activit\u00e9 inventive. On notera \u00e9galement l'absence d'exigence de \"mise en application\" ou d'exploitation de l'invention (<em>working requirements<\/em>), pr\u00e9sente dans certaines lois \u00e9trang\u00e8res. L'id\u00e9e derri\u00e8re cette r\u00e8gle \u00e9tait d'\u00e9viter que les brevets soient uniquement d\u00e9tenus par les entreprises d\u00e9tentrices des manufactures ou des capitaux n\u00e9cessaires. Les brevets pouvaient ainsi, d\u00e8s l'origine, \u00eatre d\u00e9tenus par des petits inventeurs et des entit\u00e9s non exploitantes. Mais la caract\u00e9ristique sans doute la plus importante pour l'\u00e9poque tenait aux redevances et aux formalit\u00e9s de d\u00e9p\u00f4ts. Les redevances, tout d\u2019abord, \u00e9taient fix\u00e9e d\u00e9lib\u00e9r\u00e9ment tr\u00e8s bas (3 dollars 70 cents) de mani\u00e8re \u00e0 permettre le d\u00e9p\u00f4t par des citoyens ordinaires. Cette ouverture \u00e9tait \u00e9galement assur\u00e9e par le refus d\u2019imposer une quelconque obligation d\u2019exploitation ou de fabrication au d\u00e9posant, sur le mod\u00e8le de ce qui pouvait exister \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9tranger. De m\u00eame, les formalit\u00e9s de d\u00e9p\u00f4t \u00e9taient largement simplifi\u00e9es: le d\u00e9p\u00f4t pouvait avoir lieu localement, et \u00e9tait exp\u00e9di\u00e9 aux frais de l\u2019\u00c9tat f\u00e9d\u00e9ral. Une large publicit\u00e9 \u00e9tait assur\u00e9e au travers de publications diverses.\r\n\r\nL'inventeur devait fournir une description \u00e9crite de l'invention et du mode d'utilisation. Un m\u00e9canisme d\u2019examen des conditions de brevetabilit\u00e9 \u00e9tait pr\u00e9vu. L\u2019examen \u00e9tait \u00e0 l\u2019origine confi\u00e9 \u00e0 un comit\u00e9 compos\u00e9 du Secretary of State (Thomas Jefferson), du Secretary of War (Henry Knox) et de l\u2019 Attorney General (Edmund Randolph). Il s\u2019av\u00e8rera assez lourd \u00e0 mettre en place et \u00e0 g\u00e9rer. Seuls cinquante-sept brevets furent accord\u00e9s sous l\u2019empire du Patent Act 1790.\r\n\r\nLa dur\u00e9e de ce brevet \u00e9tait de quatorze ans. Il conf\u00e9rait \u00e0 son titulaire \u00ab la libert\u00e9 et le droit exclusifs de fabriquer, construire, utiliser et de vendre \u00e0 des fins d\u2019utilisation, ladite invention ou d\u00e9couverte \u00bb[footnote]<em>Ibid.<\/em>[\/footnote].\r\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\r\n\r\n<strong>Patent Act of 1790, Ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109-112 (April 10, 1790)<\/strong>\r\n\r\n<strong>Section 1<\/strong>\r\n\r\nBe it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That upon the petition of any person or persons to the Secretary of State, the Secretary for the department of war, and the \u00a0Attorney General of the United States, setting forth, that he, she, or they, hath or have invented or discovered any useful \u00a0art, manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any improvement therein not before known or used, and praying that a patent may be granted therefor, it shall and may be lawful to and for the Secretary of State, the Secretary for the \u00a0department of war, and the Attorney General, or any two of them, if they shall deem the invention or discovery \u00a0sufficiently useful and important, to cause letters patent to be made out in the name of the United States, to bear teste by the President of the United States, reciting the allegations and suggestions of the said petition, and describing the said\r\n\r\ninvention or discovery, clearly, truly and fully, and thereupon granting to such petitioner or petitioners, his, her or their heirs, administrators or assigns for any term not exceeding fourteen years, the sole and exclusive right and liberty of \u00a0making, constructing, using and vending to others to be used, the said invention or discovery; which letters patent shall be delivered to the Attorney General of the United States to be examined, who shall, within fifteen days next after the delivery to him, if he shall find the same conformable to this act, certify it to be so at the foot thereof, and present the letters patent so certified to the President, who shall cause the seal of the United States to be thereto affixed, and the same shall be good and available to the grantee or grantees by force of this act, to all and every intent and purpose herein contained, and shall be recorded in a book to be kept for that purpose in the office of the Secretary of State, and delivered to the patentee or his agent, and the delivery thereof shall be entered on the record and endorsed on the patent by the said Secretary at the time of granting the same.\r\n\r\n<strong>Section 2<\/strong>\r\n\r\nAnd be it further enacted, That the grantee or grantees of each patent shall, at the time of granting the same, deliver to the Secretary of State a specification in writing, containing a description, accompanied with drafts or models, and explanations and models (if the nature of the invention or discovery will admit of a model) of the thing or things, by him or them invented or discovered, and described as aforesaid, in the said patents; which specification shall be so particular, and said models so exact, as not only to distinguish the invention or discovery from other things before known and used, but also to enable a workman or other person skilled in the art or manufacture, whereof it is a branch, or wherewith it may be nearest connected, to make, construct, or use the same, to the end that the public may have the full benefit thereof, after the expiration of the patent term; which specification shall be filed in the office of the said Secretary, and certified copies thereof, shall be competent evidence in all courts and before all jurisdictions, where any matter or thing, touching or concerning such patent, right, or privilege, shall come in question.\r\n\r\n<strong>Section 3<\/strong>\r\n\r\nAnd be it further enacted, That upon the application of any person to the Secretary of State, for a copy of any such specification, and for permission to have similar model or models made, it shall be the duty of the Secretary to give such copy, and to permit the person so applying for a similar model or models, to take, or make, or cause the same to be taken or made, at the expense of such applicant.\r\n\r\n<strong>Section 4<\/strong>\r\n\r\nAnd be it further enacted, That if any person or persons shall devise, make, construct, use, employ, or vend within these United States, any art, manufacture, engine, machine or device, or any invention or improvement upon, or in any art, manufacture, engine, machine or device, the sole and exclusive right of which shall be so as aforesaid granted by patent to any person or persons, by virtue and in pursuance of this act, without the consent of the patentee or patentees, their executors, administrators or assigns, first had and obtained in writing, every person so offending, shall forfeit and pay to the said patentee or patentees, his, her or their executors, administrators or assigns such damages as shall be assessed by a jury, and moreover shall forfeit to the person aggrieved, the thing or things so devised, made, constructed, used,\u00a0employed or vended, contrary to the true intent of this act, which may be recovered in an action on the case founded on this act.\r\n\r\n<strong>Section 5<\/strong>\r\n\r\nAnd be it further enacted, That upon oath or affirmation made before the judge of the district court, where the defendant resides, that any patent which shall be issued in pursuance of this act, was obtained surreptitiously by, or upon false suggestion, and motion made to the said court, within one year after issuing the said patent, but not afterwards, it shall and may be lawful to and for the judge of the said district court, if the matter alleged shall appear to him to be sufficient, to grant a rule that the patentee or patentees, his, her, or their executors, administrators or assigns, show cause why process should not issue against him, her, or them, to repeal such patents; and if sufficient cause shall not be shown to the contrary, the rule shall be made absolute, and thereupon the said judge shall order process to be issued as aforesaid, against such patentee or patentees, his, her, or their executors, administrators, or assigns. And in case no sufficient cause shall be shown to the contrary, or if it shall appear that the patentee was not the first and true inventor or discoverer, judgment shall be rendered by such court for the repeal of such patent or patents; and if the party at whose complaint the process issued, shall have judgment given against him, he shall pay all such costs as the defendant shall be put to in defending the suit, to be taxed by the court, and recovered in such manner as costs expended by defendants, shall be recovered in due course of law.\r\n\r\n<strong>Section 6<\/strong>\r\n\r\nAnd be it further enacted, That in all actions to be brought by such patentee or patentees, his, her, or their executors, administrators or assigns, for any penalty incurred by virtue of this act, the said patents or specifications shall be prima facie evidence, that the said patentee or patentees was or were the first and true inventor or inventors, discoverer or discoverers of the thing so specified, and that the same is truly specified; but that nevertheless the defendant or\u00a0defendants may plead the general issue, and give this act, and any special matter whereof notice in writing shall have been given to the plaintiff, or his attorney, thirty days before the trial, in evidence, tending to prove that the specification filed by the plaintiff does not contain the whole of the truth concerning his invention or discovery; or that it contains more than is necessary to produce the effect described; and if the concealment of part, or the addition of more than is necessary, shall appear to have been intended to mislead, or shall actually mislead the public, so as the effect described cannot be produced by the means specified, then, and in such cases, the verdict and judgment shall be for the defendant.\r\n\r\n<strong>Section 7<\/strong>\r\n\r\nAnd be it further enacted, That such patentee as aforesaid, shall, before he receives his patent, pay the following fees to the several officers employed in making out and perfecting the same, to wit: For receiving and filing the petition, fifty cents; for filing specifications, per copy-sheet containing one hundred words, ten cents; for making out patent, two dollars; for affixing great seal, one dollar; for indorsing the day of delivering the same to the patentee, including all\u00a0intermediate services, twenty cents.\r\n\r\nAPPROVED, April 10, 1790.\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\nUn nouveau Patent Act, r\u00e9dig\u00e9 par Thomas Jefferson, fut adopt\u00e9 en 1793[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.ipmall.info\/sites\/default\/files\/hosted_resources\/lipa\/patents\/Patent_Act_of_1793.pdf\">Act of Febr. 21, 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318-323<\/a>.[\/footnote]. La d\u00e9finition de l\u2019invention brevetable y est modifi\u00e9e et vise d\u00e9sormais \u00ab toute activit\u00e9, machine, fabrication ou composition de mati\u00e8re nouvelle et utile, ou toute am\u00e9lioration nouvelle et utile de toute activit\u00e9, machine, fabrication ou composition de mati\u00e8re, inconnue ou non utilis\u00e9e avant la demande \u00bb[footnote]Section 1: \u00ab any new and useful art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement on any art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, not known or used before the application<em> \u00bb.<\/em>[\/footnote]. Le Secretary of State est d\u00e9sormais seul comp\u00e9tent pour d\u00e9livrer les brevets. Fait notable, la loi supprime la d\u00e9termination du caract\u00e8re \u00ab suffisamment utile et importante \u00bb de l\u2019invention. En outre, l\u2019embryon d\u2019examen institu\u00e9 par le Patent Act 1790 est supprim\u00e9. L'appr\u00e9ciation des conditions de fond est donc laiss\u00e9e \u00e0 la seule appr\u00e9ciation des tribunaux.\r\n\r\nLa redevance d\u00e9p\u00f4t sera augment\u00e9e \u00e0 30 dollars, somme toujours tr\u00e8s inf\u00e9rieure aux taux pratiqu\u00e9s en Angleterre. Ce taux faible sera maintenu pendant pr\u00e8s de 70 ans, favorisant les d\u00e9p\u00f4ts pendant toute la p\u00e9riode de la r\u00e9volution industrielle.\r\n\r\nPar ailleurs, un syst\u00e8me d\u00e9centralis\u00e9 de d\u00e9p\u00f4t sera mis en place. Les d\u00e9p\u00f4ts pouvaient avoir lieu localement (ou par la poste), les demandes \u00e9tant exp\u00e9di\u00e9es au Patent office aux frais du gouvernement f\u00e9d\u00e9ral. Ce m\u00e9canisme permettra d\u2019accro\u00eetre le nombre de d\u00e9p\u00f4ts[footnote] \u00ab By 1865, the U.S. per capita patenting rate was more than triple that of Britain\u2019s, according to the annual reports from the commissioners of patents in both countries, and by 1885, it was more than quadruple that of Britain. Each U.S. patentee was also far more prolific than their British counterpart, so by mid-century, the United States was patenting five times the number of inventions as Britain each year, even though the populations were then equal in size\u00a0\u00bb D. Kline, D. Kappos, <a href=\"https:\/\/openstax.org\/details\/books\/introduction-intellectual-property\/\">Introduction to Intellectual Property<\/a>, Openstax 2021 (CC BY 4.0), Patents Basics, p. 24.[\/footnote].\r\n\r\nLa loi sur les brevets de 1793 conserve une d\u00e9finition large de la brevetabilit\u00e9 : un inventeur pouvait breveter \u00ab toute \u0153uvre d'art, machine, fabrication ou composition de mati\u00e8re nouvelle et utile, ou toute am\u00e9lioration nouvelle et utile de toute \u0153uvre d'art, machine, fabrication ou composition de mati\u00e8re, non connue ou utilis\u00e9e avant la demande \u00bb[footnote]Patent Act of 1793, sec. 1.[\/footnote]. L'inventeur devait fournir une description \u00e9crite de l'invention et du mode d'utilisation, dans des termes complets, clairs et exacts, permettant de la distinguer de l'art ant\u00e9rieur et \u00e0 toute personne vers\u00e9e dans l'art ou la science concern\u00e9e ou ou avec laquelle elle est le plus \u00e9troitement li\u00e9e, de la fabriquer et de l'utiliser.\r\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\r\n\r\n<strong>Patent Act of 1793, Ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318-323 (February 21, 1793) (extraits)<\/strong>\r\n\r\n<strong>Section 1<\/strong>\r\n\r\nBe it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That when any person or persons, being a citizen or citizens of the United States, shall allege that he or they have invented any new and useful art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement on any art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, not known or used before the application, and shall present a petition to the Secretary of State, signifying a desire of obtaining an exclusive property in the same, and praying that a patent may be granted therefor, it shall and may be lawful for the said Secretary of State, to cause letters patent to be made out in the name of the United States, bearing teste by the President of the United States, reciting the allegations and suggestions of the said petition, and giving a short description of the said invention or discovery, and thereupon granting to such petitioner, or petitioners, his, her, or their heirs, administrators or assigns, for a term not exceeding fourteen years, the full and exclusive right and liberty of making, constructing, using, and vending to others to be used, the said invention or discovery, which letters patent shall be delivered to the Attorney General of the United States, to be examined; who, within fifteen days after such delivery, if he finds the same conformable to this act, shall certify accordingly, at the foot thereof, and return the same to the Secretary of State, who shall present the letters patent thus certified, to be signed, and shall cause the seal of the United States to be thereto affixed: and the same shall be good and available to the grantee or grantees, by force of this act, and shall be recorded in a book, to be kept for that purpose, in the office of the Secretary of State, and delivered to the patentee or his order.\r\n\r\n<strong>Section 2<\/strong>\r\n\r\nProvided always, and be it further enacted, That any person, who shall have discovered an improvement in the principle of any machine, or in the process of any composition of matter, which shall have been patented, and shall have obtained a patent for such improvement, he shall not be at liberty to make, use or vend the original discovery, nor shall the first inventor be at liberty to use the improvement: And it is hereby enacted and declared, that simply changing the form or the proportions of any machine, or composition of matter, in any degree, shall not be deemed a discovery.\r\n\r\n<strong>Section 3<\/strong>\r\n\r\nAnd be it further enacted, That every inventor, before he can receive a patent, shall swear or affirm that he does verily believe, that he is the true inventor or discoverer of the art, machine, or improvement, for which he solicits a patent, which oath or affirmation may be made before any person authorized to administer oaths, and shall deliver a written description of his invention, and of the manner of using, or process of compounding the same, in such full, clear and exact terms, as to distinguish the same from all other things before known, and to enable any person skilled in the art or science, of which it is a branch, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make, compound, and use the same. And in the case of any machine, he shall fully explain the principle, and the several modes in which he has contemplated the application of that principle or character, by which it may be distinguished from other inventions; and he shall accompany the whole with drawings and written references, where the nature of the case admits of drawings, or with specimens of the ingredients, and of the composition of matter, sufficient in quantity for the purpose of experiment, where the invention is of a composition of matter; which description, signed by himself and attested by two witnesses, shall be filed in the office of the Secretary of State, and certified copies thereof shall be competent evidence, in all courts, where any matter or thing, touching such patent-right, shall come in question. And such inventor shall, moreover, deliver a model of his machine, provided, the secretary shall deem such model to be necessary.\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\nL\u2019absence d\u2019examen des conditions de fond aboutira \u00e0 nombreux brevets sans valeur, et favorisera les demandes de brevet plus ou moins frauduleuses[footnote]V. Report Accompanying Senate Bill No. 239, S. Doc. No. 24\u2013338, at 3 (1836).[\/footnote]. En r\u00e9action, le Congr\u00e8s adoptera en 1836 une nouvelle loi[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/patentlyo.com\/media\/docs\/2008\/03\/Patent_Act_of_1836.pdf\">Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117<\/a>.[\/footnote], le Patent Act 1836, qui institue un Patent Office, rattach\u00e9 au D\u00e9partement d\u2019\u00c9tat[footnote]Section 1.[\/footnote], codifie la jurisprudence ant\u00e9rieure en renfor\u00e7ant l\u2019exigence de description et en introisant par l\u00e0-m\u00eame les revendications[footnote]Section 6: <em>\u00ab<\/em>\u00a0before any inventor shall receive a patent for any such new invention or discovery, he shall deliver a written description of his invention or discovery, and of the manner and process of making, constructing, using, and compounding the same, in such full, clear, and exact terms, avoiding unnecessary prolixity, as to enable any person skilled in the art or science to which it appertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make, construct, compound, and use the same; and in case of any machine, he shall fully explain the principle and the several modes in which he has contemplated the application of that principle or character by which it may be distinguished from other inventions; <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\">and shall particularly specify and point out the part, improvement, or combination, which he claims as his own invention or discovery<\/span>. He shall, furthermore, accompany the whole with a drawing, or drawings, and written references, where the nature of the case admits of drawings, or with specimens of ingredients, and of the composition of matter, sufficient in quantity for the purpose of experiment, where the invention or discovery is of a composition of matter<em>\u00bb.<\/em>[\/footnote]. La loi nouvelle institue \u00e9galement un examen de la condition de nouveaut\u00e9 par des examinateurs form\u00e9s aux technologies concern\u00e9es[footnote]Section 7.[\/footnote]. Cette situation contraste fortement avec celle en vigueur en Europe \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9poque.\r\n\r\nLa dur\u00e9e de protection est \u00e9tendue, de quatorze \u00e0 vingt et un ans. Fait remarquable cette dur\u00e9e de protection sera par la suite r\u00e9duite \u00e0 dix-sept ans.\r\n\r\nEn 1839, une p\u00e9riode de gr\u00e2ce de deux ans fut introduite. Elle sera r\u00e9duite \u00e0 un an en 1939.\r\n\r\nPendant cette p\u00e9riode, la Cour Supr\u00eame rendra plusieurs d\u00e9cisions importantes. Elle d\u00e9gagera notamment le concept d\u2019activit\u00e9 inventive en 1850 dans la d\u00e9cision <em>Hotchkiss v. Greenwood<\/em>[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/52\/248\/\">52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1850)<\/a>.[\/footnote], et la doctrine des \u00e9quivalents en 1853 dans sa d\u00e9cision <em>Winans v. Denmead<\/em>[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/56\/330\/\">56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1853)<\/a>.[\/footnote].\r\n\r\nUne nouvelle codification interviendra avec le Patent Act de 1870, sans changements notables. La Cour Supr\u00eame, dont l\u2019attitude envers le syst\u00e8me des brevets \u00e9voluera \u00e0 plusieurs reprises, introduira l\u2019exception pour usage exp\u00e9rimental[footnote]City of Elizabeth v. American Nicholson Pavement Co. <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/97\/126\/\">97 U.S. (7 Otto.) 126 (1877)<\/a>.[\/footnote] et la d\u00e9fense de <em>patent misuse<\/em>[footnote]Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Development Corp., <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/283\/27\/\">283 U.S. 27 (1931)<\/a> ; Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co. <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/320\/661\/\">320 U.S. 661 (1944)<\/a>.[\/footnote].\r\n\r\nLes \u00c9tats-Unis rejoindront la Convention de Paris en 1887.\r\n\r\nUne extension importante de la protection sera r\u00e9alis\u00e9e par le Plant Patent Act 1930, qui institue un brevet sp\u00e9cial de plante[footnote]V. <em>infra, <\/em>n\u00b0431.[\/footnote].\r\n\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<strong>356._ Le Patent Act de 1952 et l\u2019\u00e9volution ult\u00e9rieure_<\/strong> Une codification majeure du droit des brevets interviendra en 1952 avec le Patent Act 1952[footnote]Public Law 593, July 19, 1952, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.govinfo.gov\/content\/pkg\/STATUTE-66\/pdf\/STATUTE-66-Pg792.pdf\">66 Stat. 792<\/a>.[\/footnote], dont les dispositions, telles que modifi\u00e9es par les textes ult\u00e9rieurs, sont toujours en vigueur. Ses articles sont codifi\u00e9s au titre 35 du Code f\u00e9d\u00e9ral. Ce texte r\u00e9unit la plus grande partie de la l\u00e9gislation en mati\u00e8re de brevets. Il est compl\u00e9t\u00e9 par le Code of Federal Regulations[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/cfr\/text\/37\">37 C.F.R.<\/a>[\/footnote] et par le Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP), qui d\u00e9taillent les r\u00e8gles applicables \u00e0 l\u2019obtention des brevets.\r\n\r\nLe Patent Act r\u00e9unit, dans une seule loi, les trois cat\u00e9gories de brevets institu\u00e9s par la loi f\u00e9d\u00e9rale, \u00e0 savoir les brevets d\u2019invention (<em>utility patents<\/em>), les brevets de mod\u00e8les (<em>design patents<\/em>) et les brevets de plantes (<em>plant patents<\/em>). En mati\u00e8re de brevets d\u2019invention, le Patents Act 1952 n\u2019a pas modifi\u00e9 les grands principes issus des lois pr\u00e9c\u00e9dentes : syst\u00e8me du premier inventeur, examen pr\u00e9alable des conditions de fond de la brevetabilit\u00e9, absence de publication des demandes avant d\u00e9livrance, dur\u00e9e de protection de dix-sept ans. Il a \u00e9galement codifi\u00e9 (mais dans une mesure variable) la plupart des principes d\u00e9gag\u00e9s par les tribunaux. Il institue ainsi une condition expresse d\u2019activit\u00e9 inventive, ainsi qu\u2019une d\u00e9finition de la contrefa\u00e7on. Des modifications l\u00e9gislatives interviendront dans les ann\u00e9es soixante, principalement sur des aspects de proc\u00e9dure.\r\n\r\n\u00c0 partir des ann\u00e9es soixante-dix, plusieurs d\u00e9cisions de la Cour supr\u00eame pr\u00e9ciseront notamment le champ de la brevetabilit\u00e9 au regard des nouvelles technologies, en mati\u00e8re de traitement de l\u2019information tout d\u2019abord[footnote]\u00e0 partir de Gottschalk v. Benson, <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/409\/63\/\">409 U.S. 63 (1972)<\/a> (algorithmes math\u00e9matiques non brevetables).[\/footnote] puis, sous l'impulsion de l\u2019arr\u00eat <em>Diamond v. Chakrabarty<\/em>[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/447\/303\/\">447 U.S. 303 (1980)<\/a>.[\/footnote] dans le domaine des biotechnologies. Les modifications n\u00e9cessaires \u00e0 l\u2019application du PCT seront int\u00e9gr\u00e9es \u00e0 la loi.\r\n\r\nLe rythme des r\u00e9formes s\u2019acc\u00e9l\u00e8re \u00e0 partie des ann\u00e9es quatre-vingt. En 1982, une Cour d\u2019appel pour le Circuit F\u00e9d\u00e9ral, ayant comp\u00e9tence exclusive d\u2019appel sur les litiges en mati\u00e8re de brevets, sera institu\u00e9e. Elle favorisera l\u2019unification de la jurisprudence dans ce domaine.\r\n\r\nEn 1984, des extensions \u00e0 la dur\u00e9e de protection en mati\u00e8re de m\u00e9dicaments et des r\u00e8gles propres aux actions en contrefa\u00e7on impliquant des m\u00e9dicaments g\u00e9n\u00e9riques sont institu\u00e9es par le Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, \u00e9galement appel\u00e9 Hatch-Waxman Act[footnote]P.L. 98-417, Title II, 98 Stat. 1585; <a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/21\/355\">21 U.S.C. \u00a7 355<\/a> and <a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/271\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 271(e)(1)<\/a>.[\/footnote].\r\n\r\nEn 1988, le Congr\u00e8s adoptera le Patent Misuse Reform Act, qui restreint l\u2019application de la doctrine de <em>patent misuse<\/em> \u00e0 certaines pratiques[footnote]P.L. 100-73, 102 Stat. 4674. La loi ajoutant deux sous-sections \u00e0 <a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/271\">35 U.S.C. Section 271(d)<\/a>.[\/footnote], et le Process Patent Amendments Act, qui \u00e9tend le droit des titulaires de brevets de proc\u00e9d\u00e9s aux importations de produits non brevet\u00e9s fabriqu\u00e9s \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9tranger \u00e0 l\u2019aide du proc\u00e9d\u00e9 brevet\u00e9[footnote]Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, P.L. 100-418, Title IX, Subtitle A, 102 Stat. 1563.[\/footnote].\r\n\r\nEn 1995, et suite \u00e0 l\u2019accord ADPIC, la dur\u00e9e de protection passera de dix-sept \u00e0 vingt ans[footnote]Uruguay Round Agreements Act (Public Law 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994)).[\/footnote]. Plusieurs dispositions de la loi f\u00e9d\u00e9rale d\u00e9favorables aux inventions r\u00e9alis\u00e9es dehors des \u00c9tats-Unis seront \u00e9galement supprim\u00e9es par la suite.\r\n\r\nToujours en 1995, le Biotechnology Process Patent Act 1995 permettra, sous certaines conditions, de ne pas appliquer le crit\u00e8re d\u2019activit\u00e9 inventive \u00e0 un proc\u00e9d\u00e9 dans le domaine des biotechnologies[footnote]V. <em>infra, <\/em>n\u00b0384.[\/footnote].\r\n\r\nEn 1999, l\u2019Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus Reform Act op\u00e9ra une r\u00e9forme majeure en instituant la publication des demandes de brevet dix-huit mois apr\u00e8s leur d\u00e9p\u00f4t[footnote]Dispositions codifi\u00e9es au <a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/122\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 122<\/a>.[\/footnote]. Il met ainsi fin \u00e0 la pratique des \u00ab brevets sous-marins \u00bb (<em>submarine patents<\/em>), dont la d\u00e9livrance \u00e9tait report\u00e9e \u00e0 dessein par les demandeurs.\r\n\r\nLa derni\u00e8re grande r\u00e9forme, sans doute la plus importante depuis le patent Act de 1952, est issue de l\u2019America Invents Act\u00a02011, qui abandonne notamment le syst\u00e8me du premier inventeur, en vigueur depuis 1790, pour la formule de l\u2019inventeur premier d\u00e9posant.\r\n\r\nAu cours de ces derni\u00e8res ann\u00e9es, le d\u00e9veloppement de l\u2019activit\u00e9 des \u00ab\u00a0patent trolls\u00a0\u00bb (autrement d\u00e9nomm\u00e9es <em>non-practicing entities<\/em>, <em>non-performing entities<\/em> ou <em>patent assertion entities<\/em>) a concentr\u00e9 une partie de l\u2019activit\u00e9 l\u00e9gislative[footnote]Sur cette question, V. <em>infra<\/em>, n\u00b0422.[\/footnote]. Plusieurs propositions de lois f\u00e9d\u00e9rales destin\u00e9es \u00e0 encadrer leurs activit\u00e9s ont \u00e9t\u00e9 d\u00e9pos\u00e9s \u00e0 partir de 2014[footnote]<em>Ibid.<\/em>[\/footnote], et dans le m\u00eame temps plusieurs \u00c9tats f\u00e9d\u00e9r\u00e9s ont adopt\u00e9 des lois destin\u00e9es \u00e0 sanctionner les demandes et mises en demeures abusives[footnote]La premi\u00e8re loi de ce type a \u00e9t\u00e9 adopt\u00e9e dans l\u2019\u00c9tat du Vermont en 2013, 9 VSA \u00a7 4195. <em>Ibid.<\/em>[\/footnote].\r\n<h2>2. L\u2019obtention du brevet d'invention<\/h2>\r\n<strong>357._ Les apports de l\u2019America Invents Act _<\/strong> Comme indiqu\u00e9, le droit des brevets aux \u00c9tats-Unis a connu une r\u00e9forme tr\u00e8s importante avec America Invents Act\u00a02011, \u00e9galement appel\u00e9 Leahy\u2013Smith America Invents Act (AIA), qui consacre le passage du syst\u00e8me du premier inventeur \u00e0 celui de l\u2019inventeur premier d\u00e9posant. Cette r\u00e9forme simplifie tout un pan du droit des brevets, en entra\u00eenant la suppression des proc\u00e9dures et litiges li\u00e9s aux conflits d\u2019ant\u00e9riorit\u00e9 associ\u00e9s au syst\u00e8me du premier inventeur (notamment les proc\u00e9dures complexes dites d\u2019<em>interference<\/em> devant l\u2019USPTO). La d\u00e9finition des ant\u00e9riorit\u00e9s (qui prenait en compte la date de d\u00e9p\u00f4t, mais \u00e9galement la date de l\u2019invention) est ajust\u00e9e en fonction.\r\n\r\nLes dispositions de l\u2019AIA s\u2019appliquent \u00e0 compter du 17 mars 2013. Sauf indication contraire, les r\u00e8gles d\u00e9crites dans ce qui suit sont celles qui s\u2019appliquent aux d\u00e9p\u00f4ts effectu\u00e9s post\u00e9rieurement \u00e0 l\u2019entr\u00e9e en vigueur de l\u2019AIA.\r\n<h3><strong>A. Les conditions de fond<\/strong><\/h3>\r\n<strong>358._ L\u2019invention brevetable_<\/strong> Aucune d\u00e9finition de l\u2019invention n\u2019est donn\u00e9e dans le Patent Act[footnote]\u00ab Invention \u00bb est d\u00e9finie au paragraphe 100 comme signifiant \u00ab une invention ou une d\u00e9couverte \u00bb.[\/footnote]. Cependant la loi d\u00e9finit les cat\u00e9gories d\u2019invention prot\u00e9g\u00e9es au paragraphe 101, qui dispose :\r\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\r\n\r\n\u00ab Toute personne qui invente ou d\u00e9couvre un proc\u00e9d\u00e9, une machine, une fabrication ou une composition de mati\u00e8res nouveaux et utiles, ou toute am\u00e9lioration nouvelle et utile de ces \u00e9l\u00e9ments, peut obtenir un brevet, sous r\u00e9serve des conditions et exigences du pr\u00e9sent ce titre \u00bb[footnote]\u00ab whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof\u2026 \u00bb.[\/footnote]\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\nCette disposition est interpr\u00e9t\u00e9e par les tribunaux comme imposant quatre conditions : (i) une condition d'unicit\u00e9 du brevet (un seul brevet peut \u00eatre obtenu pour une invention);\u00a0 ii) une condition d'identification de l'inventeur ou des inventeurs (les inventeurs doivent \u00eatre identifi\u00e9s dans une demande d\u00e9pos\u00e9e \u00e0 compter du 16 septembre 2012, ou doivent \u00eatre le demandeur dans des demandes d\u00e9pos\u00e9es avant le 16 septembre 2012); iii) l'inclusion dans une cat\u00e9gorie d'invention brevetable; et iv) l'utilit\u00e9 (invention revendiqu\u00e9e doit \u00eatre utile).\r\n\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<strong>359._ Les cat\u00e9gories d'inventions_ <\/strong>La section 101 d\u00e9finit quatre cat\u00e9gories d\u2019inven\u00adtions : les inventions de proc\u00e9d\u00e9s, tout d\u2019abord, et trois cat\u00e9gories d'inventions de produits, ensuite : les machines, les produits fabriqu\u00e9s et les compositions de mati\u00e8re. La section 100(b) d\u00e9finit plus avant les proc\u00e9d\u00e9s comme: \u00ab les processus, arts et m\u00e9thodes, incluant les nouvelles utilisations d'un proc\u00e9d\u00e9, d\u2019une machine, d\u2019une fabrication, d\u2019une composition de la mati\u00e8re, ou d\u2019un mat\u00e9riau connus \u00bb.\r\n\r\nDans son arr\u00eat <em>Diamond v. Chakrabarty<\/em>, la Cour supr\u00eame a relev\u00e9 qu' \u00ab en choisissant des termes aussi larges que \u201cfabrication\u201d et \u201ccomposition de mati\u00e8re\u201d, associ\u00e9s \u00e0 un large \u201ctout\u201d (any), le Congr\u00e8s a clairement consid\u00e9r\u00e9 que le droit des brevets doit avoir un champ large. Les travaux pr\u00e9paratoires confirment \u00e9galement une interpr\u00e9tation large \u00bb.[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/447\/303\/\">Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980)<\/a> \u00e0 308-309.[\/footnote]\r\n\r\nA cette occasion, elle a repris \u00e0 son compte l\u2019affirmation faite lors des travaux pr\u00e9paratoires du Patent Act 1952, et d\u00e9sormais devenue c\u00e9l\u00e8bre, selon laquelle le champ de la brevetabilit\u00e9 ainsi d\u00e9fini inclut \u00ab\u00a0tout ce qui a \u00e9t\u00e9 fait par l\u2019homme\u00a0\u00bb <em>(\u00ab <\/em>anything under the sun that is made by man<em>\u00a0\u00bb)<\/em>[footnote]\u00ab\u00a0<em>T<\/em>he Committee Reports accompanying the 1952 Act inform us that Congress intended statutory subject matter to \"include anything under the sun that is made by man\u00a0\u00bb. S. Rep. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1952); H. R. Rep. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1952).[\/footnote].\r\n\r\nCette formule ne doit cependant pas faire oublier que la loi ne vise que certaines cat\u00e9gories d'inventions limitativement \u00e9num\u00e9r\u00e9es, de sorte qu'une invention non r\u00e9ductible \u00e0 l'une d'entre elle n'est pas \u00e9ligible \u00e0 la protection[footnote]<a style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/in-re-nuijten\"><em>In re<\/em> Nuijten<\/a><span style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\">, 500 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007) : \u201cthe four categories together describe the exclusive reach of patentable subject matter. If a claim covers material not found in any of the four statutory categories, that claim falls outside the plainly expressed scope of \u00a7 101 even if the subject matter is otherwise new and useful\".<\/span>[\/footnote].\r\n\r\nLa section 101 vise tout d'abord les \"proc\u00e9d\u00e9s\" (ici synonymes de \"m\u00e9thodes\"), d\u00e9finis par la Cour supr\u00eame comme \"un mode de traitement de certains mat\u00e9riaux pour obtenir un r\u00e9sultat donn\u00e9. Il s'agit d'une action, ou d'une s\u00e9rie d'actions, ex\u00e9cut\u00e9es sur un objet afin de le transformer ou de le r\u00e9duire \u00e0 un \u00e9tat ou une chose diff\u00e9rents\"[footnote]\"a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a given result. It is an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a different state or thing.\" <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/409\/63\/\">Gottschalk v. Benson<\/a>, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972) (citant <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/94\/780\/\">Cochrane v. Deener<\/a>, 94 U.S. 780 (1876)). Egalement <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/in-re-nuijten\">In Re Nuijten<\/a>, 500 F.3d \u00e0 1355 (\"The Supreme Court and this court have consistently interpreted the statutory term \u2018process\u2019 to require action\"); <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/ntp-inc-v-research-in-motion-ltd-4\">NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd.<\/a>, 418 F.3d 1282, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (\"[A] process is a series of acts.\").[\/footnote]. Suivent les \"machines\", \"produits fabriqu\u00e9s\" (manufactures) et \"compositions de mati\u00e8re\", qui doivent exister sous une forme tangible[footnote]<a style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\" href=\"https:\/\/www.bitlaw.com\/source\/cases\/patent\/Digitech.html#:~:text=3d%201344,-All%20Patent%20Cases&amp;text=The%20apparatus%20claims%20covered%20%22device,as%20non%2Dstatutory%20under%20Nuitjen.\">Digitech Image Techs. v. Electronics for Imaging<\/a><span style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\">, 758 F.3d 1344, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (\"For all categories except process claims, the eligible subject matter must exist in some physical or tangible form\").[\/footnote]. Une machine est d\u00e9finie comme \"une chose concr\u00e8te, constitu\u00e9es de parties, ou de certains dispositifs ou combinaisons de dispositifs\"[footnote]\"a concrete thing, consisting of parts, or of certain devices and combination of devices.\" <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bitlaw.com\/source\/cases\/patent\/Digitech.html#:~:text=3d%201344,-All%20Patent%20Cases&amp;text=The%20apparatus%20claims%20covered%20%22device,as%20non%2Dstatutory%20under%20Nuitjen.\">Digitech<\/a>, 758 F.3d \u00e0 1348-49\u00a0 (citant <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/68\/531\/\">Burr v. Duryee<\/a>, 68 U.S. 531, 570, (1863).[\/footnote], et inclut \"tout dispositif m\u00e9canique ou toute combinaison de puissances et de dispositifs m\u00e9caniques pour ex\u00e9cuter certaines fonctions et produire un certain effet ou r\u00e9sultat\"[footnote]\"every mechanical device or combination of mechanical powers and devices to perform some function and produce a certain effect or result.\" <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/68\/531\/\">In Re Nuijten<\/a>, pr\u00e9cit\u00e9 (citant <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/56\/252\/\">Corning v. Burden<\/a>, 56 U.S. 252, 267 (1854)). [\/footnote].\u00a0 Les produits fabriqu\u00e9s d\u00e9signent \"un article tangible auquel est donn\u00e9 une nouvelle forme, qualit\u00e9, propri\u00e9t\u00e9, ou combinaison au travers de moyens humains ou artificiels\"[footnote]\"a tangible article that is given a new form, quality, property, or combination through man-made or artificial means.\" <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bitlaw.com\/source\/cases\/patent\/Digitech.html#:~:text=3d%201344,-All%20Patent%20Cases&amp;text=The%20apparatus%20claims%20covered%20%22device,as%20non%2Dstatutory%20under%20Nuitjen.\">Digitech<\/a>, pr\u00e9cit\u00e9 (citant Diamond v. Chakrabarty). Les produits fabriqu\u00e9s incluent \u00e9galement les pi\u00e8ces d'une machine prises s\u00e9par\u00e9ment de la machine: <\/span><a style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/samsung-elecs-co-v-apple-inc\">Samsung Electronics Co. v. Apple Inc.<\/a><span style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\">, 137 S. Ct. 429, 120\u00a0 (2016).[\/footnote]. Une composition de mati\u00e8re est \"une combinaison de deux substances ou plus et inclut tous les articles composites\"[footnote]\"a combination of two or more substances and includes all composite articles.\" <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bitlaw.com\/source\/cases\/patent\/Digitech.html#:~:text=3d%201344,-All%20Patent%20Cases&amp;text=The%20apparatus%20claims%20covered%20%22device,as%20non%2Dstatutory%20under%20Nuitjen.\">Digitech<\/a>, pr\u00e9cit\u00e9. La cat\u00e9gorie comprend toutes les compositions de plus de deux substances, \"'whether they be the results of chemical union or of mechanical mixture, or whether they be gases, fluids, powders or solids.\" <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/447\/303\/\">Chakrabarty<\/a>, pr\u00e9cit\u00e9.[\/footnote]. <\/span>\r\n\r\n<span style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\">Ne rentrent pas dans ces cat\u00e9gories par exemple, un signal \u00e9lectrique ou \u00e9lectromagn\u00e9tique propagateur en tant que tel[footnote]<\/span><a style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/in-re-nuijten\"><em>In re<\/em> Nuijten<\/a><span style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\">, pr\u00e9cit\u00e9.[\/footnote], un contrat[footnote]<\/span><a style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/in-re-ferguson-4?q=In%20re%20Ferguson&amp;sort=relevance&amp;p=1&amp;type=case\"><em>In re<\/em> Ferguson<\/a><span style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\">, 558 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (cert. denied).[\/footnote], une soci\u00e9t\u00e9[footnote]<\/span><em style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\">Ibid.<\/em><span style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\">[\/footnote], un arrangement typographique[footnote]<\/span><a style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\" href=\"https:\/\/law.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/appellate-courts\/F2\/418\/1392\/295156\/\"><em>In re Miller<\/em><\/a><em style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\">,<\/em><span style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\"> 418 F.2d 1392, 1396 (CCPA 1969).[\/footnote], un logiciel exprim\u00e9 sous forme de code ou d'instructions d\u00e9tach\u00e9es de tout support[footnote]assimilable \u00e0 une id\u00e9e sans incarnation physique, V. <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/550\/437\/\">Microsoft Corp. v. AT&amp;T Corp.<\/a>, 550 U.S. 437, 449;\u00a0 \u00e9galement <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/409\/63\/\">Gottschalk v. Benson<\/a>, 409 U.S. 67 (une id\u00e9e n'est pas brevetable).[\/footnote], ou encore des donn\u00e9es en tant que telles[footnote]<\/span><a style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\" href=\"https:\/\/www.bitlaw.com\/source\/cases\/patent\/Digitech.html\">Digitech<\/a><span style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\">, pr\u00e9cit\u00e9.[\/footnote]. La Cour Supr\u00eame a \u00e9galement confirm\u00e9 que le langage de la section 101 ne permet pas de couvrir notamment les lois de la nature, les ph\u00e9nom\u00e8nes physiques et les id\u00e9es abstraites[footnote]V. <em>infra<\/em>, n\u00b0364.[\/footnote].<\/span>\r\n\r\nPr\u00e9cisons que la loi n\u2019exige pas que le d\u00e9posant identifie une de ces cat\u00e9gories dans sa demande, ou la bonne cat\u00e9gorie, si l\u2019invention revendiqu\u00e9e rel\u00e8ve clairement de l\u2019une d\u2019entre elles. Par ailleurs, une invention peut relever de plusieurs cat\u00e9gories.\r\n\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<strong>360._ La distinction inventions \/ d\u00e9couvertes_<\/strong> Aux \u00c9tats-Unis comme ailleurs, les d\u00e9couvertes en tant que telles ne sont pas brevetables. Ce principe a \u00e9t\u00e9 r\u00e9affirm\u00e9 \u00e0 plusieurs reprises par la Cour supr\u00eame[footnote]V. notamment l\u2019arr\u00eat Chakrabarty: <em>\u00ab<\/em>\u00a0a new mineral discovered in the earth or a new plant found in the wild is not patentable subject matter. Likewise, Einstein could not patent his celebrated law that E=mc2; nor could Newton have patented the law of gravity<em>.\u00a0\u00bb<\/em> (447 U.S. \u00e0 309, 206 USPQ, point 197); <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/437\/584\/\"><em>Parker<\/em> v. <\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/437\/584\/\"><em>Flook<\/em><\/a><em>,<\/em> 437 U.S. 584 (1978) \u00e0 585 (formule math\u00e9matique, m\u00eame nouvelle et utile); <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/56\/62\/\">O\u2019Reilly v. Morse<\/a>, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 113-114 (1853) (citant l\u2019\u00e9lectromagn\u00e9tisme ou la puissance vapeur); <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/333\/127\/\">Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.<\/a>, 333 U.S. 127 (1948) (citant les qualit\u00e9s d\u2019une bact\u00e9rie, la chaleur du soleil, l\u2019\u00e9lectricit\u00e9 ou les propri\u00e9t\u00e9s de m\u00e9taux).[\/footnote]. Cependant, il est constant qu\u2019un produit de la nature, modifi\u00e9 par l\u2019intervention humaine, et d\u00e8s lors inexistant sous cette forme \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9tat de nature, constitue une invention. La Cour supr\u00eame l\u2019a confirm\u00e9 dans son arr\u00eat <em>Chakrabarty<\/em> pr\u00e9cit\u00e9, en s'appuyant notamment les travaux pr\u00e9paratoires du Plant Patent Act de 1930 :\r\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\r\n\r\n\u00ab le Congr\u00e8s a reconnu que la distinction pertinente n\u2019est pas entre les choses vivantes et inanim\u00e9es, mais entre les produits de la nature, qu\u2019ils soient ou non vivants, et les inventions de l\u2019homme. Dans le cas pr\u00e9sent, le microorganisme du d\u00e9fendeur est le r\u00e9sultat de l\u2019ing\u00e9niosit\u00e9 et de la recherche humaines \u00bb.[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/447\/303\/\">Diamond v. <\/a><span style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\"><a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/447\/303\/\">Chakrabarty<\/a>, 447 U.S. 303: \"In enacting the Plant Patent Act, Congress addressed both of these concerns. It explained at length its belief that the work of the plant breeder \"in aid of nature\" was patentable invention. S.Rep. No. 315, 71st Cong., 2d Sess., 8 (1930); H.R.Rep. No. 1129, 71st Cong., 2d Sess., 7-9 (1930). And it relaxed the written description requirement in favor of \"a description . . . as complete as is reasonably possible.\" 35 U.S.C. \u00a7 162. No Committee or Member of Congress, however, expressed the broader view, now urged by the petitioner, that the terms \"manufacture\" or \"composition of matter\" exclude living things. The sole support for that position in the legislative history of the 1930 Act is found in the conclusory statement of Secretary of Agriculture Hyde, in a letter to the Chairmen of the House and Senate Committees considering the 1930 Act, that \"the patent laws . . . at the present time are understood to cover only inventions or discoveries in the field of inanimate nature.\" See S.Rep. No. 315, supra at Appendix A; H.R.Rep. No. 1129, supra at Appendix A. Secretary Hyde's opinion, however, is not entitled to controlling weight. His views were solicited on the administration of the new law. and not on the scope of patentable subject matter -- an area beyond his competence. Moreover, there is language in the House and Senate Committee Reports suggesting that, to the extent Congress considered the matter, it found the Secretary's dichotomy unpersuasive. The Reports observe: \"There is a clear and logical distinction between the discovery of a new variety of plant and of certain inanimate things, such, for example, as a new and useful natural mineral. The mineral is created wholly by nature unassisted by man. . . . On the other hand, a plant discovery resulting from cultivation is unique, isolated, and is not repeated by nature, nor can it be reproduced by nature unaided by man. . . .\"\u00a0 S.Rep. No. 315, supra at 6; H.R.Rep. No. 1129, supra at 7 (emphasis added). Congress thus recognized that the relevant distinction was not between living and inanimate things, but between products of nature, whether living or not, and human-made inventions. Here, respondent's micro-organism is the result of human ingenuity and research. Hence, the passage of the Plant Patent Act affords the Government no support\".[\/footnote].<\/span>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\nDans <em>In re Roslin Institute (Edinburgh)<\/em>[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/in-re-institution\"><em>In re <\/em>Roslin Institute (Edinburgh)<\/a>, 750 F.3d 1333, 1336, 110 USPQ2d 1668, 1671 (Fed. Cir. 2014).[\/footnote], la Cour d\u2019appel pour le Circuit F\u00e9d\u00e9ral, citant <em>Chakrabarty<\/em>, a pr\u00e9cis\u00e9 que \u00ab des d\u00e9couvertes qui poss\u00e8dent des caract\u00e9ristiques fortement diff\u00e9rentes de celles trouv\u00e9es dans la nature (\u2026) sont \u00e9ligibles \u00e0 la protection par brevet \u00bb. En l\u2019esp\u00e8ce, l\u2019invention consistait dans le clone d\u2019un mammif\u00e8re pr\u00e9existant s\u00e9lectionn\u00e9 consistant dans du b\u00e9tail, des moutons, des cochons et des ch\u00e8vres. L\u2019invention incluait la fameuse brebis Dolly. La Cour a rejet\u00e9 le demande au motif que \u00ab Dolly elle-m\u00eame est une r\u00e9plique g\u00e9n\u00e9tique exacte d\u2019un autre mouton et ne poss\u00e8de pas des caract\u00e9ristiques nettement diff\u00e9rentes de tout animal pr\u00e9sent dans la nature \u00bb.\r\n\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<strong>361._ La quasi-absence d\u2019exclusions expresses du champ de la brevetabilit\u00e9<\/strong>_ Le Patent Act contient deux exclusions expresses du champ de la brevetabilit\u00e9. La premi\u00e8re concerne les inventions applicables exclusivement \u00e0 des armes nucl\u00e9aires[footnote]42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2181(a) <em>\u00ab\u00a0<\/em>No patent shall hereafter be granted for any invention or discovery which is useful solely in the utilization of special nuclear material or atomic energy in an atomic weapon. Any patent granted for any such invention or discovery is revoked, and just compensation shall be made therefor.<em>\u00a0\u00bb <\/em>Les termes \"atomic energy\" et \"special nuclear material\" sont d\u00e9finis \u00e0 la section 11 de cette loi (42 U.S.C. 2014).[\/footnote]. La seconde, introduite par le Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA)[footnote]Public Law 112-29.[\/footnote], les organismes humains.\r\n\r\nAu-del\u00e0 de ces exceptions, la loi ne contient pas d\u2019exclusions similaires \u00e0 celles pr\u00e9vues par la Convention de Munich, ni m\u00eame une disposition excluant de mani\u00e8re g\u00e9n\u00e9rale les inventions contraires \u00e0 l\u2019ordre public.\r\n\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<strong>362._ L'exclusion l\u00e9gale concernant les organismes humains_<\/strong>\u00a0<span style=\"font-size: 1em;\">\u00a0La section 33(a) de l\u2019AIA dispose\u00a0: \u00a0\u00a0\u00ab\u00a0Nonobstant toute autre disposition de la loi, aucun brevet ne peut \u00eatre d\u00e9livr\u00e9 sur la base d\u2019une revendication portant sur un organisme humain ou englobant un tel organisme \u00bb[footnote]\u00ab\u00a0<\/span>Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no patent may issue on a claim directed to or encompassing a human organism\u00a0<em style=\"font-size: 1em;\">\u00bb.<\/em><span style=\"font-size: 1em;\">[\/footnote]. <\/span><span style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\">Cette exclusion codifie en r\u00e9alit\u00e9 l\u2019exclusion d\u00e9gag\u00e9e spontan\u00e9ment (c\u2019est-\u00e0-dire en dehors de toute tentative d\u2019obtenir un brevet sur ce point) par l\u2019USPTO et les tribunaux[footnote]V. <\/span>Animals Patentability, 1077 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 24 (April 21, 1987), qui indiquait d\u00e9j\u00e0 l'impossibilit\u00e9 de breveter des organismes humains. Selon le MPEP, section 2105: Patent Eligible Subject Matter \u2014 Living Subject Matter [R-10.2019]:\u201cIf the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claimed invention as a whole encompasses a human organism, then a rejection under 35 U.S.C. 101 and AIA sec. 33(a) must be made indicating that the claimed invention is directed to a human organism and is therefore nonstatutory subject matter. Furthermore, the claimed invention must be examined with regard to all issues pertinent to patentability, and any applicable rejections under 35 U.S.C. 102, 103, or 112 must also be made\u201d.[\/footnote].\r\n\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<strong>363._ L'ordre public et les bonnes moeurs_ <\/strong>L\u2019ordre public, incluant le caract\u00e8re immoral ou illicite de l\u2019invention, n\u2019est pas un motif d\u2019exclusion du domaine de la brevetabilit\u00e9. Le principe a \u00e9t\u00e9 r\u00e9affirm\u00e9 par le Circuit f\u00e9d\u00e9ral en 1999 dans une affaire mettant en cause une invention susceptible de tromper le consommateur[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/law.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/appellate-courts\/F3\/185\/1364\/609214\/\">Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc.<\/a>, 185 F.3d 1364, 1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 1999): \"The invention claimed in the '405 patent is a post-mix beverage dispenser that is designed to look like a pre-mix beverage dispenser. The claims require the post-mix dispenser to have a transparent bowl that is filled with a fluid that simulates the appearance of the dispensed beverage and is resistant to bacterial growth. The claims also require that the dispenser create the visual impression that the bowl is the principal source of the dispensed beverage, although in fact the beverage is mixed immediately before it is dispensed, as in conventional post-mix dispensers.. The district court in this case held a patent invalid for lack of utility on the ground that the patented invention was designed to deceive customers by imitating another product and thereby increasing sales of a particular good. We reverse and remand. (...) Of course, Congress is free to declare particular types of inventions unpatentable for a variety of reasons, including deceptiveness. Cf. 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2181(a) (exempting from patent protection inventions useful solely in connection with special nuclear material or atomic weapons). Until such time as Congress does so, however, we find no basis in section 101 to hold that inventions can be ruled unpatentable for lack of utility simply because they have the capacity to fool some members of the public.<em>\" <\/em>Le MPEP n\u2019aborde pas la question de la lic\u00e9it\u00e9 des inventions ou de leur application.[\/footnote]. Le consensus semble \u00eatre que, dans la mesure o\u00f9, aux termes du Patent Act (35 U.S.C. \u00a7 154(a)(1)), le droit de brevet est un droit d\u2019exclusion, il n\u2019autorise aucune activit\u00e9 contraire \u00e0 la loi. Il reste \u00e0 d\u00e9terminer si, dans des cas extr\u00eames, une exception d'ordre public ne pourrait pas s'appliquer.\r\n\r\nOn notera que l\u2019USPTO accorde des brevets sur des inventions relatives au cannabis ou \u00e0 d\u2019autres produits stup\u00e9fiants, y compris lorsqu\u2019ils sont totalement illicites dans certains \u00c9tats.\r\n\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<strong>364._ Les cat\u00e9gories exclues par la jurisprudence : lois de la nature, ph\u00e9nom\u00e8nes naturels, id\u00e9es abstraites_<\/strong> Comme indiqu\u00e9, la jurisprudence exclut du champ de la brevetabilit\u00e9 les id\u00e9es abstraites (et notamment les formules et algorithmes math\u00e9matiques), les ph\u00e9nom\u00e8nes naturels et les lois de la nature[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/450\/175\/\">Diamond v. Diehr<\/a>, 450 U.S. 175 (1981) \u00e0 185; <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/447\/303\/\">Diamond v. Chakrabarty<\/a>, 447 U.S. 303 (1980), \u00e0 309; <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/437\/584\/\">Parker v. Flook<\/a>, 437 U.S. 584, 589, 198 USPQ 193, 197 (1978); <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/409\/63\/\">Gottschalk v. Benson<\/a>, 409 U.S. 63 (1972), \u00e0 67-68; <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/333\/127\/\">Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.<\/a>, 333 U.S. 127 (1948) \u00e0 130; <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/55\/156\/\">Le Roy v. Tatham<\/a>, 55 U.S. 156 (1852), \u00e0 175.[\/footnote]. De m\u00eame, les proc\u00e9d\u00e9s impliquant des \u00e9tapes de raisonnement (<em>mental steps<\/em>) ne peuvent \u00eatre brevet\u00e9s si ces \u00e9tapes exigent un jugement de nature esth\u00e9tique ou pr\u00e9sentant un caract\u00e8re subjectif[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/application-of-musgrave\"><em>In re<\/em> Musgrave<\/a>, 431 F.2d 882 (CCPA 1970) (les proc\u00e9d\u00e9s impliquant des <em>mental steps<\/em> ne sont pas en eux-m\u00eames exclus de la brevetabilit\u00e9); mais dans un sens beaucoup plus restrictif, voir <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/in-re-comiskey-2\"><em>In re<\/em> Comiskey<\/a>, 499 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (exclusion d\u2019une m\u00e9thode d\u2019arbitrage\u00a0: \u00abmental processes \u2013 or processes of human thinking \u2013 standing alone are not patentable even if they have pratical application\u00a0\u00bb).[\/footnote]. Cependant, aux \u00c9tats-Unis comme ailleurs, les m\u00e9thodes et produits utilisant des id\u00e9es abstraites, ph\u00e9nom\u00e8nes naturels et des lois de la nature \u00e0 des fins d\u2019application pratique peuvent \u00eatre brevet\u00e9s s\u2019ils satisfont par ailleurs aux crit\u00e8res de la brevetabilit\u00e9.\r\n\r\nLa Cour Supr\u00eame est largement revenue sur ces points dans ses arr\u00eats Mayo[footnote] <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/566\/66\/#opinions\">Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.<\/a>, 566 U.S. 66 (2012).[\/footnote] et Alice[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/573\/208\/#opinions\">Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International<\/a>, 573 U.S. 208 (2014).[\/footnote], r\u00e9guli\u00e8rement cit\u00e9s sur le sujet, et dont il sera question plus loin. Le premier concernait l'exclusion des lois ou produits de la nature, \u00e0 propos d'une invention dans le domaine m\u00e9docal[footnote]Plus pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment, une m\u00e9thode permettant d'optimiser le traitement de patients atteints de maladies auto-immunes en d\u00e9terminant si une dose de m\u00e9dicaments \u00e0 base de thiopurine est trop faible ou trop \u00e9lev\u00e9e, en s'appuyant sur la <span style=\"font-size: 1em;\">corr\u00e9lation des m\u00e9tabolites du m\u00e9dicament dans le corps pour d\u00e9terminer l'efficacit\u00e9 ou la toxicit\u00e9 du m\u00e9dicament<\/span><span style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\">. La Cour supr\u00eame avait consid\u00e9r\u00e9 que la m\u00e9thode revendiqu\u00e9e ne faisait que r\u00e9citer une loi de la nature<\/span>.[\/footnote]<span style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\">; le second l'exclusion des id\u00e9es abstraites, \u00e0 propos d'une invention mise en \u0153uvre par ordinateur[footnote]En l'esp\u00e8ce, u<\/span>ne m\u00e9thode mise en \u0153uvre par ordinateur pour att\u00e9nuer le \u00ab risque de r\u00e8glement \u00bb (risque qu'une seule partie \u00e0 une transaction financi\u00e8re paie ce qu'elle doit) en utilisant un interm\u00e9diaire tiers.[\/footnote]<span style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\">. La Cour supr\u00eame y pose comme principe que les tribunaux doivent, dans l\u2019appr\u00e9ciation du caract\u00e8re brevetable de l\u2019invention, appliquer une analyse en deux \u00e9tapes, consistant: (a) tout d'abord, \u00e0 d\u00e9terminer si les revendications portent sur une loi de la nature, un ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne naturel ou une id\u00e9e abstraite (exception pr\u00e9torienne, \u00ab <em>judicial exception<\/em> \u00bb), et (b) dans ce cas, \u00e0 d\u00e9terminer si les revendications comprennent un concept inventif, c\u2019est-\u00e0-dire des \u00e9l\u00e9ments allant suffisamment au-del\u00e0 de l\u2019exception pr\u00e9torienne.<\/span>\r\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\r\n<p style=\"text-align: center;\"><strong>Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, 573 U.S. 208 (2014) (r\u00e9f. omises).<\/strong><\/p>\r\n\u201cDans Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., nous avons \u00e9tabli un cadre permettant de distinguer les brevets qui revendiquent des lois de la nature, des ph\u00e9nom\u00e8nes naturels et des id\u00e9es abstraites de ceux qui revendiquent des applications de ces concepts.\r\n\r\nPremi\u00e8rement, nous d\u00e9terminons si les revendications en cause se rapportent \u00e0 l'un de ces concepts non brevetables. Si c'est le cas, nous nous demandons alors : \u00ab Qu'y a-t-il d'autre dans les revendications dont nous sommes saisis ? \u00bb\u00a0 Pour r\u00e9pondre \u00e0 cette question, nous examinons les \u00e9l\u00e9ments de chaque revendication \u00e0 la fois individuellement et \u00ab en tant que combinaison ordonn\u00e9e \u00bb afin de d\u00e9terminer si les \u00e9l\u00e9ments suppl\u00e9mentaires \u00ab transforment la nature de la revendication \u00bb en une demande brevetable.\r\n\r\nNous avons d\u00e9crit la deuxi\u00e8me \u00e9tape de cette analyse comme \u00e9tant la recherche d'un \u00ab \u00ab concept inventif \u00bb \u00bb, c'est-\u00e0-dire d'un \u00e9l\u00e9ment ou d'une combinaison d'\u00e9l\u00e9ments qui est \u00ab suffisant pour garantir que le brevet \u00e9quivaut en pratique \u00e0 beaucoup plus qu'un brevet sur le [concept non brevetable] lui-m\u00eame \u00bb[footnote]\"In Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U. S. ___ (2012), we set forth a framework for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts. First, we determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 8). If so, we then ask, \u201c[w]hat else is there in the claims before us?\u201d Id., at ___ (slip op., at 9). To answer that question, we consider the elements of each claim both individually and \u201cas an ordered combination\u201d to determine whether the additional elements \u201ctransform the nature of the claim\u201d into a patent-eligible application. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 10, 9). We have described step two of this analysis as a search for an \u201c \u2018inventive concept\u2019 \u201d\u2014i.e., an element or combination of elements that is \u201csufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.\u201d Id., at ___ (slip op., at 3)\". Alice, 573 U.S., para. 217-18.[\/footnote].\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<strong>365._ Les guides et exemples de l\u2019USPTO sur les inventions brevetables_<\/strong> L'USPTO a publi\u00e9 plusieurs guides sur la brevetabilit\u00e9, de port\u00e9e g\u00e9n\u00e9rale ou consacr\u00e9s \u00e0 certaines cat\u00e9gories d'inventions[footnote]Le dernier en date est le <a href=\"https:\/\/www.federalregister.gov\/documents\/2024\/07\/17\/2024-15377\/2024-guidance-update-on-patent-subject-matter-eligibility-including-on-artificial-intelligence\">2024 Guidance Update on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility, Including on Artificial Intelligence<\/a>. On soulignera que ces guides, comme le MPEP, ne lient pas le Circuit f\u00e9d\u00e9ral. In re Rudy, 956 F.3d 1379, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2020); Cleveland Clinic Found. v. True Health Diagnostics LLC, 760 F. App\u2019x. 1013, 1020 (Fed. Cir. 2019)).[\/footnote]. Ces guides ont \u00e9t\u00e9 incorpor\u00e9s dans le MPEP[footnote]\u00a7 2103-2106.07(c).[\/footnote], qui combine les indications et crit\u00e8res d\u00e9gag\u00e9s par la Cour supr\u00eame dans la d\u00e9termination de la brevetabilit\u00e9 dans deux sch\u00e9mas, applicables \u00e0 toutes les cat\u00e9gories d'invention brevetables et \u00e0 toutes les exclusions de la brevetabilit\u00e9. Ces sch\u00e9mas repr\u00e9sentent les 2 \u00e9tapes du raisonnement applicable.\r\n\r\n<img class=\"size-full wp-image-292 aligncenter\" src=\"https:\/\/www.droitangloamericaindespi.com\/brevets\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/3\/2024\/10\/Image1.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"645\" height=\"930\" \/>\r\n\r\nLa premi\u00e8re \u00e9tape concerne la d\u00e9termination de l'appartenance \u00e0 l'une des quatre cat\u00e9gories vis\u00e9es \u00e0 la section 101 du Patent Act. L'\u00e9tape 2 reprend l'analyse en deux temps de la Cour supr\u00eame (\"<em>Alice\/Mayo\"<\/em>), permettant d'identifier les revendications couvertes par une exclusion de la brevetabilit\u00e9, puis d'\u00e9valuer si des \u00e9l\u00e9ments suppl\u00e9mentaires dans la revendication rel\u00e8vent d'un concept inventif.\r\n\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<img class=\"size-full wp-image-285 aligncenter\" src=\"https:\/\/www.droitangloamericaindespi.com\/brevets\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/3\/2024\/10\/Image2.png\" alt=\"\" width=\"577\" height=\"446\" \/>\r\n\r\nL'USPTO a \u00e9galement publi\u00e9 plusieurs guides contenant des exemples d'application de ces principes, con\u00e7u comme des outils de formation destin\u00e9s aux examinateurs et au public[footnote]Site USPTO: <a href=\"https:\/\/www.uspto.gov\/patents\/laws\/examination-policy\/subject-matter-eligibility\">Subject matter eligibility<\/a>.[\/footnote]. Ces guides portent actuellement sur 49 exemples d'inventions, qui couvrent un spectre tr\u00e8s large, r\u00e9cemment \u00e9largi aux inventions dans le domaine de l'intelligence artificielle (exemples 47 \u00e0 49)[footnote]La liste comprend: Removing Malicious Code from Email; Generating a Composite Webpage; Digital Image Processing (RCT); Global Positioning System; Digital Image Processing (Digitech); Game of Bingo; E-Commerce transactions; Distribution of Products over the Internet; Gunpowder &amp; Fireworks; Pomelo Juice; Amazonic Acid Purified Proteins; Genetically Modified Bacterium; Bacterial Mixtures; Nucleic Acids Antibodies; Cells; Food; Hip Prosthesis; Robotic Arm Assembly; Transmission of Stock Quote Data; GUI for Meal Planning; GUI for Relocating Obscured Text; Updating Alarm Limits; Rubber Manufacturing; Internal Combustion Engine; BIOS System Software; Vaccines; Diagnosing and Treating Julitis; Dietary Sweeteners; Screening of Gene Alterations; Paper-making Machine; Hydrolysis of Fat; Filtering Internet Content; ATM Transactions; Tracking Inventory; Relocation of Icons on GUI; Simulating an Analog Audio Mixer; Facial Recognition; Network Traffic Monitoring; Cryptographic Communications; Medical Record Updates; Treating Kidney Disease; Denveric Acid; Controller for Injection Mold; Livestock Management; Training a Neural Network to Predict Anomalies; Speech Separation; Fibrosis Treatment.[\/footnote].\r\n\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<strong>366._Le vivant et les biotechnologies_<\/strong> Le Patent Act ne connait aucune exclusion relative \u00e0 la brevetabilit\u00e9 du vivant, \u00e0 l\u2019exception notable de celle introduite par le Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA) concernant les organismes humains[footnote]V. <em>supra, <\/em>n\u00b0361.[\/footnote]. Il ne connait pas non plus d\u2019exclusions en mati\u00e8re de biotechnologie. Les seules limites en la mati\u00e8re sont li\u00e9es \u00e0 l\u2019exclusion des d\u00e9couvertes et aux crit\u00e8res de brevetabilit\u00e9.\r\n\r\nLa Cour supr\u00eame a consacr\u00e9 ces principes en 1980 dans sa d\u00e9cision <em>Chakrabarty <\/em>pr\u00e9cit\u00e9e[footnote]447 U.S. 303 (1980).[\/footnote], \u00e0 propos d\u2019une invention consistant dans un proc\u00e9d\u00e9 permettant de transf\u00e9rer certains plasmides dans une bact\u00e9rie lui permettant d\u00e9grader le p\u00e9trole. Le Patent office avait accept\u00e9 la demande de brevet de proc\u00e9d\u00e9s[footnote]Des brevets avaient d\u00e9j\u00e0 \u00e9t\u00e9 accord\u00e9s pour des proc\u00e9d\u00e9s utilisant de la mati\u00e8re vivante. V. par exemple <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/application-of-mancy\"><em>In re<\/em> Mancy<\/a>, 499 F.2d 1289 (CCPA 1974).[\/footnote] mais avait rejet\u00e9 la demande portant sur la bact\u00e9rie ainsi modifi\u00e9e. La Cour supr\u00eame confirme que la bact\u00e9rie ne constitue pas une d\u00e9couverte, mais bien une invention de l\u2019homme, et que la loi ne pr\u00e9voit aucune exclusion pour la mati\u00e8re vivante. L\u2019argument tir\u00e9 de la protection sp\u00e9cifique et pr\u00e9tendument exclusive du vivant par le <em>plant patent<\/em> est \u00e9galement rejet\u00e9.\r\n\r\nEn avril 1987, dans l\u2019affaire <em>Ex parte Allen[footnote]Ex Parte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1425 (BPAI 1987), aff\u2019d, <\/em><a href=\"https:\/\/law.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/appellate-courts\/F2\/846\/77\/397098\/\"><em>846 F.2d 877<\/em><\/a><em> (Fed. Cir. 1988).[\/footnote]<\/em>, le Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences confirmera la possibilit\u00e9 de breveter des animaux non humains multicellulaires[footnote]L\u2019affaire portait sur une huitre g\u00e9n\u00e9tiquement modif\u00e9e. Le brevet sera refus\u00e9 pour d\u00e9faut d\u2019activit\u00e9 inventive.[\/footnote]. Quelques jours apr\u00e8s cette d\u00e9cision, le Patent Office annon\u00e7ait qu\u2019il accepterait d\u00e9sormais les demandes de brevet portant sur \u00ab des organismes vivants non humains multicellulaires obtenus par voie non naturelle, y compris des animaux \u00bb[footnote]<em>Policy announcement<\/em> par Donald J. Quigg, Assistant Secretary and Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks (7 avril 1987), 69 J. Pat. &amp; Trademark Off. Soc'Y 328 (1987). L\u2019annonce intervenait quatre jours apr\u00e8s la d\u00e9cision du Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences dans <em>Ex parte Allen<\/em>, ci-dessus.[\/footnote]. Le premier brevet concernant un animal multicellulaire, la souris g\u00e9n\u00e9tiquement modifi\u00e9e Oncomouse, fut accord\u00e9 en avril 1988. En 2001, dans l\u2019affaire <em>J.E.M. Ag Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int\u2019l<\/em>[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/534\/124\/\">J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int\u2019l, Inc.<\/a>, 534 U.S. 124 (2001).[\/footnote], la Cour supr\u00eame confirmera qu\u2019une plante g\u00e9n\u00e9tiquement modifi\u00e9e peut faire l\u2019objet \u00e0 la fois d\u2019un brevet d\u2019utilit\u00e9 et d\u2019un brevet de plante[footnote]V. <em>infra<\/em>, n\u00b0430 et 431.[\/footnote].\r\n\r\nLa question de la brevetabilit\u00e9 de s\u00e9quences de g\u00e8nes a \u00e9t\u00e9 abord\u00e9e par la Cour supr\u00eame dans l'affaire Myriad[footnote]<a style=\"font-size: 1em;\" href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/569\/576\/\">Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.<\/a><span style=\"font-size: 1em;\">, 569 U.S. 576 (2013).<\/span>[\/footnote]. Cette affaire, qui a connu des d\u00e9veloppements en Europe, concernait des brevets relatifs aux g\u00e8nes BRCA-1 et BRCA-2 associ\u00e9s au cancer du sein et de l'ovaire, que la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 <em>Myriad Genetics Inc.<\/em> a \u00e9t\u00e9 la premi\u00e8re \u00e0 s\u00e9quencer avec l'universit\u00e9 de l'Utah. Les revendications concern\u00e9es portaient\u00a0 sur les g\u00e8nes, simplement isol\u00e9s, puis modifi\u00e9s, et sur des m\u00e9thodes de diagnostic pour la pr\u00e9disposition aux cancers pr\u00e9cit\u00e9s. Les brevets avaient \u00e9t\u00e9 invalid\u00e9s par la Cour de district du district sud de New York[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/association-for-mol-pathol-v-us-patent-tm-off\">Association for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office<\/a>, No. 09-cv-4515, 94 USPQ2d 1683 (S.D.N.Y. March 29, 2010).[\/footnote]. Sur appel, la Cour d'appel pour le Circuit F\u00e9d\u00e9ral[footnote]<span style=\"font-size: 1em;\"><a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/the-assn-for-molecular-pathology-v-united-states-patent\">Ass\u2019n for Molecular Pathology v. US Patent &amp; Trademark Office<\/a>, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Myriad Genetics I).<\/span><span style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\">[\/footnote] avait notamment consid\u00e9r\u00e9 que les g\u00e8nes isol\u00e9s et synth\u00e9tiques constituaient des compositions de mati\u00e8re brevetables d\u00e9riv\u00e9es de produits de la nature.\u00a0<\/span>Sur recours, la Cour Supr\u00eame avait tout d'abord renvoy\u00e9 \u00e0 la m\u00eame Cour d'appel pour r\u00e9examen \u00e0 la lumi\u00e8re de l'arr\u00eat Mayo, rendu entretemps[footnote] V. <em>supra,<\/em> n\u00b0364.[\/footnote]. Le circuit f\u00e9d\u00e9ral avait alors rendu une d\u00e9cision dans le m\u00eame sens[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/assn-for-molecular-pathology-v-us-patent-trademark-office\">Ass\u2019n for Molecular Pathology v. US Patent &amp; Trademark Office<\/a>, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Myriad G<span style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\">enetics II).[\/footnote], en jugeant que les mol\u00e9cules d\u2019ADN isol\u00e9es, par l'effet de l'isolement\/extraction de leur environnement g\u00e9nomique, pr\u00e9sentent des structures chimiques manifestement diff\u00e9rentes de l'ADN naturel et qu\u2019elles sont d\u00e8s lors brevetables, m\u00eame si elles poss\u00e8dent les m\u00eames s\u00e9quences[footnote]\u00ab La distinction entre un produit de la nature [non brevetable] et une invention humaine au sens du paragraphe 101 [du Patent Act sur la brevetabilit\u00e9] tient \u00e0 un changement dans l'identit\u00e9 de la composition revendiqu\u00e9e, compar\u00e9 \u00e0 ce qui existe dans la nature. Plus pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment, la Cour Supr\u00eame a trac\u00e9 une ligne entre les compositions [de mati\u00e8re] qui, m\u00eame si elles sont combin\u00e9es ou modifi\u00e9es d'une mani\u00e8re qui ne se retrouve pas dans la nature, ont des caract\u00e9ristiques similaires aux m\u00eames compositions dans la nature, et les compositions auxquelles l'intervention humaine a donn\u00e9 des caract\u00e9ristiques \"manifestement diff\u00e9rentes\" ou \"distinctives\" (...) Il n'est pas contest\u00e9 que l'ADN isol\u00e9 revendiqu\u00e9 par Myriad existe sous une forme chimique distincte\/distinctive - en tant que mol\u00e9cules chimiques diff\u00e9rentes - de l'ADN pr\u00e9sent dans le corps humain, c'est-\u00e0-dire l'ADN humain \u00bb.[\/footnote]. A nouveau saisie, la Cour Supr\u00eame avait jug\u00e9 \u00e0 l'unanimit\u00e9 que les revendications de mol\u00e9cules d'AD<\/span>N isol\u00e9es n'\u00e9taient pas brevetables, dans la mesure o\u00f9 elles portaient sur un segment d'ADN naturel, produit de la nature[footnote]\"Myriad found the location of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, but that discovery, by itself, does not render the BRCA genes \u201cnew . . . composition[s] of matter,\u201d \u00a7101, that are patent eligible (...)\".[\/footnote], mais que les revendications portant sur l'ADN synth\u00e9tique \u00e9taient brevetables, car elles ne portaient pas sur des \u00e9l\u00e9ments existant \u00e0 l'\u00e9tat de nature, les parties non codantes de la s\u00e9quence g\u00e9nomique ayant \u00e9t\u00e9 supprim\u00e9es[footnote]\"cDNA does not present the same obstacles to patentability as naturally occurring, isolated DNA segments. As already explained, creation of a cDNA sequence from mRNA results in an exons-only molecule that is not naturally occurring. Petitioners concede that cDNA differs from natural DNA in that \u201cthe non-coding regions have been removed.\u201d Brief for Petitioners 49. They nevertheless argue that cDNA is not patent eligible because \u201c[t]he nucleotide sequence of cDNA is dictated by nature, not by the lab technician.\u201d Id., at 51. That may be so, but the labtechnician unquestionably creates something new when cDNA is made. cDNA retains the naturally occurring exons of DNA, but it is distinct from the DNA from which it was derived. As a result, cDNA is not a \u201cproduct of nature\u201d and is patent eligible under \u00a7101, except insofar as very short series of DNA may have no intervening introns to remove when creating cDNA. In that situation, a short strand of cDNA may be indistinguishable from natural DNA\".[\/footnote].\r\n\r\nLa Cour Supr\u00eame avait cependant pris le soin de pr\u00e9ciser qu'elle ne se pronon\u00e7ait pas sur la brevetabilit\u00e9 des m\u00e9thodes de manipulation des g\u00e8nes[footnote]<span style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\">\"It is important to note what is not implicated by this decision. First, there are no method claims before this\u00a0<\/span>Court. Had Myriad created an innovative method of manipulating genes while searching for the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, it could possibly have sought a method patent. But the processes used by Myriad to isolate DNA were well understood by geneticists at the time of Myriad\u2019s patents \u201cwere well understood, widely used, and fairly uniform insofar as any scientist engaged in the search for a gene would likely have utilized a similar approach, 702F. Supp. 2d, at 202\u2013203, and are not at issue in this case\".[\/footnote], sur les applications de connaissances acquises sur les g\u00e8nes BRCA1 et BRCA2[footnote]\"Similarly, this case does not involve patents on new applications of knowledge about the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes. Judge Bryson aptly noted that, \u201c[a]s the first party with knowledge of the [BRCA1 and BRCA2] sequences, Myriad was in an excellent position to claim applications of that knowledge. Many of its unchallenged claims are limited to such applications.\u201d 689 F. 3d, at 1349\".[\/footnote], et sur la brevetabilit\u00e9 des m<span style=\"font-size: 1em;\">ol\u00e9cules d\u2019ADN pour lesquelles l'ordre naturel des nucl\u00e9otides naturels a \u00e9t\u00e9 modifi\u00e9[footnote]<\/span><span style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\">\"Nor do we consider the patentability of DNA in which the order of the naturally occurring nucleotides has been\u00a0<\/span>altered. Scientific alteration of the genetic code presents a different inquiry, and we express no opinion about the application of \u00a7101 to such endeavors. We merely hold that genes and the information they encode are not patent eligible under \u00a7101 simply because they have been isolated from the surrounding genetic material\".[\/footnote].\r\n\r\nEn application de ces principes, les tribunaux ont consid\u00e9r\u00e9 comme ne relevant pas de l\u2019exception pr\u00e9torienne au titre des ph\u00e9nom\u00e8nes naturels ou des id\u00e9es abstraites, par exemple:\r\n<ul>\r\n \t<li style=\"text-align: justify;\">des proc\u00e9d\u00e9s de pr\u00e9paration d'une fraction d'ADN acellulaire enrichie en ADN f\u0153tal<span style=\"font-size: 1em;\">[footnote]<\/span><a style=\"font-size: 1em;\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/illumina-inc-v-ariosa-diagnostics-inc-2\">Illumina, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc.<\/a><span style=\"font-size: 1em;\">, 952 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2020) <\/span><em style=\"font-size: 1em;\">modified<\/em><span style=\"font-size: 1em;\">\u00a0967 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2020).[\/footnote]<\/span><\/li>\r\n \t<li style=\"text-align: justify;\">Un proc\u00e9d\u00e9 de traitement de la douleur \u00e0 l'aide de compositions pharmaceutiques d'oxymorphone \u00e0 lib\u00e9ration contr\u00f4l\u00e9e et des instructions sur le dosage de l'insuffisance r\u00e9nale[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/endo-pharms-inc-v-teva-pharms-usa-inc-1\"><em>Endo Pharm. Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc.<\/em><\/a>, 919 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2019).[\/footnote].<\/li>\r\n \t<li style=\"text-align: justify;\">Une m\u00e9thode de traitement des patients schizophr\u00e8nes avec de l'ilop\u00e9ridone dans laquelle la gamme posologique est bas\u00e9e sur le g\u00e9notype du patient[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/vanda-pharms-inc-v-west-ward-pharms-intl-ltd\">Vanda Pharm. Inc. v. West-Ward Pharm. Int\u2019l Ltd<\/a>, 887 F.3d 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2018).[\/footnote].<\/li>\r\n \t<li style=\"text-align: justify;\">Un proc\u00e9d\u00e9 am\u00e9lior\u00e9 de conservation des h\u00e9patocytes[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/rapid-litig-mgmt-ltd-v-cellzdirect-inc\">Rapid Litig. Mgmt. Ltd. v. Cellzdirect, Inc.<\/a>, 827 F.3d 1042 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Le proc\u00e9d\u00e9 en cause consistait dans : (a) la soumission soumettant des cellules pr\u00e9alablement congel\u00e9es et d\u00e9congel\u00e9es \u00e0 un fractionnement par gradient de densit\u00e9 pour s\u00e9parer les cellules viables des cellules non viables ; (B) la r\u00e9cup\u00e9ration des cellules viables ; et (C) la recong\u00e9lation des cellules viables.[\/footnote].<\/li>\r\n<\/ul>\r\nA l\u2019inverse, des m\u00e9thodes de diagnostic ou de g\u00e9notypage on \u00e9t\u00e9 consid\u00e9r\u00e9es comme portant sur des lois de la nature ou des id\u00e9es abstraites[footnote]V. par exemple, pour les plus r\u00e9centes: <a style=\"font-size: 1em;\" href=\"https:\/\/cafc.uscourts.gov\/opinions-orders\/22-1027.OPINION.7-18-2022_1979207.pdf\">CareDx, Inc. v. Natera, Inc.<\/a>,\u00a0<span style=\"font-size: 1em;\">40 F.4th 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2022): <\/span><span id=\"tgtAlignment_1\" class=\"ts-alignment-element\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\" data-is-focusable=\"true\">m\u00e9thodes<\/span> <span id=\"tgtAlignment_2\" class=\"ts-alignment-element\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\" data-is-focusable=\"true\">de<\/span> <span id=\"tgtAlignment_3\" class=\"ts-alignment-element\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\" data-is-focusable=\"true\">d\u00e9tection<\/span> <span id=\"tgtAlignment_4\" class=\"ts-alignment-element\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\" data-is-focusable=\"true\">du<\/span> <span id=\"tgtAlignment_5\" class=\"ts-alignment-element\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\" data-is-focusable=\"true\">rejet<\/span> <span id=\"tgtAlignment_6\" class=\"ts-alignment-element\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\" data-is-focusable=\"true\">de<\/span> <span id=\"tgtAlignment_7\" class=\"ts-alignment-element\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\" data-is-focusable=\"true\">greffe<\/span><span id=\"tgtAlignment_8\" class=\"ts-alignment-element\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\" data-is-focusable=\"true\">,<\/span><span style=\"font-size: 1em;\"> du <\/span><span id=\"tgtAlignment_9\" class=\"ts-alignment-element\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\" data-is-focusable=\"true\">dysfonctionnement<\/span> <span id=\"tgtAlignment_10\" class=\"ts-alignment-element\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\" data-is-focusable=\"true\">du<\/span> <span id=\"tgtAlignment_11\" class=\"ts-alignment-element\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\" data-is-focusable=\"true\">greffon<\/span> <span id=\"tgtAlignment_12\" class=\"ts-alignment-element\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\" data-is-focusable=\"true\">ou<\/span> <span id=\"tgtAlignment_13\" class=\"ts-alignment-element\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\" data-is-focusable=\"true\">de<\/span> <span id=\"tgtAlignment_14\" class=\"ts-alignment-element\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\" data-is-focusable=\"true\">la<\/span> <span id=\"tgtAlignment_15\" class=\"ts-alignment-element\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\" data-is-focusable=\"true\">d\u00e9faillance<\/span> <span id=\"tgtAlignment_16\" class=\"ts-alignment-element\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\" data-is-focusable=\"true\">d<\/span><span id=\"tgtAlignment_17\" class=\"ts-alignment-element\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\" data-is-focusable=\"true\">\u2019<\/span><span id=\"tgtAlignment_18\" class=\"ts-alignment-element\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\" data-is-focusable=\"true\">un<\/span> <span id=\"tgtAlignment_19\" class=\"ts-alignment-element\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\" data-is-focusable=\"true\">organe<\/span><span id=\"tgtAlignment_20\" class=\"ts-alignment-element\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\" data-is-focusable=\"true\">,<\/span> <span id=\"tgtAlignment_21\" class=\"ts-alignment-element\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\" data-is-focusable=\"true\">jug\u00e9es<\/span><span style=\"font-size: 1em;\"> relevant de lois de la nature, et comprenant les <\/span><span id=\"tgtAlignment_30\" class=\"ts-alignment-element\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\" data-is-focusable=\"true\">\u00e9tapes<\/span> <span id=\"tgtAlignment_31\" class=\"ts-alignment-element\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\" data-is-focusable=\"true\">conventionnelles<\/span> <span id=\"tgtAlignment_32\" class=\"ts-alignment-element\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\" data-is-focusable=\"true\">permettant<\/span> <span id=\"tgtAlignment_33\" class=\"ts-alignment-element\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\" data-is-focusable=\"true\">de<\/span> <span id=\"tgtAlignment_34\" class=\"ts-alignment-element\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\" data-is-focusable=\"true\">d\u00e9tecter<\/span> <span id=\"tgtAlignment_35\" class=\"ts-alignment-element\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\" data-is-focusable=\"true\">ou<\/span> <span id=\"tgtAlignment_36\" class=\"ts-alignment-element\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\" data-is-focusable=\"true\">de<\/span> <span id=\"tgtAlignment_37\" class=\"ts-alignment-element\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\" data-is-focusable=\"true\">quantifier<\/span> <span id=\"tgtAlignment_38\" class=\"ts-alignment-element\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\" data-is-focusable=\"true\">la<\/span> <span id=\"tgtAlignment_39\" class=\"ts-alignment-element\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\" data-is-focusable=\"true\">manifestation<\/span> <span id=\"tgtAlignment_40\" class=\"ts-alignment-element\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\" data-is-focusable=\"true\">de<\/span> <span id=\"tgtAlignment_41\" class=\"ts-alignment-element\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\" data-is-focusable=\"true\">cette<\/span> <span id=\"tgtAlignment_42\" class=\"ts-alignment-element\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\" data-is-focusable=\"true\">loi; <\/span><a style=\"font-size: 1em;\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/genetic-veterinary-scis-inc-v-laboklin-gmbh-co-6\">Genetic Veterinary Sciences, Inc. v. Laboklin GmbH &amp; Co. KG<\/a><span style=\"font-size: 1em;\">, 933 F.3d 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2019): <\/span><span style=\"font-size: 1em;\">m\u00e9thodes in vitro de g\u00e9notypage des chiens Labrador, afin de d\u00e9couvrir s'ils peuvent \u00eatre porteurs d'une maladie;\u00a0 <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/athena-diagnostics-inc-v-mayo-collaborative-servs-llc-3\">Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Services, LLC<\/a><em>,<\/em> 915 F.3d 743 (Fed. Cir. 2019): m\u00e9thode pour diagnostiquer des d\u00e9sordres neurologiques, fond\u00e9e sur la corr\u00e9lation entre certains anticorps naturels et les maladies concern\u00e9es; \u00e9galement, <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/roche-molecular-sys-inc-v-cepheid\">Roche Molecular Sys., Inc. v. Cepheid<\/a><em>, <\/em>905 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2018); <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bitlaw.com\/source\/cases\/patent\/Cleveland-Clinic.html\">Cleveland Clinic Found. v. True Health Diagnostics LLC<\/a>, 859 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2017); <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/genetic-techs-ltd-v-merial-llc\">Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Merial LLC<\/a>, 818 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2016); <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/ariosa-diagnostics-inc-v-sequenom-inc\">Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc.<\/a>, 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015); <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bitlaw.com\/source\/cases\/patent\/BRCA1_BRCA2.html\">In re BRCA1- and BRCA2-Based Hereditary Cancer Test<\/a>, 774 F.3d 755 (Fed. Cir. 2014).[\/footnote].\r\n\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<strong>367._ Les m\u00e9thodes commerciales_<\/strong> En l\u2019absence d\u2019exclusion expresse dans le Patent Act, et jusqu\u2019\u00e0 l\u2019arr\u00eat <em>Bilski<\/em> de la Cour supr\u00eame, la question de la protection des m\u00e9thodes commerciale a donn\u00e9 lieu \u00e0 une jurisprudence h\u00e9sitante[footnote]Certaines d\u00e9cisions ont exclu la brevetabilit\u00e9 de telles m\u00e9thodes, ou du moins de m\u00e9thodes dont la brevetabilit\u00e9 \u00e9tait recherch\u00e9e \u00ab\u00a0en tant que telles\u00a0\u00bb\u00a0: V. <a href=\"https:\/\/patentlyo.com\/patent\/2016\/05\/security-checking-lorraine.html\">Hotel Security Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co.<\/a>, 160 F. 467 (2d Cir. 1908) (m\u00e9thode de gestion des factures de restaurants); <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/application-of-johnston\"><em>In re<\/em> Johnston<\/a>, 502 F.2d 765 (CCPA 1974), <em>rev\u2019d, on other grounds sub nom<\/em>. <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/425\/219\/\">Dann v. Johnston<\/a>, 425 U.S. 219 (1976) (m\u00e9thode de gestion automatique de ch\u00e8ques et de d\u00e9p\u00f4ts, mais la d\u00e9cision porte sur l\u2019activit\u00e9 inventive)\u00a0; <a href=\"https:\/\/law.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/district-courts\/FSupp\/564\/1358\/1407627\/\">Paine, Webber, Jackson &amp; Curtis, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &amp; Smith<\/a>, 564 F. Supp. 1358 (D. Del. 1983) (m\u00e9thode commerciale brevetable, car mises en oeuvre par un ordinateur)\u00a0; ex parte Murray, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d 1819 (PTO Bd. Pat. App. &amp; Int. 1988) (m\u00e9thode comptable non brevetable). Le circuit f\u00e9d\u00e9ral a rejet\u00e9 l\u2019exception dans <a href=\"https:\/\/law.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/appellate-courts\/F3\/149\/1368\/560460\/\">State Street Bank &amp; Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.<\/a>, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (pas d'exclusion de principe pour une m\u00e9thode financi\u00e8re relative \u00e0 l'administration d'un fonds mutuel: \"As an alternative ground for invalidating the '056 patent under \u00a7 101, the court relied on the judicially-created, so-called \"business method\" exception to statutory subject matter. We take this opportunity to lay this ill-conceived exception to rest. Since its inception, the \"business method\" exception has merely represented the application of some general, but no longer applicable legal principle, perhaps arising out of the \"requirement for invention\"--which was eliminated by \u00a7 103. Since the 1952 Patent Act, business methods have been, and should have been, subject to the same legal requirements for patentability as applied to any other process or method\").[\/footnote].\r\n\r\nEn 2010, dans l'affaire <em>Bilski v. Kappos<\/em>[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/561\/593\/\">Bilski v. Kappos<\/a>, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).[\/footnote], la Cour Supr\u00eame a confirm\u00e9 que le champ de la brevetabilit\u00e9 n'exclut pas la protection des m\u00e9thodes commerciales. L'invention en cause portait sur une m\u00e9thode de protection contre les risques de fluctuation des prix sur le march\u00e9 de l'\u00e9nergie. L\u2019USPTO avait rejet\u00e9 la demande, consid\u00e9rant que les revendications ne visaient pas un objet brevetable, et avait \u00e9t\u00e9 suivi sur ce point par le Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences<em>. <\/em>Sur appel, la Cour d\u2019appel du circuit f\u00e9d\u00e9ral[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/in-re-bilski\"><em>In re<\/em> Bilski<\/a>, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed.Cir. 2008).[\/footnote] avait tent\u00e9 de d\u00e9terminer un test unique de brevetabilit\u00e9 sous forme d'un test dit \u00ab <em>machine or transformation test<\/em>\u00a0\u00bb (test de la machine ou de la transformation), consistant \u00e0 d\u00e9terminer si le proc\u00e9d\u00e9 revendiqu\u00e9 est li\u00e9 \u00e0 une machine ou s\u2019il transforme ou r\u00e9duit un \u00e9l\u00e9ment donn\u00e9 en un \u00e9tat diff\u00e9rent ou dans une chose diff\u00e9rente. La demande ne r\u00e9pondant pas \u00e0 ce test, la Cour avait confirm\u00e9 la d\u00e9cision de rejet.\r\n\r\nDans son arr\u00eat, la Cour supr\u00eame ne rejette pas le <em>machine or transformation test<\/em>, mais consid\u00e8re qu'il constitue seulement un indice de brevetabilit\u00e9. Selon la Cour l'approche de la Cour d\u2019appel est contredite par le paragraphe 100(b) du Patent Act qui d\u00e9finit largement un proc\u00e9d\u00e9 comme tout \u00ab proc\u00e9d\u00e9, art ou m\u00e9thode, incluant tout nouvel usage d'un proc\u00e9d\u00e9, d'une machine, d'une fabrication, d'une composition de mati\u00e8re ou d'un mat\u00e9riau connus \u00bb, sans lier la brevetabilit\u00e9 \u00e0 une machine ou \u00e0 une transformation, et sans exclure la brevetabilit\u00e9 des m\u00e9thodes commerciales.\r\n\r\nElle rejette cependant la brevetabilit\u00e9 de l'invention, au motif que \u00ab\u00a0le concept de protection contre les risques [\u2026] est une id\u00e9e abstraite non brevetable\u00a0\u00bb et que permettre aux demandeurs de breveter une telle invention \u00ab\u00a0emp\u00eacherait l'utilisation d'une telle approche dans tous les domaines, et conf\u00e8rerait en r\u00e9alit\u00e9 un monopole sur une id\u00e9e abstraite\u00a0\u00bb.\r\n\r\nEn pratique, l\u2019exclusion des id\u00e9es abstraites et le crit\u00e8re d\u2019activit\u00e9 inventive constituent un obstacle important \u00e0 la brevetabilit\u00e9 des m\u00e9thodes commerciales, notamment dans le domaine du commerce \u00e9lectronique.[footnote]Ainsi en 2001 la Cour d'appel pour le circuit f\u00e9d\u00e9ral a censur\u00e9 sur ces fondements l'injonction accord\u00e9e par une Cour de District dans l'affaire <em>Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com (<\/em><a href=\"https:\/\/caselaw.findlaw.com\/court\/us-federal-circuit\/1453970.html\">Amazon. com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble. com, Inc.<\/a>,<em> 337 F.3d 1024 (Fed. Cir., 2001); V. Com. com. \u00e9lectr. janv. 2000, actu. n\u00b0 18)<\/em>. La Cour F\u00e9d\u00e9rale pour le District Ouest de Washington (<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/amazoncom-inc-v-barnesandnoblecom-inc\">73 F. Supp. 2d 1228<\/a> (W.D. Wash. 1999)) avait en effet accord\u00e9 \u00e0 la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 Amazon une ordonnance pr\u00e9liminaire enjoignant son concurrent, le libraire Barnes and Noble, de cesser la contrefa\u00e7on du brevet d'Amazon prot\u00e9geant son syst\u00e8me de prise d'achats en ligne (syst\u00e8me permettant de placer un ordre d'achat par un seul \"click\").[\/footnote]\r\n\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<strong>368._ Les m\u00e9thodes de traitement th\u00e9rapeutique et chirurgicales_<\/strong> Les m\u00e9thodes de traitement th\u00e9rapeutique ou chirurgical ne sont pas exclues de la protection si elles satisfont par ailleurs aux conditions de brevetabilit\u00e9[footnote]La premi\u00e8re d\u00e9cision dans ce sens est une d\u00e9cision du Board of Appel du Patent Office de 1954, <em>Ex parte<\/em> Scherer, 103 U.S.P.Q. 107 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1954), qui renverse la jurisprudence ,ancienne du Patent Office Ex Parte Brinkerhoff, 27 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 797 (1883); les tribunaux suivront plus tardivement (v. notamment les r\u00e9ticences exprim\u00e9e sur le fondement de l'ordre public par Martin v. Wyeth, Inc., 96 F. Supp. 689 (D. Md. 1951), aff\u2019d 193 F.2d 58 (4th Cir. 1951): \"professional ethics of doctors and surgeons are more consistent with the widespread use of their medical and surgical discoveries for the benefit of mankind than in obtaining a monopoly to control their discoveries for personal commercial advantage. In this respect it would seem also that public interest is here involved\"). V. <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/prometheus-laboratories-inc-v-mayo-collaborative-serv\">Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Services<\/a>, 628 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (M\u00e9thodes de d\u00e9termination de la posologie optimale de m\u00e9dicaments \u00e0 base de thiopurine utilis\u00e9s pour traiter les maladies auto-immunes gastro-intestinales et non gastro-intestinales). Des exemples plus r\u00e9cents de m\u00e9thodes de traitement jug\u00e9es brevetables incluent : une m\u00e9thode d'utilisation de l'oxymorphone pour traiter la douleur chez des patients pr\u00e9sentant une insuffisance r\u00e9nale (<a style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/endo-pharms-inc-v-teva-pharms-usa-inc-1\">Endo Pharms., Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc.<\/a><span style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\">, 919 F.3d 1347, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2019)); d<\/span>es m\u00e9thodes de r\u00e9gulation des concentrations d'ions hydronium dans un tissu humain ou d'augmentation de la capacit\u00e9 de travail ana\u00e9robie chez un sujet humain par l'administration de quantit\u00e9s efficaces de b\u00eata-alanine (<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/natural-alternatives-intl-inc-v-creative-compounds-llc-1\">Natural Alternatives Int\u2019l, Inc. v. Creative Compounds, LLC<\/a>, 918 F.3d 1338, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2019)); ou encore une m\u00e9thode de traitement des patients schizophr\u00e8nes avec de l'ilop\u00e9ridone, qui base la posologie sur le g\u00e9notype du patient (<a style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\" href=\"https:\/\/cafc.uscourts.gov\/sites\/default\/files\/16-2707.Opinion.4-12-2018.1_0.pdf\">Vanda Pharms. Inc. v. West-Ward Pharms. Int\u2019l Ltd<\/a><span style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\">., 887 F.3d 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2018)).[\/footnote]. Mais une m\u00e9thode de diagnostic ou de traitement n'est pas brevetable si elle inclut ou combine des techniques connues avec des ph\u00e9nom\u00e8nes naturels[footnote]V. par exemple <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/law.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/appellate-courts\/cafc\/17-2508\/17-2508-2019-02-06.html\">Athena Diagnostics v. Mayo Collaborative Services<\/a>, 915 F.3d 743, 751-53 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (m\u00e9thodes de diagnostics de maladies neurologique); <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/roche-molecular-sys-inc-v-cepheid\">Roche Molecular Sys., Inc. v. Cepheid<\/a>, 905 F.3d 1363, 1370-74 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (m\u00e9thode de d\u00e9tection de la bact\u00e9rie pathog\u00e8ne Mycobacterium tuberculosis); <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bitlaw.com\/source\/cases\/patent\/Cleveland-Clinic.html\">Cleveland Clinic Foundation v. True Health Diagnostics LLC<\/a>, 859 F.3d 1352, 1361-62 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (test de diagnostic de risques cardiovasculaires); <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/genetic-techs-ltd-v-merial-llc\">Genetic Technologies, Ltd. v. Merial LLC<\/a>, 818 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2016); <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/ariosa-diagnostics-inc-v-sequenom-inc\">Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc.<\/a>, 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015); <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bitlaw.com\/source\/cases\/patent\/BRCA1_BRCA2.html\">In re BRCA1- &amp; BRCA2-Based Hereditary Cancer Test<\/a>, 774 F.3d 755, 765 (Fed. Cir. 2014).[\/footnote].\r\n\r\nA noter qu\u2019une limitation sp\u00e9cifique au droit \u00e0 dommages et int\u00e9r\u00eats pour contrefa\u00e7on d\u2019un produit ou d\u2019un proc\u00e9d\u00e9 brevet\u00e9s a \u00e9t\u00e9 introduite en 1996 au b\u00e9n\u00e9fice des \u00ab praticiens m\u00e9dicaux exer\u00e7ant dans le cadre d\u2019une activit\u00e9 m\u00e9dicale \u00bb et des institutions qui les emploient.[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/287\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 287(c)<\/a>. <em>\u00ab\u00a0<\/em>The term \u201cmedical activity\u201d means the performance of a medical or surgical procedure on a body, but shall not include (i) the use of a patented machine, manufacture, or composition of matter in violation of such patent, (ii) the practice of a patented use of a composition of matter in violation of such patent, or (iii) the practice of a process in violation of a biotechnology patent.\u00a0<em>\u00bb<\/em> <em>Ibid.<\/em>[\/footnote]\r\n\r\nLa question de la brevetabilit\u00e9 de la seconde application th\u00e9rapeutique est abord\u00e9e plus loin[footnote]V. <em>infra<\/em>, n\u00b0381.[\/footnote].\r\n\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<strong>369._ Les programmes d\u2019ordinateur et les inventions logicielles_<\/strong> Le Patent Act ne contient pas d\u2019exclusions concernant les programmes d\u2019ordinateur, ni de dispositions sp\u00e9cifiques les concernant[footnote]Le MPEP (8\u00e8me \u00e9d. 2001) pr\u00e9cisait qu\u2019 \u00ab a computer program is merely a set of instructions capable of being executed by a computer \u00bb (\u00a7 2106.IV.B.1(a)).[\/footnote]. La brevetabilit\u00e9 des programmes d\u2019ordinateur et des inventions utilisant des logiciels a donn\u00e9 lieu \u00e0 une jurisprudence abondante, souvent li\u00e9e \u00e0 la question de la brevetabilit\u00e9 des m\u00e9thodes commerciales, qui a abouti \u00e0 valider les brevets portant sur des inventions mettant en \u0153uvres des algorithmes (et notamment des logiciels) lorsqu\u2019elles pr\u00e9sentent des r\u00e9sultats utiles (ce qui implique une application pratique), concrets et tangibles (au sens de \"non-abstrait\", \"qui produit des r\u00e9sultats dans le monde r\u00e9el\")[footnote]<em>Ibid<\/em>.[\/footnote].\r\n\r\nLe point de d\u00e9part de cette \u00e9volution est constitu\u00e9 par l\u2019exclusion de la protection des id\u00e9es abstraites et des formules math\u00e9matiques, qui s\u2019\u00e9tend \u00e0 priori \u00e0 tout algorithme math\u00e9matique et \u00e0 tout logiciel non associ\u00e9 \u00e0 un r\u00e9sultat tangible.\r\n\r\nEn 1972, dans l\u2019arr\u00eat <em>Gottschalk v. Benson<\/em>[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/409\/63\/\">Gottschalk v. Benson<\/a>, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). V. Chisum, The Patentability of Algorithms, 47 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 959 (1986).[\/footnote]<em>,<\/em> la Cour supr\u00eame a jug\u00e9 qu\u2019un algorithme permettant de convertir des d\u00e9cimales cod\u00e9es en binaires en chiffres binaires (et non associ\u00e9 \u00e0 un type d\u2019ordinateur pr\u00e9cis) ne mettait en \u0153uvre qu\u2019une id\u00e9e abstraite et un ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne naturel (une d\u00e9couverte), et ne pouvait d\u00e8s lors constituer une invention brevetable. Elle a cependant pris le soin de pr\u00e9ciser qu\u2019elle n\u2019entendait pas exclure du champ de la brevetabilit\u00e9 tous les programmes d\u2019ordinateur, en indiquant que sa d\u00e9cision ne s\u2019appliquait qu\u2019aux m\u00e9thodes non limit\u00e9es \u00e0 une technologie particuli\u00e8re, \u00e0 dispositif particulier ou \u00e0 un usage pr\u00e9cis[footnote]Point 64.[\/footnote]. Elle a r\u00e9affirm\u00e9 cette position en 1978 dans son arr\u00eat <em>Parker v. Flook<\/em>[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/437\/584\/\">Parker v. Flook<\/a>, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).[\/footnote], \u00e0 propos d\u2019un algorithme mis en \u0153uvre par ordinateur destin\u00e9 \u00e0 ajuster les niveaux d\u2019alarmes des processus de conversion d\u2019hydrocarbures[footnote]En l\u2019esp\u00e8ce l\u2019algorithme avait \u00e9t\u00e9 revendiqu\u00e9 uniquement en relation avec un processus technique, et le calcul \u00e9tait suivi par une activit\u00e9 post-solution (l\u2019ajustement du niveau d\u2019alarme). La Cour supr\u00eame a cependant rejet\u00e9 la brevetabilit\u00e9 au motif que le brevet porterait sur un id\u00e9e abstraite. La mauvaise r\u00e9daction des revendications semble expliquer en partie la solution.[\/footnote].\r\n\r\nEn 1981, dans son arr\u00eat D<em>iamond v. Diehr<\/em>[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/450\/175\/\">D<\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/450\/175\/\">iamond v. Diehr<\/a>, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).[\/footnote], la Cour supr\u00eame reconnaitra pour la premi\u00e8re fois la brevetabilit\u00e9 d\u2019une invention impliquant l\u2019utilisation d\u2019une formule de calcul. L\u2019invention portait sur une m\u00e9thode concernant le moulage de caoutchouc synth\u00e9tique, fond\u00e9e sur un algorithme permettant de recalculer en continu la dur\u00e9e optimale de moulage. La Cour consid\u00e8re que l\u2019invention ne porte pas sur un algorithme, mais sur un proc\u00e9d\u00e9 industriel de transformation de mati\u00e8re reposant sur un algorithme[footnote]A cette occasion, elle op\u00e8re une distinction avec les faits de l\u2019affaire <em>Parker v. Flook, <\/em>en soulignant que la m\u00e9thode alors revendiqu\u00e9e portait sur un calcul, sans r\u00e9ellement mentionner les \u00e9tapes physiques associ\u00e9es au calcul.[\/footnote]. Elle pr\u00e9cise n\u00e9anmoins qu\u2019une \u00ab\u00a0activit\u00e9 post-solution insignifiante ne transformera pas un principe non brevetable en proc\u00e9d\u00e9 brevetable\u00a0\u00bb[footnote]Points 191-92.[\/footnote]. De m\u00eame, dans son arr\u00eat <em>Alice\u00a0 <\/em>pr\u00e9cit\u00e9<em>[footnote]<\/em><a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/573\/208\/\">Alice Corp. V. CLS Bank International<\/a>,<em> 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).[\/footnote]<\/em>, la Cour supr\u00eame a pr\u00e9cis\u00e9 que la simple mise en \u0153uvre par un ordinateur g\u00e9n\u00e9rique ne transforme pas une id\u00e9e abstraite en invention brevetable[footnote]\u00ab the mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. Stating an abstract idea \u201cwhile adding the words \u2018apply it\u2019\u201d is not enough for patent eligibility.(\u2026) Nor is limiting the use of an abstract idea \u201c\u2018to a particular technological environment.\u2019\u201d (\u2026). Stating an abstract idea while adding the words \u201capply it with a computer\u201d simply combines those two steps, with the same deficient result. Thus, if a patent\u2019s recitation of a computer amounts to a mere instruction to\u201cimplemen[t]\u201d an abstract idea \u201con . . . a computer,\u201d (\u2026) that addition cannot impart patent eligibility \u00bb.[\/footnote]. Cette derni\u00e8re d\u00e9cision semble avoir entra\u00een\u00e9 un nombre important de d\u00e9cisions invalidant des brevets de logiciels ou de m\u00e9thodes mises en \u0153uvre par logiciels[footnote]S. Callahan, Alice: <a href=\"http:\/\/www.ndtexblog.com\/?p=3550\">The Death of Software-Related Patents?<\/a>, 1er mai 2015, qui rel\u00e8ve que depuis l\u2019arr\u00eat <em>Alice<\/em>, sur les 76 d\u00e9cisions dans des affaires similaires, 57 ont invalid\u00e9 les brevets concern\u00e9 (contre 16 les ayant valid\u00e9 au fond). V. par exemple <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bitlaw.com\/source\/cases\/patent\/Digitech.html\">Digitech Image Technologies, LLC v. Electronics for Imaging, Inc.<\/a> 758 F. 3d 1344 (2014) (informations g\u00e9n\u00e9r\u00e9es sur une image et m\u00e9thodes pour g\u00e9n\u00e9rer ces informations)\u00a0; buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc, 765 F.3d 1350 (2014) (syst\u00e8me de s\u00e9curisation de transactins \u00e9lectronique en ligne)\u00a0; <a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/DDR_Holdings_v._Hotels.com\">DDR Holdings v. Hotels.com<\/a>, 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (syst\u00e8me g\u00e9n\u00e9rant des pages web d\u2019e-commerce\u00a0); <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/versata-dev-grp-inc-v-sap-am-inc-2\">Versata v. SAP America,Inc.,<\/a> 793 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 115 U.S.P.Q.2d 1681 (plusieurs brevets dont un valid\u00e9).V. \u00e9galement T. Teska, (The unfortunate) future of software patents under 35 USC \u00a7 101 and \u00a7 112, 2016 Journal of High Technology Law, p. 394; D. Taylor, Down the Rabbit Hole: Who will stand up for software patents after Alice?, 68 Me. L. Rev. 217 (2016).[\/footnote].\r\n\r\nEn r\u00e9action \u00e0 cette jurisprudence, le Manual of Patent Examination Procedure a \u00e9t\u00e9 compl\u00e9t\u00e9 depuis 2014 et pr\u00e9cise les pratiques de l\u2019Office concernant l\u2019exclusion des id\u00e9es abstraites[footnote]2014 Interim Guidance on subject Matter Eligibility, disponible sur le site de l\u2019USPTO (www.uspto.gov).[\/footnote]. Il confirme que les revendications d\u00e9crivant ou incluant un algorithme doivent contenir des \u00e9l\u00e9ments qui (consid\u00e9r\u00e9s individuellement ou dans leur combinaison) ajoutent \u00e0 l\u2019id\u00e9e abstraite constitu\u00e9e par l\u2019algorithme (<em>amount to significantly more than the judicial exception<\/em>), par exemple en d\u00e9montrant une am\u00e9lioration du fonctionnement d\u2019un ordinateur ou dans un autre domaine technique. De nombreux exemples d\u2019inventions logicielles exclues ou non de la brevetabilit\u00e9, y sont donn\u00e9s. Dans ce domaine, ont\u00a0\u00e9t\u00e9 consid\u00e9r\u00e9s par les tribunaux comme brevetables, car ne relevant pas d\u2019id\u00e9es abstraites, par exemple :\r\n<ul>\r\n \t<li style=\"text-align: justify;\">des m\u00e9thodes permettant d'am\u00e9liorer les r\u00e9sultats de recherche sur Internet en int\u00e9grant une relation de localisation physique avec une personne de r\u00e9f\u00e9rence[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/weisner-v-google-llc-7\">Weisner v. Google LLC<\/a>, 51 F.4th 1073, 1084 (Fed. Cir. 2022).[\/footnote]\u00a0;<\/li>\r\n \t<li style=\"text-align: justify;\">des syst\u00e8mes et proc\u00e9d\u00e9s de structuration d'un r\u00e9seau dynamique peer-to-peer (P2P) pour la distribution de fichiers volumineux[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/coop-entmt-v-kollective-tech\">Cooperative Entertainment, Inc. v. Kollective Technology, Inc.<\/a>, 50 F.4th 127 (Fed. Cir. 2022).[\/footnote]\u00a0;<\/li>\r\n \t<li style=\"text-align: justify;\">un proc\u00e9d\u00e9 d'authentification d'un utilisateur \u00e0 une transaction sur un terminal[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/cafc.uscourts.gov\/opinions-orders\/20-2043.opinion.10-4-2021_1843694.pdf\">CosmoKey Solutions GmbH &amp; Co. KG v. Duo Security LLC<\/a>, 15 F.4th 1091 (Fed. Cir. 2021).[\/footnote];<\/li>\r\n \t<li style=\"text-align: justify;\">des appareils et proc\u00e9d\u00e9s de surveillance de paquets \u00e9chang\u00e9s sur un r\u00e9seau informatique en classant des paquets de donn\u00e9es en fonction d'un flux de donn\u00e9es associ\u00e9 \u00e0 certaines activit\u00e9s[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/packet-intelligence-llc-v-netscout-sys-6\">Packet Intelligence LLC v. NetScout Systems, Inc.<\/a>, 965 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2020).[\/footnote];<\/li>\r\n \t<li style=\"text-align: justify;\">un syst\u00e8me de communication qui permet \u00e0 la station primaire d'envoyer des messages d'enqu\u00eate et d'effectuer des sondages simultan\u00e9ment[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/uniloc-usa-inc-v-lg-elecs-usa-inc-3\">Uniloc USA, Inc. v. LG Electronics USA, Inc.<\/a>, 957 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2020).[\/footnote];<\/li>\r\n \t<li style=\"text-align: justify;\">un proc\u00e9d\u00e9 et des dispositifs de d\u00e9tection d'erreurs de transmission dans des flux de donn\u00e9es et des paquets de donn\u00e9es[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/koninklijke-kpn-nv-v-gemalto-m2m-gmbh\">Koninklijke KPN N.V. v. Gemalto M2M Gmbh<\/a>, 942 F.3d 1143 (Fed. Cir. 2019).[\/footnote];<\/li>\r\n \t<li style=\"text-align: justify;\">un proc\u00e9d\u00e9 de connexion d'un dispositif de capture de donn\u00e9es, tel qu'un appareil photo num\u00e9rique, \u00e0 un dispositif mobile afin qu'un utilisateur puisse publier automatiquement du contenu \u00e0 partir du dispositif de capture de donn\u00e9es sur un site Web[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/cellspin-soft-inc-v-fitbit-inc-3\">Cellspin Soft, Inc. v. FitBit, Inc.<\/a>, 927 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2019).[\/footnote];<\/li>\r\n \t<li style=\"text-align: justify;\">une m\u00e9thode automatis\u00e9e de d\u00e9tection d'intrusion dans le r\u00e9seau informatique qui utilise des moniteurs de r\u00e9seau dans le r\u00e9seau d'entreprise, d\u00e9tecte les activit\u00e9s r\u00e9seau suspectes sur la base de l'analyse des donn\u00e9es de trafic r\u00e9seau, g\u00e9n\u00e8re des rapports sur les activit\u00e9s suspectes et re\u00e7oit et int\u00e8gre automatiquement les rapports sur les activit\u00e9s suspectes[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/sri-intl-inc-v-cisco-sys-inc-7\">SRI Int\u2019l, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc.<\/a>, 918 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2019), modified 930 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2019).[\/footnote];<\/li>\r\n \t<li style=\"text-align: justify;\">une m\u00e9thode de mise en \u0153uvre d'une interface \u00e0 onglets de carnet, qui permet aux utilisateurs de naviguer facilement dans des feuilles de calcul \u00e9lectroniques tridimensionnelles[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/data-engine-techs-llc-v-google-llc\">Data Engine Techs. LLC v. Google LLC<\/a>, 906 F.3d 999 (Fed. Cir. 2018).[\/footnote];<\/li>\r\n \t<li style=\"text-align: justify;\">des syst\u00e8mes et proc\u00e9d\u00e9s de conception, de cr\u00e9ation et d'importation de donn\u00e9es dans un formulaire consultable sur un ordinateur afin qu'un utilisateur puisse manipuler les donn\u00e9es du formulaire et cr\u00e9er des formulaires et des rapports consultables[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/aatrix-software-inc-v-green-shades-software-inc-1\">Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc.<\/a>, 882 F.3d 1121 (Fed. Cir. 2018).[\/footnote];<\/li>\r\n \t<li style=\"text-align: justify;\">des interfaces d'affichage am\u00e9lior\u00e9es, en particulier pour les appareils \u00e9lectroniques dot\u00e9s de petits \u00e9crans, qui permettent \u00e0 l'utilisateur d'acc\u00e9der plus rapidement aux donn\u00e9es souhait\u00e9es stock\u00e9es dans le dispositif \u00e9lectronique et aux fonctions des applications incluses dans celui-ci[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/core-wireless-licensing-sarl-v-lg-elecs-inc-16\">Core Wireless Licensing v. LG Elecs., Inc.<\/a>, 880 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018).[\/footnote];<\/li>\r\n \t<li style=\"text-align: justify;\">une m\u00e9thode qui permet aux ordinateurs de produire une synchronisation labiale et des expressions faciales pr\u00e9cises et r\u00e9alistes dans des personnages anim\u00e9s qui n'\u00e9taient auparavant produites que par des animateurs humains[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/mcro-inc-v-bandai-namco-games-am-inc-1\">McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc.<\/a>, 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016).[\/footnote];<\/li>\r\n \t<li style=\"text-align: justify;\">une m\u00e9thode et un syst\u00e8me de filtrage du contenu Internet[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/bascom-global-internet-servs-inc-v-att-mobility-llc-1\">Bascom Global Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&amp;T Mobility LLC<\/a>, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016).[\/footnote];<\/li>\r\n \t<li style=\"text-align: justify;\">des syst\u00e8mes et proc\u00e9d\u00e9s de g\u00e9n\u00e9ration d'une page Web composite qui combine certains \u00e9l\u00e9ments visuels d'un site Web \u00ab h\u00f4te \u00bb avec le contenu d'un marchand tiers[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/ddr-holdings-llc-v-hotelscom-lp\">DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P.<\/a>, 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014).[\/footnote].<\/li>\r\n<\/ul>\r\nA l'inverse, ont \u00e9t\u00e9 consid\u00e9r\u00e9es comme relevant d\u2019id\u00e9es abstraites non brevetables et d\u00e9pourvues de concept inventif:\r\n<ul>\r\n \t<li style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\">un proc\u00e9d\u00e9 de visualisation de plusieurs images vid\u00e9o affich\u00e9es et stock\u00e9es simultan\u00e9ment sur le dispositif de visualisation \u00e0 distance d'un syst\u00e8me de vid\u00e9osurveillance[footnote]<a style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\" href=\"https:\/\/cafc.uscourts.gov\/opinions-orders\/22-1222.OPINION.2-17-2023_2082526.pdf\">Hawk Tech. Sys., LLC v. Castle Retail, LLC<\/a>, 60 F.4th 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2023).[\/footnote];<\/span><\/li>\r\n \t<li style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\">une m\u00e9thode d'affichage et de synchronisation de donn\u00e9es cartographiques[footnote]<a style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/intl-bus-machs-corp-v-zillow-grp-10\">Int\u2019l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. Zillow Group, Inc.<\/a>, 50 F.4th 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2022).<\/span><span style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\">[\/footnote];<\/span><\/li>\r\n \t<li style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\">un syst\u00e8me et un proc\u00e9d\u00e9 algorithmique permettant de d\u00e9terminer l'\u00e9ligibilit\u00e9 aux prestations d'assurance invalidit\u00e9 de la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 sociale via un r\u00e9seau informatique[footnote]<a style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/in-re-killian-12\">In re Killian<\/a>, 45 F.4th 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2022).[\/footnote];<\/span><\/li>\r\n \t<li style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\">un proc\u00e9d\u00e9 de s\u00e9curisation de paiements par voie \u00e9lectronique permettant l'identification d'une personne sans fourniture d'informations personnelles[footnote]<a style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/universal-secure-registry-llc-v-apple-inc-3\">Universal Secure Registry LLC v. Apple Inc.<\/a>, 10 F.4th 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2021).[\/footnote];<\/span><\/li>\r\n \t<li style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\">un syst\u00e8me permettant d'adresser \u00e0 un utilisateur de t\u00e9l\u00e9phone mobile de la publicit\u00e9 cibl\u00e9e sur la base des donn\u00e9es recueillies sur le t\u00e9l\u00e9viseur de l'utilisateur.[footnote]<a style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\" href=\"https:\/\/law.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/appellate-courts\/cafc\/19-1506\/19-1506-2021-05-11.html\">Free Stream Media Corp. v. Alphonso Inc.<\/a>, 996 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2021).[\/footnote];<\/span><\/li>\r\n \t<li style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\">un syst\u00e8me et un proc\u00e9d\u00e9 permettant au client d'un programme de fid\u00e9lit\u00e9 d'\u00e9changer des points de fid\u00e9lit\u00e9 contre des r\u00e9compenses offertes par des vendeurs sans intervention humaine.[footnote]<a style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/cxloyalty-inc-v-maritz-holdings-inc\">cxLoyalty, Inc. v. Maritz Holdings, Inc.<\/a>, 986 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2021).[\/footnote];<\/span><\/li>\r\n \t<li><span style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\">un syst\u00e8me informatis\u00e9 permettant d'utiliser des graphiques pour cr\u00e9er des simulations orient\u00e9es objet sans programmation[footnote]<a style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/simio-llc-v-flexsim-software-prods-inc-2\">Simio, LLC v. FlexSim Software Products, Inc.<\/a>, 983 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2020).[\/footnote];<\/span><\/li>\r\n \t<li style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\">un syst\u00e8me s\u00e9curis\u00e9 de notifcation permettant \u00e0 un utilisateur de communiquer avec des livreurs ou des personnes charg\u00e9es de l'enl\u00e8vement d'objets[footnote]<a style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/elec-commcn-techs-llc-v-shopperschoicecom-llc\">Electronic Commc\u2019n Tech., LLC v. ShoppersChoice.Com, LLC<\/a>, 958 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2020).[\/footnote];<\/span><\/li>\r\n \t<li style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\">un proc\u00e9d\u00e9 mis en \u0153uvre par ordinateur pour d\u00e9tecter une fraude dans des transactions financi\u00e8res pendant un processus de compensation de paiement[footnote]<a style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/bozeman-fin-llc-v-fed-reserve-bank-of-atlanta\">Bozeman Financial LLC v. Federal Reserve Bank<\/a>, 955 F.3d 971 (Fed. Cir. 2020).[\/footnote];<\/span><\/li>\r\n \t<li style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\">une interface graphique utilisateur pour le trading par voie \u00e9lectronique[footnote]<a style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/trading-techs-intl-inc-v-ibg-llc\">Trading Tech. Int\u2019l, Inc. v. IBG LLC<\/a>, 921 F.3d 1084 (Fed. Cir. 2019).[\/footnote];<\/span><\/li>\r\n \t<li style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\">un syst\u00e8me de bornes de recharge pour v\u00e9hicules \u00e9lectriques connect\u00e9es et contr\u00f4l\u00e9es en r\u00e9seau[footnote]<a style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/chargepoint-inc-v-semaconnect-inc-1\">ChargePoint, Inc. v. SemaConnect, Inc.<\/a>, 920 F.3d 759 (Fed. Cir. 2019).[\/footnote];<\/span><\/li>\r\n \t<li style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\">des m\u00e9thodes de filtrage d'e-mails et de fichier pour d\u00e9tecter des contenus ind\u00e9sirables[footnote]<a style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\" href=\"https:\/\/www.bitlaw.com\/source\/cases\/patent\/IV-Symantec.html\">Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp.<\/a>, 838 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2016).[\/footnote];<\/span><\/li>\r\n \t<li style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\">un\u00a0 syst\u00e8me mis en \u0153uvre par ordinateur permettant aux emprunteurs d'obtenir de mani\u00e8re anonyme des pr\u00eats propos\u00e9s par une pluralit\u00e9 de pr\u00eateurs.[footnote]<a style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/mortg-grader-inc-v-first-choice-loan-servs-inc\">Mortgage Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc.<\/a>, 811 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016).[\/footnote];<\/span><\/li>\r\n \t<li style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\">une m\u00e9thode d'optimisation des prix dans un environnement d'e-commerce[footnote]<a style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\" href=\"https:\/\/www.casemine.com\/judgement\/us\/5914fa4cadd7b049349a7444\">OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.<\/a>, 788 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2015).[\/footnote];<\/span><\/li>\r\n \t<li style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\">un proc\u00e9d\u00e9 de distribution de produits multim\u00e9dias prot\u00e9g\u00e9s par le droit d'auteur sur Internet, dans lequel le consommateur re\u00e7oit gratuitement un produit multim\u00e9dia prot\u00e9g\u00e9 par le droit d'auteur en \u00e9change de la visualisation d'une publicit\u00e9, l'annonceur payant pour le contenu prot\u00e9g\u00e9.[footnote]<a style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/ultramercial-inc-v-hulu\">Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC<\/a>, 772 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014).[\/footnote].<\/span><\/li>\r\n<\/ul>\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<strong>370._ Les inventions dans le domaine de l\u2019IA _ <\/strong>Les inventions dans le domaine de l'IA (relatives \u00e0 des m\u00e9thodes ou \u00e0 des syst\u00e8mes relevant de l'IA, ou utilisant des syst\u00e8mes d'IA) sont soumises au m\u00eame r\u00e9gime que les inventions logicielles impliquant une analyse de donn\u00e9es, et peuvent poser probl\u00e8me au regard de l'exclusion de la brevetabilit\u00e9 des id\u00e9es abstraites. Rappelons cependant qu'en application de la jurisprudence <em>Alice<\/em>[footnote]V. <em>supra,<\/em> n\u00b0364.[\/footnote], des revendications portant sur des id\u00e9es abstraites restent \u00e9ligibles \u00e0 la protection si elles contiennent des \u00e9l\u00e9ments compl\u00e9mentaires qui vont au-del\u00e0 d'une id\u00e9e abstraite et rel\u00e8vent d'un concept inventif. Des illustrations int\u00e9ressantes et d\u00e9taill\u00e9es sont donn\u00e9es par l'USPTO dans son document \"Subject Matter Eligibility Examples\" de juillet 20024[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.uspto.gov\/sites\/default\/files\/documents\/2024-AI-SMEUpdateExamples47-49.pdf\">Subject Matter Eligibility Examples<\/a>, July 2024.[\/footnote], qui illustre l'application du test de brevetabilit\u00e9 \u00e0 des revendications:\r\n<ul>\r\n \t<li style=\"text-align: justify;\">portant sur l'utilisation d'un r\u00e9seau de neurones artificiels pour identifier ou d\u00e9tecter des anomalies[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.uspto.gov\/sites\/default\/files\/documents\/2024-AI-SMEUpdateExamples47-49.pdf\">Exemple 47<\/a>. [\/footnote];<\/li>\r\n \t<li style=\"text-align: justify;\">\u00e9noncant des m\u00e9thodes bas\u00e9es sur l'intelligence artificielle pour analyser les signaux vocaux et s\u00e9parer la parole souhait\u00e9e de la parole \u00e9trang\u00e8re ou de fond[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.uspto.gov\/sites\/default\/files\/documents\/2024-AI-SMEUpdateExamples47-49.pdf\">Exemple 48<\/a>.[\/footnote];<\/li>\r\n \t<li style=\"text-align: justify;\">et portant sur un mod\u00e8le d'intelligence artificielle con\u00e7u pour aider \u00e0 personnaliser le traitement m\u00e9dical en fonction des caract\u00e9ristiques individuelles d'un patient particulier[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.uspto.gov\/sites\/default\/files\/documents\/2024-AI-SMEUpdateExamples47-49.pdf\">Exemple 49<\/a>.[\/footnote].<\/li>\r\n<\/ul>\r\nLa question des inventions g\u00e9n\u00e9r\u00e9es \u00e0 l'aide ou au moyen de syst\u00e8mes d'IA g\u00e9n\u00e9rative est \u00e9tudi\u00e9e plus loin[footnote]V. <em>infra<\/em>, n\u00b0390.[\/footnote].\r\n\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<strong>371._ Tableaux des d\u00e9cisions de la Cour supr\u00eame sur la brevetabilit\u00e9_ <\/strong>Le tableau ci-dessous, adapt\u00e9 d'un tableau disponible sur le site de l'USPTO[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.uspto.gov\/sites\/default\/files\/documents\/ieg-sme_crt_dec.xlsx\">Chart of Subject Matter Eligibility Court Decisions<\/a> (updated October 17, 2019).[\/footnote], reprend les principales d\u00e9cisions de la Cour supr\u00eame ayant valeur de pr\u00e9c\u00e9dent (<em>precedential<\/em>) rendues sur la question de la brevetabilit\u00e9, dont il a \u00e9t\u00e9 question ci-dessus.\r\n<table class=\"shaded\" style=\"height: 1071px;\">\r\n<tbody>\r\n<tr style=\"height: 31px;\">\r\n<td style=\"width: 202.438px; height: 31px;\"><strong>Nom de l\u2019arr\u00eat<\/strong><\/td>\r\n<td style=\"width: 83.5625px; height: 31px;\"><strong>N\u00b0 brevet \/ demande<\/strong><\/td>\r\n<td style=\"width: 139.719px; height: 31px;\"><strong>Titre \/ objet<\/strong><\/td>\r\n<td style=\"width: 95.2812px; height: 31px;\"><strong>Type de revendication<\/strong><\/td>\r\n<td style=\"width: 76.5px; height: 31px;\"><strong>Type d\u2019exclusion<\/strong><\/td>\r\n<td style=\"width: 61.8594px; height: 31px;\"><strong>Solution<\/strong><\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr style=\"height: 142px;\">\r\n<td style=\"width: 202.438px; height: 142px;\"><em>Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int\u2019l<\/em>[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/573\/208\/\">573 U.S. __<\/a>, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 110 U.S.P.Q.2d 1976 (2014) .[\/footnote]<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"width: 83.5625px; height: 142px;\">5,970,479\r\n6,912,510\r\n7,149,720\r\n7,725,375<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"width: 139.719px; height: 142px;\">Formulation et n\u00e9gociation de contrats de gestion des risques<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"width: 95.2812px; height: 142px;\">Proc\u00e9d\u00e9s, syst\u00e8mes, supports lisibles par ordinateur<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"width: 76.5px; height: 142px;\">Id\u00e9e abstraite<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"width: 61.8594px; height: 142px;\"><em>Ineligible\r\n\u2019479: asserted claims 33-34.\r\n\u2019510, \u2019720, and \u2019375: all claims.<\/em><\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr style=\"height: 237px;\">\r\n<td style=\"width: 202.438px; height: 237px;\"><em>Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.<\/em> [footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/569\/576\/\">569 U.S. __<\/a>, 133 S. Ct. 2107, 106 U.S.P.Q.2d 1972 (2013).[\/footnote]<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"width: 83.5625px; height: 237px;\">5,747,282\r\n5,837,492\r\n5,693,473<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"width: 139.719px; height: 237px;\">G\u00e8ne pr\u00e9disposant au cancer du sein et de l'ovaire<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"width: 95.2812px; height: 237px;\">Produits<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"width: 76.5px; height: 237px;\">Produit de la nature<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"width: 61.8594px; height: 237px;\"><em>Ineligible\r\n\u2018282: claims 1, 5-6\r\n\u2018473: claim 1\r\n\u2018492: claims 1 &amp; 6\r\nEligible\r\n\u2018282: claims 2 &amp; 7\r\n\u2018492: claim 7<\/em><\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr style=\"height: 47px;\">\r\n<td style=\"width: 202.438px; height: 47px;\"><em>Bilski v. Kappos<\/em>[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/561\/593\/\">561 U.S. 593<\/a>, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001 (2010).[\/footnote]<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"width: 83.5625px; height: 47px;\">08\/833,892<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"width: 139.719px; height: 47px;\">M\u00e9thode de gestion des risques \u00e9nerg\u00e9tiques<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"width: 95.2812px; height: 47px;\">M\u00e9thode<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"width: 76.5px; height: 47px;\">Id\u00e9e abstraite<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"width: 61.8594px; height: 47px;\"><em>Ineligible<\/em><\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr style=\"height: 63px;\">\r\n<td style=\"width: 202.438px; height: 63px;\"><em>Diamond v. Chakrabarty<\/em>[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/447\/303\/\">447 U.S. 303<\/a>, 206 U.S.P.Q. 193 (1980).[\/footnote]<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"width: 83.5625px; height: 63px;\">4 259 444<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"width: 139.719px; height: 63px;\">Micro-organisme ayant des plasmides et pr\u00e9paration de celui-ci<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"width: 95.2812px; height: 63px;\">Produit et m\u00e9thodes<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"width: 76.5px; height: 63px;\">Produit de la nature<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"width: 61.8594px; height: 63px;\"><em>Eligible<\/em><\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr style=\"height: 63px;\">\r\n<td style=\"width: 202.438px; height: 63px;\"><em>Diamond v. Diehr<\/em>[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/450\/175\/\">50 U.S. 175<\/a>, 209 U.S.P.Q. 1 (1981).[\/footnote]<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"width: 83.5625px; height: 63px;\">4 344 142<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"width: 139.719px; height: 63px;\">Contr\u00f4le num\u00e9rique direct des presses de moulage de caoutchouc<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"width: 95.2812px; height: 63px;\">M\u00e9thode<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"width: 76.5px; height: 63px;\">Abstract Idea<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"width: 61.8594px; height: 63px;\"><em>Eligible<\/em><\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr style=\"height: 63px;\">\r\n<td style=\"width: 202.438px; height: 63px;\"><em>Eibel Process Co. v. Minnesota &amp; Ontario Paper Co.<\/em> [footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/261\/45\/\">261 U.S. 45<\/a> (1923).[\/footnote]<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"width: 83.5625px; height: 63px;\">845 224<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"width: 139.719px; height: 63px;\">Machine Fourdrinier pour la fabrication du papier<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"width: 95.2812px; height: 63px;\">Syst\u00e8me<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"width: 76.5px; height: 63px;\">Loi de la nature<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"width: 61.8594px; height: 63px;\"><em>Eligible<\/em><\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr style=\"height: 63px;\">\r\n<td style=\"width: 202.438px; height: 63px;\"><em>Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.<\/em> [footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/333\/127\/\">333 U.S. 127<\/a>, 131 (1948).[\/footnote]<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"width: 83.5625px; height: 63px;\">2 200 532<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"width: 139.719px; height: 63px;\">Inoculant bact\u00e9rien pour l\u00e9gumineuses<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"width: 95.2812px; height: 63px;\">Produits<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"width: 76.5px; height: 63px;\">Produit de la nature<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"width: 61.8594px; height: 63px;\"><em>Ineligible\r\nClaims 1, 3-8, 13 &amp; 14<\/em><\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr style=\"height: 63px;\">\r\n<td style=\"width: 202.438px; height: 63px;\"><em>Gottschalk v. Benson<\/em>[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/409\/63\/\">409 U.S. 63<\/a>, 175 U.S.P.Q. 673 (1972) .[\/footnote]<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"width: 83.5625px; height: 63px;\">04\/315,050<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"width: 139.719px; height: 63px;\">Conversion d'informations num\u00e9riques<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"width: 95.2812px; height: 63px;\">M\u00e9thode<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"width: 76.5px; height: 63px;\">Id\u00e9e abstraite<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"width: 61.8594px; height: 63px;\"><em>Ineligible<\/em><\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr style=\"height: 47px;\">\r\n<td style=\"width: 202.438px; height: 47px;\"><em>Mackay Radio &amp; Telegraph v. Radio Corp of Am.<\/em>[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/306\/86\/\">306 U.S. 86<\/a>, 40 U.S.P.Q. 199 (1939) .[\/footnote]<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"width: 83.5625px; height: 47px;\">1 974 387<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"width: 139.719px; height: 47px;\">Antenne<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"width: 95.2812px; height: 47px;\">Produits<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"width: 76.5px; height: 47px;\">Id\u00e9e abstraite<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"width: 61.8594px; height: 47px;\"><em>Eligible\r\nclaims 15 and 16<\/em><\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr style=\"height: 142px;\">\r\n<td style=\"width: 202.438px; height: 142px;\"><em>Mayo Collaborative Svcs. v. Prometheus Labs.<\/em> [footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/566\/66\/\">566 U.S. __<\/a>, 132 S. Ct. 1289, 101 U.S.P.Q.2d 1961 (2012) .[\/footnote]<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"width: 83.5625px; height: 142px;\">6,355,623\r\n6,680,302<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"width: 139.719px; height: 142px;\">Optimisation de l'efficacit\u00e9 th\u00e9rapeutique des m\u00e9dicaments pour le traitement des troubles gastro-intestinaux \u00e0 m\u00e9diation immunitaire<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"width: 95.2812px; height: 142px;\">M\u00e9thode<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"width: 76.5px; height: 142px;\">Loi de la nature<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"width: 61.8594px; height: 142px;\"><em>Ineligible<\/em><\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr style=\"height: 47px;\">\r\n<td style=\"width: 202.438px; height: 47px;\"><em>Parker v. Flook<\/em>[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/437\/584\/\">437 U.S. 584<\/a>, 198 U.S.P.Q. 193 (1978) .[\/footnote]<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"width: 83.5625px; height: 47px;\">05\/194,032<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"width: 139.719px; height: 47px;\">M\u00e9thode de mise \u00e0 jour des limites d'alarme<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"width: 95.2812px; height: 47px;\">M\u00e9thode<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"width: 76.5px; height: 47px;\">Abstract Idea<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"width: 61.8594px; height: 47px;\"><em>Ineligible<\/em><\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr style=\"height: 63px;\">\r\n<td style=\"width: 202.438px; height: 63px;\"><em>Tilghman v. Proctor<\/em>[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/102\/707\/\">102 U.S. 707<\/a> (1881) .[\/footnote]<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"width: 83.5625px; height: 63px;\">11 766<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"width: 139.719px; height: 63px;\">Obtention d'acides gras libres et de glyc\u00e9rine \u00e0 partir de corps gras<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"width: 95.2812px; height: 63px;\">M\u00e9thode<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"width: 76.5px; height: 63px;\">Loi de la nature<\/td>\r\n<td style=\"width: 61.8594px; height: 63px;\"><em>Eligible<\/em><\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<\/tbody>\r\n<\/table>\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<strong>372._ L\u2019exigence d\u2019unit\u00e9 d\u2019invention (prohibition de la double brevetabilit\u00e9)_ <\/strong>Le droit des brevets US consacre l\u2019exigence d\u2019unit\u00e9 d\u2019invention au travers de la prohibition de la \u00ab double brevetabilit\u00e9 \u00bb. Cette prohibition est issue de la section 101 du Patent Act[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/101\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 101<\/a>.[\/footnote], qui dispose que l\u2019inventeur peut obtenir \u00ab un brevet \u00bb pour chaque invention (\u00ab Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, ... may obtain\u00a0<em>a<\/em> patent therefor \u00bb)[footnote]V. sur ce point <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/abbvie-inc-v-mathilda-terence-kennedy-inst-of-rheumatology-trust\">AbbVie Inc. v. Mathilda and Terence Kennedy Institute of Rheumatology<\/a>, 764 F.3d 1366, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2014) : \u00ab While often described as a court-created doctrine, obviousness-type double patenting is grounded in the text of the Patent Act. See In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887, 892 (Fed.Cir.1985); see also Boehringer Ingelheim Int'l. GmbH v. Barr Labs., Inc., 592 F.3d 1340, 1346 (Fed.Cir.2010); Eli Lilly &amp; Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 967 (Fed.Cir.2001). Section 101 reads: \u201cWhoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, ... may obtain a patent therefor.\u201d 35 U.S.C. \u00a7 101 (emphasis added). Thus, \u00a7 101 forbids an individual from obtaining more than one patent on the same invention, i.e., double patenting. As this court has explained, \u201ca rejection based upon double patenting of the obviousness type\u201d is \u201cgrounded in public policy (a policy reflected in the patent statute).\u201d Longi, 759 F.2d at 892.\r\n\r\nThe courts have recognized this principle since the inception of our patent laws. In 1819, Justice Story explained, \u201cIt cannot be, that a patentee can have in use at the same time two valid patents for the same invention; and if he can successively take out at different times new patents for the same invention, he may perpetuate his exclusive right during a century.... If this proceeding could obtain countenance, it would completely destroy the whole consideration derived by the public for the grant of the patent, [ ] the right to use the invention at the expiration of the term specified in the original grant.\u201d Odiorne v. Amesbury Nail Factory, 18 F. Cas. 578, 579 (C.C.D.Mass.1819). The Supreme Court has reaffirmed the prohibition on double patenting on multiple occasions.\u00a0<em>See\u00a0Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co.,<\/em>\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/singer-mfg-co-v-june-mfg-co#p185\">163 U.S. 169, 185<\/a>,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/singer-mfg-co-v-june-mfg-co\">16 S.Ct. 1002<\/a>,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/singer-mfg-co-v-june-mfg-co\">41 L.Ed. 118<\/a>\u00a0(1896) (\u201cIt is self-evident that on the expiration of a patent the monopoly created by it ceases to exist, and the right to make the thing formerly covered by the patent becomes public property. It is upon this condition that the patent is granted.\u201d);\u00a0<em>Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co.,<\/em>\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/miller-v-eagle-manufacturing-co#p197\">151 U.S. 186, 197\u201398<\/a>,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/miller-v-eagle-manufacturing-co\">14 S.Ct. 310<\/a>,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/miller-v-eagle-manufacturing-co\">38 L.Ed. 121<\/a>\u00a0(1894);\u00a0<em>Suffolk Co. v. Hayden,<\/em>\u00a070 U.S. (3 Wall.) 315, 319, 18 L.Ed. 76 (1865). As this court recently reminded, \u201c[t]he bar against double patenting was created to preserve that bargained-for right held by the public.\u201d\u00a0<em>Gilead Scis., Inc. v. Natco Pharma Ltd.,<\/em>\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/gilead-scis-3#p1212\">753 F.3d 1208, 1212<\/a>\u00a0(Fed.Cir.2014);\u00a0<em>see also\u00a0Boehringer,<\/em>\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/boehringer-ingelheim-v-barr-labor#p1346\">592 F.3d at 1346<\/a>;\u00a0<em>Longi,<\/em>\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/longi-in-re-2#p892\">759 F.2d at 892<\/a>;\u00a0<em>In re\u00a0<\/em>\u00a0<em>Robeson,<\/em>\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/application-of-robeson\">51 CCPA 1271<\/a>,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/application-of-robeson#p614\">331 F.2d 610, 614<\/a>\u00a0(1964). The ban on double patenting ensures that the public gets the benefit of the invention after the original period of monopoly expires.\u00bb[\/footnote].\r\n\r\nLe droit US distingue deux types d'interdictions de la double brevetabilit\u00e9, qui recoupent le champ de l\u2019article 82 CBE, et de l\u2019article L 612-4 du Code de la propri\u00e9t\u00e9 intellectuelle fran\u00e7ais[footnote]\"La demande de brevet ne peut concerner qu'une invention ou une pluralit\u00e9 d'inventions li\u00e9es entre elles de telle sorte qu'elles ne forment qu'un seul concept inventif g\u00e9n\u00e9ral\".[\/footnote]: une prohibition l\u00e9gale, et une prohibition pr\u00e9torienne.\r\n\r\nLa prohibition l\u00e9gale de la double brevetabilit\u00e9 (<em>statutory<\/em> ou <em>same invention double patenting law<\/em>), issue de la section 101 du Patent Act (35 U.S.C. \u00a7 101), interdit de conf\u00e9rer \u00e0 un demandeur plusieurs brevets pour une m\u00eame invention. Cette prohibition ne conna\u00eet aucune exception.\r\n\r\nLa prohibition pr\u00e9torienne, dite <em>obviousness-type double patenting<\/em> (ODP), interdit de conf\u00e9rer \u00e0 un demandeur plusieurs brevets qui revendiquent des inventions diff\u00e9rentes mais\u00a0 li\u00e9es entre elles de telle sorte qu\u2019elles ne forment qu\u2019un seul concept inventif g\u00e9n\u00e9ral[footnote]V. <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/abbvie-inc-v-mathilda-terence-kennedy-inst-of-rheumatology-trust\">AbbVie Inc.<\/a>, 764 F.3d, p. 1372 ; <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/in-re-hubbell-3\">In re Hubbell<\/a>, 709 F.3d 1140, 1145 (Fed. Cir. 2013); <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/longi-in-re-2\">In re Longi<\/a>, 759 F.2d 887, 892 (Fed. Cir. 1985).[\/footnote]. Cette seconde prohibition connait deux exceptions, en cas de renonciation aux revendications concern\u00e9es du brevet litigieux, et en cas d\u2019application du \u00ab safe harbor \u00bb pr\u00e9vu en cas de demande divisionnaire par la section 121 du Patent Act, permettant qu\u2019une demande divisionnaire ne puisse se voir opposer la demande parente[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/121\">35. U.S.C. \u00a7 121<\/a>:<em> \"<\/em>If two or more independent and distinct inventions are claimed in one application, the Director may require the application to be restricted to one of the inventions. If the other invention is made the subject of a divisional application which complies with the requirements of section 120 [claiming benefit of priority] it shall be entitled to the benefit of the filing date of the original application. A patent issuing on an application with respect to which a requirement for restriction under this section has been made, or on an application filed as a result of such a requirement, shall not be used as a reference either in the Patent and Trademark Office or in the courts against a divisional application or against the original application or any patent issued on either of them, if the divisional application is filed before the issuance of the patent on the other application. The validity of a patent shall not be questioned for failure of the Director to require the application to be restricted to one invention\".[\/footnote].\r\n\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<strong>373._ La nouveaut\u00e9_<\/strong> La d\u00e9finition de la nouveaut\u00e9, et plus pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment des ant\u00e9riorit\u00e9s opposables (<em>prior art<\/em>), a \u00e9t\u00e9 profond\u00e9ment modifi\u00e9e par le Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA), \u00e0 effet en mars 2013. Auparavant, la section 102 disposait\u00a0:\r\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\r\n\r\n\u00ab\u00a0Une personne aura droit \u00e0 un brevet \u00e0 moins:\r\n\r\n(a) que l\u2019invention soit connue ou utilis\u00e9e par d\u2019autres dans ce pays, ou qu\u2019elle soit brevet\u00e9e ou d\u00e9crite dans une publication imprim\u00e9e dans ce pays ou \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9tranger, avant son invention par le demandeur au brevet, ou\r\n\r\n(b) que l\u2019invention soit brevet\u00e9e ou d\u00e9crite dans une publication imprim\u00e9e dans ce pays ou un pays \u00e9tranger ou soit utilis\u00e9e publiquement ou en vente dans ce pays, plus d\u2019un an avant la date de la demande de brevet aux \u00c9tats-Unis, ou\r\n\r\n(c) qu\u2019il ait abandonn\u00e9 l'invention, ou\r\n\r\n(d) que l\u2019invention ait \u00e9t\u00e9 brevet\u00e9e (\u2026) par le demandeur ou ses repr\u00e9sentants l\u00e9gaux ou cessionnaires dans un pays \u00e9tranger (\u2026) plus de douze mois avant le d\u00e9p\u00f4t de la demande aux \u00c9tats-Unis, ou\r\n\r\n(\u2026)\r\n\r\n(f) qu'il n'ait pas invent\u00e9 lui-m\u00eame l'invention \u00e0 breveter\u00a0; (\u2026)\u00a0\u00bb\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\nCette d\u00e9finition avait notamment pour effet notable de r\u00e9duire le champ des ant\u00e9riorit\u00e9s \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9tranger, en les limitant aux seules inventions brevet\u00e9es ou d\u00e9crites dans une publication \u00e9crite[footnote]Ainsi la connaissance ou l\u2019utilisation de l\u2019invention en dehors des \u00c9tats-Unis uniquement ne pouvait ant\u00e9rioriser l\u2019invention aux termes de <a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/102\">35\u00a0U.S.C. 102(a)<\/a>. <em>In re Ekenstam<\/em>, 256 F.2d 321, 118 USPQ 349 (CCPA 1958).[\/footnote]. Elle \u00e9tablissait \u00e9galement un d\u00e9lai de gr\u00e2ce d\u2019un an, qui constituait, et constitue toujours, sous sa forme modifi\u00e9e, une grande particularit\u00e9 du droit am\u00e9ricain des brevets.\r\n\r\nLe nouvel article 102(a), issu de l\u2019America Invents Act, tire toutes les cons\u00e9quences d\u2019un passage au syst\u00e8me de l\u2019inventeur premier d\u00e9posant. Il dispose d\u00e9sormais\u00a0:\r\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\r\n\r\n\u00ab\u00a0Une personne aura droit \u00e0 un brevet \u00e0 moins:\r\n\r\n(1) que l\u2019invention revendiqu\u00e9e soit brevet\u00e9e, d\u00e9crite dans une publication imprim\u00e9e, ou utilis\u00e9e publiquement, en vente, ou autrement mise \u00e0 la disposition du public avant la date effective de d\u00e9p\u00f4t de l\u2019invention revendiqu\u00e9e\u00a0; ou\r\n\r\n(2) que l\u2019invention revendiqu\u00e9e soit d\u00e9crite dans un brevet d\u00e9livr\u00e9 en application de la section 151, ou dans une demande de brevet publi\u00e9e ou pr\u00e9sum\u00e9e publi\u00e9e en application de la section 122(b), dans laquelle le brevet ou la demande, selon le cas, d\u00e9signe un autre inventeur et a \u00e9t\u00e9 effectivement d\u00e9pos\u00e9 avant la date effective de d\u00e9p\u00f4t de l\u2019invention revendiqu\u00e9e\u00a0\u00bb.\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\nLa nouveau paragraphe 102(a)(1) supprime les restrictions territoriales dans la d\u00e9finition de l\u2019art ant\u00e9rieur auparavant applicable.\r\n\r\nLe paragraphe 102(a)(2) vise quant \u00e0 lui les publications de demandes de brevets am\u00e9ricains, les brevets am\u00e9ricains et les publications de demandes PCT d\u00e9signant les \u00c9tats-Unis qui d\u00e9signent un autre inventeur. Sont ainsi compris dans l\u2019\u00e9tat de la technique les contenus de demandes de brevet qui ont une date effective de d\u00e9p\u00f4t ant\u00e9rieure au d\u00e9p\u00f4t de l\u2019invention et qui n\u2019ont \u00e9t\u00e9 publi\u00e9es qu'\u00e0 cette date ou qu'\u00e0 une date post\u00e9rieure[footnote]Cette r\u00e8gle est similaire \u00e0 celle pos\u00e9e par l\u2019article L.611-11 alin\u00e9a 3 du Cpi et par l\u2019article 54(3) de la CBE 2000.[\/footnote]. Cette date est, pour les demandes revendiquant la priorit\u00e9 d\u2019une demande \u00e9trang\u00e8re, la date de priorit\u00e9[footnote]L\u2019America Invents Act met fin sur ce point (sous r\u00e9serve des r\u00e8gles transitoires) \u00e0 la jurisprudence qui, pour ces demandes, ignorait la date de priorit\u00e9 et ne prenait en compte que la date du d\u00e9p\u00f4t aux \u00c9tats-Unis.[\/footnote].\r\n\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<strong>374._ \u00ab L\u2019usage public \u00bb_<\/strong> Comme indiqu\u00e9, le texte de la section 102(a)1 issu de l\u2019AIA (35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1)) ne pose aucune limitation g\u00e9ographique \u00e0 l\u2019utilisation publique constitutive d\u2019un \u00e9tat de la technique ant\u00e9rieure du d\u00e9p\u00f4t. Selon les tribunaux :\r\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\r\n\r\n\u00ab Le test applicable pour d\u00e9terminer l'usage public vis\u00e9 de l'article 102 b) est de savoir si l'usage pr\u00e9sum\u00e9 : (1) \u00e9tait accessible au public ou (2) a \u00e9t\u00e9 effectu\u00e9 \u00e0 des fins commerciales. L'exploitation commerciale est une indication claire de l'usage public, mais elle n\u00e9cessite probablement plus que, par exemple, une offre confidentielle \u00e0 la vente. Ainsi, le crit\u00e8re de l'usage public implique l'examen des \u00e9l\u00e9ments de preuve concernant l'exp\u00e9rimentation et, entre autres, la nature de l'activit\u00e9 qui s'est d\u00e9roul\u00e9e en public, l'acc\u00e8s du public \u00e0 l'utilisation, les obligations de confidentialit\u00e9 impos\u00e9es aux membres du public qui ont observ\u00e9 l'utilisation et l'exploitation commerciale, voir Allied Colloids, Inc. c. Am. Cyanamid Co., 64 F.3d 1570, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Ces \u00e9l\u00e9ments de preuve sont pertinents pour d\u00e9terminer si l'utilisation \u00e9tait un usage public susceptible de faire obstacle \u00e0 la brevetabilit\u00e9 \u00bb[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/invitrogen-corp-v-biocrest-mfg-lp-2\">Invitrogen Corp. v. Biocrest Manufacturing L.P.<\/a>, 424 F.3d 1374, 76 USPQ2d 1741 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Egalement, Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333, 336 (1881): \u201c[T]o constitute the public use of an invention it is not necessary that more than one of the patent articles should be publicly used. The use of a great number may tend to strengthen the proof, but one well defined case of such use is just as effectual to annul the patent as many.\u201d <em>Allied Colloids, Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co.,<\/em>\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/allied-colloids-inc-v-american-cyanamid-co#p1574\">64 F.3d 1570, 1574<\/a> (Fed. Cir. 1995).[\/footnote].\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\nUn usage public a lieu lorsqu\u2019une machine ou un objet incorporant l\u2019invention est expos\u00e9 en public ou vendu au public, m\u00eame lorsque l\u2019invention est cach\u00e9e \u00e0 la vue du public[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/application-of-blaisdell\">In re Blaisdell<\/a>, 242 F.2d 779, 783, 113 USPQ 289, 292 (CCPA 1957); <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/hall-v-macneale\">Hall v. Macneale<\/a>, 107 U.S. 90, 96-97 (1882); Ex parte Kuklo, 25 USPQ2d 1387, 1390 (Bd. Pat. App. &amp; Inter. 1992).[\/footnote], ou lorsque l\u2019inventeur permet \u00e0 un tiers d\u2019utiliser l\u2019invention sans restriction ou obligation de confidentialit\u00e9[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/smith-in-re-9\">In re Smith<\/a>, 714 F.2d 1127, 1134, 218 USPQ 976, 983 (Fed. Cir. 1983); <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/moleculon-research-corp-v-cbs-inc-2\">Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc.<\/a>, 793 F.2d 1261, 1265, 229 USPQ 805, 809 (Fed. Cir. 1986); <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/104\/333\/\">Egbert v. Lippmann<\/a>, 104 U.S. 333, 336 (1881).[\/footnote]\r\n\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<strong>375._ L\u2019offre \u00e0 la vente (<em>on sale bar<\/em>)_<\/strong>[footnote]Lindholm, Stephen Bruce, Revisiting the On-Sale Bar after Pfaff. disponible sur SSRN: <a href=\"https:\/\/ssrn.com\/abstract=656243.%5b\/footnote\">https:\/\/ssrn.com\/abstract=656243<\/a>.[\/footnote] Afin de constituer une ant\u00e9riorit\u00e9 opposable au sens de ce texte, une invention doit (1) \u00eatre l'objet d'une offre commerciale de vente \u00e0 des fins non exp\u00e9rimentales et (2) \u00eatre \u00e0 l'\u00e9tat brevetable (<em>ready for patenting<\/em>)[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/525\/55\/\">Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc.<\/a>, 525 U.S. 55 (1998): \"The on-sale bar applies when two conditions are satisfied before the critical date. First, the product must be the subject of a commercial offer for sale. Here, the acceptance of the purchase order prior to April 8, 1981, makes it clear that such an offer had been made, and there is no question that the sale was commercial. Second, the invention must be ready for patenting. That condition may be satisfied in at least two ways: by proof of reduction to practice before the critical date; or by proof that prior to the critical date the inventor had prepared drawings or other descriptions of the invention that were sufficiently specific to enable a person skilled in the art to practice the invention. This condition is satisfied here because the drawings sent to the manufacturer before the critical date fully disclosed the invention\".[\/footnote].\r\n\r\nLa d\u00e9termination de l\u2019existence d\u2019une offre \u00e0 la vente rel\u00e8ve des principes de droit des contrats[footnote]V. <a href=\"https:\/\/law.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/appellate-courts\/F3\/275\/1040\/592286\/\">Linear Tech. Corp. v. Micrel, Inc.<\/a>, 275 F.3d 1040 (Fed. Cir. 2001); <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/group-one-ltd-v-hallmark-cards-inc-2\">Group One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc.<\/a>, 254 F.3d 1041 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (\"As a general proposition, we will look to the Uniform Commercial Code (\u2018UCC\u2019) to define whether \u2026 a communication or series of communications rises to the level of a commercial offer for sale.\").[\/footnote], qui impliquent notamment l\u2019existence d\u2019une offre ferme[footnote]\"[A] communication that fails to constitute a definite offer to sell the product and to include material terms is not an \u2018offer\u2019 in the contract sense.\" <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/elan-corp-v-andrx-pharmaceuticals-inc\">Elan Corp., PLC v. Andrx Pharms. Inc.<\/a>, 366 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2004).[\/footnote].\r\n\r\nUne vente au sens de cette disposition est un contrat par lequel le vendeur accepte \"de transf\u00e9rer des droits de propri\u00e9t\u00e9\" en contrepartie d'un paiement ou d'une promesse de paiement de l'acheteur[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/in-re-caveney\">In re Caveney<\/a>, 761 F.2d 671 (Fed. Cir. 1985).[\/footnote]. Une cession licence de droits ne constitue pas non plus une vente au sens de ce texte, sauf si elle s\u2019accompagne d\u2019un transfert du produit, ce qui sera par exemple le cas des licences de logiciels standard[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/in-re-kollar-2\">In re Kollar<\/a>, 286 F.3d 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2002).[\/footnote].\u00a0L\u2019offre \u00e0 la vente constitue une ant\u00e9riorit\u00e9 m\u00eame si elle est conditionnelle[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/strong-v-general-electric-company-2\">Strong v. General Elec. Co.<\/a>, 434 F.2d 1042 (5th Cir. 1970).[\/footnote], ou unique[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/94\/92\/\">Consolidated Fruit-Jar Co. v. Wright<\/a>, 94 U.S. 92 (1876); <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/atlantic-thermoplastics-co-v-faytex-corp-2\">Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp.<\/a>, 970 F.2d 834 (Fed. Cir. 1992).[\/footnote].\u00a0Par ailleurs la vente d\u00e9truit la nouveaut\u00e9 m\u00eame lorsque l\u2019inventeur n\u2019y a pas consenti et qu\u2019elle est le fait d\u2019un tiers qui a obtenu l\u2019invention de l\u2019inventeur[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/307\/5\/\">Electric Storage Battery Co. v. Shimadzu<\/a>, 307 U.S. 5 (1939); <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/application-of-blaisdell\">In re Blaisdell<\/a>, 242 F.2d 779 (CCPA 1957); <a href=\"https:\/\/law.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/district-courts\/FSupp\/469\/801\/1582273\/\">CTS Corp. v. Electro Materials Corp. of America<\/a>, 469 F. Supp. 801, 819, 202 USPQ 22, 38 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).[\/footnote]. <span style=\"font-size: 1em;\">Enfin, la vente n\u2019a pas non plus \u00e0 \u00eatre publique. <\/span>\r\n\r\nEn 2024, dans l\u2019affaire \u00a0<em>Celanese Intl. <\/em><em>Corp. v. Intl. Trade Comm\u2019n<\/em>[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/cdn.patentlyo.com\/media\/2024\/08\/22-1827.OPINION.8-12-2024_23654021.pdf\"><em>Celanese Intl. Corp. v. Intl. Trade Comm\u2019n<\/em><\/a>,\u00a0 22-01827 (Fed. Cir. August 12, 2024).[\/footnote]<em>, <\/em>le Circuit F\u00e9d\u00e9ral a rendu une d\u00e9cision importante sur l\u2019interpr\u00e9tation du texte de la section 102 issu de l\u2019AIA, en confirmant l\u2019application des principes ant\u00e9rieurs \u00e0 l\u2019AIA, et plus pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment la possibilit\u00e9 d\u2019ant\u00e9rioriser un d\u00e9p\u00f4t par la vente d\u2019un produit fabriqu\u00e9 \u00e0 l\u2019aide d\u2019un proc\u00e9d\u00e9 tenu secret.\r\n\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<strong>376._ \u00ab Autrement accessible au public \u00bb_ <\/strong>Le Manual of Patent Examining Procedure [footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.uspto.gov\/web\/offices\/pac\/mpep\/s2152.html\">MPEP \u00a7 2152.02(e)<\/a>.[\/footnote] donne comme exemple d\u2019inventions autrement accessibles au public au sens de la section 102 l'accessibilit\u00e9 au travers d'une th\u00e8se d\u00e9pos\u00e9e dans une biblioth\u00e8que universitaire[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/in-re-cronyn\">In re Cronyn<\/a>, 890 F.2d 1158, 13 USPQ2d 1070 (Fed. Cir. 1989); <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/in-re-hall-12\">In re Hall<\/a>, 781 F.2d 897, 228 USPQ 453 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (\"that competent evidence of the general library practice may be relied upon to establish an approximate time when a thesis became accessible\"); <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/application-of-bayer\">In re Bayer<\/a>, 568 F.2d 1357, 196 USPQ 670 (CCPA 1978): une \u00a0th\u00e8se conserv\u00e9e, mais ni mise en rayon, ni catalogu\u00e9e, dans une biblioth\u00e8que universitaire n'est pas accessible au public; <a href=\"https:\/\/www.uspto.gov\/web\/offices\/pac\/mpep\/s2128.html\">MPEP \u00a7 2128.01<\/a>, I.[\/footnote], des affiches ou d'autres communications \u00e0 l'occasion d'une r\u00e9union scientifique[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/in-re-klopfenstein\">In re Klopfenstein<\/a>, 380 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2004): \"In October 1998, the appellants, along with colleague M. Liu, presented a printed slide presentation (...) at a meeting of the American Association of Cereal Chemists (\"AACC\"). The fourteen-slide presentation was printed and pasted onto poster boards. The printed slide presentation was displayed continuously for two and a half days at the AACC meeting. (...) Both parties agree that the Liu reference presented (...)\u00a0 disclosed every limitation of the invention disclosed in the '950 patent application. Furthermore, at neither presentation was there a disclaimer or notice to the intended audience prohibiting note-taking or copying of the presentation.\" ; <a href=\"https:\/\/law.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/appellate-courts\/F2\/774\/1104\/10468\/\">Massachusetts Institute of Technology v. AB Fortia<\/a>, 774 F.2d 1104 (Fed. Cir. 1985): \"The Birmingham paper was orally presented by Dr. Levine of the MIT group to the First International Cell Culture Congress in Birmingham, Alabama, September 21-25, 1975. The conference was attended by 50 to 500 cell culturists. Prior to the conference Dr. Levine gave a copy of the paper to the head of the conference. Afterward, copies were distributed on request, without any restrictions, to as many as six persons, more than one year before the filing date of the '534 and '654 patents\"; <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/jazz-pharms-inc-v-amneal-pharms-llc-1\">Jazz Pharm., Inc. v. Amneal Pharm., LLC<\/a>, 895 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2018), <a href=\"https:\/\/www.uspto.gov\/web\/offices\/pac\/mpep\/s2128.html\">MPEP \u00a7 2128.01<\/a>, IV.[\/footnote], une invention visible dans une demande de brevet[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/in-re-wyer\">In re Wyer<\/a>, 655 F.2d 221 (CCPA 1981); <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/bruckelmyer-v-ground-heaters-inc\">Bruckelmyer v. Ground Heaters, Inc.<\/a>, 445 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2006): dessins dans le dossier de brevet, accessibles au public.[\/footnote], ou un document accessible sur un site Web[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/voter-verified-inc-v-premier-election-solutions-inc\">Voter Verified, Inc. v. Premier Election Solutions<\/a>, Inc., 698 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ; <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/in-re-lister-2\">In re Lister<\/a>, 583 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2009): archive accessible sur une base de donn\u00e9es en ligne; mais v. <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/sri-intl-v-internet-sec\">SRI Int'l, Inc. v. Internet Sec. Sys., Inc.<\/a>, 511 F.3d (Fed. Cir. 2008): document sur un site FTP, mais non catalogu\u00e9 ni index\u00e9.[\/footnote].\r\n\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<strong>377._ Les divulgations non opposables_<\/strong> Les divulgations non opposables sont d\u00e9finies \u00e0 la section 102(b), qui vise le d\u00e9lai de gr\u00e2ce et d\u2019autres divulgations non opposables.\r\n\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<strong>378._ Le d\u00e9lai de gr\u00e2ce_<\/strong> La section 102(b)(1), modifi\u00e9e par le Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA) r\u00e9forme le d\u00e9lai de gr\u00e2ce (<em>Grace Period Inventor-Originated Disclosure Exception<\/em>), qui demeure une particularit\u00e9 notable du droit des brevets US (notamment au regard de son r\u00e9gime)[footnote]V. MPEP, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.uspto.gov\/web\/offices\/pac\/mpep\/s2153.html\">\u00a7 2153.01(a)<\/a>.[\/footnote]. Elle pr\u00e9voit qu\u2019une divulgation faite un an ou moins avant la date effective de d\u00e9p\u00f4t d\u2019une invention revendiqu\u00e9e n\u2019est pas opposable si elle est le fait de l\u2019inventeur, du coinventeur ou d\u2019un tiers ayant obtenu de l\u2019inventeur ou du coinventeur, directement ou indirectement, l\u2019\u00e9l\u00e9ment divulgu\u00e9, et \u00e9carte \u00e9galement toute divulgation intercalaire d\u2019un tiers:\r\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\r\n\r\n\u00ab Une divulgation faite 1 an ou moins avant la date de d\u00e9p\u00f4t effective d'une invention revendiqu\u00e9e ne constitue pas un \u00e9tat de la technique par rapport \u00e0 l'invention revendiqu\u00e9e en vertu du paragraphe (a) (1) si (A) la divulgation a \u00e9t\u00e9 faite par l'inventeur ou le co-inventeur ou par un autre qui a obtenu l'objet divulgu\u00e9 directement ou indirectement de l'inventeur ou d'un co-inventeur ; ou (B) l'objet divulgu\u00e9 avait, avant cette divulgation, \u00e9t\u00e9 divulgu\u00e9 publiquement par l'inventeur ou un co-inventeur ou une autre personne ayant obtenu l'objet divulgu\u00e9 directement ou indirectement de l'inventeur ou d'un co-inventeur \u00bb.[footnote]\u00ab A disclosure made 1 year or less before the effective filing date of a claimed invention shall not be prior art to the claimed invention under subsection (a)(1) if(A) the disclosure was made by the inventor or joint inventor or by another who obtained the subject matter disclosed directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor; or (B) the subject matter disclosed had, before such disclosure, been publicly disclosed by the inventor or a joint inventor or another who obtained the subject matter disclosed directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor<em> \u00bb.<\/em>[\/footnote].\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\nOn notera que la p\u00e9riode de douze mois est calcul\u00e9e \u00e0 partir de la date effective de priorit\u00e9, am\u00e9ricaine ou \u00e9trang\u00e8re; et donc, notamment, \u00e0 partir de la date d'une demande provisoire - <em>provisional application<\/em>[footnote]<\/em>V. <em>infra, <\/em>n\u00b0388.[footnote].\r\n\r\nUne d\u00e9claration peut \u00eatre jointe \u00e0 la demande permettant d'\u00e9tablir qu'une divulgation est bien couverte par le d\u00e9lai de gr\u00e2ce. Le d\u00e9lai de gr\u00e2ce d'un an pr\u00e9vu est prolong\u00e9 jusqu'au jour ouvrable suivant s'il expire un samedi, un dimanche ou un jour f\u00e9ri\u00e9 f\u00e9d\u00e9ral[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/21\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 21(b)<\/a>.[\/footnote].\r\n\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<strong>379._ Autres divulgations non opposables_ <\/strong><span style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\">La section 102(b)(2) (\"divulgations issues de demandes et de brevets\" - <\/span><em style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\">disclosures appearing in applications and patents<\/em><span style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\">) pr\u00e9voit quant \u00e0 elle des exceptions correspondantes \u00e0 la r\u00e8gle pr\u00e9vue \u00e0 la section 102(a)(2)<\/span><span style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\">[footnote]\u00ab Une personne aura droit \u00e0 un brevet \u00e0 moins: (...) (2) que l\u2019invention revendiqu\u00e9e soit d\u00e9crite dans un brevet d\u00e9livr\u00e9 en application de la section 151, ou dans une demande de brevet publi\u00e9e ou pr\u00e9sum\u00e9e publi\u00e9e en application de la section 122(b), dans laquelle le brevet ou la demande, selon le cas, d\u00e9signe un autre inventeur et a \u00e9t\u00e9 effectivement d\u00e9pos\u00e9e avant la date effective de d\u00e9p\u00f4t de l\u2019invention revendiqu\u00e9e \u00bb.[\/footnote]. Elle dispose :<\/span>\r\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\r\n\r\n\u00ab Une divulgation ne constitue pas un \u00e9tat de la technique d'une invention revendiqu\u00e9e en vertu du paragraphe (a)(2) si (A) l'objet divulgu\u00e9 a \u00e9t\u00e9 obtenu directement ou indirectement aupr\u00e8s de l'inventeur ou d'un co-inventeur ; (B) l'objet divulgu\u00e9 avait, avant qu'il ne soit effectivement d\u00e9pos\u00e9 en vertu du paragraphe (a)(2), \u00e9t\u00e9 divulgu\u00e9 publiquement par l'inventeur ou un co-inventeur ou une autre personne qui a obtenu l'objet divulgu\u00e9 directement ou indirectement de l'inventeur ou un co-inventeur ; ou (C) l'objet divulgu\u00e9 et l'invention revendiqu\u00e9e, au plus tard \u00e0 la date de d\u00e9p\u00f4t effective de l'invention revendiqu\u00e9e, appartenaient \u00e0 la m\u00eame personne ou \u00e9taient soumis \u00e0 une obligation de cession \u00e0 la m\u00eame personne<span style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\">\u00a0\u00bb[footnote]<\/span><span style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\">\u00ab A disclosure shall not be prior art to a claimed invention under subsection (a)(2) if (A)the subject matter disclosed was obtained directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor; (B)the subject matter disclosed had, before such subject matter was effectively filed under subsection (a)(2), been publicly disclosed by the inventor or a joint inventor or another who obtained the subject matter disclosed directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor; or (C)the subject matter disclosed and the claimed invention, not later than the effective filing date of the claimed invention, were owned by the same person or subject to an obligation of assignment to the same person<\/span><em style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\"> \u00bb.<\/em><span style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\">[\/footnote].<\/span>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\nLe paragraphe A (\"<em>Inventor-Originated Disclosure Exception<\/em>\") exclut tout du champ de la section 102(a)(2) les divulgations portant sur un objet obtenu directement ou indirectement aupr\u00e8s de l'inventeur ou d'un co-inventeur.\r\n\r\nLe paragraphe B (\"<em>Inventor-Originated Prior Public Disclosure Exception<\/em>\") exclut ensuite les divulgations issues de d\u00e9p\u00f4ts par un tiers apr\u00e8s que l'invention ait \u00e9t\u00e9 divulgu\u00e9e publiquement par l'inventeur, un co-inventeur ou une autre personne qui a obtenu l'objet directement ou indirectement de l'inventeur ou du co-inventeur.\r\n\r\nLe paragraphe C (\"<em>Common Ownership or Obligation of Assignment Exception<\/em>\") exclut enfin l'invention divulgu\u00e9e dans les brevets et demandes vis\u00e9s si l'objet divulgu\u00e9 et l'invention revendiqu\u00e9e, au plus tard \u00e0 la date de d\u00e9p\u00f4t effective de l'invention revendiqu\u00e9e, \"\u00e9taient la propri\u00e9t\u00e9 de la m\u00eame personne ou soumis \u00e0 une obligation de cession \u00e0 la m\u00eame personne\".\r\n\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<strong>380._ Effets sur la d\u00e9termination de l'activit\u00e9 inventive_<\/strong> L'\u00e9tat de la technique <span style=\"font-size: 1em;\">\u00e0 consid\u00e9rer pour l\u2019appr\u00e9ciation de l\u2019activit\u00e9 inventive est le m\u00eame que celui d\u00e9fini pour la nouveaut\u00e9<\/span><span style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\">[footnote]<\/span><a style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\" href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/103\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 103<\/a><span style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\">.[\/footnote].<\/span>\r\n\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<strong>381._ La seconde application th\u00e9rapeutique_<\/strong> Aux \u00c9tats-Unis les secondes applications th\u00e9rapeutiques de produits connus (y compris les nouveaux dosages d\u2019un m\u00e9dicament connu pour traiter une maladie connue) sont brevetables si elles satisfont aux conditions de nouveaut\u00e9 et d\u2019activit\u00e9 inventive. Comme en Europe, la revendication ne peut pas prendre un format dit de type suisse (\u00ab utilisation d\u2019une substance X pour fabriquer un m\u00e9dicament destin\u00e9 \u00e0 soigner la maladie Y \u00bb). La forme sera celle dite de la \u00ab m\u00e9thode de traitement \u00bb (m\u00e9thode de traitement d\u2019un patient souffrant d\u2019une maladie Y par l\u2019administration d\u2019un dosage ad\u00e9quat du composant ancien Y). Rappelons que les \u00ab praticiens m\u00e9dicaux exer\u00e7ant dans le cadre d\u2019une activit\u00e9 m\u00e9dicale \u00bb et les institutions qui les emploient b\u00e9n\u00e9ficient d\u2019une limitation de responsabilit\u00e9, \u00e9galement applicable dans le cadre de la contrefa\u00e7on de brevets portant sur les secondes applications th\u00e9rapeutiques brevet\u00e9es[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/287\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 287(c)<\/a>. <em>\u00ab\u00a0<\/em>The term \u201cmedical activity\u201d means the performance of a medical or surgical procedure on a body, but shall not include (i) the use of a patented machine, manufacture, or composition of matter in violation of such patent, (ii) the practice of a patented use of a composition of matter in violation of such patent, or (iii) the practice of a process in violation of a biotechnology patent.<em>\u00a0\u00bb<\/em> <em>Ibid.<\/em>[\/footnote].\r\n\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<strong>382._ L\u2019utilit\u00e9 (application industrielle)_<\/strong> La condition d\u2019utilit\u00e9 a un fondement constitutionnel, la clause de copyright et de brevet de la Constitution f\u00e9d\u00e9rale visant express\u00e9ment la promotion des \u00ab arts utiles \u00bb (<em>useful arts<\/em>)[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/law.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/appellate-courts\/F2\/945\/1173\/289654\/\">Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Renishaw PLC<\/a>, 945 F.2d 1173, 20 USPQ2d 1094 (Fed. Cir. 1991)[\/footnote]. Le crit\u00e8re d\u2019utilit\u00e9 est cit\u00e9 \u00e0 la section 101, mais ne fait pas l\u2019objet d\u2019une d\u00e9finition l\u00e9gale[footnote]V. <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/383\/519\/\">Brenner v. Manson<\/a>, 383 U.S. 519, 529, 148 USPQ 689, 693 (1966) (relevant la difficult\u00e9 de d\u00e9finir le concept).[\/footnote]. La jurisprudence exige une \u00ab utilit\u00e9 sp\u00e9cifique \u00bb (<em>specific utility<\/em>), c\u2019est-\u00e0-dire sp\u00e9cifique \u00e0 l\u2019invention revendiqu\u00e9e et susceptible d\u2019apporter un b\u00e9n\u00e9fice bien d\u00e9fini au public[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/in-re-fisher-6\"><em>In re<\/em> Fisher<\/a>, 421 F.3d 1365, 1371, 76 USPQ2d 1225, 1230 (Fed. Cir. 2005).[\/footnote]. L\u2019utilit\u00e9 doit \u00e9galement concerner l\u2019invention telle que divulgu\u00e9e, et apporter un b\u00e9n\u00e9fice imm\u00e9diat au public (<em>practical<\/em> ou <em>substantial utility<\/em>)[footnote]<em>Ibid<\/em>\u00a0: <em>\u00ab<\/em> [A]n application must show that an invention is useful to the public as disclosed in its current form, not that it may prove useful at some future date after further research. Simply put, to satisfy the \u2018substantial\u2019 utility requirement, an asserted use must show that the claimed invention has a significant and presently available benefit to the public<em> \u00bb.<\/em>[\/footnote]. Pour satisfaire \u00e0 cette condition, le demandeur doit d\u00e9montrer en quoi l\u2019invention revendiqu\u00e9e pr\u00e9sente une utilit\u00e9 sp\u00e9cifique et substantielle, explicitement ou implicitement.\r\n\r\nUne invention qui ne produit pas les effets revendiqu\u00e9s n\u2019est pas une invention utile et n\u2019est pas brevetable. Cependant, pour \u00eatre ainsi exclue de la brevetabilit\u00e9 l\u2019invention doit \u00eatre \u00ab\u00a0totalement incapable de produit un effet utile\u00a0\u00bb[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/brooktree-corp-v-advanced-micro-devices\">Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.<\/a>, 977 F.2d 1555, 1571, 24 USPQ2d 1401, 1412 (Fed. Cir. 1992). V. \u00e9galement <a href=\"https:\/\/law.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/appellate-courts\/F2\/620\/1247\/394447\/\">E.I. du Pont De Nemours and Co. v. Berkley and Co.<\/a>, 620 F.2d 1247, 1260 n.17, 205 USPQ 1, 10 n.17 (8th Cir. 1980) (\u00abA small degree of utility is sufficient (\u2026). The claimed invention must only be capable of performing some beneficial function (\u2026). An invention does not lack utility merely because the particular embodiment disclosed in the patent lacks perfection or performs crudely (\u2026). A commercially successful product is not required (\u2026). Nor is it essential that the invention accomplish all its intended functions (\u2026) or operate under all conditions (\u2026) partial success being sufficient to demonstrate patentable utility (\u2026). In short, the defense of non-utility cannot be sustained without proof of total incapacity<em>.\u00a0\u00bb, <\/em>cit\u00e9 dans le MPEP, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.uspto.gov\/web\/offices\/pac\/mpep\/s2107.html\">\u00a7 2107.01<\/a>).[\/footnote].\r\n\r\nCes r\u00e8gles sont \u00e9galement applicables dans le domaine des m\u00e9dicaments et des inventions biotechnologiques. Le demandeur doit cependant fournir des \u00e9l\u00e9ments qui permettent raisonnablement de soutenir l\u2019utilit\u00e9 de l\u2019invention[footnote]V. MPEP, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.uspto.gov\/web\/offices\/pac\/mpep\/s2107.html\">\u00a7 2107.03<\/a>: \u00ab As a general matter, evidence of pharmacological or other biological activity of a compound will be relevant to an asserted therapeutic use if there is a reasonable correlation between the activity in question and the asserted utility. Cross v. Iizuka, 753 F.2d 1040, 224 USPQ 739 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re Jolles, 628 F.2d 1322, 206 USPQ 885 (CCPA 1980); Nelson v. Bowler, 626 F.2d 853, 206 USPQ 881 (CCPA 1980). An applicant can establish this reasonable correlation by relying on statistically relevant data documenting the activity of a compound or composition, arguments or reasoning, documentary evidence (e.g., articles in scientific journals), or any combination thereof. The applicant does not have to prove that a correlation exists between a particular activity and an asserted therapeutic use of a compound as a matter of statistical certainty, nor does he or she have to provide actual evidence of success in treating humans where such a utility is asserted. Instead, as the courts have repeatedly held, all that is required is a reasonable correlation between the activity and the asserted use. Nelson v. Bowler, 626 F.2d 853, 857, 206 USPQ 881, 884 (CCPA 1980) \u00bb.[\/footnote], ce qui peut l\u2019amener \u00e0 produire des essais cliniques.\r\n\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<strong>383._ L\u2019activit\u00e9 inventive (nonobviousness)_<\/strong> Le crit\u00e8re d\u2019activit\u00e9 inventive a \u00e9t\u00e9 codifi\u00e9 dans la section 103 du Patent Act 1952. Ce texte, tel que modifi\u00e9 par l\u2019AIA, dispose\u00a0:\r\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\r\n\r\n\u00ab Un brevet pour une invention revendiqu\u00e9e ne peut pas \u00eatre obtenu, nonobstant le fait que l\u2019invention revendiqu\u00e9e n\u2019est pas divulgu\u00e9e de fa\u00e7on identique aux termes de la section 102, si les diff\u00e9rences entre l\u2019invention revendiqu\u00e9e et l\u2019art ant\u00e9rieur son telle que l\u2019invention revendiqu\u00e9e dans son ensemble \u00e9tait \u00e9vidente avant sa date de d\u00e9p\u00f4t effective pour une personne ayant des connaissances techniques ordinaires dans le domaine d\u2019application de l\u2019invention. La brevetabilit\u00e9 ne doit pas \u00eatre refus\u00e9e en consid\u00e9ration de la fa\u00e7on dont l\u2019invention a \u00e9t\u00e9 r\u00e9alis\u00e9e \u00bb[footnote]\u00ab A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made<em> \u00bb.<\/em>[\/footnote].\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\nDans sa d\u00e9cision <em>Graham v. John Deere Co.<\/em>,[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/383\/1\/\">Graham v. John Deere Co.<\/a>, 383 U.S. 1 (1966).[\/footnote] la Cour Supr\u00eame a d\u00e9fini le test d\u2019activit\u00e9 inventive comme suit (\u00ab\u00a0<em>Graham test<\/em>\u00a0\u00bb ou \u00ab\u00a0<em>Graham factors<\/em>\u00a0\u00bb):\r\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\r\n\r\n\u00ab la condition pos\u00e9e par le paragraphe 103, qui n\u2019est qu\u2019une des trois conditions [de brevetabilit\u00e9] \u00e0 satisfaire, implique l\u2019examen de plusieurs \u00e9l\u00e9ments de fait. En application du \u00a7 103, le champ et le contenu de l\u2019art ant\u00e9rieur doivent \u00eatre d\u00e9termin\u00e9s; les diff\u00e9rences entre l\u2019art ant\u00e9rieur et les revendications litigieuses doivent \u00eatre appr\u00e9ci\u00e9es; et la question du niveau des connaissances techniques ordinaires dans le domaine pertinent r\u00e9solue. Sur ces bases, le caract\u00e8re \u00e9vident ou non de invention est d\u00e9termin\u00e9. Des consid\u00e9rations secondaires telles que le succ\u00e8s commercial, un besoin exprim\u00e9 de longue date mais jamais satisfait, les \u00e9checs d\u2019autres inventeurs, etc., peuvent \u00eatre utilis\u00e9es pour \u00e9clairer les circonstances entourant l\u2019origine de l\u2019invention objet de la demande. En tant qu\u2019indices d\u2019activit\u00e9 inventives, ces questions peuvent \u00eatre pertinentes \u00bb[footnote]383 U.S., 17-18.[\/footnote].\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\nCe test a \u00e9t\u00e9 repris et pr\u00e9cis\u00e9 par la Cour Supr\u00eame en 2007 dans son arr\u00eat <em>KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc. (KSR)<\/em>[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/550\/398\/\"><em>KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc. (KSR)<\/em><\/a><em>, <\/em>550 U.S. 398, 82 USPQ2d 1385 (2007).[\/footnote], notamment au regard du niveau comp\u00e9tence \u00ab\u00a0ordinaire\u00a0\u00bb exig\u00e9 de l\u2019homme de l\u2019art.\r\n\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<strong>384._ Le r\u00e9gime sp\u00e9cifique applicable \u00e0 certains proc\u00e9d\u00e9s biotechnologiques_<\/strong> Depuis 1995 et jusqu\u2019\u00e0 r\u00e9cemment, le droit des brevets aux \u00c9tats-Unis avait mis en place un r\u00e9gime tr\u00e8s particulier concernant la brevetabilit\u00e9 des proc\u00e9d\u00e9s en mati\u00e8re de biotechnologie, curieusement peu comment\u00e9e en Europe. Ce r\u00e9gime, issu du Biotechnology Process Patent Act 1995[footnote]Pub. L. No. 104-41; B. Alley, <a href=\"https:\/\/digitalcommons.law.uga.edu\/jipl\/vol12\/iss1\/8\">The Biotechnology Process Patent Act of 1995: Providing Unresolved and Unrecognized Dilemmas in U.S. Patent Law<\/a>, 12 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 229 (2004).[\/footnote], \u00e9tait int\u00e9gr\u00e9 \u00e0 la section 103 du Patent Act, et permettait, sous certaines conditions de ne pas appliquer le crit\u00e8re d\u2019activit\u00e9 inventive \u00e0 un proc\u00e9d\u00e9 dans le domaine de la biotechnologie.\r\n\r\nUn proc\u00e9d\u00e9 biotechnologique, tel que d\u00e9fini par la loi[footnote]Le proc\u00e9d\u00e9 \u00e9tait d\u00e9fini comme suit par 35 U.S.C. \u00a7 103(b):<em> \u00ab <\/em>\u201cbiotechnological process\u201d means (A) a process of genetically altering or otherwise inducing a single- or multi-celled organism to(i) express an exogenous nucleotide sequence, (ii) inhibit, eliminate, augment, or alter expression of an endogenous nucleotide sequence, or (iii) express a specific physiological characteristic not naturally associated with said organism; (B) cell fusion procedures yielding a cell line that expresses a specific protein, such as a mono-clonal antibody; and (C) a method of using a product produced by a process defined by subparagraph (A) or (B), or a combination of subparagraphs (A) and (B).<em> \u00bb <\/em>[\/footnote], pouvait \u00eatre consid\u00e9r\u00e9 comme inventif s\u2019il utilisait ou s\u2019il r\u00e9sultait dans une composition de mati\u00e8re elle-m\u00eame nouvelle et inventive et donc brevetable. Les seules conditions pos\u00e9es \u00e9taient que les demandes visant le proc\u00e9d\u00e9 et le produit correspondant soient d\u00e9pos\u00e9es simulan\u00e9ment, et que les deux inventions aient le m\u00eame inventeur[footnote]Le texte pr\u00e9voyait que les deux brevets expirent \u00e0 la m\u00eame date.[\/footnote].\r\n\r\nCe r\u00e9gime constituait un avantage certain pour l\u2019industrie locale du m\u00e9dicament, notamment dans le cas d\u2019un brevet portant sur un proc\u00e9d\u00e9 non inventif appliqu\u00e9 pour la premi\u00e8re fois \u00e0 une mol\u00e9cule brevet\u00e9e, et aboutissant \u00e0 une mol\u00e9cule non brevetable. Il permettait en effet (et permet toujours), dans cette hypoth\u00e8se, au titulaire du brevet de proc\u00e9d\u00e9 de s\u2019opposer \u00e0 importations des mol\u00e9cules non brevet\u00e9es issues de l\u2019utilisation du proc\u00e9d\u00e9 non inventif \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9tranger (par hypoth\u00e8se en relation avec la mol\u00e9cule brevet\u00e9e aux \u00c9tats-Unis, mais non brevet\u00e9e dans ces pays).\r\n\r\nCe r\u00e9gime a \u00e9t\u00e9 supprim\u00e9 pour l\u2019avenir par l\u2019America Invents Act, et n\u2019est plus applicable aux demandes d\u00e9pos\u00e9es \u00e0 partir du 16 mars 2013. Il ne remet cependant pas en cause les brevets d\u00e9j\u00e0 accord\u00e9s.\r\n<h3><strong>B. Les conditions de forme<\/strong><\/h3>\r\n<strong>385._ Patent agents and patent attorneys_<\/strong> Aux \u00c9tats-Unis la pr\u00e9paration, le d\u00e9p\u00f4t et le suivi des demandes de brevet doivent \u00eatre effectu\u00e9s par des professionnels qualifi\u00e9s et autoris\u00e9s aupr\u00e8s du Patents and Trademark Office, les <em>patent agents<\/em> et les <em>patent attorneys<\/em>. Les <em>patent agents<\/em> font partie du <em>patent bar<\/em>. Les <em>patents attor<\/em>neys ont les m\u00eames qualifications professionnelles que les <em>patent agents<\/em>, mais sont \u00e9galement des avocats inscrit \u00e0 l\u2019un des barreaux des Etats de l\u2019Union.\r\n\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<strong>386._ L\u2019US Patents and Trademark Office_<\/strong> L\u2019United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) est une agence des \u00c9tats-Unis, \u00e9tablie au sein du minist\u00e8re du Commerce. Il est responsable de l'octroi et la d\u00e9livrance des brevets et de l'enregistrement des marques, de la diffusion de l'information du public dans ce domaine. Il \u00e9tablit les r\u00e8glements de proc\u00e9dure applicables. Son Directeur, nomm\u00e9 par le Pr\u00e9sident et le S\u00e9nat, dirige l\u2019office et la d\u00e9livrance des brevets, ainsi que l'enregistrement des marques.\r\n\r\nL\u2019USPTO a \u00e9galement un pouvoir de contr\u00f4le et de suspension des agents de brevets.\r\n\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<strong>387._ La demande (g\u00e9n\u00e9ral)_<\/strong>[footnote]V. USPTO, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.uspto.gov\/patents\/basics\/apply\/utility-patent\">A Guide to Filing a Utility Patent Application<\/a>.[\/footnote] Une demande de brevet doit \u00eatre faite ou autoris\u00e9e par l\u2019inventeur[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/part-II\/chapter-11\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 111(a)(1)<\/a>. Les coinventeurs doivent demander un brevet conjointement (<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/part-II\/chapter-11\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 116<\/a>, qui traite \u00e9galement des relations entre coinventeurs).[\/footnote]. Elle peut \u00e9galement \u00eatre d\u00e9pos\u00e9e par une personne \u00e0 qui l'inventeur a c\u00e9d\u00e9 ou accept\u00e9 par \u00e9crit de c\u00e9der l'invention[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/uscode.house.gov\/view.xhtml?req=(title:35%20section:118%20edition:prelim)\">35 USC 118<\/a>.[\/footnote]. Elle doit contenir[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/111\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 111(a)(2)<\/a>.[\/footnote] : (1) des \u00ab sp\u00e9cifications \u00bb (<em>specification<\/em>), en deux parties\u00a0: la premi\u00e8re consiste dans une description proprement dite de l\u2019invention (avec ou sans r\u00e9sum\u00e9), la seconde contient les revendications (au moins une)[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/part-II\/chapter-11\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 112<\/a>.[\/footnote]\u00a0; (2) un dessin, si n\u00e9cessaire \u00e0 la compr\u00e9hension de l\u2019invention; (3) et une d\u00e9claration sous serment de l\u2019inventeur ou, \u00e0 d\u00e9faut, par le requ\u00e9rant[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/part-II\/chapter-11\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 115<\/a>. 37 C.F.R. \u00a7 1.64.[\/footnote]. Elle s\u2019accompagne du paiement d\u2019une redevance de d\u00e9p\u00f4t (<em>filing fee<\/em>)[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/part-II\/chapter-11\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 111<\/a>.[\/footnote]. La date de d\u00e9p\u00f4t est celle du d\u00e9p\u00f4t des sp\u00e9cifications et du dessin (s\u2019il est n\u00e9cessaire)[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/cfr\/text\/37\/1.53\">37 C.F.R. \u00a7 1.53(b)<\/a>.[\/footnote], la d\u00e9claration et le paiement de la redevance du d\u00e9p\u00f4t pouvant intervenir dans un d\u00e9lai notifi\u00e9 par l'USPTO[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/cfr\/text\/37\/1.53\">37 C.F.R. \u00a7 1.53(f)<\/a>.[\/footnote].\r\n\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<strong>388._ Les demandes provisoires, divisionnaires, continues et de continuation partielles_ <\/strong>Depuis le 8 juin 1995 il est possible de d\u00e9poser de mani\u00e8re simplifi\u00e9e une demande provisoire de brevet (<em>provisional application for patent<\/em>)[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/part-II\/chapter-11\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 111(b)<\/a>.[\/footnote]. Cette demande ne contient pas de revendications ni de d\u00e9claration sous serment. Elle ne fait pas l\u2019objet d\u2019un examen des conditions de protection, et permet, si un d\u00e9p\u00f4t complet intervient dans les 12 mois[footnote]Une conversion de la demande provisoire en demande d\u00e9finitive peut \u00e9galement \u00eatre demand\u00e9e, mais qui fait perdre le b\u00e9n\u00e9fice de la premi\u00e8re date de d\u00e9p\u00f4t.[\/footnote], d\u2019obtenir le b\u00e9n\u00e9fice de la date du d\u00e9p\u00f4t provisoire. A d\u00e9faut de d\u00e9p\u00f4t ou de conversion dans les 12 mois, l\u2019entier b\u00e9n\u00e9fice du d\u00e9p\u00f4t est perdu. La demande provisoire permet de b\u00e9n\u00e9ficier du d\u00e9lai de priorit\u00e9 de la Convention de Paris. Elle d\u00e9clenche \u00e9galement le calcul du d\u00e9lai de gr\u00e2ce d'un an[footnote]V. <em>supra<\/em>, n\u00b0378.[\/footnote].\r\n\r\nAux \u00c9tats-Unis les demandes divisionnaires, de continuation, mais \u00e9galement de <em>continuation\u2013in\u2013part<\/em> sont admises.\r\n\r\nUne demande divisionnaire[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/part-II\/chapter-11\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 121<\/a>.[\/footnote] est une demande comportant la m\u00eame divulgation qu'une demande ant\u00e9rieure ou parente, et revendiquant une invention ind\u00e9pendante ou distincte.\r\n\r\nLa demande divisionnaire doit \u00e9noncer au moins la partie de la divulgation ant\u00e9rieure qui se rapporte \u00e0 l'invention telle que revendiqu\u00e9e dans la demande divisionnaire. Une demande divisionnaire d\u00e9pos\u00e9e \u00ab avant la d\u00e9livrance du brevet, l\u2019abandon ou la cl\u00f4ture de la proc\u00e9dure relative \u00e0 la demande ant\u00e9rieure ou \u00e0 une demande b\u00e9n\u00e9ficient \u00e9galement de la date de d\u00e9p\u00f4t de la demande ant\u00e9rieure \u00bb[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/part-II\/chapter-11\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 120<\/a><span style=\"background-color: #ffff00;\"><span style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\"> (Benefit of earlier filing date in the United States): \"An application for patent for an invention disclosed in the manner provided by section 112(a) (other than the requirement to disclose the best mode) in an application previously filed in the United States, or as provided by section 363 or 385, which names an inventor or joint inventor in the previously filed application shall have the same effect, as to such invention, as though filed on the date of the prior application, if filed before the patenting or abandonment of or termination of proceedings on the first application or on an application similarly entitled to the benefit of the filing date of the first application and if it contains or is amended to contain a specific reference to the earlier filed application. No application shall be entitled to the benefit of an earlier filed application under this section unless an amendment containing the specific reference to the earlier filed application is submitted at such time during the pendency of the application as required by the Director. The Director may consider the failure to submit such an amendment within that time period as a waiver of any benefit under this section. The Director may establish procedures, including the requirement for payment of the fee specified in section 41(a)(7), to accept an unintentionally delayed submission of an amendment under this section\".<\/span><\/span>[\/footnote] b\u00e9n\u00e9ficie de la date de d\u00e9p\u00f4t de la demande initiale. Ces demandes reprennent fr\u00e9quemment des revendications exclues de la demande parente (ce qui sera le cas si la demande revendique plusieurs inventions distinctes et ind\u00e9pendantes), et peuvent contenir des revendications compl\u00e9mentaires.\r\n\r\nLes demandes de continuation\u00a0portent \u00e9galement sur un objet divulgu\u00e9\u00a0 dans une demande pr\u00e9alablement d\u00e9pos\u00e9e. La divulgation dans la demande de continuation ne doit pas inclure une mati\u00e8re nouvelle par rapport \u00e0 la demande parente. Elle b\u00e9n\u00e9ficie \u00e9galement de la date de d\u00e9p\u00f4t de la demande initiale lorsqu'elle est d\u00e9pos\u00e9e \u00ab avant la d\u00e9livrance du brevet, l\u2019abandon ou la cl\u00f4ture de la proc\u00e9dure relative \u00e0 la demande ant\u00e9rieure ou \u00e0 une demande b\u00e9n\u00e9ficient \u00e9galement de la date de d\u00e9p\u00f4t de la demande ant\u00e9rieure \u00bb[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/part-II\/chapter-11\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 120<\/a>.[\/footnote].\r\n\r\nUne demande de <em>continuation-in-part<\/em> peut ajouter une mati\u00e8re nouvelle par rapport \u00e0 la demande parente. Cependant le mat\u00e9riel nouveau ne peut alors b\u00e9n\u00e9ficier de la date de priorit\u00e9 de la demande parente.\r\n\r\nLa loi am\u00e9ricaine n'impose pas de contrainte particuli\u00e8re dans la r\u00e9daction des revendications dans le cas de demandes divisionnaires ou de continuation, similaires \u00e0 celles impos\u00e9es en Europe[footnote]Comp. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.epo.org\/fr\/legal\/epc\/2020\/a123.html\">CBE, art. 123<\/a>.[\/footnote]\r\n\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<strong>389._ L'inventeur_<\/strong><span style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\">L'inventeur, et chaque co-inventeur dans le cas d'une invention conjointe doit \u00eatre d\u00e9sign\u00e9s dans la demande[footnote]Le MPEP pr\u00e9cise que \"<\/span>Pursuant to\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.uspto.gov\/web\/offices\/pac\/mpep\/mpep-9015-appx-l.html#d0e302926\">35 U.S.C. 119(a)<\/a>, the foreign application must have been filed by the same applicant as the applicant in the United States, or by applicant's legal representatives or assigns. Consistent with longstanding Office policy, this is interpreted to mean that the U.S. and foreign applications must name the same inventor or have at least one joint inventor in common\"[\/footnote]. Chaque inventeur ou coinventeur doit signer une d\u00e9claration sous serment[footnote]Une d\u00e9claration peut cependant \u00eatre fournie si l'inventeur est d\u00e9c\u00e9d\u00e9, incapable, a refus\u00e9 de signer le serment ou la d\u00e9claration ou ne peut pas \u00eatre retrouv\u00e9 ou joint \u00e0 la suite de d\u00e9marches diligentes: <a href=\"https:\/\/www.uspto.gov\/web\/offices\/pac\/mpep\/mpep-9020-appx-r.html#aia_d0e319924\">37 CFR 1.64<\/a>.[\/footnote]. Les fausses d\u00e9clarations sont punies d'une peine d'amende ou d'emprisonnement[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/18\/1001\">18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1001<\/a>:\"(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States, knowingly and willfully: (1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact; (2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation; or (3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry; shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years (...)\".[\/footnote].\r\n\r\nLe paragraphe 100 du Patent Act[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.uspto.gov\/web\/offices\/pac\/mpep\/mpep-9015-appx-l.html#d0e302367313\">35 U.S.C. 100(f)<\/a>.[\/footnote] d\u00e9finit l'inventeur et le coinventeur (<em>joint inventor<\/em>) comme suit:\r\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\r\n\r\n(f) The term \"inventor\" means the individual or, if a joint invention, the individuals collectively who invented or discovered the subject matter of the invention.\r\n\r\n(g) The terms \"joint inventor\" and \"coinventor\" mean any 1 of the individuals who invented or discovered the subject matter of a joint invention.\r\n\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\nL'inventeur est d\u00e9fini par la jurisprudence comme celui qui contribue \u00e0 la conception de l'invention[footnote]\u201cThe threshold question in determining inventorship is who conceived the invention. Unless a person contributes to the conception of the invention, he is not an inventor. \u2026 Insofar as defining an inventor is concerned, reduction to practice, <i>per se,<\/i>\u00a0is irrelevant [except for simultaneous conception and reduction to practice,\u00a0<i>Fiers v. Revel,<\/i>\u00a0984 F.2d 1164, 1168, 25\u00a0USPQ2d 1601, 1604-05 (Fed. Cir. 1993)]. One must contribute to the conception to be an inventor.\u201d\u00a0<i>In re Hardee,<\/i> 223 USPQ 1122, 1123 (Comm\u2019r Pat. 1984), extrait du MPEP, qui cite \u00e9galement <i>In re VerHoef,<\/i> 888 F.3d 1362, 1366-67, 126 F.2d 1561, 1564-65 (Fed. Cir. 2018); <i>Board of Education ex rel. Board of Trustees of Florida State Univ. v. American Bioscience Inc.,<\/i> 333 F.3d 1330, 1340, 67 USPQ2d 1252, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (\u201cInvention requires conception.\u201d\u00a0 V. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.uspto.gov\/web\/offices\/pac\/mpep\/s2138.html#d0e207607\">MPEP \u00a7\u00a02138.04<\/a>\u00a0-\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.uspto.gov\/web\/offices\/pac\/mpep\/s2138.html#d0e207753\">\u00a7 2138.05<\/a> pour la question des preuves \u00e0 fournir.[\/footnote].\r\n\r\nAux termes de la section 116 du Patent Act[footnote]<a style=\"font-size: 1em;\" href=\"https:\/\/www.uspto.gov\/web\/offices\/pac\/mpep\/mpep-9015-appx-l.html#d0e302886912\">35 U.S.C. 116<\/a><span style=\"font-size: 1em;\">.[\/footnote] les coinventeurs <\/span>doivent d\u00e9poser une demande de brevet conjointement et pr\u00eater chacune le serment requis. Les inventeurs peuvent demander un brevet conjointement m\u00eame si (1) ils n'ont pas travaill\u00e9 physiquement ensemble ou en m\u00eame temps, (2) chacun n'a pas apport\u00e9 le m\u00eame type ou le m\u00eame montant de contribution, ou (3) chacun n'a pas apport\u00e9 de contribution \u00e0 l'objet de chaque revendication du brevet.\r\n\r\nL'inventeur est n\u00e9cessairement une personne physique. La solution pouvait sembler acquise \u00e0 la lecture du texte du Patent Act[footnote]V. <a style=\"font-size: 1em;\" href=\"https:\/\/www.uspto.gov\/web\/offices\/pac\/mpep\/s2109.html\">MPEP, \u00a7 2109<\/a>: \"The Patent statute is replete with language indicating that an inventor is a natural person. For example, as noted <i>supra<\/i>,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.uspto.gov\/web\/offices\/pac\/mpep\/mpep-9015-appx-l.html#d0e302367313\">35 U.S.C. 100(f)<\/a>\u00a0defines the term \u201cinventor\u201d as \u201cthe individual or, if a joint invention, the individuals collectively who invented or discovered the subject matter of the invention.\u201d\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.uspto.gov\/web\/offices\/pac\/mpep\/mpep-9015-appx-l.html#d0e302376\">35 U.S.C. 101<\/a>\u00a0also provides \u201c[w]hoever\u00a0invents or discovers\u2026may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.\u201d (emphasis added). Additionally,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.uspto.gov\/web\/offices\/pac\/mpep\/mpep-9015-appx-l.html#al_d1d85b_11e72_2ee\">35 U.S.C. 102(a)<\/a>\u00a0states, \u201cA\u00a0person\u00a0shall be entitled to a patent unless\u2026\u201d (emphasis added).\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.uspto.gov\/web\/offices\/pac\/mpep\/mpep-9015-appx-l.html#al_d1d85b_2ae86_22c\">35 U.S.C. 115(b)(2)<\/a> further provides, in pertinent part, \u201c[a]n oath or declaration under subsection (a) shall contain statements that\u2026such individual believes himself or herself to be the original inventor or an original joint inventor of a claimed invention in the application\u201d (emphasis added)\".[\/footnote], et avait \u00e9t\u00e9 formul\u00e9e \u00e0 l'occasion d'affaire portant sur des d\u00e9signations de personnes morales[footnote]<span style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\">Univ. of Utah v. Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Forderung der Wissenschaften E.V., 734 F.3d 1315, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (\u201c[I]nventors must be natural persons and cannot be corporations or sovereigns.\u201d); Beech Aircraft Corp. v. EDO Corp., 990 F.2d 1237, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (\u201c[O]nly natural persons can be \u2018inventors.\u2019\u201d) cit\u00e9s in <a href=\"https:\/\/cafc.uscourts.gov\/opinions-orders\/21-2347.OPINION.8-5-2022_1988142.pdf\">Thaler v. Vidal<\/a>, ci dessous.[\/footnote].<\/span>\r\n\r\nElle \u00e9t\u00e9 confirm\u00e9e en des termes tr\u00e8s clairs (et semble-t-il l\u00e9g\u00e8rement irrit\u00e9s) par le Circuit f\u00e9d\u00e9ral en 2022 dans l'affaire <em>Thaler v. Vidal<\/em>[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/cafc.uscourts.gov\/opinions-orders\/21-2347.OPINION.8-5-2022_1988142.pdf\">Thaler v. Vidal<\/a>, <em>43 F.4th 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2022), cert denied, 143 S. Ct. 1783 (2023).<\/em>[\/footnote], version locale des nombreuses tentatives de Stephen Thaler d'obtenir, notamment en Europe, un brevet pour une invention au nom de son intelligence artificielle DABUS[footnote]V. nos d\u00e9veloppements <em>supra<\/em>, n\u00b0312.[\/footnote]:\r\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\r\n\r\n\u00ab Cette affaire pose la question de savoir qui, ou quoi, peut \u00eatre un inventeur. Plus pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment, on nous demande de d\u00e9cider si un syst\u00e8me logiciel d'intelligence artificielle (IA) peut \u00eatre inscrit comme inventeur sur une demande de brevet. \u00c0 premi\u00e8re vue, il pourrait sembler que la r\u00e9solution de cette question impliquerait une enqu\u00eate abstraite sur la nature de l'invention ou les droits, le cas \u00e9ch\u00e9ant, des syst\u00e8mes d'IA. En fait, cependant, nous n'avons pas besoin de r\u00e9fl\u00e9chir \u00e0 ces questions m\u00e9taphysiques. Au lieu de cela, notre t\u00e2che commence \u2013 et se termine \u2013 par l'examen de la d\u00e9finition applicable dans la loi pertinente.\u00a0(...)\r\n\r\nLa Loi sur les brevets pr\u00e9voit express\u00e9ment que les inventeurs sont des \u00ab individus \u00bb. Depuis 2011, avec l'adoption du LeahySmith America Invents Act, la loi sur les brevets d\u00e9finit un \u00ab inventeur \u00bb comme \u00ab l'individu ou, s'il s'agit d'une invention conjointe, les individus qui ont\u00a0<span style=\"font-size: 1em; word-spacing: normal;\">\u00a0<\/span><span style=\"font-size: 1em; word-spacing: normal;\">collectivement <\/span><span style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em; word-spacing: normal;\">invent\u00e9 ou d\u00e9couvert l'objet de l'invention \u00bb. 35 U.S.C. \u00a7 100(f). De m\u00eame, la Loi d\u00e9finit les termes \u00ab inventeur conjoint \u00bb et \u00ab co-inventeur \u00bb comme \u00ab l'une quelconque des personnes qui ont invent\u00e9 ou d\u00e9couvert l'objet d'une invention conjointe \u00bb. \u00a7 100(g). En d\u00e9crivant les d\u00e9clarations exig\u00e9es d'un inventeur lorsqu'il d\u00e9pose une demande de brevet, la loi fait syst\u00e9matiquement r\u00e9f\u00e9rence aux inventeurs et aux co-inventeurs comme \u00e0 des \u00ab individus \u00bb. Voir \u00a7 115. La Loi sur les brevets ne d\u00e9finit pas le terme \u00ab individu \u00bb. Cependant, comme l'a expliqu\u00e9 la Cour supr\u00eame, lorsqu'il est utilis\u00e9 \u00ab comme un nom, le terme \u00ab individu \u00bb signifie ordinairement un \u00eatre humain, une personne \u00bb. Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 566 U.S. 449, 454 (2012) (modification interne et guillemets omis). Cela est conforme \u00e0 la \u00ab fa\u00e7on dont nous utilisons le mot dans le langage courant \u00bb : \u00ab Nous disons \u00ab l'individu est all\u00e9 au magasin \u00bb, \u00ab l'individu a quitt\u00e9 la pi\u00e8ce \u00bb et \u00ab l'individu a pris la voiture \u00bb, chaque fois se r\u00e9f\u00e9rant sans \u00e9quivoque \u00e0 une personne physique. \u00bb Id. Les dictionnaires confirment qu'il s'agit de l'interpr\u00e9tation courante du mot. (...)<\/span>\r\n\r\nPar cons\u00e9quent, la Cour supr\u00eame a statu\u00e9 que, lorsqu'il est utilis\u00e9 dans les lois, le mot \u00ab individu \u00bb fait r\u00e9f\u00e9rence \u00e0 des \u00eatres humains, \u00e0 moins qu'il n'existe \u00ab une indication que le Congr\u00e8s l'entendait autrement \u00bb. Id., p. 455 (italiques omis). Rien dans la Loi sur les brevets n'indique que le Congr\u00e8s avait l'intention de s'\u00e9carter du sens commun. Au contraire, le reste de la Loi sur les brevets confirme que le terme \u00ab individu \u00bb dans la Loi d\u00e9signe les \u00eatres humains. (...)\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<strong>390._ Les lignes directrices de l'USPTO sur la qualit\u00e9 d'inventeur pour les inventions assist\u00e9es par IA_<\/strong>Le Circuit f\u00e9d\u00e9ral\u00a0 dans l'arr\u00eat Thaler n'a cependant pas abord\u00e9 l'hypoth\u00e8se d'inventions <em>assist\u00e9es<\/em> par IA. Faisant suite \u00e0 <span style=\"font-size: 1em;\">une consultation publique sur l'IA lanc\u00e9e par l'USPTO en 2019, l'USPTO a adopt\u00e9 le 12\u00a0<\/span>f\u00e9vrier 2023 des lignes directrices sur les inventions assist\u00e9es par intelligence artificielle[footnote]<em><a href=\"https:\/\/www.federalregister.gov\/documents\/2024\/02\/13\/2024-02623\/inventorship-guidance-for-ai-assisted-inventions\">Inventorship Guidance for AI-assisted Inventions<\/a>, Docket n\u00b0\u00a0 PTO-P-2023-0043; <\/em>qui\u00a0s'ajoutent \u00e0 celles d\u00e9j\u00e0 publi\u00e9es en mati\u00e8re de copyright par le Copyright Office le 10\u00a0mai 2023 <em>(V. P. Kamina, Comm. com. \u00e9lectr. 2023, comm. 29).<\/em>[\/footnote] L'USPTO y confirme que ces inventions entrent dans le champ de la brevetabilit\u00e9 si une personne physique y contribue <em>\u00ab\u00a0de mani\u00e8re significative\u00a0\u00bb<\/em> (une contribution significative \u00e0 une seule revendication est suffisante\u00a0; cependant chaque revendication doit porter sur un \u00e9l\u00e9ment invent\u00e9 par un des inventeurs (personne physique) d\u00e9sign\u00e9s dans le brevet). L'USPTO rappelle les facteurs \u00e0 prendre en compte dans cette d\u00e9termination, issus de l'arr\u00eat <em>Pannu v.\u00a0Iolab Corp<\/em>.[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/pannu-v-iolab-corp\">Pannu v.\u00a0Iolab<\/a> <em>Corp<\/em>., 155 F.3d 1344, 1351 <em>(Fed. Cir. 1998)<\/em>[\/footnote]<em>(\u00ab\u00a0Pannu\u00a0factors\u00a0\u00bb)<\/em> : \u00e0 savoir, si chaque inventeur (1) contribue d'une mani\u00e8re significative \u00e0 la conception ou \u00e0 la mise en pratique de l'invention, (2) apporte \u00e0 l'invention revendiqu\u00e9e une contribution qui n'est pas n\u00e9gligeable en qualit\u00e9, lorsque cette contribution est mesur\u00e9e par rapport \u00e0 l'invention compl\u00e8te, et (3) fait plus que simplement expliquer des concepts bien connus et\/ou l'\u00e9tat actuel de la technique. L'Office propose alors cinq principes permettant d'appliquer ces facteurs dans le cas d'inventions assist\u00e9es par IA\u00a0:\r\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\r\n\r\n\"1. L'utilisation par une personne physique d'un syst\u00e8me d'IA dans la cr\u00e9ation d'une invention assist\u00e9e par l'IA n'exclut pas les contributions de la personne en tant qu'inventeur (\u00ab does not negate the person\u2019s contributions as an inventor \u00bb) [note omise]. La personne physique peut \u00eatre inscrite en tant qu'inventeur ou co-inventeur si elle contribue de mani\u00e8re significative \u00e0 l'invention assist\u00e9e par l'IA.\r\n<p class=\"marginTopBottom14 editable \">2. Le simple fait de reconna\u00eetre un probl\u00e8me ou d'avoir un objectif g\u00e9n\u00e9ral ou un plan de recherche \u00e0 poursuivre n\u2019\u00e9quivaut pas \u00e0 une acte de conception. [note omise] Une personne physique qui ne pr\u00e9sente un probl\u00e8me qu'\u00e0 un syst\u00e8me d'IA peut ne pas \u00eatre l\u2019inventeur ou le co-inventeur d'une invention identifi\u00e9e \u00e0 partir de la sortie du syst\u00e8me d'IA. Cependant, une contribution significative pourrait r\u00e9sulter de la fa\u00e7on dont elle construit les commandes (prompts) dans le but d\u2019obtenir du syst\u00e8me d\u2019IA une solution particuli\u00e8re \u00e0 un probl\u00e8me sp\u00e9cifique envisag\u00e9 (\u00ab by the way the person constructs the prompt in view of a specific problem to elicit a particular solution from the AI system \u00bb).<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"marginTopBottom14 editable \">3. La mise en pratique d\u2019une invention n'est pas \u00e0 elle seule une contribution significative suffisante pour caract\u00e9riser l\u2019inventivit\u00e9. [note omise] Par cons\u00e9quent, une personne physique qui se contente de reconna\u00eetre et d'appr\u00e9cier la production d'un syst\u00e8me d'IA en tant qu'invention, en particulier lorsque les propri\u00e9t\u00e9s et l'utilit\u00e9 de cette production sont \u00e9videntes pour ceux qui ont des comp\u00e9tences ordinaires, n'est pas n\u00e9cessairement un inventeur. [note omise] Cependant, une personne qui utilise les r\u00e9sultats d'un syst\u00e8me d'IA et y contribue de mani\u00e8re significative pour cr\u00e9er une invention peut \u00eatre un v\u00e9ritable inventeur. Par ailleurs, dans certaines situations, une personne qui m\u00e8ne une exp\u00e9rience r\u00e9ussie en utilisant les r\u00e9sultats du syst\u00e8me d'IA pourrait d\u00e9montrer qu'elle a apport\u00e9 une contribution importante \u00e0 l'invention, m\u00eame si elle n'est pas en mesure d'\u00e9tablir la conception tant que l'invention n'a pas \u00e9t\u00e9 mise en pratique. [note omise]<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"marginTopBottom14 editable \">4. Une personne physique qui met au point un \u00e9l\u00e9ment essentiel \u00e0 partir duquel l'invention revendiqu\u00e9e est d\u00e9riv\u00e9e peut \u00eatre consid\u00e9r\u00e9e comme ayant apport\u00e9 une contribution importante \u00e0 la conception de l'invention revendiqu\u00e9e, m\u00eame si elle n'\u00e9tait pas pr\u00e9sente ou n'a pas particip\u00e9 \u00e0 chaque activit\u00e9 qui a conduit \u00e0 la conception de l'invention revendiqu\u00e9e. [note omise] Dans certaines situations, la ou les personnes physiques qui con\u00e7oivent, construisent ou entra\u00eenent un syst\u00e8me d'IA pour obtenir une solution particuli\u00e8re \u00e0 un probl\u00e8me sp\u00e9cifique peuvent \u00eatre inventeurs, lorsque la conception, la construction ou l'entra\u00eenement du syst\u00e8me d'IA constitue une contribution significative \u00e0 l'invention cr\u00e9\u00e9e avec le syst\u00e8me d'IA.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"marginTopBottom14 editable \">5. Le seul maintien, par une personne, d'une \u00ab domination intellectuelle \u00bb sur un syst\u00e8me d'IA, ne fait pas de celle-ci un inventeur des d'inventions cr\u00e9\u00e9es par l'utilisation du syst\u00e8me d'IA. [note omise] Par cons\u00e9quent, le simple fait de poss\u00e9der ou de superviser un syst\u00e8me d'IA utilis\u00e9 dans la cr\u00e9ation d'une invention, sans apporter une contribution importante \u00e0 la conception de l'invention, ne fait pas de cette personne un inventeur.\"<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\nLes lignes directrices abordent \u00e9videmment la question d\u00e9licate (et cruciale) de la sinc\u00e9rit\u00e9 des d\u00e9p\u00f4ts, appliqu\u00e9e \u00e0 l'hypoth\u00e8se d'inventions assist\u00e9es par IA. L'Office rappelle sur ce point aux d\u00e9posants les devoirs qui leur incombent<em> (duty of disclosure, duty of reasonable inquiry, <\/em>que l'Office n'envisage pas de modifier<em>), <\/em>ainsi que les pouvoirs de l'Office de demander des informations compl\u00e9mentaires, qu'il entend exercer en relation avec cette cat\u00e9gorie d'inventions, ou en cas de doute.\r\n\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<strong>391._ La description, les revendications et le dessin_<\/strong> Les sp\u00e9cifications doivent contenir une description \u00e9crite de l'invention, de son proc\u00e9d\u00e9 de fabrication et de son utilisation, dans des termes complets, clairs, concis et exacts (<em>adequate written description<\/em>)[footnote]MPEP, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.uspto.gov\/web\/offices\/pac\/mpep\/s2161.html\">\u00a7 2161.01<\/a>: <em>\u00ab\u00a0<\/em>The function of the written description requirement is to ensure that the inventor had possession of, as of the filing date of the application relied on, the specific subject matter later claimed by him or her; how the specification accomplishes this is not material. In re Herschler, 591 F.2d 693, 700-01, 200 USPQ 711, 717 (CCPA 1979) and further reiterated in In re Kaslow, 707 F.2d 1366, 707 F.2d 1366, 217 USPQ 1089 (Fed. Cir. 1983)\u00a0\u00bb. Ibid., \u00a7 2103: \u00ab\u00a0For the written description requirement, an applicant\u2019s specification must reasonably convey to those skilled in the art that the applicant was in possession of the claimed invention as of the date of invention<em>\u00a0\u00bb.<\/em>[\/footnote] qui permettent \u00e0 toute personne vers\u00e9e dans l'art auquel elle se rapporte, ou dans l\u2019art le plus proche, de la fabriquer de l\u2019utiliser (<em>enablement requirement<\/em>)[footnote]MPEP, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.uspto.gov\/web\/offices\/pac\/mpep\/s2103.html\">\u00a7 2103<\/a>: <em>\u00ab\u00a0<\/em>An applicant\u2019s specification must enable a person skilled in the art to make and use the claimed inven\u00adtion without undue experimentation. The fact that experimentation is complex, however, will not make it undue if a person of skill in the art typically engages in such complex experimentation.\u00a0\u00bb Ibid., \u00a7 2161.01: \u00ab\u00a0When basing a rejection on the failure of the appli\u00adcant\u2019s disclosure to meet the enablement provisions of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112, USPTO person\u00adnel must establish on the record a reasonable basis for questioning the adequacy of the disclosure to enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to make and use the claimed invention without resorting to undue experi\u00admentation. See In re Brown, 477 F.2d 946, 177 USPQ 691 (CCPA 1973); In re Ghiron, 442 F.2d 985, 169 USPQ 723 (CCPA 1971). Once USPTO personnel have advanced a reasonable basis for questioning the adequacy of the disclosure, it becomes incumbent on the applicant to rebut that challenge and factually demonstrate that his or her application disclosure is in fact sufficient. See In re Doyle, 482 F.2d 1385, 1392, 179 USPQ 227, 232 (CCPA 1973); In re Scarbrough, 500 F.2d 560, 566, 182 USPQ 298, 302 (CCPA 1974); In re Ghiron, supra.\u00a0<em>\u00bb <\/em>[\/footnote], et doivent indiquer la meilleure mani\u00e8re envisag\u00e9e par l'inventeur de r\u00e9aliser son invention (<em>best mode requirement<\/em>)[footnote]MPEP, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.uspto.gov\/web\/offices\/pac\/mpep\/s2165.html\">\u00a7 2165<\/a>: <em>\u00ab\u00a0<\/em>The purpose of the best mode requirement is to \u201crestrain inventors from applying for patents while at the same time concealing from the public the pre\u00adferred embodiments of their inventions which they have in fact conceived.\u00a0\u00bb In re Gay, 309 F.2d 769, 772, 135 USPQ 311, 315 (CCPA 1962). Only evidence of concealment, \u201cwhether accidental or intentional,\u201d is considered in judging the adequacy of the disclosure for compliance with the best mode requirement. Spec\u00adtra-Physics, Inc. v.\u00a0Coherent, Inc.,827 F.2d 1524, 1535, 3 USPQ 2d 1737, 1745 (Fed. Cir. 1987). That evidence, in order to result in affirmance of a best mode rejection, must tend to show that the quality of an applicant\u2019s best mode disclosure is so poor as to effectively result in concealment.\u201d In re Sherwood, 613 F.2d 809, 816-817, 204\u00a0USPQ 537, 544 (CCPA 1980). Also, see White Consol. Indus. v. Vega Servo-Control Inc., 214 USPQ 796, 824 (S.D. Mich. 1982), aff\u2019d on related grounds, 713 F.2d 788, 218 USPQ 961 (Fed. Cir. 1983). See also MPEP \u00a7 2165 - \u00a7\u00a02165.04.There are two factual inquiries to be made in deter\u00admining whether a specification satisfies the best mode requirement. First, there must be a subjective determi\u00adnation as to whether at the time the application was filed, the inventor knew of a best mode of practicing the invention. Second, if the inventor had a best mode of practicing the invention in mind, there must be an objective determination as to whether that best mode was disclosed in sufficient detail to allow one skilled in the art to practice it. Fonar Corp. v. General Elec\u00adtric Co., 107 F.3d 1543, 41 USPQ2d 1801, 1804 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Chemcast Corp. v. Arco Industries, 913 F.2d 923, 927-28, 16 USPQ2d 1033, 1036 (Fed. Cir. 1990). \u201cAs a general rule, where software constitutes part of a best mode of carrying out an invention, description of such a best mode is satisfied by a dis\u00adclosure of the functions of the software. This is because, normally, writing code for such software is within the skill of the art, not requiring undue experi\u00admentation, once its functions have been disclosed. . . . [F]low charts or source code listings are not a require\u00adment for adequately disclosing the functions of soft\u00adware.\u201d Fonar Corp., 107 F.3d at 1549, 41 USPQ2d at 1805 (citations omitted).Determining compliance with the best mode requirement requires a two-prong inquiry:1)at the time the application was filed, did the inventor possess a best mode for practicing the inven\u00adtion; and 2)if the inventor did possess a best mode, does the written description disclose the best mode such that a person skilled in the art could practice it.\u00a0\u00bb [\/footnote]. Ces trois exigences sont distinctes. Depuis l\u2019America Invents Act, le d\u00e9faut ou l\u2019insuffisance de description du <em>best mode<\/em> n\u2019est plus une cause de nullit\u00e9 du brevet. L\u2019exigence a donc \u00e9t\u00e9 maintenue, mais n\u2019est plus sanctionn\u00e9e[footnote]V. Jan Wolfe, Patent Reform's Reduced 'Best Mode' Requirement Creates Uncertainty, law.com, October 10, 2011.[\/footnote].\r\n\r\nLes sp\u00e9cifications doivent se conclure avec une ou plusieurs revendications \u00ab mettant pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment en \u00e9vidence et revendiquant distinctement l'objet que le requ\u00e9rant consid\u00e8re comme son invention \u00bb[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/part-II\/chapter-11\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 112<\/a>.[\/footnote]. Aux \u00c9tats-Unis comme ailleurs, les revendications d\u00e9terminent la port\u00e9e de l\u2019invention, et le titulaire du brevet n\u2019a aucun droit sur des \u00e9l\u00e9ments non revendiqu\u00e9s, quand bien m\u00eame seraient-ils inclus dans la description ou le dessin. L\u2019ordre, le format de pr\u00e9sentation et la structure des revendications sont pr\u00e9cis\u00e9s par l\u2019USPTO[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/cfr\/text\/37\/1.75\">37 C.F.R. \u00a7 1.75<\/a>: \u00ab (\u2026) (e) Where the nature of the case admits, as in the case of an improvement, any independent claim should contain in the following order: (1) A preamble comprising a general description of all the elements or steps of the claimed combination which are conventional or known, (2) A phrase such as \u201cwherein the improvement comprises,\u201d and (3) Those elements, steps and\/or relationships which constitute that portion of the claimed combination which the applicant considers as the new or improved portion. (f) If there are several claims, they shall be numbered consecutively in Arabic numerals. (g) The least restrictive claim should be presented as claim number 1, and all dependent claims should be grouped together with the claim or claims to which they refer to the extent practicable. (h) The claim or claims must commence on a separate physical sheet or electronic page. Any sheet including a claim or portion of a claim may not contain any other parts of the application or other material. (i) Where a claim sets forth a plurality of elements or steps, each element or step of the claim should be separated by a line indentation\u00a0<em>\u00bb.<\/em>[\/footnote]. Les exigences de r\u00e9daction sont l\u00e9g\u00e8rement plus souples que celles en vigueur en Europe[footnote]V. sur ce point Cabinet Regimbeau, Demandes de continuation : Conseils aux d\u00e9posants europ\u00e9ens pour la cr\u00e9ation d\u2019un portefeuille de brevets am\u00e9ricains, <a href=\"https:\/\/regimbeau.eu\/insight\/demandes-de-continuation-conseils-aux-deposants-europeens-pour-la-creation-dun-portefeuille-de-brevets-americains\/#:~:text=Une%20demande%20de%20continuation-in,ou%20sur%20la%20mati%C3%A8re%20nouvelle\">en ligne<\/a>.[\/footnote].\r\n\r\nLes revendications multiples sont possibles, \u00e0 la condition qu\u2019elles soient diff\u00e9rentes (<em>provided they differ substantially<\/em>) et qu\u2019elles ne soit pas indument multipli\u00e9es[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/cfr\/text\/37\/1.75\">37 C.F.R. \u00a7 1.75(b)<\/a>.[\/footnote].\r\n\r\nUne ou plusieurs revendications peuvent \u00eatre pr\u00e9sent\u00e9es sous forme d\u00e9pendante. Une revendication d\u00e9pendante inclut tous les \u00e9l\u00e9ments de la revendication dont elle d\u00e9pend, et est pr\u00e9sum\u00e9e valide (si le brevet est d\u00e9livr\u00e9) m\u00eame si elle d\u00e9pend d\u2019une revendication invalide[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/part-III\/chapter-29\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 282<\/a>.[\/footnote].\r\n\r\nLe demandeur doit fournir un dessin s\u2019il est n\u00e9cessaire \u00e0 la compr\u00e9hension de l'invention[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/part-II\/chapter-11\">35 U.S.C \u00a7 113<\/a>.[\/footnote]. Le Directeur peut \u00e9galement exiger du demandeur de fournir un mod\u00e8le de l\u2019invention[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/part-II\/chapter-11\">35 U.S.C \u00a7 114<\/a>.[\/footnote]. Lorsque l'invention consiste en une composition de mati\u00e8re, le directeur peut exiger du demandeur de fournir des \u00e9chantillons ou des ingr\u00e9dients[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/part-II\/chapter-11\">35 U.S.C \u00a7 114<\/a>.[\/footnote].\r\n\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<strong>392._ Le d\u00e9p\u00f4t et l\u2019acc\u00e8s au mat\u00e9riel_<\/strong> Comme indiqu\u00e9, si l\u2019invention ne peut \u00eatre r\u00e9alis\u00e9e sans acc\u00e8s \u00e0 un \u00e9l\u00e9ment ou mat\u00e9riel auquel le public ne peut avoir acc\u00e8s, un d\u00e9p\u00f4t ou une fourniture d\u2019information permettant d\u2019acc\u00e9der \u00e0 cet \u00e9l\u00e9ment peuvent \u00eatre exig\u00e9s, sur le fondement de la condition d\u2019<em>enablement<\/em>. Cette exigence est strictement appliqu\u00e9e dans le domaine des biotechnologies[footnote]Mais \u00e9galement en mati\u00e8re d\u2019informatique, V. <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/white-consol-indus-v-vega-servo-control\">White Consolidated Indus., Inc. v. Vega Servo-Control, Inc.<\/a>, 713 F.2d 788 (Fed. Cir. 1983); <em>In re<\/em> Ghiron, 442 F.2d 985, 991 (CCPA 1971).[\/footnote]. Cependant, elle n\u2019implique pas n\u00e9cessairement un d\u00e9p\u00f4t physique[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/amgen-inc-v-chugai-pharmaceutical-co-ltd\">Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd.<\/a>, 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (pas de violation de l\u2019exigence de <em>best mode<\/em> en cas d\u2019absencce de d\u00e9p\u00f4t de cellules transform\u00e9es par la s\u00e9quence d\u2019ADN brevet\u00e9e).[\/footnote]. Par exemple, dans une affaire impliquant la brevetabilit\u00e9 d\u2019\u00e9l\u00e9ments biochimiques naturels issus d\u2019un organisme marin, la condition d\u2019<em>enablement<\/em> a \u00e9t\u00e9 jug\u00e9e satisfaite par la fourniture, par le titulaire du brevet, d\u2019informations d\u00e9taill\u00e9es sur la localisation g\u00e9ographique et l\u2019habitat de l\u2019organisme marin source[footnote]<em>Ex parte<\/em> Rinehart, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1719, 1720 (Bd. Pat. App. &amp; Int\u2019f 1989)[\/footnote]. En revanche, des d\u00e9p\u00f4ts seront exig\u00e9s si l\u2019organisme source ne peut pas \u00eatre identifi\u00e9 ou d\u00e9crit avec suffisamment de pr\u00e9cision.\r\n\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<strong>393._ L\u2019examen, la publication et la d\u00e9livrance du brevet_<\/strong> La proc\u00e9dure d\u2019obtention du brevet prend la forme d\u2019une \u00ab\u00a0instruction\u00a0\u00bb (<em>prosecution<\/em>) men\u00e9e par un examinateur d\u00e9sign\u00e9 par l\u2019USPTO. La proc\u00e9dure entra\u00eene paiement de plusieurs redevances, ind\u00e9pendamment des honoraires du <em>patent agent <\/em>ou du <em>patent attorney<\/em>.\r\n\r\nL\u2019examen porte sur toutes les conditions de brevetabilit\u00e9. Il donne lieu \u00e0 l\u2019envoi par l\u2019examinateur d\u2019un document \u00e9crit d\u00e9nomm\u00e9 \u00ab\u00a0<em>office action<\/em>\u00a0\u00bb, qui pr\u00e9cise et justifie sa d\u00e9cision (acceptation ou rejet) au regard de chaque revendication. Ces <em>office actions<\/em> peuvent \u00eatre d\u00e9finitives ou non d\u00e9finitives (<em>final <\/em>ou <em>non final<\/em>), ce qui a des cons\u00e9quences sur les possibilit\u00e9s de r\u00e9ponse ou de recours. Si l\u2019<em>office action <\/em>est d\u00e9finitive, le d\u00e9posant peut soit faire appel aupr\u00e8s du Board of Patent Appels et Interferences[footnote]Puis, le cas \u00e9ch\u00e9ant devant la Cour d\u2019Appel pour le Circuit f\u00e9d\u00e9ral ou la Cour de District pour le District de Columbia. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/part-II\/chapter-13\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 141, 145<\/a>.[\/footnote], soit apporter les modifications n\u00e9cessaires \u00e0 sa demande. Si elle est provisoire, le d\u00e9posant peut r\u00e9pondre et solliciter un nouvel examen. Ce dernier a en principe six mois pour r\u00e9pondre \u00e0 l\u2019examinateur, mais la dur\u00e9e est en pratique plus courte (de un \u00e0 trois mois).\r\n\r\nLe d\u00e9posant \u00e0 l\u2019obligation de communiquer \u00e0 l\u2019examinateur tous les \u00e9l\u00e9ments pertinents dont il a connaissance permettant d\u2019appr\u00e9cier la validit\u00e9 de l\u2019invention (<em>duty of candor<\/em>). A d\u00e9faut, sa conduite pourra \u00eatre jug\u00e9 fautive (<em>inequitable conduct<\/em>), et entra\u00eener la perte de ses droits. La pratique favorise la communication d\u2019un document reprenant ces informations (<em>information disclosure statement<\/em>).\r\n\r\nLa possibilit\u00e9 de modifier les sp\u00e9cifications apr\u00e8s le d\u00e9p\u00f4t est fortement limit\u00e9e par l\u2019interdiction d\u2019introduire de nouveaux \u00e9l\u00e9ments dans la demande, pos\u00e9e par la section 132 du Patent act[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/part-II\/chapter-12\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 132(a)<\/a> (<em>\u00ab\u00a0No amendment shall introduce new matter into the disclosure of the invention.\u00a0\u00bb<\/em>).[\/footnote].\r\n\r\nChaque demande de brevet doit \u00eatre publi\u00e9e, conform\u00e9ment aux proc\u00e9dures fix\u00e9es par le Directeur, \u00e0 bref d\u00e9lai apr\u00e8s l'expiration d'une p\u00e9riode de dix-huit mois \u00e0 compter de la date de d\u00e9p\u00f4t. \u00c0 la demande du d\u00e9posant, une demande peut \u00eatre publi\u00e9e plus t\u00f4t que la fin de cette p\u00e9riode de 18 mois[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/122\">35 U.S.C \u00a7 122(b)(1)(A)<\/a>.[\/footnote]. Cette publication permet au demander de b\u00e9n\u00e9ficier de \u00ab <em>provisional rights<\/em>\u00a0\u00bb avant d\u00e9livrance du brevet[footnote]C\u2019est-\u00e0-dire du droit de demander une redevance raisonnable \u00e0 toute personne qui exploite l\u2019invention jusqu\u2019\u00e0 la d\u00e9livrance du brevet. V. <em>infra, <\/em>n\u00b0364.[\/footnote]. Ne sont pas publi\u00e9es[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/part-II\/chapter-11\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 122(b)(2)<\/a>.[\/footnote] les demandes qui ne sont plus en cours, et les demandes couvertes par une ordonnance de secret requise par le Gouvernement[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/part-II\/chapter-17\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 181<\/a>.[\/footnote] ou dont la divulgation serait contraire \u00e0 la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale. Le d\u00e9posant peut \u00e9galement demander que la demande ne soit pas publi\u00e9e s\u2019il certifie qu\u2019aucun d\u00e9p\u00f4t de la m\u00eame invention ne sera effectu\u00e9 dans un autre pays ou au travers d\u2019une convention internationale qui requiert une telle publication[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/part-II\/chapter-11\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 122(b)(2)(B)<\/a>.[\/footnote].\r\n\r\nAvant publication, les demandes de brevets doivent \u00eatre conserv\u00e9es \u00e0 titre confidentiel par le PTO, et aucune information les concernant ne peut \u00eatre donn\u00e9e sans l'autorisation du d\u00e9posant ou du titulaire[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/part-II\/chapter-11\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 122(a)<\/a>. Sauf mise en oeuvre d\u2019une disposition l\u00e9gale ou dans des circonstances particuli\u00e8res d\u00e9termin\u00e9es par le Directeur.[\/footnote].\r\n\r\nLe Patent Act ne pr\u00e9voit pas de proc\u00e9dure d\u2019opposition pendant la phase d\u2019examen, mais l\u2019America Invents Act a introduit une possibilit\u00e9 pour les tiers de pr\u00e9senter \u00e0 l\u2019Office des brevets, des demandes de brevets et des publications pertinentes avant d\u00e9livrance d\u2019un brevet (<em>third party preissuance submissions<\/em>)[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/part-II\/chapter-11\">35 U.S.C. 122(e)<\/a>.[\/footnote].\r\n\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<strong>394._ La proc\u00e9dure de r\u00e9examen_<\/strong>\u00a0L\u2019America Invents Act a modifi\u00e9 les proc\u00e9dures d\u2019opposition post d\u00e9livrance devant l\u2019USPTO (<em>reexamination procedures<\/em>). Trois proc\u00e9dures sont d\u00e9sormais disponibles. Une proc\u00e9dure ex parte (<em>ex parte reexamination<\/em>)[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/part-III\/chapter-30\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 302<\/a>. Proc\u00e9dure initialement introduite en 1981.[\/footnote], ouverte au titulaire du brevet, aux tiers et au directeur de l\u2019USPTO, et ouverte uniquement en pr\u00e9sence d\u2019une question nouvelle importante affectant la brevetabilit\u00e9 (<em>substantial new question of patentability<\/em>), une nouvelle proc\u00e9dure d\u00e9nomm\u00e9e <em>post grant review<\/em>[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/part-III\/chapter-32\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 321-30.<\/a>[\/footnote], ouvertes pendant neuf mois \u00e0 compter de la d\u00e9livrance du brevet, et une proc\u00e9dure <em>inter partes<\/em> (<em>inter partes review<\/em>, qui se substitue \u00e0 l\u2019ancienne <em>inter partes reexamination<\/em>)[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/part-III\/chapter-31\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 311-19<\/a>.[\/footnote], ouverte apr\u00e8s expiration du d\u00e9lai de la <em>post grant review<\/em>. Ces proc\u00e9dures ob\u00e9issent \u00e0 un r\u00e9gime diff\u00e9rent et \u00e0 des r\u00e8gles proc\u00e9durales distinctes. Les dispositions transitoires les concernant sont complexes. Un appel des d\u00e9cisions rendues est possible devant le Patent Trial and Appeal Board et le Circuit F\u00e9d\u00e9ral.\r\n\r\nEn dehors de ces proc\u00e9dures, une action en d\u00e9claration d\u2019invalidit\u00e9 peut \u00eatre port\u00e9e devant les tribunaux. Cependant elle n\u2019est ouverte qu\u2019aux personnes qui utilisent l\u2019invention ou se pr\u00e9parent \u00e0 le faire. Bien \u00e9videmment, la validit\u00e9 du brevet peut toujours \u00eatre contest\u00e9e en d\u00e9fense \u00e0 une action en contrefa\u00e7on.\r\n<h2>3. La propri\u00e9t\u00e9 et l'exploitation de l'invention<\/h2>\r\n<strong>395._ Plan_ <\/strong>Nous distinguerons les r\u00e8gles de titularit\u00e9 (A), l'\u00e9tendue de la protection (B) et les r\u00e8gles applicables \u00e0 l'exploitation du brevet.\r\n<h3><strong>A. La titularit\u00e9 du brevet<\/strong><\/h3>\r\n<strong>396._ Du premier inventeur \u00e0 l\u2019inventeur premier d\u00e9posant : l\u2019America Invents Act _<\/strong> Comme indiqu\u00e9, une des \u00e9volutions les plus importantes du droit am\u00e9ricain des brevets depuis 1952 concerne le droit au brevet, et est issue du Leahy\u2013Smith America Invents Act de 2011, qui substitue au syst\u00e8me traditionnel du premier inventeur (<em>first to invent<\/em>) un syst\u00e8me d\u2019inventeur premier d\u00e9posant (<em>first inventor to file<\/em>)[footnote]V. <em>supra, <\/em>n\u00b0357.[\/footnote], au travers notamment de la modification de la section 102(a)(1) du Patent Act[footnote]Qui dispose qu' \"une demande de brevet doit \u00eatre faite ou autoris\u00e9e \u00e0 \u00eatre faite, par l'inventeur, sauf disposition contraire dans le pr\u00e9sent titre, par \u00e9crit au directeur.\" Le texte ant\u00e9rieur disposait : Une personne a droit \u00e0 un brevet sauf si l'invention a \u00e9t\u00e9 connue ou utilis\u00e9e par d'autres dans ce pays ou brevet\u00e9e ou d\u00e9crite dans une publication imprim\u00e9e dans ce pays ou \u00e0 l'\u00e9tranger, avant l'invention de celui-ci par le demandeur de brevet\"; V. MPEP, \u00a7 2131 \u00e0 2138.[\/footnote]. Les principales dispositions de cette r\u00e9forme sont entr\u00e9es en vigueur le 16 mars 2013. Elles n\u2019ont pas d\u2019effet r\u00e9troactif.&gt;\r\n\r\nDans le syst\u00e8me ant\u00e9rieur \u00e0 la r\u00e9forme, une proc\u00e9dure sp\u00e9cifique complexe devant l\u2019USPTO, ob\u00e9issant \u00e0 des r\u00e8gles proc\u00e9durales propres, d\u00e9nomm\u00e9e proc\u00e9dure d\u2019interf\u00e9rence (<em>interference proceeding<\/em>) \u00e9tait destin\u00e9e \u00e0 r\u00e9soudre les questions de priorit\u00e9s entre inventeurs[footnote]<span style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\">V. MPEP, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.uspto.gov\/web\/offices\/pac\/mpep\/s2301.html\">\u00a7 2301<\/a>.<\/span>[\/footnote].\u00a0Pour les demandes d\u00e9pos\u00e9es apr\u00e8s cette date, l\u2019AIA a institu\u00e9 une nouvelle proc\u00e9dure devant l\u2019USPTO, dite <em>Derivations Proceedings<\/em>, destin\u00e9e \u00e0 d\u00e9terminer si le d\u00e9posant ou le brevet\u00e9 est bien inventeur ou ayant cause de l\u2019inventeur[footnote]V.<span style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\"> MPEP, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.uspto.gov\/web\/offices\/pac\/mpep\/s2310.html\">\u00a7 2310<\/a>.<\/span>[\/footnote].\r\n\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<strong>397._ Les inventions de salari\u00e9s_<\/strong> Aux \u00c9tats-Unis la question des inventions de salari\u00e9s, comme celle des contrats de transfert en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral, n\u2019est pas r\u00e9gie par la loi f\u00e9d\u00e9rale. Elle est donc r\u00e9gl\u00e9e au niveau des \u00c9tats, soit en application des principes de <em>common law<\/em>, soit par des lois \u00e9crites. Les solutions ne sont donc pas uniformes sur ce point.\r\n\r\nEn <em>common law<\/em> la solution de principe consiste \u00e0 attribuer les droits \u00e0 l\u2019employ\u00e9 inventeur[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/289\/178\/\">United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp.<\/a>, 289 U.S. 178 (1933).[\/footnote]. Les clauses expresses d\u2019attribution des droits \u00e0 l\u2019employeur sont cependant valables, et ne semblent pas faire l\u2019objet de restrictions particuli\u00e8res. En l\u2019absence de clause expresse, et dans certains cas, une licence ou, plus rarement, une cession tacite, peuvent \u00eatre d\u00e9couvertes[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/wommack-v-durham-pecan-co-inc\">Wommack v. Durham Pecan Co., Inc.<\/a>, 715 F.2d 962, 219 U.S.P.Q. 1153 (5th Cir. 1983); <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/tin-decorating-co-v-metal-package-corp\">Tin Decorating Co. of Baltimore v. Metal Package Corp.<\/a>, 29 F.2d 1006 (S.D.N.Y. 1928), <em>aff\u2019d on other grounds<\/em>, 37 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1930); Wiegand v. Dover Mfg. Co., 292 F. 255 (N.D. Ohio 1923); <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/francklyn-v-guilford-packing-co\">Francklyn v. Guilford Packing Co.<\/a>, 695 F.2d 1158, 1160-61 (9th Cir. 1983); <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/kurt-h-volk-v-found-for-christian-living\">Kurt H. Volk, Inc. v. Foundation for Christian Living<\/a>, 534 F. Supp. 1059, 1083-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).[\/footnote]. Les crit\u00e8res appliqu\u00e9s pour d\u00e9terminer l\u2019existence d\u2019une licence ou d\u2019une cession tacite rappellent ceux qui sont utilis\u00e9s dans nos r\u00e9gimes d\u2019inventions de salari\u00e9s\u00a0: nature de l\u2019activit\u00e9 de l\u2019employ\u00e9, instructions ou utilisation des ressources de l\u2019employeur, etc. Les dirigeants de l\u2019entreprise semblent \u00eatre soumis \u00e0 une obligation implicite de transf\u00e9rer leurs droits \u00e0 leur employeur. Une licence tacite peut \u00eatre exclusive ou non. Les r\u00e8gles de <em>common law<\/em> n\u2019imposent pas une r\u00e9mun\u00e9ration distincte du salaire vers\u00e9.\r\n\r\nLes lois \u00e9tatiques adopt\u00e9es par certains Etats f\u00e9d\u00e9r\u00e9s, soit codifient les solutions d\u00e9gag\u00e9es en <em>common law<\/em>, soit les alt\u00e8rent. Elles peuvent \u00e9tablir ou autoriser un <em>shop right<\/em> (droit de boutique), c\u2019est-\u00e0-dire un droit, non exclusif, conf\u00e9r\u00e9 \u00e0 l\u2019employeur d\u2019exploiter l\u2019invention concern\u00e9e pour son propre usage.\r\n\r\nLa Loi de Californie, inscrite du Code du travail de l\u2019\u00c9tat[footnote]Cal. Lab. Code \u00a7\u00a7 2870 \u00e0 2872.[\/footnote] pr\u00e9voit que les cessions de droits \u00e0 l\u2019employeur ne couvrent pas une invention que l'employ\u00e9 a con\u00e7ue enti\u00e8rement sur son temps libre sans utiliser l'\u00e9quipement, les fournitures, les installations ou les secrets commerciaux de l'employeur, \u00e0 l'exception des inventions qui : se rapportent au moment de la conception ou de l'utilisation aux activit\u00e9s de l'employeur (<em>employer\u2019s bunisess<\/em>) ou \u00e0 ses activit\u00e9s de recherche ou de d\u00e9veloppement r\u00e9elles ou pr\u00e9vues (<em>demonstrably anticipated<\/em>), ou r\u00e9sultent d'un travail effectu\u00e9 pour l'employeur.\u00a0 Le contrat de travail d\u00e9termine \u00e9galement les conditions de divulgation par l\u2019employ\u00e9 de ses inventions et de d\u00e9termination de leur classification (sous condition de confidentialit\u00e9). Des lois similaires ont \u00e9t\u00e9 adopt\u00e9s dans le Delaware[footnote]19 Del C. \u00a7 805).[\/footnote], en Illinois[footnote]765 ILCS 1060\/1 \u00e0 1060\/3.[\/footnote], au Kansas[footnote]K.S.A. 44-130[\/footnote], dans le Minnesota[footnote]Minn. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 181.78.[\/footnote], au Nevada[footnote]NRS 600.500.[\/footnote], dans le New Jersey[footnote]N.J.S.A. 34:1B-265.[\/footnote], en Caroline du Nord[footnote]N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 66-57.1 et 66-57.2.[\/footnote], dans l\u2019Utah[footnote]Utah Code \u00a7\u00a7 34-39-1 \u00e0 34-39-3.[\/footnote] et dans l\u2019\u00c9tat de Washington[footnote]RCW 49.44.140 et 49.44.150.[\/footnote].\r\n\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<strong>398._ Propri\u00e9t\u00e9 et copropri\u00e9t\u00e9 du brevet_<\/strong> Aux termes du paragraphe 261 du Patent Act les brevets ont \u00ab\u00a0les attributs de la propri\u00e9t\u00e9 personnelle\u00a0\u00bb (<em>the attributes of personal property<\/em>). Les demandes de brevets, les brevets, ou tout int\u00e9r\u00eat y aff\u00e9rent, sont cessibles et peuvent faire l\u2019objet de licences, exclusives ou non.\r\n\r\nLes coinventeurs ont un droit indivis dans le brevet. En l'absence de toute convention contraire, chacun des copropri\u00e9taires d'un brevet peut fabriquer, utiliser, offrir \u00e0 la vente, ou vendre l'invention brevet\u00e9e aux \u00c9tats-Unis, ou importer l'invention brevet\u00e9e aux \u00c9tats-Unis, sans le consentement des autres propri\u00e9taires[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/part-III\/chapter-26\">35 U.S.C.\u00a7 262<\/a>.[\/footnote]. Il peut \u00e9galement librement c\u00e9der sa quote-part dans le brevet.\r\n\r\nDe mani\u00e8re g\u00e9n\u00e9rale, les questions relatives \u00e0 la propri\u00e9t\u00e9 et au transfert du brevet sont r\u00e9gies par les loi \u00e9tatiques[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/farmland-irrigation-co-v-dopplmaier\">Farmland Irrigation Co., Inc. v. Dopplmaier<\/a>, 48 Cal. 2d 208, 308 P.2d 732 (1957).[\/footnote].\r\n<h3><strong>B. L'\u00e9tendue de la protection<\/strong><\/h3>\r\n<strong>399._ Les droits exclusifs du brevet\u00e9_<\/strong> Le monopole du brevet\u00e9 est d\u00e9fini de mani\u00e8re n\u00e9gative, comme le droit d\u2019interdire aux tiers d\u2019effectuer certains actes sur l\u2019invention[footnote]V. par exemple <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/transcore-v-electronic-transaction\">TransCore, L.P. v. Electronic Transaction Consultants Corp.<\/a>, 563 F.3d 1271, 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2009); <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/leatherman-tool-group-v-cooper-industries-2\">Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. v. Cooper Industries, Inc.<\/a>, 131 F.3d 1011, 1015 (Fed. Cir. 1997).[\/footnote]. Aux termes du paragraphe 154(1)(a) du Patent Act, tout brevet conf\u00e8re au brevet\u00e9, \u00e0 ses h\u00e9ritiers ou ayants droit, le droit d'interdire \u00e0 toute pertsonne de fabriquer, utiliser, offrir \u00e0 la vente, ou de vendre l'invention \u00e0 travers les \u00c9tats-Unis ou d'importer l'invention aux \u00c9tats-Unis, et, si l'invention est un proc\u00e9d\u00e9, le droit d'emp\u00eacher autrui d'utiliser, offrir \u00e0 la vente ou \u00e0 la vente aux \u00c9tats-Unis, ou d'importer aux \u00c9tats-Unis, les produits fabriqu\u00e9s par ce proc\u00e9d\u00e9, se r\u00e9f\u00e9rant \u00e0 la sp\u00e9cification des indications de ceux-ci[footnote]\u00ab Every patent shall contain a short title of the invention and a grant to the patentee, his heirs or assigns, of the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States or importing the invention into the United States, and, if the invention is a process, of the right to exclude others from using, offering for sale or selling throughout the United States, or importing into the United States, products made by that process, referring to the specification for the particulars thereof\u00a0<em>\u00bb.<\/em>[\/footnote].\r\n\r\nLa d\u00e9finition des actes contrefaisants est pr\u00e9cis\u00e9e aux paragraphes 271(a) et 271(g) du Patent Act, qui disposent\u00a0:\r\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\r\n\r\n\u00ab 271. - (a) Sauf disposition contraire dans le pr\u00e9sent titre [35 USCS 1 et suiv. ], quiconque sans autorisation fabrique, utilise, offre de vendre ou vend une invention brevet\u00e9e, aux \u00c9tats-Unis ou importe aux \u00c9tats-Unis une invention brevet\u00e9e pendant la dur\u00e9e du brevet correspondant, contrefait le brevet[footnote]\"(a) Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States, or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent\".[\/footnote].\r\n\r\n(\u2026)\r\n\r\n(g) Quiconque, sans autorisation, les importations aux \u00c9tats-Unis ou des offres de vente, vend ou utilise aux \u00c9tats-Unis un produit qui est fabriqu\u00e9 par un proc\u00e9d\u00e9 brevet\u00e9 aux \u00c9tats-Unis seront responsables comme un contrefacteur, si l'importation, l'offre \u00e0 vente, la vente ou l'utilisation du produit survient pendant la dur\u00e9e d'un tel brevet de proc\u00e9d\u00e9. Dans une action en contrefa\u00e7on d'un brevet de proc\u00e9d\u00e9, aucun recours ne peut \u00eatre accord\u00e9 pour infraction en raison de l'usage non commercial ou vente au d\u00e9tail d'un produit moins qu'il n'y ait pas de recours ad\u00e9quat en vertu du pr\u00e9sent titre pour infraction en raison de l'importation ou de toute autre utilisation, l'offre de vendre, ou de la vente de ce produit. Un produit qui est fabriqu\u00e9 par un proc\u00e9d\u00e9 brevet\u00e9 sera, aux fins du pr\u00e9sent titre, ne peut \u00eatre consid\u00e9r\u00e9 comme fait apr\u00e8s\r\n\r\n(1) il est sensiblement modifi\u00e9 par les processus ult\u00e9rieurs; ou\r\n\r\n(2) il devient un \u00e9l\u00e9ment trivial et non essentiel d'un autre produit\u00a0\u00bb[footnote]Traduction OMPI. \u201c(g) Whoever without authority imports into the United States or offers to sell, sells, or uses within the United States a product which is made by a process patented in the United States shall be liable as an infringer, if the importation, offer to sell, sale, or use of the product occurs during the term of such process patent. In an action for infringement of a process patent, no remedy may be granted for infringement on account of the noncommercial use or retail sale of a product unless there is no adequate remedy under this title for infringement on account of the importation or other use, offer to sell, or sale of that product. A product which is made by a patented process will, for purposes of this title, not be considered to be so made after \u2014 (1) it is materially changed by subsequent processes; or (2) it becomes a trivial and nonessential component of another product.<em>\u00a0\u00bb <\/em>[\/footnote].\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\nChacun de ces actes constitue un acte distinct de contrefa\u00e7on directe (primaire).\r\n\r\nL\u2019importation est vis\u00e9e de mani\u00e8re g\u00e9n\u00e9rale comme un acte primaire de contrefa\u00e7on depuis 1994[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/271\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 271(a)<\/a>.[\/footnote], sous r\u00e9serve de l\u2019application de la doctrine de <em>first sale<\/em>[footnote]V. <em>infra, <\/em>n\u00b0400.[\/footnote]. Le titulaire du brevet peut \u00e9galement, en vertu de la Section 337 du Tariff Act du 1930, demander \u00e0 l\u2019United States International Trade Commission (ITC) une injonction interdisant l\u2019importation contrefaisante[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/19\/1337\">19 U.S.C. \u00a7 1337(a)<\/a>.[\/footnote]. L\u2019ITC ne peut cependant accorder de dommages et int\u00e9r\u00eat. Deux proc\u00e9dures sont donc souvent lanc\u00e9es en parall\u00e8le, devant l\u2019ITC et les tribunaux.\r\n\r\nLa loi consid\u00e8re \u00e9galement comme actes de contrefa\u00e7on primaire (a) le d\u00e9p\u00f4t d\u2019une demande d\u2019autorisation relative \u00e0 un m\u00e9dicament couvert par un brevet (sous r\u00e9serve d\u2019exceptions limit\u00e9es en mati\u00e8re de biotechnologies)[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/271\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 271(e)<\/a> point 2 et suivants\u00a0: <em>\u00ab\u00a0<\/em>(e) (1) It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell within the United States or import into the United States a patented invention (other than a new animal drug or veterinary biological product (as those terms are used in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Act of March 4, 1913) which is primarily manufactured using recombinant DNA, recombinant RNA, hybridoma technology, or other processes involving site specific genetic manipulation techniques) solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products. (2) It shall be an act of infringement to submit \u2014 (A) an application under section 505(j) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act or described in section 505(b)(2) of such Act for a drug claimed in a patent or the use of which is claimed in a patent, (B) an application under section 512 of such Act or under the Act of March 4, 1913 (21 U.S.C. 151 - 158) for a drug or veterinary biological product which is not primarily manufactured using recombinant DNA, recombinant RNA, hybridoma technology, or other processes involving site specific genetic manipulation techniques and which is claimed in a patent or the use of which is claimed in a patent, or (C) (i) with respect to a patent that is identified in the list of patents described in section 351(l)(3) of the Public Health Service Act (including as provided under section 351(l)(7) of such Act), an application seeking approval of a biological product, or(ii) if the applicant for the application fails to provide the application and information required under section 351(l)(2)(A) of such Act, an application seeking approval of a biological product for a patent that could be identified pursuant to section 351(l)(3)(A)(i) of such Act, if the purpose of such submission is to obtain approval under such Act to engage in the commercial manufacture, use, or sale of a drug, veterinary biological product, or biological product claimed in a patent or the use of which is claimed in a patent before the expiration of such patent.\u00a0<em>\u00bb <\/em>V. <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/496\/661\/\">Eli Lilly and Co. v. Medtronic, Inc.<\/a>, 496 U.S. 661 (1990); <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/545\/193\/\">Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd.<\/a>, 545 U.S. 193 (2005).[\/footnote], (b) depuis une modification de 1984, le fait de fournir aux \u00c9tats-Unis ou \u00e0 partir des \u00c9tats-Unis une partie substantielle des composants, non combin\u00e9s, d'une invention brevet\u00e9e, de mani\u00e8re \u00e0 induire activement la combinaison de ces composants \u00e0 l'ext\u00e9rieur des \u00c9tats-Unis d'une mani\u00e8re qui porterait atteinte au brevet si une telle combinaison \u00e9tait effectu\u00e9e aux \u00c9tats-Unis[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/271\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 271(f)<\/a>. V. <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/550\/437\/\">Microsoft Corp. v. AT&amp;T Corp.<\/a>, 550 U.S. 437 (2007).[\/footnote], et (c) depuis 1988 (r\u00e9forme issue du Process Patents Amendments Act de 1988) l\u2019importation, l\u2019offre \u00e0 la vente, la vente ou l\u2019utilisation aux \u00c9tats-Unis d\u2019un produit fabriqu\u00e9 en dehors des \u00c9tats-Unis au moyen d\u2019un proc\u00e9d\u00e9 brevet\u00e9 aux \u00c9tats-Unis[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/271\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 271(g)<\/a>: <em>\u00ab<\/em>\u00a0Whoever without authority imports into the United States or offers to sell, sells, or uses within the United States a product which is made by a process patented in the United States shall be liable as an infringer, if the importation, offer to sell, sale, or use of the product occurs during the term of such process patent. In an action for infringement of a process patent, no remedy may be granted for infringement on account of the noncommercial use or retail sale of a product unless there is no adequate remedy under this title for infringement on account of the importation or other use, offer to sell, or sale of that product. A product which is made by a patented process will, for purposes of this title, not be considered to be so made after \u2014 (1) it is materially changed by subsequent processes; or (2) it becomes a trivial and nonessential component of another product.\u00a0<em>\u00bb <\/em>[\/footnote].\r\n\r\nLa contrefa\u00e7on secondaire (<em>indirect<\/em> ou <em>dependent infringement<\/em>) est vis\u00e9e aux paragraphes 271(b) et (c), et consiste dans l\u2019incitation \u00e0 la contrefa\u00e7on (<em>active inducement<\/em>) et la fourniture de moyens contrefaisants (<em>contributory infingement<\/em>)[footnote]\u00ab (b) Quiconque induit activement contrefa\u00e7on d'un brevet est responsable comme un contrefacteur.(c) Celui qui offre de vendre ou vend aux \u00c9tats-Unis ou des importations aux \u00c9tats-Unis une composante d'une machine brevet\u00e9e, la fabrication, la combinaison ou la composition, ou d'un mat\u00e9riau ou d'un appareil pour une utilisation dans la pratique d'un proc\u00e9d\u00e9 brevet\u00e9, constituant une partie de la mati\u00e8re de l'invention, que l'on sait \u00eatre sp\u00e9cialement con\u00e7u ou sp\u00e9cialement adapt\u00e9 pour une utilisation \u00e0 une violation de ce brevet, et non un article de base ou d'un produit du commerce adapt\u00e9 \u00e0 une utilisation importante de contrefaisant, est responsable comme un contrefacteur \u00bb.[\/footnote]. L\u2019incitation \u00e0 la contrefa\u00e7on requiert la preuve d\u2019un encouragement actif et intentionnel ou d\u2019une aide apport\u00e9e \u00e0 la r\u00e9alisation de la contrefa\u00e7on[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/dsu-medical-corp-v-jms-co\">DSU Medical Corp. v. JMS Co.<\/a>, 471 F.3d 1293, 1305-06 (Fed. Cir. 2006); <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/manville-sales-corp-v-paramount-systems\">Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Systems, Inc.<\/a>, 917 F.2d 544, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1990); <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/water-technologies-corp-v-calco-ltd-3\">Water Technologies Corp. v. Calco, Ltd.<\/a>, 850 F.2d 660, 668 (Fed. Cir. 1988).[\/footnote]. La contrefa\u00e7on indirecte ou secondaire implique n\u00e9cessairement l\u2019existence d\u2019un acte de contrefa\u00e7on primaire associ\u00e9[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/365\/336\/\">Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co.<\/a>, 365 U.S. 336 (1961).[\/footnote].\r\n\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<strong>400._ L\u2019\u00e9puisement des droits_<\/strong> En mati\u00e8re de brevet la th\u00e9orie de l'\u00e9puisement des droits (<em>first sale doctrine<\/em>), d\u00e9velopp\u00e9e en <em>common law,<\/em> ne fait l'objet d'aucune disposition dans le Patent Act.\r\n\r\nLa Cour supr\u00eame l'a consacr\u00e9 pour la premi\u00e8re fois en mati\u00e8re de brevets dans son arr\u00eat <em>Adams v. Burke<\/em> de 1873[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/84\/453\/\"><em>Adams v. Burke<\/em><\/a>, 84 U.S. (17 Wall) 453 1873.[\/footnote], qui concernait des restrictions territoriales \u00e0 l'int\u00e9rieur des \u00c9tats-Unis impos\u00e9es par un vendeur de cercueils, jug\u00e9es en l'esp\u00e8ce inopposables aux utilisateurs. La Cour y fonde la th\u00e9orie sur l'id\u00e9e qu'une vente autoris\u00e9e doit n\u00e9cessairement entra\u00eener le droit d'utiliser, de la mani\u00e8re la plus compl\u00e8te, le produit vendu\u00a0:\r\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\r\n\r\n\u00ab\u00a0Le fondement r\u00e9el de ces d\u00e9cisions est que la vente par une personne qui poss\u00e8de le droit de fabriquer, vendre et utiliser une machine entra\u00eene le droit d'utiliser cette machine de la fa\u00e7on la plus compl\u00e8te qui soit\u00a0\u00bb[footnote]\u00ab\u00a0The true ground on which these decisions rest is that the sale by a person who has the full right to make, sell, and use such a machine carries with it the right to the use of that machine to the full extent to which it can be used in point of time<em>.\u00a0\u00bb Adams v. Burke, ibid<\/em>.[\/footnote]\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\nDe l\u00e0 vient l'expression <em>first sale doctrine<\/em>, th\u00e9orie de la premi\u00e8re vente, qui correspond \u00e0 la th\u00e9orie de l'\u00e9puisement des droits d\u00e9gag\u00e9e (import\u00e9e?) par Kohler en Allemagne \u00e0 la m\u00eame \u00e9poque[footnote]Kohler proposera en Allemagne la th\u00e9orie des licences tacites d\u00e8s 1878 (Dans son trait\u00e9 Deutsches Patentrecht..., Verlag von J. Bensheimer, 1878. \u00ab\u00a0vendre le produit sans conc\u00e9der le droit d'usage n'aurait pas de sens\u00a0\u00bb, p 162-163, cit\u00e9 et traduit<em> in<\/em> B. Castell, L'\u00e9puisement des droits intellectuels, Puf 1989, p 54), mais ne semble avoir formul\u00e9 la th\u00e9orie de l'\u00e9puisement (automatique) que plus tard (Handbuch des Deutscher patentrechts rechtvergleichender darstellung, Manheim, 1900). La proximit\u00e9 des raisonnements est frappante.[\/footnote].\r\n\r\nLa Cour supr\u00eame est revenue \u00e0 plusieurs reprises sur cette doctrine en mati\u00e8re de brevets[footnote]Notamment <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/106\/89\/\">American Cotton Tie Supply Co. v. Simmons<\/a>, 106 U.S. 89 (1882).[\/footnote], qu'elle a red\u00e9finie comme suit en 1942 dans l'arr\u00eat <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/316\/241\/\"><em>US v Univis Lens Co<\/em><\/a>[footnote]316 US 241, 250 (1942).[\/footnote]:\r\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\r\n\r\n\u00ab Le brevet\u00e9 peut se d\u00e9partir de son monopole en totalit\u00e9 par la vente de son brevet ou en partie par la vente d'un article incorporant l'invention\u2026 Mais la vente de cet article \u00e9puise le monopole qui y subsiste et le brevet\u00e9 ne peut pas d\u00e8s lors, sur le fondement de son brevet, contr\u00f4ler l'utilisation ou la cession de l'article \u00bb[footnote]\u00ab The patentee may surrender his monopoly in whole by the sale of his patent or in part by the sale of an article embodying the invention... But sale of it exhausts the monopoly in that article and the patentee may not thereafter, by virtue of his patent, control the use or disposition of the article<em> \u00bb.<\/em>[\/footnote].\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\nContrairement au m\u00e9canisme de licence tacite, \u00e9galement applicable[footnote]V. <em>infra<\/em>, n\u00b0402.[\/footnote] l'\u00e9puisement issu de la doctrine de <em>first sale<\/em> vaut \u00e9galement en pr\u00e9sence de clause contraire. La Cour Supr\u00eame a ainsi jug\u00e9, dans son arr\u00eat <span style=\"orphans: 1;\"><em>Impression Products, Inc. v. Lexmark International, Inc.<\/em>[footnote]<\/span><span style=\"orphans: 1;\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.supremecourt.gov\/opinions\/16pdf\/15-1189_ebfj.pdf\">Impression Products, Inc. v. Lexmark International, Inc.<\/a>,\u00a0<\/span><span style=\"font-size: 1em; orphans: 1;\">137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017).[\/footnote]<\/span><span style=\"font-size: 1em; orphans: 1; text-align: initial;\">,\u00a0que la d\u00e9cision d'un titulaire de brevet de vendre un produit \u00e9puise tous ses droits de brevet sur cet article, quelles que soient les restrictions que le titulaire du brevet pr\u00e9tend imposer \u00e0 ses clients, m\u00eame si les restrictions sont claires et applicables en vertu du droit des contrats.<\/span>\r\n\r\nL'\u00e9puisement s'applique en cas de vente, mais \u00e9galement dans l'hypoth\u00e8se d'une licence, ou encore d'un engagement inconditionnel d'une soci\u00e9t\u00e9 de ne pas agir en contrefa\u00e7on contre un concurrent qui commercialise des produits couverts par ses brevets[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/transcore-v-electronic-transaction\">TransCore, LP v Electronic Transaction Consultants Corp.<\/a>, 563 F.3d 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Les licences sont g\u00e9n\u00e9ralement assilil\u00e9es \u00e0 des engagements de ne pas agir en contrefa\u00e7on. La Cour Supr\u00eame l'a notamment affirm\u00e9 dans son arr\u00eat <i style=\"font-size: 1em;\">e Forest Radio Telephone Telegraph Co. v. United States<\/i><span style=\"font-size: 1em;\">,<\/span><span style=\"font-size: 1em;\">\u00a0<\/span><a class=\"raw-ref\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/de-forest-co-v-united-states#p242\">273 U.S. 236, 242<\/a><span style=\"font-size: 1em;\">\u00a0<\/span><span style=\"font-size: 1em;\">(1927) (\"<\/span>As a license passes no interest in the monopoly, it has been described as a mere waiver of the right to sue by the patentee.\").[\/footnote].\r\n\r\nPar ailleurs, dans son arr\u00eat <em>Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc. <\/em>de 2008[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/553\/617\/\">Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc.<\/a>, 553 U.S. 617 (2008).[\/footnote]<em>,\u00a0<\/em>la Cour supr\u00eame a jug\u00e9 que l'\u00e9puisement s'appliquait \u00e9galement aux brevets de proc\u00e9d\u00e9s<em>. <\/em>Elle en a d\u00e9duit que, dans l'hypoth\u00e8se o\u00f9 un contrat de licence autorise la vente de composants issu de ces proc\u00e9d\u00e9s, le titulaire ne pouvait plus faire valoir ses droits de brevets contre une combinaison incorporant ces composants et des composants tiers.\r\n\r\nEnfin, en 2013, dans son arr\u00eat <em>Bowman v. Monsanto<\/em>[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/569\/278\/\">Bowman v. Monsanto Co.<\/a>, <em>569 U.S. 278 (2013)<\/em>[\/footnote], elle a jug\u00e9, \u00e0 propos de semences brevet\u00e9es, que la doctrine de la premi\u00e8re vente s'applique aux semences vendues mais qu'elle ne couvre pas leur reproduction, notamment par r\u00e9ensemencement.\r\n\r\n<span style=\"font-size: 1em;\">Le domaine <\/span>d\u2019application de la doctrine dans l\u2019ordre interne concerne les r\u00e9parations, en principe licites[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/377\/422\/\">Wilbur-Ellis Co. v. Kuther<\/a>, 377 U.S. 422 (1964); <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/365\/336\/\">Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co.<\/a>, 365 U.S. 336 (1961); <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/general-elec-co-v-united-states-7\">General Elec. Co. v. United States<\/a>, 572 F.2d 745, 778-86 (Ct. Cl. 1978); <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/jazz-photo-corp-v-intl-trade-comn\">Jazz Photo Corp. v. International Trade Commission<\/a>, 264 F.3d \u00e0 1101, 1105-07; <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/porter-v-farmers-supply-service-inc-2\">Porter v. Farmers Supply Service, Inc.<\/a>, 790 F.2d 882 (Fed. Cir. 1986).[\/footnote], et les reconstructions, en principe non couvertes par l\u2019\u00e9puisement[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/106\/89\/\">American Cotton-Tie Co. v. Simmons<\/a>, 106 U.S. (16 Otto.) 89 (1882); Hydril Co. v. Crossman Engineering, Inc., 152 U.S.P.Q. 171 (E.D. Tex. 1966); <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/aktiebolag-v-ej-company\">Sandvik Aktiebolag v. E.J. Co.<\/a>, 121 F.3d 669 (Fed. Cir. 1997).[\/footnote].\r\n\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<strong>401._ L\u2019\u00e9puisement international_<\/strong> La question de l'\u00e9puisement international du brevet a \u00e9t\u00e9 longtemps d\u00e9battue aux \u00c9tats-Unis, la Cour supr\u00eame ne s'\u00e9tant pas prononc\u00e9e sur la question[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.casemine.com\/judgement\/us\/5914ab28add7b0493472ffc0\">Boesch v. Graff<\/a>, 133 U.S. 697 (1890) \u00e9tait quelquefois cit\u00e9e, mais en l'esp\u00e8ce le produit import\u00e9 n'avait pas \u00e9t\u00e9 fabriqu\u00e9 ou mis sur le march\u00e9 avec l'autorisation du titulaire du brevet US, et \u00e9manait d'un concurrent.[\/footnote]. Apr\u00e8s avoir \u00e9t\u00e9 appliqu\u00e9 par certaines cours f\u00e9d\u00e9rales[footnote]Holiday v. Mattheson, 24 F. 185, 185 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1885), Dickerson v. Mattheson, 57 F. 524, 527 (2d Cir.1893); Curtiss Aeroplane &amp; Motor Corp. v. United Aircraft Eng\u2019g Corp., 266 F. 71, 78\u201379 (2d Cir. 1920).[\/footnote], le principe d'\u00e9puisement international a \u00e9t\u00e9 clairement \u00e9cart\u00e9 par la Cour f\u00e9d\u00e9rale d'appel pour le circuit f\u00e9d\u00e9ral (institu\u00e9e en 1982 et ayant comp\u00e9tence exclusive en mati\u00e8re de brevets) depuis sa d\u00e9cision <em>Jazz Camera Photo v. International Trade Commission<\/em> de 2001[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/jazz-photo-corp-v-intl-trade-comn\">Jazz Camera Photo v. International Trade Commission<\/a>, 264 F.3d 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2001), portant sur l'importation aux \u00c9tats-Unis d'appareils photos jetables achet\u00e9s aux \u00c9tats-Unis et reconditionn\u00e9s en Chine. Dans cette d\u00e9cision la Cour pr\u00e9cise notamment la distinction entre les simples r\u00e9parations couvertes par l'\u00e9puisement et les reconstructions soumises au monopole. V. \u00e9galement <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/fuji-photo-film-co-v-jazz-photo-corp\">Fuji Photo Film Co. v Jazz Photo Corp.<\/a>, 394 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2005):\u00a0\u00ab Les droits de brevet conf\u00e9r\u00e9s aux \u00c9tats-Unis ne sont pas \u00e9puis\u00e9s par des produits en provenance de l'\u00e9tranger. Pour invoquer la protection de la doctrine de first sale, la premi\u00e8re vente autoris\u00e9e doit avoir \u00e9t\u00e9 faite sous l'empire du brevet am\u00e9ricain \u00bb.[\/footnote].\u00a0Cette position a \u00e9t\u00e9 r\u00e9affirm\u00e9e en 2012 par la m\u00eame Cour f\u00e9d\u00e9rale de district dans l'affaire <em>Ninestar Technology Co., Ltd. v. International Trade Com'n<\/em>[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/law.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/appellate-courts\/cafc\/09-1549\/09-1549-2012-02-08.html\">Ninestar Technology Co., Ltd. v. International Trade Com'n<\/a>, 667 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Newman, J.).[\/footnote]. Le refus de la Cour supr\u00eame de recevoir l'appel de cette d\u00e9cision le 25 mars 2013[footnote]Supreme Court No. 12-552.[\/footnote], donc post\u00e9rieurement \u00e0 son arr\u00eat <em>Kirtsaeng<\/em>[footnote]V. Tome 1, n\u00b0 229.[\/footnote], laissait ainsi perdurer, pour les brevets, l'exclusion de l'\u00e9puisement international pour les produits fabriqu\u00e9s \u00e0 l'\u00e9tranger.\r\n\r\nL'\u00e9puisement international en mati\u00e8re de brevets sera finalement consacr\u00e9 par la Cour Supr\u00eame en 2017, dans son arr\u00eat <span style=\"orphans: 1;\"><em>Impression Products, Inc. v. Lexmark International, Inc. <\/em>pr\u00e9cit\u00e9[footnote]<\/span><span style=\"orphans: 1;\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.supremecourt.gov\/opinions\/16pdf\/15-1189_ebfj.pdf\">Impression Products, Inc. v. Lexmark International, Inc.<\/a>,\u00a0<\/span><span style=\"font-size: 1em; orphans: 1;\">137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017).[\/footnote]. La r\u00e8gle est d\u00e9sormais clairement pos\u00e9e: une vente par le titulaire des droits ou avec son consentement en dehors du territoire des \u00c9tats-Unis emporte \u00e9puisement du droit du titulaire du brevet de la m\u00eame fa\u00e7on qu'une vente sur le territoire des \u00c9tats-Unis.\u00a0<\/span>\r\n\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<strong>402._ Les licences tacites_<\/strong> Dans la mesure o\u00f9 une licence peut \u00eatre tacite, la d\u00e9couverte par le juge d\u2019une licence tacite peut permettre de valider des usages autrement contrefaisants<span style=\"font-size: 1em;\">[footnote]<\/span>Comme l'a indiqu\u00e9 la Cour supr\u00eame: <span style=\"font-size: 1em;\">\"No formal granting of a <\/span><span id=\"co_term_199\" class=\"co_searchTerm\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\">license<\/span><span style=\"font-size: 1em;\">\u00a0is necessary in order to give it effect. Any language used by the owner of the patent or any conduct on his part exhibited to another, from which that other may properly infer that the owner consents to his use of the patent in making or using it, or selling it, upon which the other acts, constitutes a\u00a0<\/span><span id=\"co_term_259\" class=\"co_searchTerm\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\">license<\/span><span style=\"font-size: 1em;\"> and a defense to an action for a tort.\" <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/273\/236\/\">DeForest Radio Tel. &amp; Tel. Co. v. United States<\/a>, 47 U.S. 366 (1927). Sur le r\u00e9gime et les conditions des licences tacites V. \u00e9galement General Motors Corp. v. Dailey, 93 F.2d 938, 941 (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1937); <a href=\"https:\/\/law.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/district-courts\/FSupp\/565\/931\/1458241\/\">Sanofi, S.A. v. Med-Tech Veterinarian Products, Inc.<\/a>, 565 F. Supp. 931, 940 (D.N.J. 1983); Stickle v. Heublein, Inc., 716 F.2d 1550, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1983); <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/winbond-electronics-v-international-trade\">Winbond Electronics Corp. v. International Trade Com'n<\/a>, 262 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2001), opinion corrected, 275 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Teter v. Glass Onion, Inc., 723 F. Supp. 2d 1138 (W.D. Mo. 2010);\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/corbello-v-devito-21\">Corbello v. DeVito<\/a>, 777 F.3d 1058, 1067 (9th Cir. 2015); <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/atkins-v-fischer-2\">Atkins v. Fischer<\/a>, 331 F.3d 988 (D.C. Cir. 2003).[\/footnote].\r\n\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<strong>403._ Les exceptions (g\u00e9n\u00e9ral)_<\/strong> Le Patent Act ne contient pas d\u2019exceptions pour usage \u00e0 titre priv\u00e9 et non commercial et pour usage \u00e0 titre exp\u00e9rimental. Cependant ces usages sont largement consid\u00e9r\u00e9s comme non contrefaisants, \u00e0 conditions, pour les usages \u00e0 titre exp\u00e9rimental, qu\u2019ils ne s\u2019int\u00e8grent pas dans le cadre d\u2019une activit\u00e9 commerciale[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/madey-v-duke-university-5\">Madey v. Duke University<\/a>, 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002); <a href=\"https:\/\/law.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/appellate-courts\/F2\/733\/858\/459501\/\">Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co.<\/a>, 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984); <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/pitcairn-v-united-states\">Pitcairn v. United States<\/a>, 547 F.2d 1106 (Ct. Cl. 1976).[\/footnote].\r\n\r\nLe droit de possession personnelle ant\u00e9rieure, qui repose en l\u2019esp\u00e8ce sur l\u2019usage ant\u00e9rieur, est codifi\u00e9 \u00e0 la section 273 du Patent Act[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/273\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7273<\/a>.[\/footnote], et sa port\u00e9e a \u00e9t\u00e9 \u00e9largie par l\u2019America Invents Act[footnote]Cette d\u00e9fense ne s\u2019appliquait auparavant qu\u2019aux methodes commerciales.[\/footnote]. Ce droit peut \u00eatre invoqu\u00e9 par quiconque a utilis\u00e9 dans le commerce[footnote]Certains usages non commerciaux par des entit\u00e9s non commerciales sont \u00e9galement \u00e9ligibles.[\/footnote], de bonne foi, l\u2019invention concern\u00e9e, au moins un an avant la date de d\u00e9p\u00f4t de l\u2019invention ou avant la date \u00e0 laquelle elle a \u00e9t\u00e9 divulgu\u00e9e au public.\r\n\r\nLes autres exceptions concernent certaines utilisations d\u2019inventions brevet\u00e9es li\u00e9es aux obligations issues de la r\u00e9glementation f\u00e9d\u00e9rale en mati\u00e8re de m\u00e9dicament[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/271\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 271(e)(1)<\/a>.[\/footnote] et le transit sur le territoire des \u00c9tats-Unis d\u2019aeronefs, de bateaux et de v\u00e9hicules utilisant une invention brevet\u00e9e[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/272\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 272<\/a>.[\/footnote].\r\n\r\nA noter enfin qu\u2019en mati\u00e8re de brevet le principe d\u2019immunit\u00e9 des institutions f\u00e9d\u00e9rales (<em>sovereign immunity<\/em>) a \u00e9t\u00e9 \u00e9cart\u00e9, sous r\u00e9serve d\u2019exceptions, par la loi[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/28\/1498\">28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1498(a)<\/a>.[\/footnote]. La loi limite cependant les rem\u00e8des offerts au titulaire du brevet (principalement \u00e0 des dommages et int\u00e9r\u00eats). La Cour Supr\u00eame a r\u00e9affirm\u00e9 l\u2019application de ce principe aux \u00c9tats et aux institutions des \u00c9tats f\u00e9d\u00e9r\u00e9s[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/527\/627\/\">Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank<\/a>, 527 U.S. 627 (1999).\u00a0[\/footnote].\r\n\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<strong>404._ Les exceptions relatives aux m\u00e9dicaments g\u00e9n\u00e9riques_ <\/strong>Le Hatch-Waxman Act[footnote]P.L. 98-417, Title II, 98 Stat. 1585; <a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/21\/355\">21 U.S.C. \u00a7 355<\/a> and <a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/271\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 271(e)(1)<\/a>. V. <em>supra<\/em>, n\u00b0356.[\/footnote] a introduit une exception b\u00e9n\u00e9fice des fabricants de m\u00e9dicaments g\u00e9n\u00e9riques, qui couvre les actes raisonnablement li\u00e9s au d\u00e9veloppement et \u00e0 la soumission de toute information \u00e0 la FDA, y compris le d\u00e9veloppement d'une demande de m\u00e9dicament g\u00e9n\u00e9rique[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/271\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 271(e)(1)<\/a>: \"It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell within the United States or import into the United States a patented invention (other than a new animal drug or veterinary biological product (as those terms are used in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Act of March 4, 1913) which is primarily manufactured using recombinant DNA, recombinant RNA, hybridoma technology, or other processes involving site specific genetic manipulation techniques) solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products\". V. <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/545\/193\/\">Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd.<\/a>, 545 U.S. 193, 202 (2005) and <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/496\/661\/\">Eli Lilly &amp; Co. Inc.<\/a>, 496 U.S. \u00e0 671; <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/momenta-pharms-inc-v-teva-pharms-us-inc\">Momenta Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA Inc.<\/a>, 809 F.3d 610, 620-21 (Fed Cir. 2015); <a href=\"https:\/\/cafc.uscourts.gov\/opinions-orders\/19-1067.opinion.12-16-2019.pdf\">Amgen Inc. v. Hospira, Inc.<\/a>, 944 F.3d 1327, 1340 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2019).<span style=\"font-size: 1em;\">[\/footnote].<\/span>\r\n\r\nOn notera que des r\u00e8gles proc\u00e9durales sp\u00e9ciales sont pr\u00e9vues par le Hatch-Waxman Act en mati\u00e8re d\u2019action contre des fabricants de m\u00e9dicaments g\u00e9n\u00e9riques, et notamment des d\u00e9lais d\u2019actions sp\u00e9cifiques et des possibilit\u00e9s de suspension de l\u2019approbation de la FDA[footnote]V. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/21\/355\">21 U.S.C. \u00a7 355<\/a>, et notamment (c)(3)(D)[\/footnote].\r\n\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<strong>405._ La dur\u00e9e des droits du brevet\u00e9_<\/strong> Le Patent Act de 1952 pr\u00e9voyait \u00e0 l\u2019origine une dur\u00e9e de protection de dix-sept ans \u00e0 compter de la date de d\u00e9livrance du brevet[footnote]Ou vingt ans \u00e0 compter de la date de d\u00e9p\u00f4t d\u2019une demande nationale ou PCT assortie du d\u00e9lai de priorit\u00e9 (dans ce cas le d\u00e9lai le plus long s\u2019appliquait). La dur\u00e9e de dix-sept ans avait \u00e9t\u00e9 institu\u00e9e en 1861.[\/footnote]. Cette dur\u00e9e a \u00e9t\u00e9 modifi\u00e9e en 1995 conform\u00e9ment aux dispositions de l\u2019accord ADPIC, et a \u00e9t\u00e9 port\u00e9e \u00e0 vingt ans \u00e0 compter du d\u00e9p\u00f4t[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/154\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 154 (a)(2)<\/a>.[\/footnote]. La dur\u00e9e ancienne continuait \u00e0 s\u2019appliquer aux brevets d\u00e9livr\u00e9s en vertu de demandes d\u00e9pos\u00e9es avant le 8 juin 1995, d\u00e9sormais expir\u00e9s.\r\n\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<strong>406._ Les extensions. <\/strong>Depuis l\u2019entr\u00e9e en vigueur de l\u2019AIA, le dur\u00e9e de protection peut \u00eatre \u00e9tendue cas (a) de retard dans la d\u00e9livrance en raison d\u2019un retard de l\u2019USPTO au regard de certains d\u00e9lais, pour une dur\u00e9e \u00e9quivalente \u00e0 ce retard[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/154\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 154(b)(1)(A)<\/a>.[\/footnote], (b) de d\u00e9passement d\u2019un d\u00e9lai de trois ans apr\u00e8s le d\u00e9p\u00f4t pour la d\u00e9livrance du brevet (sous r\u00e9serve de suspensions ou de demandes de d\u00e9lai par le demandeur), pour une dur\u00e9e \u00e9quivalente au d\u00e9passement de ce d\u00e9lai[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/154\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 154(b)(1)(B)<\/a>.[\/footnote], ou (c) en pr\u00e9sence de retard li\u00e9s \u00e0 des proc\u00e9dures d\u2019interf\u00e9rences, \u00e0 l\u2019application d\u2019une ordonnance de secret, ou \u00e0 un appel, pour la dur\u00e9e des proc\u00e9dures concern\u00e9es (sous r\u00e9serve d\u2019une r\u00e9duction en fonction de l\u2019attitude du d\u00e9posant)[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/154\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 154(b)(1)(C)<\/a>.[\/footnote].\r\n\r\nCette dur\u00e9e peut \u00e9galement \u00eatre \u00e9tendue, pour un m\u00e9dicament \u00e0 usage humain, un mat\u00e9riel m\u00e9dical, un additif ou un colorant alimentaire, un\u00a0m\u00e9dicaments pour animaux ou un produit biologique v\u00e9t\u00e9rinaire pour une dur\u00e9e \u00e9quivalente aux dur\u00e9es n\u00e9cessaires \u00e0 l\u2019obtention d\u2019une autorisation administrative de mise sur le march\u00e9 du produit concern\u00e9[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/156\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 156<\/a>. V. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.uspto.gov\/web\/offices\/pac\/mpep\/s2750.html\">MPEP, \u00a7 2750<\/a>.[\/footnote]. Les r\u00e8gles de calcul et d\u2019application de ces extensions sont tr\u00e8s complexes.\r\n\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<strong>407._ Les exclusivit\u00e9s. <\/strong>Des exclusivit\u00e9s sur les donn\u00e9es d\u2019essai (<em>market exclusivities<\/em>) sont \u00e9galement pr\u00e9vues par le Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA)[footnote]Codifi\u00e9 dans <a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/21\/chapter-9\">21 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 301\u2013397<\/a>.[\/footnote], jusqu\u2019\u00e0 cinq ans pour les nouveaux m\u00e9dicaments (<em>new chemical entity exclusivities<\/em>)[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/21\/chapter-9\/subchapter-V\/part-A\">21 U.S.C. \u00a7 355(c)(3)(E)(ii), (j)(5)(F)(ii))<\/a>.[\/footnote], et jusqu\u2019\u00e0 trois ans pour les donn\u00e9es de test cliniques pr\u00e9sent\u00e9es au soutien de modifications de produit existants (<em>clinical investigation exclusivities<\/em>)[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/21\/chapter-9\">21 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 355, 360cc<\/a> et 35 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 <a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/271\">271<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/282\">282<\/a>.[\/footnote].\r\n\r\nDes exclusivit\u00e9s sont \u00e9galement donn\u00e9es pour les m\u00e9dicaments destin\u00e9s au traitement de maladies orphelines ou rares, en application de l\u2019Orphan Drug Act de 1983[footnote]V. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/21\/chapter-9\/subchapter-V\/part-B\">21 U.S.C. \u00a7 360aa \u00e0 360ee<\/a>, et <a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/42\/236\">42 U.S.C \u00a7 236<\/a>; \u00e9galement 21 C.F.R. Part 316.La loi concerne les \u00ab maladies ou affections rares \u00bb, d\u00e9finies comme celles qui affectent moins de 200 000 personnes aux \u00c9tats-Unis, ou pour lesquelles il n'existe aucune perspective raisonnable de r\u00e9cup\u00e9ration des co\u00fbts de d\u00e9veloppement et de mise \u00e0 disposition aux \u00c9tats-Unis, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/21\/360bb\">21 U.S.C. \u00a7 360bb<\/a>.[\/footnote], et pour des d\u00e9veloppements en faveur du traitement des enfants (<em>pediatric exclusivities<\/em>) (6 mois suppl\u00e9mentaires)[footnote]Introduites par le Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act 2007 (BPCA), Pub. L. No. 11\u2013185.[\/footnote].\r\n<h3><strong>C. L'exploitation du brevet<\/strong><\/h3>\r\n<strong>408._ Les contrats_<\/strong> Les demandes de brevets, les brevets et tous droits les concernant sont cessibles et peuvent faire l\u2019objet de licences, exclusives ou non. Les licences sont assimil\u00e9es \u00e0 des renonciations \u00e0 agir en contrefa\u00e7on[footnote]<span style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\"><i>De: Forest Radio Telephone Telegraph Co. v. United States<\/i>,\u00a0<a class=\"raw-ref\" style=\"font-size: 1em; background-color: #ffffff;\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/de-forest-co-v-united-states#p242\">273 U.S. 236, 242<\/a><span style=\"font-size: 1em; background-color: #ffffff;\">,\u00a0<\/span><a class=\"raw-ref\" style=\"font-size: 1em; background-color: #ffffff;\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/de-forest-co-v-united-states\">47 S.Ct. 366<\/a><span style=\"font-size: 1em; background-color: #ffffff;\">,\u00a0<\/span><a class=\"raw-ref\" style=\"font-size: 1em; background-color: #ffffff;\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/de-forest-co-v-united-states\">71 L.Ed. 625<\/a><span style=\"font-size: 1em; background-color: #ffffff;\"> (1927)(<\/span><span style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em; background-color: #ffffff;\">\"As a license passes no interest in the monopoly, it has been described as a mere waiver of the right to sue by the patentee.\").[\/footnote].<\/span><\/span>\u00a0Les cessions doivent \u00eatre \u00e9tablies par \u00e9crit[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/261\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 261<\/a>.[\/footnote].\r\n\r\nLes cessions, transferts de propri\u00e9t\u00e9 et constitutions de s\u00fbret\u00e9s doivent \u00eatre inscrits dans les trois mois de leur signature au registre tenu par l\u2019USPTO, sous peine d\u2019inopposabilit\u00e9 aux tiers[footnote]<em>Ibid.<\/em> <em>\u00ab\u00a0<\/em>An interest that constitutes an assignment, grant, or conveyance shall be void as against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for a valuable consideration, without notice, unless it is recorded in the Patent and Trademark Office within three months from its date or prior to the date of such subsequent purchase or mortgage<em> \u00bb.<\/em>[\/footnote]. Cette r\u00e8gle ne s\u2019applique pas aux licences.\r\n\r\nDe mani\u00e8re g\u00e9n\u00e9rale, les questions relatives \u00e0 la propri\u00e9t\u00e9 et au transfert du brevet sont r\u00e9gl\u00e9es par les lois \u00e9tatiques[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/farmland-irrigation-co-v-dopplmaier\">Farmland Irrigation Co., Inc. v. Dopplmaier<\/a>, 48 Cal. 2d 208, 308 P.2d 732 (1957), qui juge qu'un\u00a0contrat de licence de brevet est cessible en vertu de la politique \u00ab clairement manifest\u00e9e \u00bb par \u00ab les lois de cet \u00c9tat (...) en faveur de la libre transf\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 de tous les types de biens, y compris les droits d\u00e9coulant des contrats \u00bb, sauf si les les termes ou l\u2019objet du contrat d\u00e9montrent qu'il \u00e9tait incessible[\/footnote].\r\n\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<strong>409._ Les licences obligatoires_<\/strong> Le Patent Act ne pr\u00e9voit pas de licences obligatoires[footnote]V. cependant <em>infra<\/em>, n\u00b0355. Le refus d\u2019accorder une injonction en cas de contrefa\u00e7on aboutit, de facto, \u00e0 imposer une licence au brevet\u00e9.[\/footnote]. Cependant des licences obligatoires sont institu\u00e9es par certaines l\u00e9gislations en dehors du Patent Act, comme par exemple l\u2019Atomic Energy Act[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/42\/2183\">42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2183<\/a>.[\/footnote] ou le Clean Air Act[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/42\/7608\">42 U.S.C. \u00a7 7608<\/a>.[\/footnote].\r\n\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<strong>410._ Aspects antitrust (renvoi)_<\/strong> Les principes g\u00e9n\u00e9raux dans ce domaine ont \u00e9t\u00e9 d\u00e9crits en introduction \u00e0 cet ouvrage[footnote]V. Tome 1, n\u00b0 [\/footnote]. Les r\u00e8gles applicables sont \u00e9galement d\u00e9taill\u00e9es dans deux documents produits par la DOJ et la FTC, intitul\u00e9s Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual Property Rights: Promoting Innovation and Competition (2007) (IP Report) et Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property (2017) (IP Guidelines), auxquels nous renvoyons le lecteur. \u00a0Rappelons simplement qu\u2019aux \u00c9tats-Unis, quatre lois f\u00e9d\u00e9rales de concurrence s'appliquent au domaine de la propri\u00e9t\u00e9 intellectuelle: le <em>Sherman Act<\/em>[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/15\">15 U.S.C.<\/a> \u00a7\u00a7 1-7.[\/footnote], dont la section 1 interdit les pratiques restrictives du commerce (<em>unreasonable restraints of trade<\/em>) et la section 2 les abus de position dominante (<em>monopolization and attempts to monopolize<\/em>); le <em>Clayton Act<\/em>[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/15\">15 U.S.C.<\/a> \u00a7\u00a7 12-27 et <a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/29\">29 U.S.C.<\/a> \u00a7\u00a7 52-53.[\/footnote], qui interdit les acquisitions restrictives de concurrence[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/15\">15 U.S.C.<\/a>\u00a0\u00a7 18.[\/footnote] et certaines clauses d'exclusivit\u00e9s associ\u00e9es \u00e0 la vente de produits[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/15\">15 U.S.C.<\/a> \u00a7 14.[\/footnote]; le <em>Federal Trade Commission Act<\/em> (FTC Act)[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/15\">15 U.S.C.<\/a> \u00a7 41.[\/footnote], qui sanctionne certaines pratiques d\u00e9loyales[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/15\">15 U.S.C.<\/a> 45.[\/footnote]; et le <em>Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976<\/em> (HSR)[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/15\">15 U.S.C.<\/a> \u00a7 18a.[\/footnote], qui permet la suspension pour examen de certains projets de fusion ou d'acquisitions.\r\n\r\nLa jurisprudence dans ce domaine est \u00e0 la fois riche et ancienne, et sanctionne les agissements des titulaires de droits contraires aux r\u00e8gles ou aux principes pos\u00e9s par ces textes[footnote]V. notamment notre compte rendu de l\u2019affaire <a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/United_States_v._Microsoft_Corp.\">USA v. Microsoft<\/a>, <em>253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001), <\/em>Com. Comm. \u00c9lectr. n\u00b0 10, Octobre 2001, act. 106. Egalement, M. A. Einhorn, \u00ab Intellectual Property and Antitrust: Music Performing Rights in Broadcasting \u00bb, 24 Colum.-VLA J.L. &amp; Arts 349 (2000-2001) ; S. F. Anthony, \u00ab Antitrust and Intellectual Property Law: From Adversaries to Partners \u00bb, 28 AIPLA Q. J. 1 (2000) ; D. A. Balto, A. M. Wolman, \u00ab Intellectual Property and Antitrust : General Principles \u00bb, 43 IDEA 395 (2003) ; S. B. Opi, \u00ab The Application of the Essential Facilities Doctrine to Intellectual Property Licensing in the European Union and the United States: Are Intellectual Property Rights Till Sacrosanct \u00bb, 11 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media &amp; Ent. L.J. 409 (2000-2001); E. T. Sullivan, \u00ab The Confluence of Antitrust and Intellectual Property at the New Century \u00bb, 1 Minn. Intell. Prop. Rev. [iii] (2000) ; R. A. Posner, \u00ab Transaction Costs and Antitrust Concerns in the Licensing of Intellectual Property \u00bb, 4 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. [i] (2004-2005) ; pour un article ancien, A.C. Hugin, \u00ab Intellectual Property and the Antitrust Laws \u00bb 30 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 450, 513, 601, 654, 867 (1948).[\/footnote].\r\n\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<strong>411._ Les obligations du brevet\u00e9_<\/strong> Le titulaire du brevet doit payer les redevances (<em>maintenance fee<\/em>) sous peine d\u2019expiration du brevet. La loi pr\u00e9voit des possibilit\u00e9s limit\u00e9es de restaurer un brevet expir\u00e9 pour d\u00e9faut de paiement de la <em>maintenance fee<\/em>. La redevance n\u2019est pas payable annuellement, mais \u00e0 trois reprises pendant la dur\u00e9e du brevet, entre trois ans et trois ans et demi, sept ans et sept and et demi et onze ans et onze ans et demi apr\u00e8s la date de d\u00e9livrance.\r\n<table>\r\n<thead>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td><strong>Description<\/strong><\/td>\r\n<td><strong>redevance<\/strong><\/td>\r\n<td><strong>Petite entreprise<\/strong><\/td>\r\n<td><strong>Micro entreprise<\/strong><\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<\/thead>\r\n<tbody>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td>3,5 ans<\/td>\r\n<td>2.000 $<\/td>\r\n<td>800 $<\/td>\r\n<td>400 $<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td>7,5 ans<\/td>\r\n<td>3.760 $<\/td>\r\n<td>1.504 $<\/td>\r\n<td>752 $<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr>\r\n<td>11.5 years<\/td>\r\n<td>7.700 $<\/td>\r\n<td>3.080 $<\/td>\r\n<td>1.540 $<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<\/tbody>\r\n<\/table>\r\nLe Patent Act ne pr\u00e9voit pas d\u2019obligation d\u2019exploiter le brevet. Cependant dans le cas d\u2019une contrefa\u00e7on de brevets, depuis la d\u00e9cision de la Cour supr\u00eame dans l\u2019affaire <em>eBay Inc. V. MercExchange L.L.C<\/em>.[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/547\/388\/\">eBay Inc. V. MercExchange L.L.C.<\/a>, 547 U.S. 388 (2006).[\/footnote], une injonction n\u2019est plus automatiquement accord\u00e9e par les tribunaux, notamment lorsque le brevet\u00e9 n\u2019exploite pas l\u2019invention[footnote]V. <em>infra, <\/em>n\u00b0418.[\/footnote].\r\n<h2>4. La d\u00e9fense des droits<\/h2>\r\n<strong>412._ La contrefa\u00e7on_<\/strong> La contrefa\u00e7on consiste dans l\u2019exercice, sans le consentement du titulaire du brevet ni l\u00e9gitimation, de l\u2019un des droits du brevet\u00e9 d\u00e9finis par la loi[footnote]V. <em>supra, <\/em>n\u00b0399.[\/footnote].\r\n\r\nLa contrefa\u00e7on (primaire) de brevet \u00e9tant une <em>strict liability offense<\/em>, l\u2019intention et la bonne foi sont inop\u00e9rantes[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/thurber-corporation-v-fairchild-motor-corp\">Thurber Corp. v. Fairchild Motor Corp.<\/a>, 269 F.2d 841, 845, 849 (5th Cir. 1959).[\/footnote].\u00a0En revanche, l\u2019\u00e9l\u00e9ment intentionnel est requis pour les actes de contrefa\u00e7on secondaires, peut \u00e9galement affecter le calcul des dommages et int\u00e9r\u00eats. De m\u00eame, les actes de contrefa\u00e7on secondaire (<em>indirect<\/em> ou <em>dependent infringement<\/em>), c\u2019est-\u00e0-dire l\u2019incitation \u00e0 la contrefa\u00e7on (<em>inducement<\/em>) et la fourniture de moyens (<em>contributory infringement<\/em>) impliquent\u00a0 la connaissance du brevet et de l\u2019acte primaire de contrefa\u00e7on.\r\n\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<strong>413._ Le droit d\u2019agir en contrefa\u00e7on_<\/strong> En principe, seul le titulaire du brevet peut agir en contrefa\u00e7on[footnote]V. <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/morrow-v-microsoft-corp\">Morrow v. Microsoft Corp.<\/a>, 499 F.3d 1332, 1339 (Fed.Cir. 2007); <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/wiav-solutions-llc-v-motorola-inc\">WiAV Sols. LLC v. Motorola, Inc.<\/a>, 631 F.3d 1257, 1264\u201365 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Sont plus pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment vis\u00e9es les seules personnes \u00ab\u00a0with exclusionary rights to a patent\u00a0\u00bb.[\/footnote]. Le licenci\u00e9 ne peut agir en contrefa\u00e7on, \u00e0 moins qu\u2019il se soit vu conc\u00e9der \u00ab tous les droits essentiels \u00bb (<em>all substantial rights<\/em>) dans le brevet[footnote]V. <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/luminara-worldwide-llc-v-liown-elecs-co-4\">Luminara Worldwide, LLC. V. Liown Elecs. <\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/luminara-worldwide-llc-v-liown-elecs-co-4\">Co.<\/a>, 814 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2016), 118 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1148 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 29, 2016)[\/footnote]. Ainsi, la jurisprudence consid\u00e8re qu'une licence non exclusive ne donne pas droit \u00e0 agir au licenci\u00e9. Ce dernier ne peut non plus se joindre \u00e0 une action initi\u00e9e par le conc\u00e9dant. Le licenci\u00e9 exclusif ne pourra agir que s'il d\u00e9tient tous les droits essentiels dans le brevet. Cette d\u00e9termination doit \u00eatre faite au cas par cas, en examinant les termes de la licence. La jurisprudence semble assez stricte sur ce point[footnote]Par exemple, elle refuse de consid\u00e9rer qu'un licenci\u00e9 exclusif disposant des droits d'exploitation les plus larges avait tous les droits essentiels du brevet\u00e9 \u00ab lorsqu'il ne poss\u00e9dait pas le droit exclusif d'assigner en contrefa\u00e7on du brevet conc\u00e9d\u00e9 sans le consentement du conc\u00e9dant \u00bb, et ce, alors m\u00eame lorsque le conc\u00e9dant ne retenait aucun droit d'exploiter le brevet pour son compte. V. \u00e9galement la d\u00e9cision de la Cour d'appel f\u00e9d\u00e9rale du 18 octobre 2005 dans l'affaire <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/sicom-systems-ltd-v-agilent-technologies-2\">Sicom v. Agilent Tech<\/a> (427 F.3d 971 (Fed. Cir. 2005))<em> : <\/em>En l'esp\u00e8ce, la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 Sicom \u00e9tait licenci\u00e9e exclusive d'un brevet. La licence accordait \u00e0 Sicom \u00ab le droit exclusif d'assigner en contrefa\u00e7on du brevet \u00bb, mais le conc\u00e9dant se r\u00e9servait le droit de continuer \u00e0 exploiter la technologie brevet\u00e9e, ainsi que d'autres droits, et notamment celui de s'opposer \u00e0 la cession de ses droits par le licenci\u00e9. La Cour de district avait jug\u00e9 que la clause du contrat de licence accordant \u00e0 Sicom le droit exclusif d'assigner en contrefa\u00e7on du brevet \u00ab ne conc\u00e8de pas \u00e0 Sicom les droits exclusifs n\u00e9cessaires pour transformer sa licence en cession de droits \u00bb, et ne lui permettait donc pas d'agir en contrefa\u00e7on. Elle relevait \u00e9galement au soutien de cette constatation l'absence d'autorisation d'assigner pour des actes de contrefa\u00e7on ant\u00e9rieurs au contrat. La Cour d'appel confirme, en relevant \u00e9galement d'autres droits retenus par le conc\u00e9dant, et notamment les restrictions de cession ou de sous-licence impos\u00e9es au licenci\u00e9.[\/footnote].\r\n\r\nLe titulaire du brevet doit \u00eatre partie (volontaire ou forc\u00e9e) \u00e0 toute action en contrefa\u00e7on intent\u00e9e par un licenci\u00e9 exclusif.\r\n\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<strong>414._ La comp\u00e9tence (renvoi)_<\/strong> Les r\u00e8gles de comp\u00e9tence ont \u00e9t\u00e9 abord\u00e9es en introduction \u00e0 cet ouvrage[footnote]V. Tome 1, n\u00b050.[\/footnote].\r\n\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<strong>415._ L\u2019appr\u00e9ciation de la contrefa\u00e7on : l\u2019interpr\u00e9tation des revendications_<\/strong>\u00a0Dans son arr\u00eat <em>Markman v. Westview Instruments Inc <\/em>de 1996[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/517\/370\/\">Markman v. Westview Instruments Inc.<\/a>, 517 U.S. 370, 391 (1996).[\/footnote], la Cour supr\u00eame a pos\u00e9 comme principe que l'interpr\u00e9tation des revendications est une question de droit et non de fait (qui ne rel\u00e8ve donc pas de la comp\u00e9tence d'un jury). Cette d\u00e9cision a eu notamment pour cons\u00e9quence l'institution par les cours de district d'audience et de d\u00e9cisions sp\u00e9ciales sur les questions d'interpr\u00e9tation des revendications (respectivement <em>Markman hearings<\/em> et <em>Markman orders<\/em>).\r\n\r\nLes standards d'interpr\u00e9tation, qui sont les m\u00eames pour appr\u00e9cier la validit\u00e9 et la contrefa\u00e7on d'un brevet, ont \u00e9t\u00e9 d\u00e9crits en d\u00e9tail par le Circuit f\u00e9d\u00e9ral dans une affaire <em>Phillips<\/em> de 2005[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/phillips-v-awh-corp-3\">Phillips v. AWH Corp.<\/a>, 415 F.3d 1303, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (<em>en banc<\/em>); auparavant, V. <i>Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,<\/i>\u00a0<a class=\"raw-ref\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/markman-v-westview-instruments-inc#p979\">52 F.3d 967, 979-81<\/a>\u00a0(Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc),\u00a0<i>aff'd,<\/i>\u00a0<a class=\"raw-ref\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/markman-v-westview-instruments\">517 U.S. 370<\/a>,\u00a0<a class=\"raw-ref\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/markman-v-westview-instruments\">116 S.Ct. 1384<\/a>,\u00a0<a class=\"raw-ref\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/markman-v-westview-instruments\">134 L.Ed.2d 577<\/a> (1996); <i>Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc.,<\/i>\u00a0<a class=\"raw-ref\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/vitronics-corp-v-conceptronic-inc\">90 F.3d 1576<\/a> (Fed. Cir. 1996); <i>Innova\/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Systems, Inc.,<\/i>\u00a0<a class=\"raw-ref\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/innovapure-water-v-safari-water-filtr\">381 F.3d 1111<\/a> (Fed. Cir. 2004)[\/footnote]. La m\u00e9thodologie applicable peut \u00eatre r\u00e9sum\u00e9e comme suit:\r\n\r\nLes tribunaux doivent d'abord s'attacher aux \u00e9l\u00e9ments intrins\u00e8ques (revendications, descriptions, <em>prosecution history<\/em>), avant d'avoir recours, le cas \u00e9ch\u00e9ant, aux \u00e9l\u00e9ments extrins\u00e8ques (Principes scientifiques pertinents, signification des termes techniques, \u00e9tat de la technique).\r\n\r\nS'agissant des \u00e9l\u00e9ments intrins\u00e8ques, les tribunaux doivent donner aux mots utilis\u00e9s dans les revendications leur sens ordinaire et habituel pour un homme de l'art \u00e0 l'\u00e9poque de l'invention (\"a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention\", \"POSITA\"), c'est-\u00e0-dire \u00e0 la date de d\u00e9p\u00f4t:\r\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\r\n<p id=\"pa71\" class=\"paragraph\">\"S'interroger sur le point de savoir comment une personne de l'art (<em>a person of ordinary skill in the art<\/em>) comprend les termes d'une revendication constitue une base objective \u00e0 partir de laquelle il faut commencer l'interpr\u00e9tation des revendications. <i>See Innova,<\/i>\u00a0<a class=\"raw-ref\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/innovapure-water-v-safari-water-filtr#p1116\">381 F.3d at 1116<\/a>. Ce point de d\u00e9part se fonde sur le constat fait de longue date que les inventeurs sont typiquement des personnes vers\u00e9es dans le domaine de l'invention et que les brevets sont destin\u00e9s \u00e0 lus par d'autres personnes vers\u00e9es dans le domaine technique pertinent. <i>See Verve, LLC v. Crane Cams, Inc.,<\/i>\u00a0<a class=\"raw-ref\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/verve-llc-v-crane-cams-inc#p1119\">311 F.3d 1116, 1119<\/a> (Fed. Cir. 2002) (les documents de brevet sont cens\u00e9s \u00eatre \"un expos\u00e9 concis destin\u00e9 aux personnes dans le domaine concern\u00e9\"); <i>In re Nelson,<\/i>\u00a0<a class=\"raw-ref\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/application-of-nelson\">47 C.C.P.A. 1031<\/a>,\u00a0<a class=\"raw-ref\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/application-of-nelson#p181\">280 F.2d 172, 181<\/a> (1960) (\"Les descriptions dans les brevets ne sont pas destin\u00e9es au public en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral, aux juristes ou aux juges, mais, comme le dit la section 112, aux personnes vers\u00e9es dans le domaine technique concern\u00e9 ou dans celui dont l'invention est la plus proche.\").<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"pa72\" class=\"paragraph\">Par ailleurs, la personne de l'art est suppos\u00e9e lire les termes de la revendication non pas au seul regard de la revendication particuli\u00e8re dans laquelle le terme appara\u00eet, mais au vu de la demande dans son ensemble, incluant les sp\u00e9cifications (...)\"[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/phillips-v-awh-corp-3\">Phillips v. AWH Corp.<\/a>, 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005); V. \u00e9galement <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/dayco-prod-v-total-containment-inc\">Dayco Products, Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc.<\/a>, 258 F.3d 1317, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (<em>\u00ab\u00a0<\/em>If an argument offered in support of a particular claim construction is so convoluted and artificial that it would not be apparent to a skilled artisan reading the patent and the prosecution history, the argument is simply unhelpful to the performance of our task.<em>\u00a0\u00bb<\/em>)[\/footnote].<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\nLes revendications \"doivent \u00e9galement \u00eatre lues \u00e0 la lumi\u00e8re de la description, dont elles font partie\"[footnote]<i>Markman,<\/i>\u00a0<a class=\"raw-ref\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/markman-v-westview-instruments-inc#p978\">52 F.3d \u00e0 978<\/a>. <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/bell-atlantic-network-serv-v-covad-com\">Bell Atlantic Network Services, Inc. v. Covad Communications Gp., Inc.<\/a>, 262 F.3d 1258, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (les sp\u00e9cifications \u201cmust clearly redefine a claim term \u2018so as to put a reasonable competitor or one reasonably skilled in the art on notice that the patentee intended to so redefine that claim term.\").[\/footnote]. Elles peuvent \u00e9galement \u00eatre interpr\u00e9t\u00e9es par r\u00e9f\u00e9rence \u00e0 d\u2019autres revendications[footnote]V. Phillips v. AWH Corp., pr\u00e9cit\u00e9e (\u00ab Because claim terms are normally used consistently throughout the patent, the usage of a term in one claim can often illuminate the meaning of the same term in other claims (\u2026). Differences among claims can also be a useful guide in understanding the meaning of particular claim terms \u00bb).[\/footnote].\r\n\r\nL'historique du dossier d'examen (<em>prosecution history<\/em>, qui inclut les ant\u00e9riorit\u00e9s cit\u00e9es et toutes les affirmations ou remarques faites par le demandeur) peut ensuite fournir des indications importantes sur l'\u00e9tendue des revendications (et m\u00eame aboutir \u00e0 r\u00e9duire leur port\u00e9e)[footnote]<em>Phillips<\/em>, pr\u00e9cit\u00e9: \"In addition to consulting the specification, we have held that a court \"should also consider the patent's prosecution history, if it is in evidence.\" <i>Markman,<\/i>\u00a0<a class=\"raw-ref\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/markman-v-westview-instruments-inc#p980\">52 F.3d \u00e0 980<\/a>;\u00a0<i>see also Graham v. John Deere Co.,<\/i>\u00a0<a class=\"raw-ref\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/graham-v-john-deere-company-of-kansas-city-calmar-inc-v-cook-chemical-company-company-v-cook-chemical-company#p33\">383 U.S. 1, 33<\/a>,\u00a0<a class=\"raw-ref\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/graham-v-john-deere-company-of-kansas-city-calmar-inc-v-cook-chemical-company-company-v-cook-chemical-company\">86 S.Ct. 684<\/a>,\u00a0<a class=\"raw-ref\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/graham-v-john-deere-company-of-kansas-city-calmar-inc-v-cook-chemical-company-company-v-cook-chemical-company\">15 L.Ed.2d 545<\/a>\u00a0(1966) (\"[A]n invention is construed not only in the light of the claims, but also with reference to the file wrapper or prosecution history in the Patent Office.\"). The prosecution history, which we have designated as part of the \"intrinsic evidence,\" consists of the complete record of the proceedings before the PTO and includes the prior art cited during the examination of the patent.\u00a0<i>Autogiro,<\/i>\u00a0<a class=\"raw-ref\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/autogiro-company-of-america-v-united-states#p399\">384 F.2d \u00e0 399<\/a>. Like the specification, the prosecution history provides evidence of how the PTO and the inventor understood the patent.\u00a0<i>See Lemelson v. Gen. Mills, Inc.,<\/i>\u00a0<a class=\"raw-ref\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/lemelson-v-general-mills-inc#p1206\">968 F.2d 1202, 1206<\/a>\u00a0(Fed. Cir. 1992). Furthermore, like the specification, the prosecution history was created by the patentee in attempting to explain and obtain the patent. Yet because the prosecution history represents an ongoing negotiation between the PTO and the applicant, rather than the final product of that negotiation, it often lacks the clarity of the specification and thus is less useful for claim construction purposes.\u00a0<i>See Inverness Med. Switz. GmbH v. Warner Lambert Co.,<\/i>\u00a0<a class=\"raw-ref\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/inverness-medical-v-warner-lambert-co#p1380\">309 F.3d 1373, 1380-82<\/a>\u00a0(Fed. Cir. 2002) (the ambiguity of the prosecution history made it less relevant to claim construction);\u00a0<i>Athletic Alternatives, Inc. v. Prince Mfg., Inc.,<\/i>\u00a0<a class=\"raw-ref\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/athletic-alternatives-inc-v-prince-mfg#p1580\">73 F.3d 1573, 1580<\/a>\u00a0(Fed. Cir. 1996) (the ambiguity of the prosecution history made it \"unhelpful as an interpretive resource\" for claim construction). Nonetheless, the prosecution history can often inform the meaning of the claim language by demonstrating how the inventor understood the invention and whether the inventor limited the invention in the course of prosecution, making the claim scope narrower than it would otherwise be.\u00a0<i>Vitronics,<\/i>\u00a0<a class=\"raw-ref\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/vitronics-corp-v-conceptronic-inc#p1582\">90 F.3d at 1582-83<\/a>;\u00a0<i>see also Chimie v. PPG Indus., Inc.,<\/i>\u00a0<a class=\"raw-ref\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/chimie-v-ppg-industries-inc#p1384\">402 F.3d 1371, 1384<\/a>\u00a0(Fed. Cir. 2005) (\"The purpose of consulting the prosecution history in construing a claim is to 'exclude any interpretation that was disclaimed during prosecution.'\"),\u00a0<i>quoting ZMI Corp. v. Cardiac Resuscitator Corp.,<\/i>\u00a0<a class=\"raw-ref\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/zmi-corp-v-cardiac-resuscitator-corp#p1580\">844 F.2d 1576, 1580<\/a>\u00a0(Fed. Cir. 1988);\u00a0<i>Southwall Techs., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co.,<\/i>\u00a0<a class=\"raw-ref\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/southwall-technologies-v-cardinal-ig-co#p1576\">54 F.3d 1570, 1576<\/a> (Fed. Cir. 1995)\".[\/footnote].\r\n\r\nLorsque les \u00e9l\u00e9ments intrins\u00e8ques ne permettent pas d'obtenir une interpr\u00e9tation claire des revendications, les tribunaux peuvent recourir \u00e0 des \u00e9l\u00e9ments extrins\u00e8ques, en s'aidant de dictionnaires, de traites scientifiques ou d'experts[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/phillips-v-awh-corp-3\">Phillips v. AWH Corp.<\/a>, 415 F.3d \u00e0 1317-18.[\/footnote]\r\n\r\nEnfin, en cas d\u2019ambigu\u00eft\u00e9, et dans la mesure du possible, une revendication doit \u00eatre interpr\u00e9t\u00e9e de fa\u00e7on \u00e0 pr\u00e9server sa validit\u00e9[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/liebel-flarsheim-company-v-medrad-inc\">Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad Inc.<\/a>, 358 F.3d 898, 911 (Fed. Cir. 2004); <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/tate-access-floors-v-interface-archit-res\">Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural Resources, Inc.<\/a>, 279 F.3d 1357, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2002); <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/apple-computer-inc-v-articulate-sys-inc\">Apple Computer, Inc. v. Articulate Sys., Inc.<\/a>, 234 F.3d 14, 24 (Fed. Cir. 2000).[\/footnote].\r\n\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<strong>416._ Contrefa\u00e7on litt\u00e9rale et par \u00e9quivalent_<\/strong> La contrefa\u00e7on peut \u00eatre litt\u00e9rale (<em>literal infringement<\/em>) ou par \u00e9quivalent. La contrefa\u00e7on litt\u00e9rale implique la reprise de tous les \u00e9l\u00e9ments d\u2019une revendication dans le produit ou le proc\u00e9d\u00e9 argu\u00e9 de contrefa\u00e7on[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/becton-v-tyco-healthcare-grp\">Becton, Dickinson &amp; Co. v. Tyco Healthcare Group, LP<\/a>, 616 F.3d 1249, 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2010); <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/southwall-technologies-v-cardinal-ig-co\">Southwall Technologies, Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co.<\/a>, 54 F.3d 1570, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1995).[\/footnote]. L\u2019ajout d\u2019\u00e9l\u00e9ments (y compris les am\u00e9liorations \u00e9ventuelles) par le contrefacteur est indiff\u00e9rent.\r\n\r\nLa doctrine des \u00e9quivalents permet de s\u2019\u00e9carter de l\u2019interpr\u00e9tation litt\u00e9rale des revendications pour y inclure certains \u00ab\u00a0\u00e9quivalents\u00a0\u00bb. Elle prot\u00e8ge ainsi le titulaire du brevet en permettant d\u2019\u00e9viter qu\u2019un contrefacteur n\u2019\u00e9chappe au brevet en proc\u00e9dant \u00e0 des changements mineurs (ce qu\u2019une interpr\u00e9tation purement litt\u00e9rale des revendications pourrait permettre). Bien qu\u2019elle soit source d\u2019incertitudes sur l\u2019\u00e9tendue r\u00e9elle du brevet, elle a toujours \u00e9t\u00e9 r\u00e9affirm\u00e9e en jurisprudence.\r\n\r\nLa doctrine des \u00e9quivalents a \u00e9t\u00e9 reconnue pour la premi\u00e8re fois par la Cour Supr\u00eame en 1853 dans son arr\u00eat <em>Winans v. Denmead<\/em>[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/56\/330\/\">Winans v. Denmead<\/a>, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1853)[\/footnote]. La d\u00e9cision principale de la Cour Supr\u00eame sur la doctrine des \u00e9quivalents est la d\u00e9cision <em>Graver Tank &amp; Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co de 1952<\/em>[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/339\/605\/\">Graver Tank &amp; Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co<\/a>, 339 U.S. 605 (1950).[\/footnote]<em>. <\/em>La Cour Supr\u00eame y d\u00e9finit la doctrine comme suit\u00a0:\r\n\r\n\u00ab\u00a0si deux dispositifs font la m\u00eame chose d\u2019une mani\u00e8re substantiellement identique, et aboutissent \u00e0 un r\u00e9sultat substantiellement identique, ils sont identiques\u00a0\u00bb[footnote]\u00ab\u00a0if two devices do the same work in substantially the same way, and accomplish substantially the same result, they are the same\u00a0\u00bb.[\/footnote].\r\n\r\nCe test est dit de \u00ab\u00a0triple identit\u00e9\u00a0\u00bb (fonction \/ mani\u00e8re \/ r\u00e9sultat)\u00a0: les diff\u00e9rences entre les revendications sont ignor\u00e9es si le second moyen (1) remplit la m\u00eame fonction, (2) d\u2019une fa\u00e7on substantiellement identique (3) et avec un r\u00e9sultat substantiellement identique. Le test est appliqu\u00e9 sur chaque revendication, et non pas sur l\u2019invention dans son ensemble.\r\n\r\nUne limite importante \u00e0 la doctrine des \u00e9quivalents se trouve dans r\u00e8gle dite du <em>prosecution history estoppel<\/em>, consacr\u00e9e par la Cour supr\u00eame dans sa d\u00e9cision <em>Warner-Jenkinson Co.<\/em> v. <em>Hilton Davis Chemical Co. <\/em>de 1997[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/520\/17\/\">Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. <\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/520\/17\/\">Hilton Davis Chemical Co.<\/a>, 520 U.S. 17.[\/footnote], qui requiert que les revendications soient interpr\u00e9t\u00e9es \u00e0 la lumi\u00e8re de la proc\u00e9dure d\u2019examen devant le Patent and Trademark Office (PTO)\u00a0(<em>prosecution history<\/em>). Plus pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment, elle signifie que lorsque le titulaire du brevet a r\u00e9duit ses revendications \u00e0 la suite d\u2019un refus de l\u2019examinateur, il ne peut plus pr\u00e9tendre aux \u00e9quivalents correspondant \u00e0 la part des revendications abandonn\u00e9e ou r\u00e9duite. Le concurrent peut ainsi se fonder sur l\u2019historique des modifications des revendications pour d\u00e9terminer plus pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment la port\u00e9e des \u00e9quivalents couverts par le brevet. Dans son arr\u00eat rendu le 28 mai 2002 dans l\u2019affaire <em>Festo Corp. V. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd.<\/em> (n\u00b000-1543)[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/535\/722\/\">Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.<\/a>, 535 U.S. 722 (2002).[\/footnote], la Cour supr\u00eame a confirm\u00e9 que la doctrine peut s\u2019appliquer \u00e0 toute modification des revendications faite pour satisfaire aux exigences l\u00e9gales, et non pas seulement \u00e0 celles fond\u00e9es sur l\u2019existence d\u2019ant\u00e9riorit\u00e9s. Elle consid\u00e8re cependant que la doctrine n\u2019a pas n\u00e9cessairement pour effet d\u2019emp\u00eacher le brevet\u00e9 de s\u2019opposer \u00e0 tout \u00e9quivalent de la revendication modifi\u00e9e : bien que l\u2019<em>estoppel<\/em> puisse faire obstacle \u00e0 la prise en compte d\u2019un large ensemble d\u2019\u00e9quivalents, la d\u00e9termination de sa port\u00e9e r\u00e9elle n\u00e9cessite un examen au cas par cas des abandons effectu\u00e9s par les revendications modifi\u00e9es.\r\n\r\nNotons enfin que les tribunaux ont d\u00e9velopp\u00e9 une contrepartie \u00e0 la doctrine des \u00e9quivalents\u00a0d\u00e9nomm\u00e9e <em>reverse doctrine of equivalents<\/em>, qui permet cette fois de consid\u00e9rer comme non contrefaisant un dispositif d\u00e9crit litt\u00e9ralement dans un brevet\u00a0(donc contrefaisant en principe) s\u2019il a \u00e9t\u00e9 modifi\u00e9 dans son principe de mani\u00e8re \u00e0 fonctionner de mani\u00e8re substantiellement diff\u00e9rente[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/339\/605\/\">Graver Tank &amp; Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co.<\/a>, 339 U.S. 605, 608\u201309 (1950) (\u00ab\u00a0The wholesome realism of [the doctrine of equivalents] is not always applied in favor of a patentee but is sometimes used against him. Thus, where a device is so far changed in principle from a patented article that it performs the same or a similar function in a substantially different way, but nevertheless falls within the literal words of the claim, the doctrine of equivalents may be used to restrict the claim and defeat the patentee\u2019s action for infringement\u00a0\u00bb); <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/sri-intern-v-matsushita-elec-corp-of-am\">SRI Int\u2019l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp.<\/a>, 775 F.2d 1107, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc).[\/footnote]. Cependant cette r\u00e8gle est tr\u00e8s rarement appliqu\u00e9e[footnote]V. <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/roche-palo-alto-v-apotex\">Roche Palo Alto, LLC v. Apotex, Inc.<\/a>, 531 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2008) : \u00ab The reverse doctrine of equivalents is rarely applied, and this court has never affirmed a finding of non-infringement under the reverse doctrine of equivalents\u00a0\u00bb. Pour des applications, V. par exemple Precision Metal Fabricators Inc. v. Jetstream Sys. Co., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1704 (N.D. Cal.1988); Lesona Corp. v. United States, 530 F.2d 896, 905\u201306 (Ct. Cl. 1976).[\/footnote].\r\n\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<strong>417._ Les moyens de d\u00e9fense_<\/strong> Le d\u00e9fendeur \u00e0 une action en contrefa\u00e7on a \u00e0 sa disposition plusieurs moyens de d\u00e9fense.\r\n\r\nIl peut tout d\u2019abord, bien s\u00fbr, invoquer un motif d\u2019invalidit\u00e9 du brevet[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/282\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 282(b)(2)<\/a>.[\/footnote]. La loi \u00e9tablissant une pr\u00e9somption de validit\u00e9 du brevet et de chacune des revendications, prise ind\u00e9pendamment[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/282\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 282<\/a>.[\/footnote], la charge de la preuve de l\u2019invalidit\u00e9 du brevet ou d\u2019une revendication incombe au d\u00e9fendeur. A noter que la doctrine dite de l\u2019<em>assignor estoppel<\/em> (estoppel du cessionnaire) interdit au cessionnaire de contester la validit\u00e9 du brevet[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/diamond-scientific-co-v-ambico-inc-2\">Diamond Scientific Co. v. Ambico, Inc., 848 F.2d<\/a> 1220,1225 (Fed. Cir. 1988); <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/pandrol-usa-lp-v-airboss-ry-prod-inc\">Pandrol USA, LP v. Airboss Railway Prods., Inc.<\/a>, 424 F.3d 1161, 1166 (Fed. Cir. 2005).[\/footnote].\r\n\r\nIl peut ensuite invoquer une exception ou limite aux droits exclusifs, et d\u00e9montrer l\u2019absence de contrefa\u00e7on litt\u00e9rale ou par \u00e9quivalent[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/282\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 282(b)(1)<\/a>.[\/footnote], plusieurs autres moyens de d\u00e9fense sont envisageables.\r\n\r\nMais le droit f\u00e9d\u00e9ral lui permet \u00e9galement d'invoquer la fraude ou une conduite in\u00e9quitable (<em>inequitable conduct<\/em>) du demandeur pendant l\u2019examen du brevet, par exemple en cas de violation par ce dernier de son devoir de divulgation de l\u2019information n\u00e9cessaire \u00e0 l\u2019examen[footnote]37 C.F.R. 1.56(a), (b).[\/footnote].\r\n\r\nUne autre d\u00e9fense, propre au syst\u00e8me am\u00e9ricain, est constitu\u00e9e par la doctrine de <em>patent misuse<\/em>, qui constitue l\u2019extension au brevet de la doctrine \u00e9quitable d\u2019<em>unclean hands<\/em>. Le titulaire du brevet ne peut pas b\u00e9n\u00e9ficier des r\u00e9parations pr\u00e9vues par la loi en cas de contrefa\u00e7on s\u2019il a exploit\u00e9 son brevet de mani\u00e8re fautive (<em>patent misuse<\/em>). Les cas de <em>patent misuse<\/em> correspondent le plus souvent \u00e0 des cas de violation des r\u00e8gles de concurrence[footnote]V. par exemple<a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/352\/457\/\"> United States Gypsum v. National Gypsum<\/a>, 352 U.S. 457 (1957) (prix impos\u00e9s), <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/senza-gel-corp-v-seiffhart\">Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seiffhart<\/a>, 803 F.2d 661 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (ventes li\u00e9es).[\/footnote]. Cependant, la section 271(d) vient exclure ou limiter l\u2019application de la doctrine dans plusieurs hypoth\u00e8ses, couvrant notamment le refus de licence et, sauf si le titulaire du brevet d\u00e9tient une position dominante (<em>market power<\/em>) sur le march\u00e9, les ventes li\u00e9es[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/271\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 271(d)<\/a>: <em>\u00ab\u00a0<\/em>No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or contributory infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by reason of his having done one or more of the following: (1) derived revenue from acts which if performed by another without his consent would constitute contributory infringement of the patent; (2) licensed or authorized another to perform acts which if performed without his consent would constitute contributory infringement of the patent; (3) sought to enforce his patent rights against infringement or contributory infringement; (4) refused to license or use any rights to the patent; or (5) conditioned the license of any rights to the patent or the sale of the patented product on the acquisition of a license to rights in another patent or purchase of a separate product, unless, in view of the circumstances, the patent owner has market power in the relevant market for the patent or patented product on which the license or sale is conditioned\u00a0<em>\u00bb.<\/em>[\/footnote]. A noter que cette d\u00e9fense peut \u00eatre invoqu\u00e9e par le d\u00e9fenseur m\u00eame s\u2019il n\u2019est pas directement victime du <em>patent misuse<\/em>.\r\n\r\nLes autres moyens de d\u00e9fense incluent l\u2019application des doctrines \u00e9quitables de <em>laches<\/em> et d\u2019<em>estoppel<\/em>, d\u00e9j\u00e0 d\u00e9crites[footnote]V. Tome 1, n\u00b0263.[\/footnote].\r\n\r\nA noter enfin que le paragraphe 286 du Patent Act pr\u00e9cise que le titulaire ne peut pas obtenir de dommages et int\u00e9r\u00eats pour des faits de contrefa\u00e7on ant\u00e9rieurs de plus de six ans au d\u00e9p\u00f4t de son assignation en contrefa\u00e7on[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/286\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 286<\/a>.[\/footnote].\r\n\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<strong>418._ Rem\u00e8des et sanctions (renvoi partiel)_<\/strong> Les rem\u00e8des disponibles incluent les injonctions, les dommages et int\u00e9r\u00eats et <em>attorney fees<\/em>[footnote]V. Tome 1, n\u00b065.[\/footnote]. A noter que depuis la d\u00e9cision de la Cour supr\u00eame de 2006 dans l\u2019affaire <em>eBay Inc. V. MercExchange L.L.C<\/em>.[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/547\/388\/\">eBay Inc. V. MercExchange L.L.C.<\/a>, 547 U.S. 388 (2006).[\/footnote], une injonction n\u2019est plus automatiquement accord\u00e9e par les tribunaux en mati\u00e8re de contrefa\u00e7on de brevet. Ainsi, dans certains cas, notamment lorsque le brevet\u00e9 n\u2019exploite pas l\u2019invention (et par exemple dans le cas de <em>patent trolls<\/em>), la mise en balance de l\u2019int\u00e9r\u00eat public et des int\u00e9r\u00eats du brevet\u00e9 peut aboutir au refus d\u2019accorder une injonction, ce qui, <em>de facto<\/em>, impose une licence au brevet\u00e9.\r\n\r\nEn cas d\u2019importations contrefaisantes, d\u2019autres rem\u00e8des peuvent \u00eatre obtenus aupr\u00e8s de l\u2019United States International Trade Commission[footnote]<em>Ibid.<\/em>[\/footnote].\r\n\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<strong>419._ Le marquage et l\u2019information du contrefacteur_<\/strong> Aux termes du paragraphe 287(a) du Patent Act, les titulaire de brevets et les personnes qui fabriquent, importent, offrent \u00e0 la vente ou vendent aux \u00c9tats-Unis un article brevet\u00e9 peuvent notifier au public le caract\u00e8re brevet\u00e9 de l\u2019article, soit en apposant sur ce dernier le mot \u00ab\u00a0patent \u00bb ou l'abr\u00e9viation \u00ab\u00a0pat.\u00a0\u00bb et le num\u00e9ro du brevet, soit en apposant sur ce dernier le mot \u00ab\u00a0patent\u00a0\u00bb ou l'abr\u00e9viation \u00ab\u00a0pat.\u00a0\u00bb en y associant une adresse accessible au public sur l\u2019Internet contenant le num\u00e9ro du brevet, soit encore (si l\u2019apposition sur le produit n\u2019est pas possible) en ins\u00e9rant ces informations sur une \u00e9tiquette appos\u00e9e sur le produit ou son emballage. Les marquages frauduleux sont sanctionn\u00e9s[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/292\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 292(a)<\/a>.[\/footnote].\r\n\r\nA d\u00e9faut de marquage, aucun dommages-int\u00e9r\u00eats ne peut \u00eatre obtenu, sauf si s\u2019il est d\u00e9montr\u00e9 que le contrefacteur s\u2019est vu notifier la contrefa\u00e7on et a continu\u00e9 \u00e0 contrefaire les droits du brevet\u00e9 (auquel cas les dommages et int\u00e9r\u00eats ne peuvent \u00eatre recouvr\u00e9s que pour les actes post\u00e9rieurs \u00e0 cette notification). L\u2019assignation en contrefa\u00e7on \u00e9quivaut \u00e0 une telle information.\r\n\r\nL\u2019expression <em>patent pending<\/em> est utilis\u00e9e par la pratique pour informer d\u2019une demande de brevet en cours d\u2019examen, mais n\u2019a pas d\u2019effets juridiques.\r\n\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<strong>420._ La d\u00e9fense des droits avant d\u00e9livrance (les <em>provisional rights<\/em>)_<\/strong> Les brevets ne prennent effet qu\u2019apr\u00e8s d\u00e9livrance. Cependant, apr\u00e8s d\u00e9livrance, le titulaire du brevet peut obtenir une redevance \u00e9quitable (<em>reasonable royalty<\/em>) de toute personne qui, prenant la p\u00e9riode allant de la publication de la demande \u00e0 la d\u00e9livrance, a commis des actes de contrefa\u00e7on, \u00e0 condition qu\u2019elle se soit vue notifier cette publication[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/154\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 154(d)<\/a> (\u00ab\u00a0<em>provisional rights<\/em>\u00a0\u00bb).[\/footnote].\r\n\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<strong>421._ L\u2019action en d\u00e9claration de non-contrefa\u00e7on_<\/strong> Aux \u00c9tats-Unis, l\u2019article III de la Constitution f\u00e9d\u00e9rale restreint le pouvoir judiciaire \u00e0 la seule adjudication des \u00ab\u00a0litiges\u00a0\u00bb ou \u00ab\u00a0controverses\u00a0\u00bb (<em>cases or controversies<\/em>). Les actions en d\u00e9claration de non-contrefa\u00e7on sont possibles dans le cadre du Declaratory Judgment Act[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/28\/2201\">28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2201<\/a>.[\/footnote], dont les dispositions ont \u00e9t\u00e9 interpr\u00e9t\u00e9es par la Cour supr\u00eame au regard de l\u2019exigence constitutionnelle d\u2019une \u00ab controverse \u00bb[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/300\/227\/\">Aetna Life Ins. Co.<\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/300\/227\/\"> v. Haworth<\/a>, 300 U. S. 227, 240 (1937).[\/footnote]. La Cour supr\u00eame a notamment consid\u00e9r\u00e9 qu\u2019aucune controverse n\u2019existe lorsque le demandeur tente d\u2019obtenir un jugement pr\u00e9matur\u00e9 sur des d\u00e9fenses potentielles qui seraient typiquement jug\u00e9es dans le cadre d\u2019un litige futur[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/coffman-v-breeze-corporations\">Coffman<\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/coffman-v-breeze-corporations\"> v. Breeze Corps.<\/a>, 323 U.S. 316 (1945).[\/footnote]. La simple existence d\u2019un brevet g\u00eanant ne suffit pas. A l\u2019inverse, une menace d\u2019action en contrefa\u00e7on formul\u00e9e par le titulaire du brevet n\u2019est pas indispensable. Selon la Cour supr\u00eame[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/549\/118\/\">MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.<\/a>, 549 U.S. 118 (2007).[\/footnote], le demandeur doit d\u00e9montrer \u00ab\u00a0que les faits all\u00e9gu\u00e9s dans les circonstances de l\u2019affaire d\u00e9montrent l\u2019existence d\u2019une controverse entre les parties ayant des int\u00e9r\u00eats juridiques oppos\u00e9s d\u2019une imm\u00e9diatet\u00e9 et d\u2019une r\u00e9alit\u00e9 suffisantes pour garantir la prise d\u2019un jugement d\u00e9claratoire\u00a0\u00bb[footnote]En l\u2019esp\u00e8ce, jug\u00e9 qu\u2019un licenci\u00e9 n\u2019a pas \u00e0 r\u00e9silier ou cesser d\u2019ex\u00e9cuter sa licence avant de placer sa demande de jgement d\u00e9claratoire d\u2019invalidit\u00e9 ou de non contrefa\u00e7on.[\/footnote].\r\n\r\nUn risque, li\u00e9 au comportement actif du titulaire du brevet, de pr\u00e9judice caus\u00e9 \u00e0 l\u2019activit\u00e9 du demandeur, suffit. Les conditions d\u2019acc\u00e8s \u00e0 un jugement d\u00e9claratoire, notamment dans l\u2019hypoth\u00e8se d\u2019une licence, ont \u00e9t\u00e9 pr\u00e9cis\u00e9es par la Cour Supr\u00eame en 2007 et par des jugements ult\u00e9rieurs[footnote]Les conditions d\u2019acc\u00e8s \u00e0 un jugement d\u00e9claratoire, notamment dans l\u2019hypoth\u00e8se d\u2019une licence, ont \u00e9t\u00e9 pr\u00e9cis\u00e9es par des d\u00e9cisions ult\u00e9rieures, V. M. Donovan, The Impact of MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc. and Its Progeny on Technology Licensing, 3 J. Bus. Entrepreneurship &amp; L. Iss. 1 (2009).[\/footnote].\r\n\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<strong>422._ La l\u00e9gislation sur les Patent trolls_<\/strong> Au cours de ces derni\u00e8res ann\u00e9es, le d\u00e9veloppement de l\u2019activit\u00e9 des \u00ab patent trolls \u00bb (autrement d\u00e9nomm\u00e9es non-practicing entities, non-performing entities ou patent assertion entities) a concentr\u00e9 une partie de l\u2019activit\u00e9 l\u00e9gislative. Plusieurs propositions de lois f\u00e9d\u00e9rales destin\u00e9es \u00e0 encadrer leurs activit\u00e9s ont \u00e9t\u00e9 d\u00e9pos\u00e9s[footnote]V. par exemple H.R. 9, \u00ab Innovation Act \u00bb, qui proposait d\u2019imposer aux tribunaux de se prononcer sur la validit\u00e9 d\u2019un brevet d\u00e8s le d\u00e9but d\u2019une proc\u00e9dure pour \u00e9viter que les trolls de brevets ne puissent pas faire durer les proc\u00e8s pendant des ann\u00e9es sur le fondement de revendications invalides.[\/footnote], et de nombreux \u00c9tats f\u00e9d\u00e9r\u00e9s (\u00e0 l\u2019exception notable de la Californie) ont adopt\u00e9 des lois destin\u00e9es \u00e0 sanctionner les demandes et mises en demeures abusives des entit\u00e9s non exploitantes. La premi\u00e8re loi de ce type a \u00e9t\u00e9 adopt\u00e9e dans l\u2019\u00c9tat du Vermont en 2013[footnote]9 VSA \u00a7 4195 et suivants.[\/footnote]. La loi a pour but de sanctionner les \u00ab demandes en contrefa\u00e7on faite de mauvaise foi \u00bb (bad faith assertions of patent infringement). Elle \u00e9num\u00e8re les facteurs permettant au juge de d\u00e9terminer si une demande est form\u00e9e de mauvaise foi[footnote]9 VSA, \u00a7 4197, qui dispose : \u00ab (a) A person shall not make a bad faith assertion of patent infringement.\r\n\r\n(b) A court may consider the following factors as evidence that a person has made a bad faith assertion of patent infringement:\r\n\r\n(1) The demand letter does not contain the following information:\r\n\r\n(A) the patent number;\r\n\r\n(B) the name and address of the patent owner or owners and assignee or assignees, if any; and\r\n\r\n(C) factual allegations concerning the specific areas in which the target\u2019s products, services, and technology infringe the patent or are covered by the claims in the patent.\r\n\r\n(2) Prior to sending the demand letter, the person fails to conduct an analysis comparing the claims in the patent to the target\u2019s products, services, and technology, or such an analysis was done but does not identify specific areas in which the products, services, and technology are covered by the claims in the patent.\r\n\r\n(3) The demand letter lacks the information described in subdivision (1) of this subsection, the target requests the information, and the person fails to provide the information within a reasonable period of time.\r\n\r\n(4) The demand letter demands payment of a license fee or response within an unreasonably short period of time.\r\n\r\n(5) The person offers to license the patent for an amount that is not based on a reasonable estimate of the value of the license.\r\n\r\n(6) The claim or assertion of patent infringement is meritless, and the person knew, or should have known, that the claim or assertion is meritless.\r\n\r\n(7) The claim or assertion of patent infringement is deceptive.\r\n\r\n(8) The person or its subsidiaries or affiliates have previously filed or threatened to file one or more lawsuits based on the same or similar claim of patent infringement (...):\r\n\r\n(9) Any other factor the court finds relevant (...)\u201d[\/footnote]. Elle pr\u00e9voit \u00e9galement [footnote]9 VSA, \u00a7 4198.[\/footnote] qu\u2019\u00e0 la demande du destinataire de la demande et s\u2019il apparait au tribunal que le demandeur \u00e9tabli avec une probabilit\u00e9 raisonnable que l\u2019all\u00e9gation de contrefa\u00e7on de brevet a \u00e9t\u00e9 faite de mauvaise foi, le tribunal peut exiger de l\u2019exp\u00e9diteur qu'il d\u00e9pose un cautionnement d'un montant \u00e9gal \u00e0 une estimation de bonne foi des frais de justice que le destinataire cibl\u00e9 devra avancer pour se d\u00e9fendre (le cautionnement \u00e9tant plafonn\u00e9 \u00e0 250 000 $). Le tribunal peut refuser le cautionnement s'il estime que la personne concern\u00e9e dispose d'actifs disponibles \u00e9gaux au montant de la caution propos\u00e9e. Enfin, l\u2019Attorney General est charg\u00e9 de l\u2019application de la loi, et peut notamment conduire des enqu\u00eates et mener des actions, et le d\u00e9fendeur peut intenter une action sur le seul fondement de la violation de cette loi et se voir allouer des dommages et int\u00e9r\u00eats \u00e0 ce titre[footnote]9 VSA, \u00a7 4199 (Enforcement; remedies; damages), qui dispose : \u00ab (a) The Attorney General shall have the same authority under this chapter to make rules, conduct civil investigations, bring civil actions, and enter into assurances of discontinuance as provided under chapter 63 of this title. In an action brought by the Attorney General under this chapter, the court may award or impose any relief available under chapter 63 of this title.\r\n\r\n(b) A target of conduct involving assertions of patent infringement, or a person aggrieved by a violation of this chapter or by a violation of rules adopted under this chapter, may bring an action in Superior Court. A court may award the following remedies to a plaintiff who prevails in an action brought pursuant to this subsection:\r\n\r\n(1) equitable relief;\r\n\r\n(2) damages;\r\n\r\n(3) costs and fees, including reasonable attorney\u2019s fees; and\r\n\r\n(4) exemplary damages in an amount equal to $50,000.00 or three times the total of damages, costs, and fees, whichever is greater.\r\n\r\n(c) This chapter shall not be construed to limit rights and remedies available to the State of Vermont or to any person under any other law and shall not alter or restrict the Attorney General\u2019s authority under chapter 63 of this title with regard to conduct involving assertions of patent infringement. (Added 2013, No. 44, \u00a7 6; 2013, No. 47, \u00a7 2, eff. May 24, 2013.)\u00a0\u00bb[\/footnote].\r\n\r\nUne autre loi notable est celle du Texas, adopt\u00e9e en 2015, et codifi\u00e9e au Code de commerce local[footnote]<a href=\"http:\/\/www.statutes.legis.state.tx.us\/Docs\/%20BC\/htm\/BC.17.htm\">Tex Bus &amp; Com Code Ann \u00a7 17952<\/a>, Added by Acts 2015, Texas Acts of the 84th Leg. - Regular Session, ch. 856,Sec. 1, eff. 9\/1\/2015. La section 17.952 du Code de commerce prohibe les demandes en contrefa\u00e7on mauvaise de foi (Bad Faith Claim of Patent Infringement), et dispose :\r\n\r\n\u201c(a)\u00a0A person may not send to an end user located or doing business in this state a written or electronic communication that is a bad faith claim of patent infringement.\r\n\r\n(b)\u00a0A communication is a bad faith claim of patent infringement if the communication includes a claim that the end user or a person affiliated with the end user has infringed a patent and is liable for that infringement and:\r\n\r\n(1)\u00a0the communication falsely states that the sender has filed a lawsuit in connection with the claim;\r\n\r\n(2)\u00a0the claim is objectively baseless because:(A)\u00a0the sender or a person the sender represents does not have a current right to license the patent to or enforce the patent against the end user;(B)\u00a0the patent has been held invalid or unenforceable in a final judgment or administrative decision; or(C)\u00a0the infringing activity alleged in the communication occurred after the patent expired; or\r\n\r\n(3) the communication is likely to materially mislead a reasonable end user because the communication does not contain information sufficient to inform the end user of:(A) the identity of the person asserting the claim;(B) the patent that is alleged to have been infringed; and(C) at least one product, service, or technology obtained by the end user that is alleged to infringe the patent or the activity of the end user that is alleged to infringe the patent\u201d.[\/footnote]. Contrairement \u00e0 la loi du Vermont, la loi du Texas ne consacre pas de droit d\u2019agir au civil, ni de pouvoir sp\u00e9ciaux confi\u00e9s \u00e0 l\u2019Attorney General.\r\n\r\nOn notera que l\u2019adoption de ces lois ne semble pas avoir fait dispara\u00eetre les demandes d\u2019intervention sur le sujet au niveau f\u00e9d\u00e9ral.","rendered":"<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>352._ Pr\u00e9sentation_<\/strong>Les \u00c9tats-Unis sont un acteur majeur du monde des brevets, uniquement d\u00e9pass\u00e9s par la Chine en termes de d\u00e9p\u00f4ts et de d\u00e9livrance. Sur les 1,7 million de brevets d&rsquo;utilit\u00e9 accord\u00e9s dans le monde en 2020, les \u00c9tats-Unis en ont accord\u00e9 377 170 (597 000 demandes), contre 695 946 pour la Chine (1,59 million de demandes), e<span style=\"font-size: 1em;\">t 184 372 pour le Japon (288 000 demandes)<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Source statistiques OMPI, IP Facts and Figures.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-1\" href=\"#footnote-279-1\" aria-label=\"Footnote 1\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[1]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n<p>Une grande partie de ces brevets sont d\u00e9pos\u00e9s dans les secteurs des technologies de l&rsquo;information, des t\u00e9l\u00e9communications et des produits pharmaceutiques. Une majorit\u00e9 de ces demandes provient d&rsquo;entit\u00e9s \u00e9trang\u00e8res<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"54 % de toutes les demandes de brevets d\u2019utilit\u00e9 en 2020.\u200b Source: statistiques USPTO.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-2\" href=\"#footnote-279-2\" aria-label=\"Footnote 2\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[2]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Contrairement \u00e0 la situation qui pr\u00e9vaut pour d&rsquo;autres droits de propri\u00e9t\u00e9 intellectuelle, les \u00c9tats-Unis sont signataires de toutes les conventions internationales en mati\u00e8re de brevet<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Sur les textes internationaux et leur int\u00e9gration aux \u00c9tats-Unis, v. Tome 1, n\u00b041.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-3\" href=\"#footnote-279-3\" aria-label=\"Footnote 3\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[3]<\/sup><\/a>. En dernier lieu, les dispositions pertinentes du Trait\u00e9 sur le droit des brevets (PLT) de 2000 ont \u00e9t\u00e9 transpos\u00e9es par le Patent Law Treaties Implementation Act de 2012<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Patent Law Treaties Implementation Act, Pub. L. 112-211, 126 Stat. 1527 (2012).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-4\" href=\"#footnote-279-4\" aria-label=\"Footnote 4\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[4]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Les \u00c9tats-Unis ont adopt\u00e9 assez t\u00f4t des solutions innovantes dans le domaine des brevets et des cr\u00e9ations techniques : contr\u00f4le de l\u2019activit\u00e9 inventive d\u00e8s 1836, loi sur les obtentions v\u00e9g\u00e9tales (<em>plant patent<\/em>) d\u00e8s 1930, etc. La loi f\u00e9d\u00e9rale a \u00e9galement longtemps maintenu des solutions techniques originales ou abandonn\u00e9es dans les autres syst\u00e8mes de brevet<em>, <\/em>et notamment une dur\u00e9e de protection plus courte (17 ans), et un syst\u00e8me du premier inventeur. Ces particularit\u00e9s, et d&rsquo;autres, ont \u00e9t\u00e9 abandonn\u00e9es \u00e0 partir des ann\u00e9es 1990 (au 16 mars 2023 pour le syst\u00e8me du premier inventeur). Cependant, certaines particularit\u00e9s subsistent. L\u2019absence, dans le <em>Patent Act<\/em> de 1952, d\u2019exclusions du domaine de la brevetabilit\u00e9 similaires \u00e0 celles \u00e9tablies par la Convention de Munich en est une. La loi pr\u00e9voit \u00e9galement un d\u00e9lai de gr\u00e2ce d&rsquo;un an absent (ou abandonn\u00e9 par) de nombreuses l\u00e9gislations en mati\u00e8re de brevet, et des exceptions originales. D&rsquo;autres particularit\u00e9s sont proc\u00e9durales, comme la possibilit\u00e9 de demandes provisoires (<em>provisional patent application<\/em>), ou les possibilit\u00e9s de <em>continuation in part;<\/em> ou encore des possibilit\u00e9s d&rsquo;extension de la p\u00e9riode de protection (<em>patent term adjustments<\/em>) en raison de d\u00e9lais d&rsquo;examens des demandes par l&rsquo;USPTO ou de m\u00e9canismes d&rsquo;autorisation de mises sur le march\u00e9 par la Food and Drug Administration. Par ailleurs, aux \u00c9tats-Unis les sanctions pr\u00e9vues en mati\u00e8re de brevets sont uniquement civiles<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"V. Tome 1, n\u00b066.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-5\" href=\"#footnote-279-5\" aria-label=\"Footnote 5\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[5]<\/sup><\/a>. Enfin, on notera que le droit des brevets US ne pr\u00e9voit pas de protection des mod\u00e8les d&rsquo;utilit\u00e9s<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"V. cependant, dans le domaine du design, le Vessel Hull Design Protection Act, T. 1, n\u00b0297.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-6\" href=\"#footnote-279-6\" aria-label=\"Footnote 6\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[6]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>353._ Plan_ <\/strong>Apr\u00e8s une introduction historique (I), nous aborderons les r\u00e8gles li\u00e9es \u00e0 l&rsquo;obtention (II) et \u00e0 la propri\u00e9t\u00e9 et \u00e0 l&rsquo;exploitation (III) du brevet.<\/p>\n<h2>1.<strong>\u00a0Introduction historique<\/strong><\/h2>\n<p><strong>354._ La protection des inventions avant le Patent Act de 1790_<\/strong> Le Statute of Monopolies anglais<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"V. supra, n\u00b0307.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-7\" href=\"#footnote-279-7\" aria-label=\"Footnote 7\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[7]<\/sup><\/a> n\u2019a jamais \u00e9t\u00e9 applicable dans les colonies am\u00e9ricaines. Cependant les gouvernements locaux ont attribu\u00e9 tr\u00e8s t\u00f4t des droits commerciaux exclusifs sur certaines inventions ou importations utiles. Le premier de ces \u00ab brevets \u00bb fut accord\u00e9 en 1640 au Massachusetts, pour une dur\u00e9e de dix ans, sur un proc\u00e9d\u00e9 de production de sel. Pendant la p\u00e9riode conf\u00e9d\u00e9rale, plusieurs \u00c9tats adopteront des lois sur les brevets, sur le mod\u00e8le du Statute of Monopolies<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"La premi\u00e8re sera la Caroline du Sud en 1784.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-8\" href=\"#footnote-279-8\" aria-label=\"Footnote 8\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[8]<\/sup><\/a>. Ces lois assez sommaires pr\u00e9voyaient notamment une protection pour quatorze ans aux inventeurs de \u00ab machines utiles \u00bb.<\/p>\n<p>Pour r\u00e9pondre notamment \u00e0 des conflits relatifs aux brevets d\u00e9livr\u00e9s dans plusieurs \u00c9tats <a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Affaire des brevets concurrents sur les bateaux \u00e0 vapeur (steamboat patents), d\u00e9livr\u00e9s respectivement \u00e0 John Fitch et James Rumsey, qui se disputaient l'invention. A. Sutcliffe, Steam: The Untold Story of America's First Great Invention. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. Les deux recevront des brevets f\u00e9d\u00e9raux en 1791.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-9\" href=\"#footnote-279-9\" aria-label=\"Footnote 9\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[9]<\/sup><\/a>, la Constitution f\u00e9d\u00e9rale, adopt\u00e9e le 17 septembre 1787, transf\u00e8rera au Congr\u00e8s le pouvoir d\u2019adopter des lois en mati\u00e8re de brevet, au travers de la clause de brevet et de copyright de la Constitution (Article I, section 8 : \u00ab Le Congr\u00e8s aura le pouvoir\u2026 de favoriser le progr\u00e8s de la science et des arts utiles<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"L\u2019expression vise de mani\u00e8re g\u00e9n\u00e9rale les technologies.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-10\" href=\"#footnote-279-10\" aria-label=\"Footnote 10\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[10]<\/sup><\/a>, en assurant, pour un temps limit\u00e9, aux auteurs et inventeurs le droit exclusif sur leurs \u00e9crits et sur leurs d\u00e9couvertes respectifs \u00bb)<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"V. Tome 1, n\u00b038 et s. (cadre constitutionnel).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-11\" href=\"#footnote-279-11\" aria-label=\"Footnote 11\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[11]<\/sup><\/a>. Ce texte, qui permettra l\u2019adoption de la premi\u00e8re loi f\u00e9d\u00e9rale sur les brevets, \u00e9tablit plusieurs concepts fondamentaux dans ce domaine (\u00ab arts utiles \u00bb, \u00ab temps limit\u00e9 \u00bb, \u00ab inventeur \u00bb, \u00ab d\u00e9couvertes \u00bb) et suscitera une jurisprudence qui fa\u00e7onnera le droit des brevets aux \u00c9tats-Unis<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Ibid.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-12\" href=\"#footnote-279-12\" aria-label=\"Footnote 12\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[12]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>355._ Du Patent Act de 1790 au Patent Act de 1952_<\/strong> La premi\u00e8re loi f\u00e9d\u00e9rale sur les brevets fut adopt\u00e9e en 1790<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-13\" href=\"#footnote-279-13\" aria-label=\"Footnote 13\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[13]<\/sup><\/a>. Cette loi tr\u00e8s courte ne contenait que sept articles. Elle permettait au Secretary of State (Thomas Jefferson \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9poque), au Secretary for the department of war et \u00e0 l\u2019Attorney General of the United States (ou \u00e0 deux d\u2019entre eux), d\u2019accorder au \u00ab premier et vrai inventeur \u00bb un brevet sur \u00ab tout art utile, toute fabrication, machine ou tout appareil, ou leur am\u00e9lioration, auparavant inconnu ou non utilis\u00e9 \u00bb<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Section 1.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-14\" href=\"#footnote-279-14\" aria-label=\"Footnote 14\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[14]<\/sup><\/a>. Le texte pr\u00e9voyait n\u00e9anmoins que le brevet ne pouvait \u00eatre accord\u00e9 que si l\u2019invention \u00e9tait consid\u00e9r\u00e9e comme \u00ab suffisamment utile et importante \u00bb<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Ibid.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-15\" href=\"#footnote-279-15\" aria-label=\"Footnote 15\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[15]<\/sup><\/a>. La loi contenait donc d\u00e9j\u00e0 en germe le crit\u00e8re d\u2019activit\u00e9 inventive. On notera \u00e9galement l&rsquo;absence d&rsquo;exigence de \u00ab\u00a0mise en application\u00a0\u00bb ou d&rsquo;exploitation de l&rsquo;invention (<em>working requirements<\/em>), pr\u00e9sente dans certaines lois \u00e9trang\u00e8res. L&rsquo;id\u00e9e derri\u00e8re cette r\u00e8gle \u00e9tait d&rsquo;\u00e9viter que les brevets soient uniquement d\u00e9tenus par les entreprises d\u00e9tentrices des manufactures ou des capitaux n\u00e9cessaires. Les brevets pouvaient ainsi, d\u00e8s l&rsquo;origine, \u00eatre d\u00e9tenus par des petits inventeurs et des entit\u00e9s non exploitantes. Mais la caract\u00e9ristique sans doute la plus importante pour l&rsquo;\u00e9poque tenait aux redevances et aux formalit\u00e9s de d\u00e9p\u00f4ts. Les redevances, tout d\u2019abord, \u00e9taient fix\u00e9e d\u00e9lib\u00e9r\u00e9ment tr\u00e8s bas (3 dollars 70 cents) de mani\u00e8re \u00e0 permettre le d\u00e9p\u00f4t par des citoyens ordinaires. Cette ouverture \u00e9tait \u00e9galement assur\u00e9e par le refus d\u2019imposer une quelconque obligation d\u2019exploitation ou de fabrication au d\u00e9posant, sur le mod\u00e8le de ce qui pouvait exister \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9tranger. De m\u00eame, les formalit\u00e9s de d\u00e9p\u00f4t \u00e9taient largement simplifi\u00e9es: le d\u00e9p\u00f4t pouvait avoir lieu localement, et \u00e9tait exp\u00e9di\u00e9 aux frais de l\u2019\u00c9tat f\u00e9d\u00e9ral. Une large publicit\u00e9 \u00e9tait assur\u00e9e au travers de publications diverses.<\/p>\n<p>L&rsquo;inventeur devait fournir une description \u00e9crite de l&rsquo;invention et du mode d&rsquo;utilisation. Un m\u00e9canisme d\u2019examen des conditions de brevetabilit\u00e9 \u00e9tait pr\u00e9vu. L\u2019examen \u00e9tait \u00e0 l\u2019origine confi\u00e9 \u00e0 un comit\u00e9 compos\u00e9 du Secretary of State (Thomas Jefferson), du Secretary of War (Henry Knox) et de l\u2019 Attorney General (Edmund Randolph). Il s\u2019av\u00e8rera assez lourd \u00e0 mettre en place et \u00e0 g\u00e9rer. Seuls cinquante-sept brevets furent accord\u00e9s sous l\u2019empire du Patent Act 1790.<\/p>\n<p>La dur\u00e9e de ce brevet \u00e9tait de quatorze ans. Il conf\u00e9rait \u00e0 son titulaire \u00ab la libert\u00e9 et le droit exclusifs de fabriquer, construire, utiliser et de vendre \u00e0 des fins d\u2019utilisation, ladite invention ou d\u00e9couverte \u00bb<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Ibid.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-16\" href=\"#footnote-279-16\" aria-label=\"Footnote 16\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[16]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\n<p><strong>Patent Act of 1790, Ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109-112 (April 10, 1790)<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>Section 1<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That upon the petition of any person or persons to the Secretary of State, the Secretary for the department of war, and the \u00a0Attorney General of the United States, setting forth, that he, she, or they, hath or have invented or discovered any useful \u00a0art, manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any improvement therein not before known or used, and praying that a patent may be granted therefor, it shall and may be lawful to and for the Secretary of State, the Secretary for the \u00a0department of war, and the Attorney General, or any two of them, if they shall deem the invention or discovery \u00a0sufficiently useful and important, to cause letters patent to be made out in the name of the United States, to bear teste by the President of the United States, reciting the allegations and suggestions of the said petition, and describing the said<\/p>\n<p>invention or discovery, clearly, truly and fully, and thereupon granting to such petitioner or petitioners, his, her or their heirs, administrators or assigns for any term not exceeding fourteen years, the sole and exclusive right and liberty of \u00a0making, constructing, using and vending to others to be used, the said invention or discovery; which letters patent shall be delivered to the Attorney General of the United States to be examined, who shall, within fifteen days next after the delivery to him, if he shall find the same conformable to this act, certify it to be so at the foot thereof, and present the letters patent so certified to the President, who shall cause the seal of the United States to be thereto affixed, and the same shall be good and available to the grantee or grantees by force of this act, to all and every intent and purpose herein contained, and shall be recorded in a book to be kept for that purpose in the office of the Secretary of State, and delivered to the patentee or his agent, and the delivery thereof shall be entered on the record and endorsed on the patent by the said Secretary at the time of granting the same.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Section 2<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>And be it further enacted, That the grantee or grantees of each patent shall, at the time of granting the same, deliver to the Secretary of State a specification in writing, containing a description, accompanied with drafts or models, and explanations and models (if the nature of the invention or discovery will admit of a model) of the thing or things, by him or them invented or discovered, and described as aforesaid, in the said patents; which specification shall be so particular, and said models so exact, as not only to distinguish the invention or discovery from other things before known and used, but also to enable a workman or other person skilled in the art or manufacture, whereof it is a branch, or wherewith it may be nearest connected, to make, construct, or use the same, to the end that the public may have the full benefit thereof, after the expiration of the patent term; which specification shall be filed in the office of the said Secretary, and certified copies thereof, shall be competent evidence in all courts and before all jurisdictions, where any matter or thing, touching or concerning such patent, right, or privilege, shall come in question.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Section 3<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>And be it further enacted, That upon the application of any person to the Secretary of State, for a copy of any such specification, and for permission to have similar model or models made, it shall be the duty of the Secretary to give such copy, and to permit the person so applying for a similar model or models, to take, or make, or cause the same to be taken or made, at the expense of such applicant.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Section 4<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>And be it further enacted, That if any person or persons shall devise, make, construct, use, employ, or vend within these United States, any art, manufacture, engine, machine or device, or any invention or improvement upon, or in any art, manufacture, engine, machine or device, the sole and exclusive right of which shall be so as aforesaid granted by patent to any person or persons, by virtue and in pursuance of this act, without the consent of the patentee or patentees, their executors, administrators or assigns, first had and obtained in writing, every person so offending, shall forfeit and pay to the said patentee or patentees, his, her or their executors, administrators or assigns such damages as shall be assessed by a jury, and moreover shall forfeit to the person aggrieved, the thing or things so devised, made, constructed, used,\u00a0employed or vended, contrary to the true intent of this act, which may be recovered in an action on the case founded on this act.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Section 5<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>And be it further enacted, That upon oath or affirmation made before the judge of the district court, where the defendant resides, that any patent which shall be issued in pursuance of this act, was obtained surreptitiously by, or upon false suggestion, and motion made to the said court, within one year after issuing the said patent, but not afterwards, it shall and may be lawful to and for the judge of the said district court, if the matter alleged shall appear to him to be sufficient, to grant a rule that the patentee or patentees, his, her, or their executors, administrators or assigns, show cause why process should not issue against him, her, or them, to repeal such patents; and if sufficient cause shall not be shown to the contrary, the rule shall be made absolute, and thereupon the said judge shall order process to be issued as aforesaid, against such patentee or patentees, his, her, or their executors, administrators, or assigns. And in case no sufficient cause shall be shown to the contrary, or if it shall appear that the patentee was not the first and true inventor or discoverer, judgment shall be rendered by such court for the repeal of such patent or patents; and if the party at whose complaint the process issued, shall have judgment given against him, he shall pay all such costs as the defendant shall be put to in defending the suit, to be taxed by the court, and recovered in such manner as costs expended by defendants, shall be recovered in due course of law.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Section 6<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>And be it further enacted, That in all actions to be brought by such patentee or patentees, his, her, or their executors, administrators or assigns, for any penalty incurred by virtue of this act, the said patents or specifications shall be prima facie evidence, that the said patentee or patentees was or were the first and true inventor or inventors, discoverer or discoverers of the thing so specified, and that the same is truly specified; but that nevertheless the defendant or\u00a0defendants may plead the general issue, and give this act, and any special matter whereof notice in writing shall have been given to the plaintiff, or his attorney, thirty days before the trial, in evidence, tending to prove that the specification filed by the plaintiff does not contain the whole of the truth concerning his invention or discovery; or that it contains more than is necessary to produce the effect described; and if the concealment of part, or the addition of more than is necessary, shall appear to have been intended to mislead, or shall actually mislead the public, so as the effect described cannot be produced by the means specified, then, and in such cases, the verdict and judgment shall be for the defendant.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Section 7<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>And be it further enacted, That such patentee as aforesaid, shall, before he receives his patent, pay the following fees to the several officers employed in making out and perfecting the same, to wit: For receiving and filing the petition, fifty cents; for filing specifications, per copy-sheet containing one hundred words, ten cents; for making out patent, two dollars; for affixing great seal, one dollar; for indorsing the day of delivering the same to the patentee, including all\u00a0intermediate services, twenty cents.<\/p>\n<p>APPROVED, April 10, 1790.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p>Un nouveau Patent Act, r\u00e9dig\u00e9 par Thomas Jefferson, fut adopt\u00e9 en 1793<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Act of Febr. 21, 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318-323.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-17\" href=\"#footnote-279-17\" aria-label=\"Footnote 17\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[17]<\/sup><\/a>. La d\u00e9finition de l\u2019invention brevetable y est modifi\u00e9e et vise d\u00e9sormais \u00ab toute activit\u00e9, machine, fabrication ou composition de mati\u00e8re nouvelle et utile, ou toute am\u00e9lioration nouvelle et utile de toute activit\u00e9, machine, fabrication ou composition de mati\u00e8re, inconnue ou non utilis\u00e9e avant la demande \u00bb<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Section 1: \u00ab any new and useful art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement on any art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, not known or used before the application \u00bb.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-18\" href=\"#footnote-279-18\" aria-label=\"Footnote 18\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[18]<\/sup><\/a>. Le Secretary of State est d\u00e9sormais seul comp\u00e9tent pour d\u00e9livrer les brevets. Fait notable, la loi supprime la d\u00e9termination du caract\u00e8re \u00ab suffisamment utile et importante \u00bb de l\u2019invention. En outre, l\u2019embryon d\u2019examen institu\u00e9 par le Patent Act 1790 est supprim\u00e9. L&rsquo;appr\u00e9ciation des conditions de fond est donc laiss\u00e9e \u00e0 la seule appr\u00e9ciation des tribunaux.<\/p>\n<p>La redevance d\u00e9p\u00f4t sera augment\u00e9e \u00e0 30 dollars, somme toujours tr\u00e8s inf\u00e9rieure aux taux pratiqu\u00e9s en Angleterre. Ce taux faible sera maintenu pendant pr\u00e8s de 70 ans, favorisant les d\u00e9p\u00f4ts pendant toute la p\u00e9riode de la r\u00e9volution industrielle.<\/p>\n<p>Par ailleurs, un syst\u00e8me d\u00e9centralis\u00e9 de d\u00e9p\u00f4t sera mis en place. Les d\u00e9p\u00f4ts pouvaient avoir lieu localement (ou par la poste), les demandes \u00e9tant exp\u00e9di\u00e9es au Patent office aux frais du gouvernement f\u00e9d\u00e9ral. Ce m\u00e9canisme permettra d\u2019accro\u00eetre le nombre de d\u00e9p\u00f4ts<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"\u00ab By 1865, the U.S. per capita patenting rate was more than triple that of Britain\u2019s, according to the annual reports from the commissioners of patents in both countries, and by 1885, it was more than quadruple that of Britain. Each U.S. patentee was also far more prolific than their British counterpart, so by mid-century, the United States was patenting five times the number of inventions as Britain each year, even though the populations were then equal in size\u00a0\u00bb D. Kline, D. Kappos, Introduction to Intellectual Property, Openstax 2021 (CC BY 4.0), Patents Basics, p. 24.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-19\" href=\"#footnote-279-19\" aria-label=\"Footnote 19\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[19]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>La loi sur les brevets de 1793 conserve une d\u00e9finition large de la brevetabilit\u00e9 : un inventeur pouvait breveter \u00ab toute \u0153uvre d&rsquo;art, machine, fabrication ou composition de mati\u00e8re nouvelle et utile, ou toute am\u00e9lioration nouvelle et utile de toute \u0153uvre d&rsquo;art, machine, fabrication ou composition de mati\u00e8re, non connue ou utilis\u00e9e avant la demande \u00bb<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Patent Act of 1793, sec. 1.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-20\" href=\"#footnote-279-20\" aria-label=\"Footnote 20\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[20]<\/sup><\/a>. L&rsquo;inventeur devait fournir une description \u00e9crite de l&rsquo;invention et du mode d&rsquo;utilisation, dans des termes complets, clairs et exacts, permettant de la distinguer de l&rsquo;art ant\u00e9rieur et \u00e0 toute personne vers\u00e9e dans l&rsquo;art ou la science concern\u00e9e ou ou avec laquelle elle est le plus \u00e9troitement li\u00e9e, de la fabriquer et de l&rsquo;utiliser.<\/p>\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\n<p><strong>Patent Act of 1793, Ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318-323 (February 21, 1793) (extraits)<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>Section 1<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That when any person or persons, being a citizen or citizens of the United States, shall allege that he or they have invented any new and useful art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement on any art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, not known or used before the application, and shall present a petition to the Secretary of State, signifying a desire of obtaining an exclusive property in the same, and praying that a patent may be granted therefor, it shall and may be lawful for the said Secretary of State, to cause letters patent to be made out in the name of the United States, bearing teste by the President of the United States, reciting the allegations and suggestions of the said petition, and giving a short description of the said invention or discovery, and thereupon granting to such petitioner, or petitioners, his, her, or their heirs, administrators or assigns, for a term not exceeding fourteen years, the full and exclusive right and liberty of making, constructing, using, and vending to others to be used, the said invention or discovery, which letters patent shall be delivered to the Attorney General of the United States, to be examined; who, within fifteen days after such delivery, if he finds the same conformable to this act, shall certify accordingly, at the foot thereof, and return the same to the Secretary of State, who shall present the letters patent thus certified, to be signed, and shall cause the seal of the United States to be thereto affixed: and the same shall be good and available to the grantee or grantees, by force of this act, and shall be recorded in a book, to be kept for that purpose, in the office of the Secretary of State, and delivered to the patentee or his order.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Section 2<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Provided always, and be it further enacted, That any person, who shall have discovered an improvement in the principle of any machine, or in the process of any composition of matter, which shall have been patented, and shall have obtained a patent for such improvement, he shall not be at liberty to make, use or vend the original discovery, nor shall the first inventor be at liberty to use the improvement: And it is hereby enacted and declared, that simply changing the form or the proportions of any machine, or composition of matter, in any degree, shall not be deemed a discovery.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Section 3<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>And be it further enacted, That every inventor, before he can receive a patent, shall swear or affirm that he does verily believe, that he is the true inventor or discoverer of the art, machine, or improvement, for which he solicits a patent, which oath or affirmation may be made before any person authorized to administer oaths, and shall deliver a written description of his invention, and of the manner of using, or process of compounding the same, in such full, clear and exact terms, as to distinguish the same from all other things before known, and to enable any person skilled in the art or science, of which it is a branch, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make, compound, and use the same. And in the case of any machine, he shall fully explain the principle, and the several modes in which he has contemplated the application of that principle or character, by which it may be distinguished from other inventions; and he shall accompany the whole with drawings and written references, where the nature of the case admits of drawings, or with specimens of the ingredients, and of the composition of matter, sufficient in quantity for the purpose of experiment, where the invention is of a composition of matter; which description, signed by himself and attested by two witnesses, shall be filed in the office of the Secretary of State, and certified copies thereof shall be competent evidence, in all courts, where any matter or thing, touching such patent-right, shall come in question. And such inventor shall, moreover, deliver a model of his machine, provided, the secretary shall deem such model to be necessary.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p>L\u2019absence d\u2019examen des conditions de fond aboutira \u00e0 nombreux brevets sans valeur, et favorisera les demandes de brevet plus ou moins frauduleuses<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"V. Report Accompanying Senate Bill No. 239, S. Doc. No. 24\u2013338, at 3 (1836).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-21\" href=\"#footnote-279-21\" aria-label=\"Footnote 21\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[21]<\/sup><\/a>. En r\u00e9action, le Congr\u00e8s adoptera en 1836 une nouvelle loi<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-22\" href=\"#footnote-279-22\" aria-label=\"Footnote 22\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[22]<\/sup><\/a>, le Patent Act 1836, qui institue un Patent Office, rattach\u00e9 au D\u00e9partement d\u2019\u00c9tat<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Section 1.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-23\" href=\"#footnote-279-23\" aria-label=\"Footnote 23\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[23]<\/sup><\/a>, codifie la jurisprudence ant\u00e9rieure en renfor\u00e7ant l\u2019exigence de description et en introisant par l\u00e0-m\u00eame les revendications<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Section 6: \u00ab\u00a0before any inventor shall receive a patent for any such new invention or discovery, he shall deliver a written description of his invention or discovery, and of the manner and process of making, constructing, using, and compounding the same, in such full, clear, and exact terms, avoiding unnecessary prolixity, as to enable any person skilled in the art or science to which it appertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make, construct, compound, and use the same; and in case of any machine, he shall fully explain the principle and the several modes in which he has contemplated the application of that principle or character by which it may be distinguished from other inventions; and shall particularly specify and point out the part, improvement, or combination, which he claims as his own invention or discovery. He shall, furthermore, accompany the whole with a drawing, or drawings, and written references, where the nature of the case admits of drawings, or with specimens of ingredients, and of the composition of matter, sufficient in quantity for the purpose of experiment, where the invention or discovery is of a composition of matter\u00bb.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-24\" href=\"#footnote-279-24\" aria-label=\"Footnote 24\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[24]<\/sup><\/a>. La loi nouvelle institue \u00e9galement un examen de la condition de nouveaut\u00e9 par des examinateurs form\u00e9s aux technologies concern\u00e9es<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Section 7.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-25\" href=\"#footnote-279-25\" aria-label=\"Footnote 25\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[25]<\/sup><\/a>. Cette situation contraste fortement avec celle en vigueur en Europe \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9poque.<\/p>\n<p>La dur\u00e9e de protection est \u00e9tendue, de quatorze \u00e0 vingt et un ans. Fait remarquable cette dur\u00e9e de protection sera par la suite r\u00e9duite \u00e0 dix-sept ans.<\/p>\n<p>En 1839, une p\u00e9riode de gr\u00e2ce de deux ans fut introduite. Elle sera r\u00e9duite \u00e0 un an en 1939.<\/p>\n<p>Pendant cette p\u00e9riode, la Cour Supr\u00eame rendra plusieurs d\u00e9cisions importantes. Elle d\u00e9gagera notamment le concept d\u2019activit\u00e9 inventive en 1850 dans la d\u00e9cision <em>Hotchkiss v. Greenwood<\/em><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1850).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-26\" href=\"#footnote-279-26\" aria-label=\"Footnote 26\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[26]<\/sup><\/a>, et la doctrine des \u00e9quivalents en 1853 dans sa d\u00e9cision <em>Winans v. Denmead<\/em><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1853).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-27\" href=\"#footnote-279-27\" aria-label=\"Footnote 27\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[27]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Une nouvelle codification interviendra avec le Patent Act de 1870, sans changements notables. La Cour Supr\u00eame, dont l\u2019attitude envers le syst\u00e8me des brevets \u00e9voluera \u00e0 plusieurs reprises, introduira l\u2019exception pour usage exp\u00e9rimental<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"City of Elizabeth v. American Nicholson Pavement Co. 97 U.S. (7 Otto.) 126 (1877).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-28\" href=\"#footnote-279-28\" aria-label=\"Footnote 28\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[28]<\/sup><\/a> et la d\u00e9fense de <em>patent misuse<\/em><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Development Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931) ; Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co. 320 U.S. 661 (1944).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-29\" href=\"#footnote-279-29\" aria-label=\"Footnote 29\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[29]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Les \u00c9tats-Unis rejoindront la Convention de Paris en 1887.<\/p>\n<p>Une extension importante de la protection sera r\u00e9alis\u00e9e par le Plant Patent Act 1930, qui institue un brevet sp\u00e9cial de plante<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"V. infra, n\u00b0431.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-30\" href=\"#footnote-279-30\" aria-label=\"Footnote 30\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[30]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>356._ Le Patent Act de 1952 et l\u2019\u00e9volution ult\u00e9rieure_<\/strong> Une codification majeure du droit des brevets interviendra en 1952 avec le Patent Act 1952<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Public Law 593, July 19, 1952, 66 Stat. 792.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-31\" href=\"#footnote-279-31\" aria-label=\"Footnote 31\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[31]<\/sup><\/a>, dont les dispositions, telles que modifi\u00e9es par les textes ult\u00e9rieurs, sont toujours en vigueur. Ses articles sont codifi\u00e9s au titre 35 du Code f\u00e9d\u00e9ral. Ce texte r\u00e9unit la plus grande partie de la l\u00e9gislation en mati\u00e8re de brevets. Il est compl\u00e9t\u00e9 par le Code of Federal Regulations<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"37 C.F.R.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-32\" href=\"#footnote-279-32\" aria-label=\"Footnote 32\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[32]<\/sup><\/a> et par le Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP), qui d\u00e9taillent les r\u00e8gles applicables \u00e0 l\u2019obtention des brevets.<\/p>\n<p>Le Patent Act r\u00e9unit, dans une seule loi, les trois cat\u00e9gories de brevets institu\u00e9s par la loi f\u00e9d\u00e9rale, \u00e0 savoir les brevets d\u2019invention (<em>utility patents<\/em>), les brevets de mod\u00e8les (<em>design patents<\/em>) et les brevets de plantes (<em>plant patents<\/em>). En mati\u00e8re de brevets d\u2019invention, le Patents Act 1952 n\u2019a pas modifi\u00e9 les grands principes issus des lois pr\u00e9c\u00e9dentes : syst\u00e8me du premier inventeur, examen pr\u00e9alable des conditions de fond de la brevetabilit\u00e9, absence de publication des demandes avant d\u00e9livrance, dur\u00e9e de protection de dix-sept ans. Il a \u00e9galement codifi\u00e9 (mais dans une mesure variable) la plupart des principes d\u00e9gag\u00e9s par les tribunaux. Il institue ainsi une condition expresse d\u2019activit\u00e9 inventive, ainsi qu\u2019une d\u00e9finition de la contrefa\u00e7on. Des modifications l\u00e9gislatives interviendront dans les ann\u00e9es soixante, principalement sur des aspects de proc\u00e9dure.<\/p>\n<p>\u00c0 partir des ann\u00e9es soixante-dix, plusieurs d\u00e9cisions de la Cour supr\u00eame pr\u00e9ciseront notamment le champ de la brevetabilit\u00e9 au regard des nouvelles technologies, en mati\u00e8re de traitement de l\u2019information tout d\u2019abord<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"\u00e0 partir de Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972) (algorithmes math\u00e9matiques non brevetables).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-33\" href=\"#footnote-279-33\" aria-label=\"Footnote 33\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[33]<\/sup><\/a> puis, sous l&rsquo;impulsion de l\u2019arr\u00eat <em>Diamond v. Chakrabarty<\/em><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"447 U.S. 303 (1980).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-34\" href=\"#footnote-279-34\" aria-label=\"Footnote 34\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[34]<\/sup><\/a> dans le domaine des biotechnologies. Les modifications n\u00e9cessaires \u00e0 l\u2019application du PCT seront int\u00e9gr\u00e9es \u00e0 la loi.<\/p>\n<p>Le rythme des r\u00e9formes s\u2019acc\u00e9l\u00e8re \u00e0 partie des ann\u00e9es quatre-vingt. En 1982, une Cour d\u2019appel pour le Circuit F\u00e9d\u00e9ral, ayant comp\u00e9tence exclusive d\u2019appel sur les litiges en mati\u00e8re de brevets, sera institu\u00e9e. Elle favorisera l\u2019unification de la jurisprudence dans ce domaine.<\/p>\n<p>En 1984, des extensions \u00e0 la dur\u00e9e de protection en mati\u00e8re de m\u00e9dicaments et des r\u00e8gles propres aux actions en contrefa\u00e7on impliquant des m\u00e9dicaments g\u00e9n\u00e9riques sont institu\u00e9es par le Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, \u00e9galement appel\u00e9 Hatch-Waxman Act<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"P.L. 98-417, Title II, 98 Stat. 1585; 21 U.S.C. \u00a7 355 and 35 U.S.C. \u00a7 271(e)(1).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-35\" href=\"#footnote-279-35\" aria-label=\"Footnote 35\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[35]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>En 1988, le Congr\u00e8s adoptera le Patent Misuse Reform Act, qui restreint l\u2019application de la doctrine de <em>patent misuse<\/em> \u00e0 certaines pratiques<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"P.L. 100-73, 102 Stat. 4674. La loi ajoutant deux sous-sections \u00e0 35 U.S.C. Section 271(d).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-36\" href=\"#footnote-279-36\" aria-label=\"Footnote 36\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[36]<\/sup><\/a>, et le Process Patent Amendments Act, qui \u00e9tend le droit des titulaires de brevets de proc\u00e9d\u00e9s aux importations de produits non brevet\u00e9s fabriqu\u00e9s \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9tranger \u00e0 l\u2019aide du proc\u00e9d\u00e9 brevet\u00e9<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, P.L. 100-418, Title IX, Subtitle A, 102 Stat. 1563.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-37\" href=\"#footnote-279-37\" aria-label=\"Footnote 37\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[37]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>En 1995, et suite \u00e0 l\u2019accord ADPIC, la dur\u00e9e de protection passera de dix-sept \u00e0 vingt ans<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Uruguay Round Agreements Act (Public Law 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994)).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-38\" href=\"#footnote-279-38\" aria-label=\"Footnote 38\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[38]<\/sup><\/a>. Plusieurs dispositions de la loi f\u00e9d\u00e9rale d\u00e9favorables aux inventions r\u00e9alis\u00e9es dehors des \u00c9tats-Unis seront \u00e9galement supprim\u00e9es par la suite.<\/p>\n<p>Toujours en 1995, le Biotechnology Process Patent Act 1995 permettra, sous certaines conditions, de ne pas appliquer le crit\u00e8re d\u2019activit\u00e9 inventive \u00e0 un proc\u00e9d\u00e9 dans le domaine des biotechnologies<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"V. infra, n\u00b0384.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-39\" href=\"#footnote-279-39\" aria-label=\"Footnote 39\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[39]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>En 1999, l\u2019Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus Reform Act op\u00e9ra une r\u00e9forme majeure en instituant la publication des demandes de brevet dix-huit mois apr\u00e8s leur d\u00e9p\u00f4t<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Dispositions codifi\u00e9es au 35 U.S.C. \u00a7 122.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-40\" href=\"#footnote-279-40\" aria-label=\"Footnote 40\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[40]<\/sup><\/a>. Il met ainsi fin \u00e0 la pratique des \u00ab brevets sous-marins \u00bb (<em>submarine patents<\/em>), dont la d\u00e9livrance \u00e9tait report\u00e9e \u00e0 dessein par les demandeurs.<\/p>\n<p>La derni\u00e8re grande r\u00e9forme, sans doute la plus importante depuis le patent Act de 1952, est issue de l\u2019America Invents Act\u00a02011, qui abandonne notamment le syst\u00e8me du premier inventeur, en vigueur depuis 1790, pour la formule de l\u2019inventeur premier d\u00e9posant.<\/p>\n<p>Au cours de ces derni\u00e8res ann\u00e9es, le d\u00e9veloppement de l\u2019activit\u00e9 des \u00ab\u00a0patent trolls\u00a0\u00bb (autrement d\u00e9nomm\u00e9es <em>non-practicing entities<\/em>, <em>non-performing entities<\/em> ou <em>patent assertion entities<\/em>) a concentr\u00e9 une partie de l\u2019activit\u00e9 l\u00e9gislative<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Sur cette question, V. infra, n\u00b0422.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-41\" href=\"#footnote-279-41\" aria-label=\"Footnote 41\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[41]<\/sup><\/a>. Plusieurs propositions de lois f\u00e9d\u00e9rales destin\u00e9es \u00e0 encadrer leurs activit\u00e9s ont \u00e9t\u00e9 d\u00e9pos\u00e9s \u00e0 partir de 2014<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Ibid.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-42\" href=\"#footnote-279-42\" aria-label=\"Footnote 42\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[42]<\/sup><\/a>, et dans le m\u00eame temps plusieurs \u00c9tats f\u00e9d\u00e9r\u00e9s ont adopt\u00e9 des lois destin\u00e9es \u00e0 sanctionner les demandes et mises en demeures abusives<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"La premi\u00e8re loi de ce type a \u00e9t\u00e9 adopt\u00e9e dans l\u2019\u00c9tat du Vermont en 2013, 9 VSA \u00a7 4195. Ibid.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-43\" href=\"#footnote-279-43\" aria-label=\"Footnote 43\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[43]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<h2>2. L\u2019obtention du brevet d&rsquo;invention<\/h2>\n<p><strong>357._ Les apports de l\u2019America Invents Act _<\/strong> Comme indiqu\u00e9, le droit des brevets aux \u00c9tats-Unis a connu une r\u00e9forme tr\u00e8s importante avec America Invents Act\u00a02011, \u00e9galement appel\u00e9 Leahy\u2013Smith America Invents Act (AIA), qui consacre le passage du syst\u00e8me du premier inventeur \u00e0 celui de l\u2019inventeur premier d\u00e9posant. Cette r\u00e9forme simplifie tout un pan du droit des brevets, en entra\u00eenant la suppression des proc\u00e9dures et litiges li\u00e9s aux conflits d\u2019ant\u00e9riorit\u00e9 associ\u00e9s au syst\u00e8me du premier inventeur (notamment les proc\u00e9dures complexes dites d\u2019<em>interference<\/em> devant l\u2019USPTO). La d\u00e9finition des ant\u00e9riorit\u00e9s (qui prenait en compte la date de d\u00e9p\u00f4t, mais \u00e9galement la date de l\u2019invention) est ajust\u00e9e en fonction.<\/p>\n<p>Les dispositions de l\u2019AIA s\u2019appliquent \u00e0 compter du 17 mars 2013. Sauf indication contraire, les r\u00e8gles d\u00e9crites dans ce qui suit sont celles qui s\u2019appliquent aux d\u00e9p\u00f4ts effectu\u00e9s post\u00e9rieurement \u00e0 l\u2019entr\u00e9e en vigueur de l\u2019AIA.<\/p>\n<h3><strong>A. Les conditions de fond<\/strong><\/h3>\n<p><strong>358._ L\u2019invention brevetable_<\/strong> Aucune d\u00e9finition de l\u2019invention n\u2019est donn\u00e9e dans le Patent Act<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"\u00ab Invention \u00bb est d\u00e9finie au paragraphe 100 comme signifiant \u00ab une invention ou une d\u00e9couverte \u00bb.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-44\" href=\"#footnote-279-44\" aria-label=\"Footnote 44\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[44]<\/sup><\/a>. Cependant la loi d\u00e9finit les cat\u00e9gories d\u2019invention prot\u00e9g\u00e9es au paragraphe 101, qui dispose :<\/p>\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\n<p>\u00ab Toute personne qui invente ou d\u00e9couvre un proc\u00e9d\u00e9, une machine, une fabrication ou une composition de mati\u00e8res nouveaux et utiles, ou toute am\u00e9lioration nouvelle et utile de ces \u00e9l\u00e9ments, peut obtenir un brevet, sous r\u00e9serve des conditions et exigences du pr\u00e9sent ce titre \u00bb<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"\u00ab whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof\u2026 \u00bb.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-45\" href=\"#footnote-279-45\" aria-label=\"Footnote 45\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[45]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p>Cette disposition est interpr\u00e9t\u00e9e par les tribunaux comme imposant quatre conditions : (i) une condition d&rsquo;unicit\u00e9 du brevet (un seul brevet peut \u00eatre obtenu pour une invention);\u00a0 ii) une condition d&rsquo;identification de l&rsquo;inventeur ou des inventeurs (les inventeurs doivent \u00eatre identifi\u00e9s dans une demande d\u00e9pos\u00e9e \u00e0 compter du 16 septembre 2012, ou doivent \u00eatre le demandeur dans des demandes d\u00e9pos\u00e9es avant le 16 septembre 2012); iii) l&rsquo;inclusion dans une cat\u00e9gorie d&rsquo;invention brevetable; et iv) l&rsquo;utilit\u00e9 (invention revendiqu\u00e9e doit \u00eatre utile).<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>359._ Les cat\u00e9gories d&rsquo;inventions_ <\/strong>La section 101 d\u00e9finit quatre cat\u00e9gories d\u2019inven\u00adtions : les inventions de proc\u00e9d\u00e9s, tout d\u2019abord, et trois cat\u00e9gories d&rsquo;inventions de produits, ensuite : les machines, les produits fabriqu\u00e9s et les compositions de mati\u00e8re. La section 100(b) d\u00e9finit plus avant les proc\u00e9d\u00e9s comme: \u00ab les processus, arts et m\u00e9thodes, incluant les nouvelles utilisations d&rsquo;un proc\u00e9d\u00e9, d\u2019une machine, d\u2019une fabrication, d\u2019une composition de la mati\u00e8re, ou d\u2019un mat\u00e9riau connus \u00bb.<\/p>\n<p>Dans son arr\u00eat <em>Diamond v. Chakrabarty<\/em>, la Cour supr\u00eame a relev\u00e9 qu&rsquo; \u00ab en choisissant des termes aussi larges que \u201cfabrication\u201d et \u201ccomposition de mati\u00e8re\u201d, associ\u00e9s \u00e0 un large \u201ctout\u201d (any), le Congr\u00e8s a clairement consid\u00e9r\u00e9 que le droit des brevets doit avoir un champ large. Les travaux pr\u00e9paratoires confirment \u00e9galement une interpr\u00e9tation large \u00bb.<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) \u00e0 308-309.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-46\" href=\"#footnote-279-46\" aria-label=\"Footnote 46\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[46]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<p>A cette occasion, elle a repris \u00e0 son compte l\u2019affirmation faite lors des travaux pr\u00e9paratoires du Patent Act 1952, et d\u00e9sormais devenue c\u00e9l\u00e8bre, selon laquelle le champ de la brevetabilit\u00e9 ainsi d\u00e9fini inclut \u00ab\u00a0tout ce qui a \u00e9t\u00e9 fait par l\u2019homme\u00a0\u00bb <em>(\u00ab <\/em>anything under the sun that is made by man<em>\u00a0\u00bb)<\/em><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"\u00ab\u00a0The Committee Reports accompanying the 1952 Act inform us that Congress intended statutory subject matter to &quot;include anything under the sun that is made by man\u00a0\u00bb. S. Rep. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1952); H. R. Rep. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1952).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-47\" href=\"#footnote-279-47\" aria-label=\"Footnote 47\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[47]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Cette formule ne doit cependant pas faire oublier que la loi ne vise que certaines cat\u00e9gories d&rsquo;inventions limitativement \u00e9num\u00e9r\u00e9es, de sorte qu&rsquo;une invention non r\u00e9ductible \u00e0 l&rsquo;une d&rsquo;entre elle n&rsquo;est pas \u00e9ligible \u00e0 la protection<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007) : \u201cthe four categories together describe the exclusive reach of patentable subject matter. If a claim covers material not found in any of the four statutory categories, that claim falls outside the plainly expressed scope of \u00a7 101 even if the subject matter is otherwise new and useful&quot;.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-48\" href=\"#footnote-279-48\" aria-label=\"Footnote 48\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[48]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>La section 101 vise tout d&rsquo;abord les \u00ab\u00a0proc\u00e9d\u00e9s\u00a0\u00bb (ici synonymes de \u00ab\u00a0m\u00e9thodes\u00a0\u00bb), d\u00e9finis par la Cour supr\u00eame comme \u00ab\u00a0un mode de traitement de certains mat\u00e9riaux pour obtenir un r\u00e9sultat donn\u00e9. Il s&rsquo;agit d&rsquo;une action, ou d&rsquo;une s\u00e9rie d&rsquo;actions, ex\u00e9cut\u00e9es sur un objet afin de le transformer ou de le r\u00e9duire \u00e0 un \u00e9tat ou une chose diff\u00e9rents\u00a0\u00bb<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"&quot;a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a given result. It is an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a different state or thing.&quot; Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972) (citant Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780 (1876)). Egalement In Re Nuijten, 500 F.3d \u00e0 1355 (&quot;The Supreme Court and this court have consistently interpreted the statutory term \u2018process\u2019 to require action&quot;); NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (&quot;[A] process is a series of acts.&quot;).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-49\" href=\"#footnote-279-49\" aria-label=\"Footnote 49\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[49]<\/sup><\/a>. Suivent les \u00ab\u00a0machines\u00a0\u00bb, \u00ab\u00a0produits fabriqu\u00e9s\u00a0\u00bb (manufactures) et \u00ab\u00a0compositions de mati\u00e8re\u00a0\u00bb, qui doivent exister sous une forme tangible<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Digitech Image Techs. v. Electronics for Imaging, 758 F.3d 1344, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (&quot;For all categories except process claims, the eligible subject matter must exist in some physical or tangible form&quot;).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-50\" href=\"#footnote-279-50\" aria-label=\"Footnote 50\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[50]<\/sup><\/a>. Une machine est d\u00e9finie comme \u00ab\u00a0une chose concr\u00e8te, constitu\u00e9es de parties, ou de certains dispositifs ou combinaisons de dispositifs\u00a0\u00bb<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"&quot;a concrete thing, consisting of parts, or of certain devices and combination of devices.&quot; Digitech, 758 F.3d \u00e0 1348-49\u00a0 (citant Burr v. Duryee, 68 U.S. 531, 570, (1863).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-51\" href=\"#footnote-279-51\" aria-label=\"Footnote 51\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[51]<\/sup><\/a>, et inclut \u00ab\u00a0tout dispositif m\u00e9canique ou toute combinaison de puissances et de dispositifs m\u00e9caniques pour ex\u00e9cuter certaines fonctions et produire un certain effet ou r\u00e9sultat\u00a0\u00bb<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"&quot;every mechanical device or combination of mechanical powers and devices to perform some function and produce a certain effect or result.&quot; In Re Nuijten, pr\u00e9cit\u00e9 (citant Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267 (1854)).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-52\" href=\"#footnote-279-52\" aria-label=\"Footnote 52\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[52]<\/sup><\/a>.\u00a0 Les produits fabriqu\u00e9s d\u00e9signent \u00ab\u00a0un article tangible auquel est donn\u00e9 une nouvelle forme, qualit\u00e9, propri\u00e9t\u00e9, ou combinaison au travers de moyens humains ou artificiels\u00a0\u00bb<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"&quot;a tangible article that is given a new form, quality, property, or combination through man-made or artificial means.&quot; Digitech, pr\u00e9cit\u00e9 (citant Diamond v. Chakrabarty). Les produits fabriqu\u00e9s incluent \u00e9galement les pi\u00e8ces d'une machine prises s\u00e9par\u00e9ment de la machine: Samsung Electronics Co. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429, 120\u00a0 (2016).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-53\" href=\"#footnote-279-53\" aria-label=\"Footnote 53\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[53]<\/sup><\/a>. Une composition de mati\u00e8re est \u00ab\u00a0une combinaison de deux substances ou plus et inclut tous les articles composites\u00a0\u00bb<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"&quot;a combination of two or more substances and includes all composite articles.&quot; Digitech, pr\u00e9cit\u00e9. La cat\u00e9gorie comprend toutes les compositions de plus de deux substances, &quot;'whether they be the results of chemical union or of mechanical mixture, or whether they be gases, fluids, powders or solids.&quot; Chakrabarty, pr\u00e9cit\u00e9.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-54\" href=\"#footnote-279-54\" aria-label=\"Footnote 54\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[54]<\/sup><\/a>. <\/span><\/p>\n<p><span style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\">Ne rentrent pas dans ces cat\u00e9gories par exemple, un signal \u00e9lectrique ou \u00e9lectromagn\u00e9tique propagateur en tant que tel<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"In re Nuijten, pr\u00e9cit\u00e9.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-55\" href=\"#footnote-279-55\" aria-label=\"Footnote 55\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[55]<\/sup><\/a>, un contrat<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"In re Ferguson, 558 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (cert. denied).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-56\" href=\"#footnote-279-56\" aria-label=\"Footnote 56\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[56]<\/sup><\/a>, une soci\u00e9t\u00e9<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Ibid.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-57\" href=\"#footnote-279-57\" aria-label=\"Footnote 57\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[57]<\/sup><\/a>, un arrangement typographique<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"In re Miller, 418 F.2d 1392, 1396 (CCPA 1969).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-58\" href=\"#footnote-279-58\" aria-label=\"Footnote 58\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[58]<\/sup><\/a>, un logiciel exprim\u00e9 sous forme de code ou d&rsquo;instructions d\u00e9tach\u00e9es de tout support<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"assimilable \u00e0 une id\u00e9e sans incarnation physique, V. Microsoft Corp. v. AT&amp;T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 449;\u00a0 \u00e9galement Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 67 (une id\u00e9e n'est pas brevetable).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-59\" href=\"#footnote-279-59\" aria-label=\"Footnote 59\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[59]<\/sup><\/a>, ou encore des donn\u00e9es en tant que telles<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Digitech, pr\u00e9cit\u00e9.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-60\" href=\"#footnote-279-60\" aria-label=\"Footnote 60\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[60]<\/sup><\/a>. La Cour Supr\u00eame a \u00e9galement confirm\u00e9 que le langage de la section 101 ne permet pas de couvrir notamment les lois de la nature, les ph\u00e9nom\u00e8nes physiques et les id\u00e9es abstraites<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"V. infra, n\u00b0364.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-61\" href=\"#footnote-279-61\" aria-label=\"Footnote 61\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[61]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n<p>Pr\u00e9cisons que la loi n\u2019exige pas que le d\u00e9posant identifie une de ces cat\u00e9gories dans sa demande, ou la bonne cat\u00e9gorie, si l\u2019invention revendiqu\u00e9e rel\u00e8ve clairement de l\u2019une d\u2019entre elles. Par ailleurs, une invention peut relever de plusieurs cat\u00e9gories.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>360._ La distinction inventions \/ d\u00e9couvertes_<\/strong> Aux \u00c9tats-Unis comme ailleurs, les d\u00e9couvertes en tant que telles ne sont pas brevetables. Ce principe a \u00e9t\u00e9 r\u00e9affirm\u00e9 \u00e0 plusieurs reprises par la Cour supr\u00eame<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"V. notamment l\u2019arr\u00eat Chakrabarty: \u00ab\u00a0a new mineral discovered in the earth or a new plant found in the wild is not patentable subject matter. Likewise, Einstein could not patent his celebrated law that E=mc2; nor could Newton have patented the law of gravity.\u00a0\u00bb (447 U.S. \u00e0 309, 206 USPQ, point 197); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978) \u00e0 585 (formule math\u00e9matique, m\u00eame nouvelle et utile); O\u2019Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 113-114 (1853) (citant l\u2019\u00e9lectromagn\u00e9tisme ou la puissance vapeur); Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948) (citant les qualit\u00e9s d\u2019une bact\u00e9rie, la chaleur du soleil, l\u2019\u00e9lectricit\u00e9 ou les propri\u00e9t\u00e9s de m\u00e9taux).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-62\" href=\"#footnote-279-62\" aria-label=\"Footnote 62\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[62]<\/sup><\/a>. Cependant, il est constant qu\u2019un produit de la nature, modifi\u00e9 par l\u2019intervention humaine, et d\u00e8s lors inexistant sous cette forme \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9tat de nature, constitue une invention. La Cour supr\u00eame l\u2019a confirm\u00e9 dans son arr\u00eat <em>Chakrabarty<\/em> pr\u00e9cit\u00e9, en s&rsquo;appuyant notamment les travaux pr\u00e9paratoires du Plant Patent Act de 1930 :<\/p>\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\n<p>\u00ab le Congr\u00e8s a reconnu que la distinction pertinente n\u2019est pas entre les choses vivantes et inanim\u00e9es, mais entre les produits de la nature, qu\u2019ils soient ou non vivants, et les inventions de l\u2019homme. Dans le cas pr\u00e9sent, le microorganisme du d\u00e9fendeur est le r\u00e9sultat de l\u2019ing\u00e9niosit\u00e9 et de la recherche humaines \u00bb.<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303: &quot;In enacting the Plant Patent Act, Congress addressed both of these concerns. It explained at length its belief that the work of the plant breeder &quot;in aid of nature&quot; was patentable invention. S.Rep. No. 315, 71st Cong., 2d Sess., 8 (1930); H.R.Rep. No. 1129, 71st Cong., 2d Sess., 7-9 (1930). And it relaxed the written description requirement in favor of &quot;a description . . . as complete as is reasonably possible.&quot; 35 U.S.C. \u00a7 162. No Committee or Member of Congress, however, expressed the broader view, now urged by the petitioner, that the terms &quot;manufacture&quot; or &quot;composition of matter&quot; exclude living things. The sole support for that position in the legislative history of the 1930 Act is found in the conclusory statement of Secretary of Agriculture Hyde, in a letter to the Chairmen of the House and Senate Committees considering the 1930 Act, that &quot;the patent laws . . . at the present time are understood to cover only inventions or discoveries in the field of inanimate nature.&quot; See S.Rep. No. 315, supra at Appendix A; H.R.Rep. No. 1129, supra at Appendix A. Secretary Hyde's opinion, however, is not entitled to controlling weight. His views were solicited on the administration of the new law. and not on the scope of patentable subject matter -- an area beyond his competence. Moreover, there is language in the House and Senate Committee Reports suggesting that, to the extent Congress considered the matter, it found the Secretary's dichotomy unpersuasive. The Reports observe: &quot;There is a clear and logical distinction between the discovery of a new variety of plant and of certain inanimate things, such, for example, as a new and useful natural mineral. The mineral is created wholly by nature unassisted by man. . . . On the other hand, a plant discovery resulting from cultivation is unique, isolated, and is not repeated by nature, nor can it be reproduced by nature unaided by man. . . .&quot;\u00a0 S.Rep. No. 315, supra at 6; H.R.Rep. No. 1129, supra at 7 (emphasis added). Congress thus recognized that the relevant distinction was not between living and inanimate things, but between products of nature, whether living or not, and human-made inventions. Here, respondent's micro-organism is the result of human ingenuity and research. Hence, the passage of the Plant Patent Act affords the Government no support&quot;.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-63\" href=\"#footnote-279-63\" aria-label=\"Footnote 63\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[63]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p>Dans <em>In re Roslin Institute (Edinburgh)<\/em><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"In re Roslin Institute (Edinburgh), 750 F.3d 1333, 1336, 110 USPQ2d 1668, 1671 (Fed. Cir. 2014).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-64\" href=\"#footnote-279-64\" aria-label=\"Footnote 64\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[64]<\/sup><\/a>, la Cour d\u2019appel pour le Circuit F\u00e9d\u00e9ral, citant <em>Chakrabarty<\/em>, a pr\u00e9cis\u00e9 que \u00ab des d\u00e9couvertes qui poss\u00e8dent des caract\u00e9ristiques fortement diff\u00e9rentes de celles trouv\u00e9es dans la nature (\u2026) sont \u00e9ligibles \u00e0 la protection par brevet \u00bb. En l\u2019esp\u00e8ce, l\u2019invention consistait dans le clone d\u2019un mammif\u00e8re pr\u00e9existant s\u00e9lectionn\u00e9 consistant dans du b\u00e9tail, des moutons, des cochons et des ch\u00e8vres. L\u2019invention incluait la fameuse brebis Dolly. La Cour a rejet\u00e9 le demande au motif que \u00ab Dolly elle-m\u00eame est une r\u00e9plique g\u00e9n\u00e9tique exacte d\u2019un autre mouton et ne poss\u00e8de pas des caract\u00e9ristiques nettement diff\u00e9rentes de tout animal pr\u00e9sent dans la nature \u00bb.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>361._ La quasi-absence d\u2019exclusions expresses du champ de la brevetabilit\u00e9<\/strong>_ Le Patent Act contient deux exclusions expresses du champ de la brevetabilit\u00e9. La premi\u00e8re concerne les inventions applicables exclusivement \u00e0 des armes nucl\u00e9aires<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2181(a) \u00ab\u00a0No patent shall hereafter be granted for any invention or discovery which is useful solely in the utilization of special nuclear material or atomic energy in an atomic weapon. Any patent granted for any such invention or discovery is revoked, and just compensation shall be made therefor.\u00a0\u00bb Les termes &quot;atomic energy&quot; et &quot;special nuclear material&quot; sont d\u00e9finis \u00e0 la section 11 de cette loi (42 U.S.C. 2014).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-65\" href=\"#footnote-279-65\" aria-label=\"Footnote 65\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[65]<\/sup><\/a>. La seconde, introduite par le Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA)<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Public Law 112-29.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-66\" href=\"#footnote-279-66\" aria-label=\"Footnote 66\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[66]<\/sup><\/a>, les organismes humains.<\/p>\n<p>Au-del\u00e0 de ces exceptions, la loi ne contient pas d\u2019exclusions similaires \u00e0 celles pr\u00e9vues par la Convention de Munich, ni m\u00eame une disposition excluant de mani\u00e8re g\u00e9n\u00e9rale les inventions contraires \u00e0 l\u2019ordre public.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>362._ L&rsquo;exclusion l\u00e9gale concernant les organismes humains_<\/strong>\u00a0<span style=\"font-size: 1em;\">\u00a0La section 33(a) de l\u2019AIA dispose\u00a0: \u00a0\u00a0\u00ab\u00a0Nonobstant toute autre disposition de la loi, aucun brevet ne peut \u00eatre d\u00e9livr\u00e9 sur la base d\u2019une revendication portant sur un organisme humain ou englobant un tel organisme \u00bb<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"\u00ab\u00a0Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no patent may issue on a claim directed to or encompassing a human organism\u00a0\u00bb.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-67\" href=\"#footnote-279-67\" aria-label=\"Footnote 67\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[67]<\/sup><\/a>. <\/span><span style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\">Cette exclusion codifie en r\u00e9alit\u00e9 l\u2019exclusion d\u00e9gag\u00e9e spontan\u00e9ment (c\u2019est-\u00e0-dire en dehors de toute tentative d\u2019obtenir un brevet sur ce point) par l\u2019USPTO et les tribunaux<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"V. Animals Patentability, 1077 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 24 (April 21, 1987), qui indiquait d\u00e9j\u00e0 l'impossibilit\u00e9 de breveter des organismes humains. Selon le MPEP, section 2105: Patent Eligible Subject Matter \u2014 Living Subject Matter [R-10.2019]:\u201cIf the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claimed invention as a whole encompasses a human organism, then a rejection under 35 U.S.C. 101 and AIA sec. 33(a) must be made indicating that the claimed invention is directed to a human organism and is therefore nonstatutory subject matter. Furthermore, the claimed invention must be examined with regard to all issues pertinent to patentability, and any applicable rejections under 35 U.S.C. 102, 103, or 112 must also be made\u201d.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-68\" href=\"#footnote-279-68\" aria-label=\"Footnote 68\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[68]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>363._ L&rsquo;ordre public et les bonnes moeurs_ <\/strong>L\u2019ordre public, incluant le caract\u00e8re immoral ou illicite de l\u2019invention, n\u2019est pas un motif d\u2019exclusion du domaine de la brevetabilit\u00e9. Le principe a \u00e9t\u00e9 r\u00e9affirm\u00e9 par le Circuit f\u00e9d\u00e9ral en 1999 dans une affaire mettant en cause une invention susceptible de tromper le consommateur<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 1999): &quot;The invention claimed in the '405 patent is a post-mix beverage dispenser that is designed to look like a pre-mix beverage dispenser. The claims require the post-mix dispenser to have a transparent bowl that is filled with a fluid that simulates the appearance of the dispensed beverage and is resistant to bacterial growth. The claims also require that the dispenser create the visual impression that the bowl is the principal source of the dispensed beverage, although in fact the beverage is mixed immediately before it is dispensed, as in conventional post-mix dispensers.. The district court in this case held a patent invalid for lack of utility on the ground that the patented invention was designed to deceive customers by imitating another product and thereby increasing sales of a particular good. We reverse and remand. (...) Of course, Congress is free to declare particular types of inventions unpatentable for a variety of reasons, including deceptiveness. Cf. 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2181(a) (exempting from patent protection inventions useful solely in connection with special nuclear material or atomic weapons). Until such time as Congress does so, however, we find no basis in section 101 to hold that inventions can be ruled unpatentable for lack of utility simply because they have the capacity to fool some members of the public.&quot; Le MPEP n\u2019aborde pas la question de la lic\u00e9it\u00e9 des inventions ou de leur application.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-69\" href=\"#footnote-279-69\" aria-label=\"Footnote 69\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[69]<\/sup><\/a>. Le consensus semble \u00eatre que, dans la mesure o\u00f9, aux termes du Patent Act (35 U.S.C. \u00a7 154(a)(1)), le droit de brevet est un droit d\u2019exclusion, il n\u2019autorise aucune activit\u00e9 contraire \u00e0 la loi. Il reste \u00e0 d\u00e9terminer si, dans des cas extr\u00eames, une exception d&rsquo;ordre public ne pourrait pas s&rsquo;appliquer.<\/p>\n<p>On notera que l\u2019USPTO accorde des brevets sur des inventions relatives au cannabis ou \u00e0 d\u2019autres produits stup\u00e9fiants, y compris lorsqu\u2019ils sont totalement illicites dans certains \u00c9tats.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>364._ Les cat\u00e9gories exclues par la jurisprudence : lois de la nature, ph\u00e9nom\u00e8nes naturels, id\u00e9es abstraites_<\/strong> Comme indiqu\u00e9, la jurisprudence exclut du champ de la brevetabilit\u00e9 les id\u00e9es abstraites (et notamment les formules et algorithmes math\u00e9matiques), les ph\u00e9nom\u00e8nes naturels et les lois de la nature<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981) \u00e0 185; Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980), \u00e0 309; Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589, 198 USPQ 193, 197 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972), \u00e0 67-68; Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948) \u00e0 130; Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156 (1852), \u00e0 175.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-70\" href=\"#footnote-279-70\" aria-label=\"Footnote 70\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[70]<\/sup><\/a>. De m\u00eame, les proc\u00e9d\u00e9s impliquant des \u00e9tapes de raisonnement (<em>mental steps<\/em>) ne peuvent \u00eatre brevet\u00e9s si ces \u00e9tapes exigent un jugement de nature esth\u00e9tique ou pr\u00e9sentant un caract\u00e8re subjectif<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882 (CCPA 1970) (les proc\u00e9d\u00e9s impliquant des mental steps ne sont pas en eux-m\u00eames exclus de la brevetabilit\u00e9); mais dans un sens beaucoup plus restrictif, voir In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (exclusion d\u2019une m\u00e9thode d\u2019arbitrage\u00a0: \u00abmental processes \u2013 or processes of human thinking \u2013 standing alone are not patentable even if they have pratical application\u00a0\u00bb).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-71\" href=\"#footnote-279-71\" aria-label=\"Footnote 71\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[71]<\/sup><\/a>. Cependant, aux \u00c9tats-Unis comme ailleurs, les m\u00e9thodes et produits utilisant des id\u00e9es abstraites, ph\u00e9nom\u00e8nes naturels et des lois de la nature \u00e0 des fins d\u2019application pratique peuvent \u00eatre brevet\u00e9s s\u2019ils satisfont par ailleurs aux crit\u00e8res de la brevetabilit\u00e9.<\/p>\n<p>La Cour Supr\u00eame est largement revenue sur ces points dans ses arr\u00eats Mayo<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-72\" href=\"#footnote-279-72\" aria-label=\"Footnote 72\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[72]<\/sup><\/a> et Alice<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, 573 U.S. 208 (2014).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-73\" href=\"#footnote-279-73\" aria-label=\"Footnote 73\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[73]<\/sup><\/a>, r\u00e9guli\u00e8rement cit\u00e9s sur le sujet, et dont il sera question plus loin. Le premier concernait l&rsquo;exclusion des lois ou produits de la nature, \u00e0 propos d&rsquo;une invention dans le domaine m\u00e9docal<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Plus pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment, une m\u00e9thode permettant d'optimiser le traitement de patients atteints de maladies auto-immunes en d\u00e9terminant si une dose de m\u00e9dicaments \u00e0 base de thiopurine est trop faible ou trop \u00e9lev\u00e9e, en s'appuyant sur la corr\u00e9lation des m\u00e9tabolites du m\u00e9dicament dans le corps pour d\u00e9terminer l'efficacit\u00e9 ou la toxicit\u00e9 du m\u00e9dicament. La Cour supr\u00eame avait consid\u00e9r\u00e9 que la m\u00e9thode revendiqu\u00e9e ne faisait que r\u00e9citer une loi de la nature.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-74\" href=\"#footnote-279-74\" aria-label=\"Footnote 74\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[74]<\/sup><\/a><span style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\">; le second l&rsquo;exclusion des id\u00e9es abstraites, \u00e0 propos d&rsquo;une invention mise en \u0153uvre par ordinateur<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"En l'esp\u00e8ce, une m\u00e9thode mise en \u0153uvre par ordinateur pour att\u00e9nuer le \u00ab risque de r\u00e8glement \u00bb (risque qu'une seule partie \u00e0 une transaction financi\u00e8re paie ce qu'elle doit) en utilisant un interm\u00e9diaire tiers.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-75\" href=\"#footnote-279-75\" aria-label=\"Footnote 75\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[75]<\/sup><\/a><span style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\">. La Cour supr\u00eame y pose comme principe que les tribunaux doivent, dans l\u2019appr\u00e9ciation du caract\u00e8re brevetable de l\u2019invention, appliquer une analyse en deux \u00e9tapes, consistant: (a) tout d&rsquo;abord, \u00e0 d\u00e9terminer si les revendications portent sur une loi de la nature, un ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne naturel ou une id\u00e9e abstraite (exception pr\u00e9torienne, \u00ab <em>judicial exception<\/em> \u00bb), et (b) dans ce cas, \u00e0 d\u00e9terminer si les revendications comprennent un concept inventif, c\u2019est-\u00e0-dire des \u00e9l\u00e9ments allant suffisamment au-del\u00e0 de l\u2019exception pr\u00e9torienne.<\/span><\/p>\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\n<p style=\"text-align: center;\"><strong>Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, 573 U.S. 208 (2014) (r\u00e9f. omises).<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>\u201cDans Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., nous avons \u00e9tabli un cadre permettant de distinguer les brevets qui revendiquent des lois de la nature, des ph\u00e9nom\u00e8nes naturels et des id\u00e9es abstraites de ceux qui revendiquent des applications de ces concepts.<\/p>\n<p>Premi\u00e8rement, nous d\u00e9terminons si les revendications en cause se rapportent \u00e0 l&rsquo;un de ces concepts non brevetables. Si c&rsquo;est le cas, nous nous demandons alors : \u00ab Qu&rsquo;y a-t-il d&rsquo;autre dans les revendications dont nous sommes saisis ? \u00bb\u00a0 Pour r\u00e9pondre \u00e0 cette question, nous examinons les \u00e9l\u00e9ments de chaque revendication \u00e0 la fois individuellement et \u00ab en tant que combinaison ordonn\u00e9e \u00bb afin de d\u00e9terminer si les \u00e9l\u00e9ments suppl\u00e9mentaires \u00ab transforment la nature de la revendication \u00bb en une demande brevetable.<\/p>\n<p>Nous avons d\u00e9crit la deuxi\u00e8me \u00e9tape de cette analyse comme \u00e9tant la recherche d&rsquo;un \u00ab \u00ab concept inventif \u00bb \u00bb, c&rsquo;est-\u00e0-dire d&rsquo;un \u00e9l\u00e9ment ou d&rsquo;une combinaison d&rsquo;\u00e9l\u00e9ments qui est \u00ab suffisant pour garantir que le brevet \u00e9quivaut en pratique \u00e0 beaucoup plus qu&rsquo;un brevet sur le [concept non brevetable] lui-m\u00eame \u00bb<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"&quot;In Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U. S. ___ (2012), we set forth a framework for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts. First, we determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 8). If so, we then ask, \u201c[w]hat else is there in the claims before us?\u201d Id., at ___ (slip op., at 9). To answer that question, we consider the elements of each claim both individually and \u201cas an ordered combination\u201d to determine whether the additional elements \u201ctransform the nature of the claim\u201d into a patent-eligible application. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 10, 9). We have described step two of this analysis as a search for an \u201c \u2018inventive concept\u2019 \u201d\u2014i.e., an element or combination of elements that is \u201csufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.\u201d Id., at ___ (slip op., at 3)&quot;. Alice, 573 U.S., para. 217-18.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-76\" href=\"#footnote-279-76\" aria-label=\"Footnote 76\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[76]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>365._ Les guides et exemples de l\u2019USPTO sur les inventions brevetables_<\/strong> L&rsquo;USPTO a publi\u00e9 plusieurs guides sur la brevetabilit\u00e9, de port\u00e9e g\u00e9n\u00e9rale ou consacr\u00e9s \u00e0 certaines cat\u00e9gories d&rsquo;inventions<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Le dernier en date est le 2024 Guidance Update on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility, Including on Artificial Intelligence. On soulignera que ces guides, comme le MPEP, ne lient pas le Circuit f\u00e9d\u00e9ral. In re Rudy, 956 F.3d 1379, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2020); Cleveland Clinic Found. v. True Health Diagnostics LLC, 760 F. App\u2019x. 1013, 1020 (Fed. Cir. 2019)).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-77\" href=\"#footnote-279-77\" aria-label=\"Footnote 77\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[77]<\/sup><\/a>. Ces guides ont \u00e9t\u00e9 incorpor\u00e9s dans le MPEP<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"\u00a7 2103-2106.07(c).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-78\" href=\"#footnote-279-78\" aria-label=\"Footnote 78\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[78]<\/sup><\/a>, qui combine les indications et crit\u00e8res d\u00e9gag\u00e9s par la Cour supr\u00eame dans la d\u00e9termination de la brevetabilit\u00e9 dans deux sch\u00e9mas, applicables \u00e0 toutes les cat\u00e9gories d&rsquo;invention brevetables et \u00e0 toutes les exclusions de la brevetabilit\u00e9. Ces sch\u00e9mas repr\u00e9sentent les 2 \u00e9tapes du raisonnement applicable.<\/p>\n<p><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"size-full wp-image-292 aligncenter\" src=\"https:\/\/www.droitangloamericaindespi.com\/brevets\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/3\/2024\/10\/Image1.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"645\" height=\"930\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.droitangloamericaindespi.com\/brevets\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/3\/2024\/10\/Image1.jpg 645w, https:\/\/www.droitangloamericaindespi.com\/brevets\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/3\/2024\/10\/Image1-208x300.jpg 208w, https:\/\/www.droitangloamericaindespi.com\/brevets\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/3\/2024\/10\/Image1-65x94.jpg 65w, https:\/\/www.droitangloamericaindespi.com\/brevets\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/3\/2024\/10\/Image1-225x324.jpg 225w, https:\/\/www.droitangloamericaindespi.com\/brevets\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/3\/2024\/10\/Image1-350x505.jpg 350w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 645px) 100vw, 645px\" \/><\/p>\n<p>La premi\u00e8re \u00e9tape concerne la d\u00e9termination de l&rsquo;appartenance \u00e0 l&rsquo;une des quatre cat\u00e9gories vis\u00e9es \u00e0 la section 101 du Patent Act. L&rsquo;\u00e9tape 2 reprend l&rsquo;analyse en deux temps de la Cour supr\u00eame (\u00ab\u00a0<em>Alice\/Mayo\u00a0\u00bb<\/em>), permettant d&rsquo;identifier les revendications couvertes par une exclusion de la brevetabilit\u00e9, puis d&rsquo;\u00e9valuer si des \u00e9l\u00e9ments suppl\u00e9mentaires dans la revendication rel\u00e8vent d&rsquo;un concept inventif.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"size-full wp-image-285 aligncenter\" src=\"https:\/\/www.droitangloamericaindespi.com\/brevets\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/3\/2024\/10\/Image2.png\" alt=\"\" width=\"577\" height=\"446\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.droitangloamericaindespi.com\/brevets\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/3\/2024\/10\/Image2.png 577w, https:\/\/www.droitangloamericaindespi.com\/brevets\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/3\/2024\/10\/Image2-300x232.png 300w, https:\/\/www.droitangloamericaindespi.com\/brevets\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/3\/2024\/10\/Image2-65x50.png 65w, https:\/\/www.droitangloamericaindespi.com\/brevets\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/3\/2024\/10\/Image2-225x174.png 225w, https:\/\/www.droitangloamericaindespi.com\/brevets\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/3\/2024\/10\/Image2-350x271.png 350w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 577px) 100vw, 577px\" \/><\/p>\n<p>L&rsquo;USPTO a \u00e9galement publi\u00e9 plusieurs guides contenant des exemples d&rsquo;application de ces principes, con\u00e7u comme des outils de formation destin\u00e9s aux examinateurs et au public<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Site USPTO: Subject matter eligibility.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-79\" href=\"#footnote-279-79\" aria-label=\"Footnote 79\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[79]<\/sup><\/a>. Ces guides portent actuellement sur 49 exemples d&rsquo;inventions, qui couvrent un spectre tr\u00e8s large, r\u00e9cemment \u00e9largi aux inventions dans le domaine de l&rsquo;intelligence artificielle (exemples 47 \u00e0 49)<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"La liste comprend: Removing Malicious Code from Email; Generating a Composite Webpage; Digital Image Processing (RCT); Global Positioning System; Digital Image Processing (Digitech); Game of Bingo; E-Commerce transactions; Distribution of Products over the Internet; Gunpowder &amp; Fireworks; Pomelo Juice; Amazonic Acid Purified Proteins; Genetically Modified Bacterium; Bacterial Mixtures; Nucleic Acids Antibodies; Cells; Food; Hip Prosthesis; Robotic Arm Assembly; Transmission of Stock Quote Data; GUI for Meal Planning; GUI for Relocating Obscured Text; Updating Alarm Limits; Rubber Manufacturing; Internal Combustion Engine; BIOS System Software; Vaccines; Diagnosing and Treating Julitis; Dietary Sweeteners; Screening of Gene Alterations; Paper-making Machine; Hydrolysis of Fat; Filtering Internet Content; ATM Transactions; Tracking Inventory; Relocation of Icons on GUI; Simulating an Analog Audio Mixer; Facial Recognition; Network Traffic Monitoring; Cryptographic Communications; Medical Record Updates; Treating Kidney Disease; Denveric Acid; Controller for Injection Mold; Livestock Management; Training a Neural Network to Predict Anomalies; Speech Separation; Fibrosis Treatment.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-80\" href=\"#footnote-279-80\" aria-label=\"Footnote 80\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[80]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>366._Le vivant et les biotechnologies_<\/strong> Le Patent Act ne connait aucune exclusion relative \u00e0 la brevetabilit\u00e9 du vivant, \u00e0 l\u2019exception notable de celle introduite par le Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA) concernant les organismes humains<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"V. supra, n\u00b0361.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-81\" href=\"#footnote-279-81\" aria-label=\"Footnote 81\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[81]<\/sup><\/a>. Il ne connait pas non plus d\u2019exclusions en mati\u00e8re de biotechnologie. Les seules limites en la mati\u00e8re sont li\u00e9es \u00e0 l\u2019exclusion des d\u00e9couvertes et aux crit\u00e8res de brevetabilit\u00e9.<\/p>\n<p>La Cour supr\u00eame a consacr\u00e9 ces principes en 1980 dans sa d\u00e9cision <em>Chakrabarty <\/em>pr\u00e9cit\u00e9e<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"447 U.S. 303 (1980).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-82\" href=\"#footnote-279-82\" aria-label=\"Footnote 82\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[82]<\/sup><\/a>, \u00e0 propos d\u2019une invention consistant dans un proc\u00e9d\u00e9 permettant de transf\u00e9rer certains plasmides dans une bact\u00e9rie lui permettant d\u00e9grader le p\u00e9trole. Le Patent office avait accept\u00e9 la demande de brevet de proc\u00e9d\u00e9s<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Des brevets avaient d\u00e9j\u00e0 \u00e9t\u00e9 accord\u00e9s pour des proc\u00e9d\u00e9s utilisant de la mati\u00e8re vivante. V. par exemple In re Mancy, 499 F.2d 1289 (CCPA 1974).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-83\" href=\"#footnote-279-83\" aria-label=\"Footnote 83\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[83]<\/sup><\/a> mais avait rejet\u00e9 la demande portant sur la bact\u00e9rie ainsi modifi\u00e9e. La Cour supr\u00eame confirme que la bact\u00e9rie ne constitue pas une d\u00e9couverte, mais bien une invention de l\u2019homme, et que la loi ne pr\u00e9voit aucune exclusion pour la mati\u00e8re vivante. L\u2019argument tir\u00e9 de la protection sp\u00e9cifique et pr\u00e9tendument exclusive du vivant par le <em>plant patent<\/em> est \u00e9galement rejet\u00e9.<\/p>\n<p>En avril 1987, dans l\u2019affaire <em>Ex parte Allen<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Ex Parte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1425 (BPAI 1987), aff\u2019d, 846 F.2d 877 (Fed. Cir. 1988).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-84\" href=\"#footnote-279-84\" aria-label=\"Footnote 84\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[84]<\/sup><\/a><\/em>, le Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences confirmera la possibilit\u00e9 de breveter des animaux non humains multicellulaires<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"L\u2019affaire portait sur une huitre g\u00e9n\u00e9tiquement modif\u00e9e. Le brevet sera refus\u00e9 pour d\u00e9faut d\u2019activit\u00e9 inventive.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-85\" href=\"#footnote-279-85\" aria-label=\"Footnote 85\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[85]<\/sup><\/a>. Quelques jours apr\u00e8s cette d\u00e9cision, le Patent Office annon\u00e7ait qu\u2019il accepterait d\u00e9sormais les demandes de brevet portant sur \u00ab des organismes vivants non humains multicellulaires obtenus par voie non naturelle, y compris des animaux \u00bb<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Policy announcement par Donald J. Quigg, Assistant Secretary and Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks (7 avril 1987), 69 J. Pat. &amp; Trademark Off. Soc'Y 328 (1987). L\u2019annonce intervenait quatre jours apr\u00e8s la d\u00e9cision du Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences dans Ex parte Allen, ci-dessus.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-86\" href=\"#footnote-279-86\" aria-label=\"Footnote 86\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[86]<\/sup><\/a>. Le premier brevet concernant un animal multicellulaire, la souris g\u00e9n\u00e9tiquement modifi\u00e9e Oncomouse, fut accord\u00e9 en avril 1988. En 2001, dans l\u2019affaire <em>J.E.M. Ag Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int\u2019l<\/em><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int\u2019l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124 (2001).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-87\" href=\"#footnote-279-87\" aria-label=\"Footnote 87\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[87]<\/sup><\/a>, la Cour supr\u00eame confirmera qu\u2019une plante g\u00e9n\u00e9tiquement modifi\u00e9e peut faire l\u2019objet \u00e0 la fois d\u2019un brevet d\u2019utilit\u00e9 et d\u2019un brevet de plante<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"V. infra, n\u00b0430 et 431.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-88\" href=\"#footnote-279-88\" aria-label=\"Footnote 88\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[88]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>La question de la brevetabilit\u00e9 de s\u00e9quences de g\u00e8nes a \u00e9t\u00e9 abord\u00e9e par la Cour supr\u00eame dans l&rsquo;affaire Myriad<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (2013).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-89\" href=\"#footnote-279-89\" aria-label=\"Footnote 89\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[89]<\/sup><\/a>. Cette affaire, qui a connu des d\u00e9veloppements en Europe, concernait des brevets relatifs aux g\u00e8nes BRCA-1 et BRCA-2 associ\u00e9s au cancer du sein et de l&rsquo;ovaire, que la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 <em>Myriad Genetics Inc.<\/em> a \u00e9t\u00e9 la premi\u00e8re \u00e0 s\u00e9quencer avec l&rsquo;universit\u00e9 de l&rsquo;Utah. Les revendications concern\u00e9es portaient\u00a0 sur les g\u00e8nes, simplement isol\u00e9s, puis modifi\u00e9s, et sur des m\u00e9thodes de diagnostic pour la pr\u00e9disposition aux cancers pr\u00e9cit\u00e9s. Les brevets avaient \u00e9t\u00e9 invalid\u00e9s par la Cour de district du district sud de New York<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Association for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, No. 09-cv-4515, 94 USPQ2d 1683 (S.D.N.Y. March 29, 2010).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-90\" href=\"#footnote-279-90\" aria-label=\"Footnote 90\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[90]<\/sup><\/a>. Sur appel, la Cour d&rsquo;appel pour le Circuit F\u00e9d\u00e9ral<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Ass\u2019n for Molecular Pathology v. US Patent &amp; Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Myriad Genetics I).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-91\" href=\"#footnote-279-91\" aria-label=\"Footnote 91\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[91]<\/sup><\/a> avait notamment consid\u00e9r\u00e9 que les g\u00e8nes isol\u00e9s et synth\u00e9tiques constituaient des compositions de mati\u00e8re brevetables d\u00e9riv\u00e9es de produits de la nature.\u00a0<\/span>Sur recours, la Cour Supr\u00eame avait tout d&rsquo;abord renvoy\u00e9 \u00e0 la m\u00eame Cour d&rsquo;appel pour r\u00e9examen \u00e0 la lumi\u00e8re de l&rsquo;arr\u00eat Mayo, rendu entretemps<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"V. supra, n\u00b0364.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-92\" href=\"#footnote-279-92\" aria-label=\"Footnote 92\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[92]<\/sup><\/a>. Le circuit f\u00e9d\u00e9ral avait alors rendu une d\u00e9cision dans le m\u00eame sens<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Ass\u2019n for Molecular Pathology v. US Patent &amp; Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Myriad Genetics II).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-93\" href=\"#footnote-279-93\" aria-label=\"Footnote 93\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[93]<\/sup><\/a>, en jugeant que les mol\u00e9cules d\u2019ADN isol\u00e9es, par l&rsquo;effet de l&rsquo;isolement\/extraction de leur environnement g\u00e9nomique, pr\u00e9sentent des structures chimiques manifestement diff\u00e9rentes de l&rsquo;ADN naturel et qu\u2019elles sont d\u00e8s lors brevetables, m\u00eame si elles poss\u00e8dent les m\u00eames s\u00e9quences<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"\u00ab La distinction entre un produit de la nature [non brevetable] et une invention humaine au sens du paragraphe 101 [du Patent Act sur la brevetabilit\u00e9] tient \u00e0 un changement dans l'identit\u00e9 de la composition revendiqu\u00e9e, compar\u00e9 \u00e0 ce qui existe dans la nature. Plus pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment, la Cour Supr\u00eame a trac\u00e9 une ligne entre les compositions [de mati\u00e8re] qui, m\u00eame si elles sont combin\u00e9es ou modifi\u00e9es d'une mani\u00e8re qui ne se retrouve pas dans la nature, ont des caract\u00e9ristiques similaires aux m\u00eames compositions dans la nature, et les compositions auxquelles l'intervention humaine a donn\u00e9 des caract\u00e9ristiques &quot;manifestement diff\u00e9rentes&quot; ou &quot;distinctives&quot; (...) Il n'est pas contest\u00e9 que l'ADN isol\u00e9 revendiqu\u00e9 par Myriad existe sous une forme chimique distincte\/distinctive - en tant que mol\u00e9cules chimiques diff\u00e9rentes - de l'ADN pr\u00e9sent dans le corps humain, c'est-\u00e0-dire l'ADN humain \u00bb.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-94\" href=\"#footnote-279-94\" aria-label=\"Footnote 94\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[94]<\/sup><\/a>. A nouveau saisie, la Cour Supr\u00eame avait jug\u00e9 \u00e0 l&rsquo;unanimit\u00e9 que les revendications de mol\u00e9cules d&rsquo;AD<\/span>N isol\u00e9es n&rsquo;\u00e9taient pas brevetables, dans la mesure o\u00f9 elles portaient sur un segment d&rsquo;ADN naturel, produit de la nature<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"&quot;Myriad found the location of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, but that discovery, by itself, does not render the BRCA genes \u201cnew . . . composition[s] of matter,\u201d \u00a7101, that are patent eligible (...)&quot;.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-95\" href=\"#footnote-279-95\" aria-label=\"Footnote 95\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[95]<\/sup><\/a>, mais que les revendications portant sur l&rsquo;ADN synth\u00e9tique \u00e9taient brevetables, car elles ne portaient pas sur des \u00e9l\u00e9ments existant \u00e0 l&rsquo;\u00e9tat de nature, les parties non codantes de la s\u00e9quence g\u00e9nomique ayant \u00e9t\u00e9 supprim\u00e9es<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"&quot;cDNA does not present the same obstacles to patentability as naturally occurring, isolated DNA segments. As already explained, creation of a cDNA sequence from mRNA results in an exons-only molecule that is not naturally occurring. Petitioners concede that cDNA differs from natural DNA in that \u201cthe non-coding regions have been removed.\u201d Brief for Petitioners 49. They nevertheless argue that cDNA is not patent eligible because \u201c[t]he nucleotide sequence of cDNA is dictated by nature, not by the lab technician.\u201d Id., at 51. That may be so, but the labtechnician unquestionably creates something new when cDNA is made. cDNA retains the naturally occurring exons of DNA, but it is distinct from the DNA from which it was derived. As a result, cDNA is not a \u201cproduct of nature\u201d and is patent eligible under \u00a7101, except insofar as very short series of DNA may have no intervening introns to remove when creating cDNA. In that situation, a short strand of cDNA may be indistinguishable from natural DNA&quot;.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-96\" href=\"#footnote-279-96\" aria-label=\"Footnote 96\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[96]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>La Cour Supr\u00eame avait cependant pris le soin de pr\u00e9ciser qu&rsquo;elle ne se pronon\u00e7ait pas sur la brevetabilit\u00e9 des m\u00e9thodes de manipulation des g\u00e8nes<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"&quot;It is important to note what is not implicated by this decision. First, there are no method claims before this\u00a0Court. Had Myriad created an innovative method of manipulating genes while searching for the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, it could possibly have sought a method patent. But the processes used by Myriad to isolate DNA were well understood by geneticists at the time of Myriad\u2019s patents \u201cwere well understood, widely used, and fairly uniform insofar as any scientist engaged in the search for a gene would likely have utilized a similar approach, 702F. Supp. 2d, at 202\u2013203, and are not at issue in this case&quot;.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-97\" href=\"#footnote-279-97\" aria-label=\"Footnote 97\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[97]<\/sup><\/a>, sur les applications de connaissances acquises sur les g\u00e8nes BRCA1 et BRCA2<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"&quot;Similarly, this case does not involve patents on new applications of knowledge about the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes. Judge Bryson aptly noted that, \u201c[a]s the first party with knowledge of the [BRCA1 and BRCA2] sequences, Myriad was in an excellent position to claim applications of that knowledge. Many of its unchallenged claims are limited to such applications.\u201d 689 F. 3d, at 1349&quot;.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-98\" href=\"#footnote-279-98\" aria-label=\"Footnote 98\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[98]<\/sup><\/a>, et sur la brevetabilit\u00e9 des m<span style=\"font-size: 1em;\">ol\u00e9cules d\u2019ADN pour lesquelles l&rsquo;ordre naturel des nucl\u00e9otides naturels a \u00e9t\u00e9 modifi\u00e9<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"&quot;Nor do we consider the patentability of DNA in which the order of the naturally occurring nucleotides has been\u00a0altered. Scientific alteration of the genetic code presents a different inquiry, and we express no opinion about the application of \u00a7101 to such endeavors. We merely hold that genes and the information they encode are not patent eligible under \u00a7101 simply because they have been isolated from the surrounding genetic material&quot;.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-99\" href=\"#footnote-279-99\" aria-label=\"Footnote 99\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[99]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>En application de ces principes, les tribunaux ont consid\u00e9r\u00e9 comme ne relevant pas de l\u2019exception pr\u00e9torienne au titre des ph\u00e9nom\u00e8nes naturels ou des id\u00e9es abstraites, par exemple:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li style=\"text-align: justify;\">des proc\u00e9d\u00e9s de pr\u00e9paration d&rsquo;une fraction d&rsquo;ADN acellulaire enrichie en ADN f\u0153tal<span style=\"font-size: 1em;\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Illumina, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., 952 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2020) modified\u00a0967 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2020).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-100\" href=\"#footnote-279-100\" aria-label=\"Footnote 100\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[100]<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/li>\n<li style=\"text-align: justify;\">Un proc\u00e9d\u00e9 de traitement de la douleur \u00e0 l&rsquo;aide de compositions pharmaceutiques d&rsquo;oxymorphone \u00e0 lib\u00e9ration contr\u00f4l\u00e9e et des instructions sur le dosage de l&rsquo;insuffisance r\u00e9nale<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Endo Pharm. Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 919 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2019).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-101\" href=\"#footnote-279-101\" aria-label=\"Footnote 101\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[101]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/li>\n<li style=\"text-align: justify;\">Une m\u00e9thode de traitement des patients schizophr\u00e8nes avec de l&rsquo;ilop\u00e9ridone dans laquelle la gamme posologique est bas\u00e9e sur le g\u00e9notype du patient<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Vanda Pharm. Inc. v. West-Ward Pharm. Int\u2019l Ltd, 887 F.3d 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2018).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-102\" href=\"#footnote-279-102\" aria-label=\"Footnote 102\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[102]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/li>\n<li style=\"text-align: justify;\">Un proc\u00e9d\u00e9 am\u00e9lior\u00e9 de conservation des h\u00e9patocytes<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Rapid Litig. Mgmt. Ltd. v. Cellzdirect, Inc., 827 F.3d 1042 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Le proc\u00e9d\u00e9 en cause consistait dans : (a) la soumission soumettant des cellules pr\u00e9alablement congel\u00e9es et d\u00e9congel\u00e9es \u00e0 un fractionnement par gradient de densit\u00e9 pour s\u00e9parer les cellules viables des cellules non viables ; (B) la r\u00e9cup\u00e9ration des cellules viables ; et (C) la recong\u00e9lation des cellules viables.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-103\" href=\"#footnote-279-103\" aria-label=\"Footnote 103\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[103]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>A l\u2019inverse, des m\u00e9thodes de diagnostic ou de g\u00e9notypage on \u00e9t\u00e9 consid\u00e9r\u00e9es comme portant sur des lois de la nature ou des id\u00e9es abstraites<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"V. par exemple, pour les plus r\u00e9centes: CareDx, Inc. v. Natera, Inc.,\u00a040 F.4th 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2022): m\u00e9thodes de d\u00e9tection du rejet de greffe, du dysfonctionnement du greffon ou de la d\u00e9faillance d\u2019un organe, jug\u00e9es relevant de lois de la nature, et comprenant les \u00e9tapes conventionnelles permettant de d\u00e9tecter ou de quantifier la manifestation de cette loi; Genetic Veterinary Sciences, Inc. v. Laboklin GmbH &amp; Co. KG, 933 F.3d 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2019): m\u00e9thodes in vitro de g\u00e9notypage des chiens Labrador, afin de d\u00e9couvrir s'ils peuvent \u00eatre porteurs d'une maladie;\u00a0 Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Services, LLC, 915 F.3d 743 (Fed. Cir. 2019): m\u00e9thode pour diagnostiquer des d\u00e9sordres neurologiques, fond\u00e9e sur la corr\u00e9lation entre certains anticorps naturels et les maladies concern\u00e9es; \u00e9galement, Roche Molecular Sys., Inc. v. Cepheid, 905 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Cleveland Clinic Found. v. True Health Diagnostics LLC, 859 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Merial LLC, 818 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015); In re BRCA1- and BRCA2-Based Hereditary Cancer Test, 774 F.3d 755 (Fed. Cir. 2014).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-104\" href=\"#footnote-279-104\" aria-label=\"Footnote 104\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[104]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>367._ Les m\u00e9thodes commerciales_<\/strong> En l\u2019absence d\u2019exclusion expresse dans le Patent Act, et jusqu\u2019\u00e0 l\u2019arr\u00eat <em>Bilski<\/em> de la Cour supr\u00eame, la question de la protection des m\u00e9thodes commerciale a donn\u00e9 lieu \u00e0 une jurisprudence h\u00e9sitante<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Certaines d\u00e9cisions ont exclu la brevetabilit\u00e9 de telles m\u00e9thodes, ou du moins de m\u00e9thodes dont la brevetabilit\u00e9 \u00e9tait recherch\u00e9e \u00ab\u00a0en tant que telles\u00a0\u00bb\u00a0: V. Hotel Security Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467 (2d Cir. 1908) (m\u00e9thode de gestion des factures de restaurants); In re Johnston, 502 F.2d 765 (CCPA 1974), rev\u2019d, on other grounds sub nom. Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219 (1976) (m\u00e9thode de gestion automatique de ch\u00e8ques et de d\u00e9p\u00f4ts, mais la d\u00e9cision porte sur l\u2019activit\u00e9 inventive)\u00a0; Paine, Webber, Jackson &amp; Curtis, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &amp; Smith, 564 F. Supp. 1358 (D. Del. 1983) (m\u00e9thode commerciale brevetable, car mises en oeuvre par un ordinateur)\u00a0; ex parte Murray, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d 1819 (PTO Bd. Pat. App. &amp; Int. 1988) (m\u00e9thode comptable non brevetable). Le circuit f\u00e9d\u00e9ral a rejet\u00e9 l\u2019exception dans State Street Bank &amp; Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (pas d'exclusion de principe pour une m\u00e9thode financi\u00e8re relative \u00e0 l'administration d'un fonds mutuel: &quot;As an alternative ground for invalidating the '056 patent under \u00a7 101, the court relied on the judicially-created, so-called &quot;business method&quot; exception to statutory subject matter. We take this opportunity to lay this ill-conceived exception to rest. Since its inception, the &quot;business method&quot; exception has merely represented the application of some general, but no longer applicable legal principle, perhaps arising out of the &quot;requirement for invention&quot;--which was eliminated by \u00a7 103. Since the 1952 Patent Act, business methods have been, and should have been, subject to the same legal requirements for patentability as applied to any other process or method&quot;).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-105\" href=\"#footnote-279-105\" aria-label=\"Footnote 105\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[105]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>En 2010, dans l&rsquo;affaire <em>Bilski v. Kappos<\/em><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-106\" href=\"#footnote-279-106\" aria-label=\"Footnote 106\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[106]<\/sup><\/a>, la Cour Supr\u00eame a confirm\u00e9 que le champ de la brevetabilit\u00e9 n&rsquo;exclut pas la protection des m\u00e9thodes commerciales. L&rsquo;invention en cause portait sur une m\u00e9thode de protection contre les risques de fluctuation des prix sur le march\u00e9 de l&rsquo;\u00e9nergie. L\u2019USPTO avait rejet\u00e9 la demande, consid\u00e9rant que les revendications ne visaient pas un objet brevetable, et avait \u00e9t\u00e9 suivi sur ce point par le Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences<em>. <\/em>Sur appel, la Cour d\u2019appel du circuit f\u00e9d\u00e9ral<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed.Cir. 2008).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-107\" href=\"#footnote-279-107\" aria-label=\"Footnote 107\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[107]<\/sup><\/a> avait tent\u00e9 de d\u00e9terminer un test unique de brevetabilit\u00e9 sous forme d&rsquo;un test dit \u00ab <em>machine or transformation test<\/em>\u00a0\u00bb (test de la machine ou de la transformation), consistant \u00e0 d\u00e9terminer si le proc\u00e9d\u00e9 revendiqu\u00e9 est li\u00e9 \u00e0 une machine ou s\u2019il transforme ou r\u00e9duit un \u00e9l\u00e9ment donn\u00e9 en un \u00e9tat diff\u00e9rent ou dans une chose diff\u00e9rente. La demande ne r\u00e9pondant pas \u00e0 ce test, la Cour avait confirm\u00e9 la d\u00e9cision de rejet.<\/p>\n<p>Dans son arr\u00eat, la Cour supr\u00eame ne rejette pas le <em>machine or transformation test<\/em>, mais consid\u00e8re qu&rsquo;il constitue seulement un indice de brevetabilit\u00e9. Selon la Cour l&rsquo;approche de la Cour d\u2019appel est contredite par le paragraphe 100(b) du Patent Act qui d\u00e9finit largement un proc\u00e9d\u00e9 comme tout \u00ab proc\u00e9d\u00e9, art ou m\u00e9thode, incluant tout nouvel usage d&rsquo;un proc\u00e9d\u00e9, d&rsquo;une machine, d&rsquo;une fabrication, d&rsquo;une composition de mati\u00e8re ou d&rsquo;un mat\u00e9riau connus \u00bb, sans lier la brevetabilit\u00e9 \u00e0 une machine ou \u00e0 une transformation, et sans exclure la brevetabilit\u00e9 des m\u00e9thodes commerciales.<\/p>\n<p>Elle rejette cependant la brevetabilit\u00e9 de l&rsquo;invention, au motif que \u00ab\u00a0le concept de protection contre les risques [\u2026] est une id\u00e9e abstraite non brevetable\u00a0\u00bb et que permettre aux demandeurs de breveter une telle invention \u00ab\u00a0emp\u00eacherait l&rsquo;utilisation d&rsquo;une telle approche dans tous les domaines, et conf\u00e8rerait en r\u00e9alit\u00e9 un monopole sur une id\u00e9e abstraite\u00a0\u00bb.<\/p>\n<p>En pratique, l\u2019exclusion des id\u00e9es abstraites et le crit\u00e8re d\u2019activit\u00e9 inventive constituent un obstacle important \u00e0 la brevetabilit\u00e9 des m\u00e9thodes commerciales, notamment dans le domaine du commerce \u00e9lectronique.<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Ainsi en 2001 la Cour d'appel pour le circuit f\u00e9d\u00e9ral a censur\u00e9 sur ces fondements l'injonction accord\u00e9e par une Cour de District dans l'affaire Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com (Amazon. com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble. com, Inc., 337 F.3d 1024 (Fed. Cir., 2001); V. Com. com. \u00e9lectr. janv. 2000, actu. n\u00b0 18). La Cour F\u00e9d\u00e9rale pour le District Ouest de Washington (73 F. Supp. 2d 1228 (W.D. Wash. 1999)) avait en effet accord\u00e9 \u00e0 la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 Amazon une ordonnance pr\u00e9liminaire enjoignant son concurrent, le libraire Barnes and Noble, de cesser la contrefa\u00e7on du brevet d'Amazon prot\u00e9geant son syst\u00e8me de prise d'achats en ligne (syst\u00e8me permettant de placer un ordre d'achat par un seul &quot;click&quot;).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-108\" href=\"#footnote-279-108\" aria-label=\"Footnote 108\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[108]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>368._ Les m\u00e9thodes de traitement th\u00e9rapeutique et chirurgicales_<\/strong> Les m\u00e9thodes de traitement th\u00e9rapeutique ou chirurgical ne sont pas exclues de la protection si elles satisfont par ailleurs aux conditions de brevetabilit\u00e9<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"La premi\u00e8re d\u00e9cision dans ce sens est une d\u00e9cision du Board of Appel du Patent Office de 1954, Ex parte Scherer, 103 U.S.P.Q. 107 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1954), qui renverse la jurisprudence ,ancienne du Patent Office Ex Parte Brinkerhoff, 27 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 797 (1883); les tribunaux suivront plus tardivement (v. notamment les r\u00e9ticences exprim\u00e9e sur le fondement de l'ordre public par Martin v. Wyeth, Inc., 96 F. Supp. 689 (D. Md. 1951), aff\u2019d 193 F.2d 58 (4th Cir. 1951): &quot;professional ethics of doctors and surgeons are more consistent with the widespread use of their medical and surgical discoveries for the benefit of mankind than in obtaining a monopoly to control their discoveries for personal commercial advantage. In this respect it would seem also that public interest is here involved&quot;). V. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Services, 628 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (M\u00e9thodes de d\u00e9termination de la posologie optimale de m\u00e9dicaments \u00e0 base de thiopurine utilis\u00e9s pour traiter les maladies auto-immunes gastro-intestinales et non gastro-intestinales). Des exemples plus r\u00e9cents de m\u00e9thodes de traitement jug\u00e9es brevetables incluent : une m\u00e9thode d'utilisation de l'oxymorphone pour traiter la douleur chez des patients pr\u00e9sentant une insuffisance r\u00e9nale (Endo Pharms., Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 919 F.3d 1347, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2019)); des m\u00e9thodes de r\u00e9gulation des concentrations d'ions hydronium dans un tissu humain ou d'augmentation de la capacit\u00e9 de travail ana\u00e9robie chez un sujet humain par l'administration de quantit\u00e9s efficaces de b\u00eata-alanine (Natural Alternatives Int\u2019l, Inc. v. Creative Compounds, LLC, 918 F.3d 1338, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2019)); ou encore une m\u00e9thode de traitement des patients schizophr\u00e8nes avec de l'ilop\u00e9ridone, qui base la posologie sur le g\u00e9notype du patient (Vanda Pharms. Inc. v. West-Ward Pharms. Int\u2019l Ltd., 887 F.3d 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2018)).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-109\" href=\"#footnote-279-109\" aria-label=\"Footnote 109\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[109]<\/sup><\/a>. Mais une m\u00e9thode de diagnostic ou de traitement n&rsquo;est pas brevetable si elle inclut ou combine des techniques connues avec des ph\u00e9nom\u00e8nes naturels<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"V. par exemple Athena Diagnostics v. Mayo Collaborative Services, 915 F.3d 743, 751-53 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (m\u00e9thodes de diagnostics de maladies neurologique); Roche Molecular Sys., Inc. v. Cepheid, 905 F.3d 1363, 1370-74 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (m\u00e9thode de d\u00e9tection de la bact\u00e9rie pathog\u00e8ne Mycobacterium tuberculosis); Cleveland Clinic Foundation v. True Health Diagnostics LLC, 859 F.3d 1352, 1361-62 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (test de diagnostic de risques cardiovasculaires); Genetic Technologies, Ltd. v. Merial LLC, 818 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015); In re BRCA1- &amp; BRCA2-Based Hereditary Cancer Test, 774 F.3d 755, 765 (Fed. Cir. 2014).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-110\" href=\"#footnote-279-110\" aria-label=\"Footnote 110\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[110]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>A noter qu\u2019une limitation sp\u00e9cifique au droit \u00e0 dommages et int\u00e9r\u00eats pour contrefa\u00e7on d\u2019un produit ou d\u2019un proc\u00e9d\u00e9 brevet\u00e9s a \u00e9t\u00e9 introduite en 1996 au b\u00e9n\u00e9fice des \u00ab praticiens m\u00e9dicaux exer\u00e7ant dans le cadre d\u2019une activit\u00e9 m\u00e9dicale \u00bb et des institutions qui les emploient.<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"35 U.S.C. \u00a7 287(c). \u00ab\u00a0The term \u201cmedical activity\u201d means the performance of a medical or surgical procedure on a body, but shall not include (i) the use of a patented machine, manufacture, or composition of matter in violation of such patent, (ii) the practice of a patented use of a composition of matter in violation of such patent, or (iii) the practice of a process in violation of a biotechnology patent.\u00a0\u00bb Ibid.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-111\" href=\"#footnote-279-111\" aria-label=\"Footnote 111\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[111]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<p>La question de la brevetabilit\u00e9 de la seconde application th\u00e9rapeutique est abord\u00e9e plus loin<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"V. infra, n\u00b0381.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-112\" href=\"#footnote-279-112\" aria-label=\"Footnote 112\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[112]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>369._ Les programmes d\u2019ordinateur et les inventions logicielles_<\/strong> Le Patent Act ne contient pas d\u2019exclusions concernant les programmes d\u2019ordinateur, ni de dispositions sp\u00e9cifiques les concernant<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Le MPEP (8\u00e8me \u00e9d. 2001) pr\u00e9cisait qu\u2019 \u00ab a computer program is merely a set of instructions capable of being executed by a computer \u00bb (\u00a7 2106.IV.B.1(a)).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-113\" href=\"#footnote-279-113\" aria-label=\"Footnote 113\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[113]<\/sup><\/a>. La brevetabilit\u00e9 des programmes d\u2019ordinateur et des inventions utilisant des logiciels a donn\u00e9 lieu \u00e0 une jurisprudence abondante, souvent li\u00e9e \u00e0 la question de la brevetabilit\u00e9 des m\u00e9thodes commerciales, qui a abouti \u00e0 valider les brevets portant sur des inventions mettant en \u0153uvres des algorithmes (et notamment des logiciels) lorsqu\u2019elles pr\u00e9sentent des r\u00e9sultats utiles (ce qui implique une application pratique), concrets et tangibles (au sens de \u00ab\u00a0non-abstrait\u00a0\u00bb, \u00ab\u00a0qui produit des r\u00e9sultats dans le monde r\u00e9el\u00a0\u00bb)<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Ibid.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-114\" href=\"#footnote-279-114\" aria-label=\"Footnote 114\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[114]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Le point de d\u00e9part de cette \u00e9volution est constitu\u00e9 par l\u2019exclusion de la protection des id\u00e9es abstraites et des formules math\u00e9matiques, qui s\u2019\u00e9tend \u00e0 priori \u00e0 tout algorithme math\u00e9matique et \u00e0 tout logiciel non associ\u00e9 \u00e0 un r\u00e9sultat tangible.<\/p>\n<p>En 1972, dans l\u2019arr\u00eat <em>Gottschalk v. Benson<\/em><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). V. Chisum, The Patentability of Algorithms, 47 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 959 (1986).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-115\" href=\"#footnote-279-115\" aria-label=\"Footnote 115\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[115]<\/sup><\/a><em>,<\/em> la Cour supr\u00eame a jug\u00e9 qu\u2019un algorithme permettant de convertir des d\u00e9cimales cod\u00e9es en binaires en chiffres binaires (et non associ\u00e9 \u00e0 un type d\u2019ordinateur pr\u00e9cis) ne mettait en \u0153uvre qu\u2019une id\u00e9e abstraite et un ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne naturel (une d\u00e9couverte), et ne pouvait d\u00e8s lors constituer une invention brevetable. Elle a cependant pris le soin de pr\u00e9ciser qu\u2019elle n\u2019entendait pas exclure du champ de la brevetabilit\u00e9 tous les programmes d\u2019ordinateur, en indiquant que sa d\u00e9cision ne s\u2019appliquait qu\u2019aux m\u00e9thodes non limit\u00e9es \u00e0 une technologie particuli\u00e8re, \u00e0 dispositif particulier ou \u00e0 un usage pr\u00e9cis<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Point 64.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-116\" href=\"#footnote-279-116\" aria-label=\"Footnote 116\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[116]<\/sup><\/a>. Elle a r\u00e9affirm\u00e9 cette position en 1978 dans son arr\u00eat <em>Parker v. Flook<\/em><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-117\" href=\"#footnote-279-117\" aria-label=\"Footnote 117\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[117]<\/sup><\/a>, \u00e0 propos d\u2019un algorithme mis en \u0153uvre par ordinateur destin\u00e9 \u00e0 ajuster les niveaux d\u2019alarmes des processus de conversion d\u2019hydrocarbures<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"En l\u2019esp\u00e8ce l\u2019algorithme avait \u00e9t\u00e9 revendiqu\u00e9 uniquement en relation avec un processus technique, et le calcul \u00e9tait suivi par une activit\u00e9 post-solution (l\u2019ajustement du niveau d\u2019alarme). La Cour supr\u00eame a cependant rejet\u00e9 la brevetabilit\u00e9 au motif que le brevet porterait sur un id\u00e9e abstraite. La mauvaise r\u00e9daction des revendications semble expliquer en partie la solution.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-118\" href=\"#footnote-279-118\" aria-label=\"Footnote 118\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[118]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>En 1981, dans son arr\u00eat D<em>iamond v. Diehr<\/em><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-119\" href=\"#footnote-279-119\" aria-label=\"Footnote 119\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[119]<\/sup><\/a>, la Cour supr\u00eame reconnaitra pour la premi\u00e8re fois la brevetabilit\u00e9 d\u2019une invention impliquant l\u2019utilisation d\u2019une formule de calcul. L\u2019invention portait sur une m\u00e9thode concernant le moulage de caoutchouc synth\u00e9tique, fond\u00e9e sur un algorithme permettant de recalculer en continu la dur\u00e9e optimale de moulage. La Cour consid\u00e8re que l\u2019invention ne porte pas sur un algorithme, mais sur un proc\u00e9d\u00e9 industriel de transformation de mati\u00e8re reposant sur un algorithme<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"A cette occasion, elle op\u00e8re une distinction avec les faits de l\u2019affaire Parker v. Flook, en soulignant que la m\u00e9thode alors revendiqu\u00e9e portait sur un calcul, sans r\u00e9ellement mentionner les \u00e9tapes physiques associ\u00e9es au calcul.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-120\" href=\"#footnote-279-120\" aria-label=\"Footnote 120\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[120]<\/sup><\/a>. Elle pr\u00e9cise n\u00e9anmoins qu\u2019une \u00ab\u00a0activit\u00e9 post-solution insignifiante ne transformera pas un principe non brevetable en proc\u00e9d\u00e9 brevetable\u00a0\u00bb<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Points 191-92.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-121\" href=\"#footnote-279-121\" aria-label=\"Footnote 121\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[121]<\/sup><\/a>. De m\u00eame, dans son arr\u00eat <em>Alice\u00a0 <\/em>pr\u00e9cit\u00e9<em><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Alice Corp. V. CLS Bank International, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-122\" href=\"#footnote-279-122\" aria-label=\"Footnote 122\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[122]<\/sup><\/a><\/em>, la Cour supr\u00eame a pr\u00e9cis\u00e9 que la simple mise en \u0153uvre par un ordinateur g\u00e9n\u00e9rique ne transforme pas une id\u00e9e abstraite en invention brevetable<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"\u00ab the mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. Stating an abstract idea \u201cwhile adding the words \u2018apply it\u2019\u201d is not enough for patent eligibility.(\u2026) Nor is limiting the use of an abstract idea \u201c\u2018to a particular technological environment.\u2019\u201d (\u2026). Stating an abstract idea while adding the words \u201capply it with a computer\u201d simply combines those two steps, with the same deficient result. Thus, if a patent\u2019s recitation of a computer amounts to a mere instruction to\u201cimplemen[t]\u201d an abstract idea \u201con . . . a computer,\u201d (\u2026) that addition cannot impart patent eligibility \u00bb.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-123\" href=\"#footnote-279-123\" aria-label=\"Footnote 123\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[123]<\/sup><\/a>. Cette derni\u00e8re d\u00e9cision semble avoir entra\u00een\u00e9 un nombre important de d\u00e9cisions invalidant des brevets de logiciels ou de m\u00e9thodes mises en \u0153uvre par logiciels<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"S. Callahan, Alice: The Death of Software-Related Patents?, 1er mai 2015, qui rel\u00e8ve que depuis l\u2019arr\u00eat Alice, sur les 76 d\u00e9cisions dans des affaires similaires, 57 ont invalid\u00e9 les brevets concern\u00e9 (contre 16 les ayant valid\u00e9 au fond). V. par exemple Digitech Image Technologies, LLC v. Electronics for Imaging, Inc. 758 F. 3d 1344 (2014) (informations g\u00e9n\u00e9r\u00e9es sur une image et m\u00e9thodes pour g\u00e9n\u00e9rer ces informations)\u00a0; buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc, 765 F.3d 1350 (2014) (syst\u00e8me de s\u00e9curisation de transactins \u00e9lectronique en ligne)\u00a0; DDR Holdings v. Hotels.com, 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (syst\u00e8me g\u00e9n\u00e9rant des pages web d\u2019e-commerce\u00a0); Versata v. SAP America,Inc., 793 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 115 U.S.P.Q.2d 1681 (plusieurs brevets dont un valid\u00e9).V. \u00e9galement T. Teska, (The unfortunate) future of software patents under 35 USC \u00a7 101 and \u00a7 112, 2016 Journal of High Technology Law, p. 394; D. Taylor, Down the Rabbit Hole: Who will stand up for software patents after Alice?, 68 Me. L. Rev. 217 (2016).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-124\" href=\"#footnote-279-124\" aria-label=\"Footnote 124\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[124]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>En r\u00e9action \u00e0 cette jurisprudence, le Manual of Patent Examination Procedure a \u00e9t\u00e9 compl\u00e9t\u00e9 depuis 2014 et pr\u00e9cise les pratiques de l\u2019Office concernant l\u2019exclusion des id\u00e9es abstraites<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"2014 Interim Guidance on subject Matter Eligibility, disponible sur le site de l\u2019USPTO (www.uspto.gov).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-125\" href=\"#footnote-279-125\" aria-label=\"Footnote 125\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[125]<\/sup><\/a>. Il confirme que les revendications d\u00e9crivant ou incluant un algorithme doivent contenir des \u00e9l\u00e9ments qui (consid\u00e9r\u00e9s individuellement ou dans leur combinaison) ajoutent \u00e0 l\u2019id\u00e9e abstraite constitu\u00e9e par l\u2019algorithme (<em>amount to significantly more than the judicial exception<\/em>), par exemple en d\u00e9montrant une am\u00e9lioration du fonctionnement d\u2019un ordinateur ou dans un autre domaine technique. De nombreux exemples d\u2019inventions logicielles exclues ou non de la brevetabilit\u00e9, y sont donn\u00e9s. Dans ce domaine, ont\u00a0\u00e9t\u00e9 consid\u00e9r\u00e9s par les tribunaux comme brevetables, car ne relevant pas d\u2019id\u00e9es abstraites, par exemple :<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li style=\"text-align: justify;\">des m\u00e9thodes permettant d&rsquo;am\u00e9liorer les r\u00e9sultats de recherche sur Internet en int\u00e9grant une relation de localisation physique avec une personne de r\u00e9f\u00e9rence<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Weisner v. Google LLC, 51 F.4th 1073, 1084 (Fed. Cir. 2022).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-126\" href=\"#footnote-279-126\" aria-label=\"Footnote 126\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[126]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0;<\/li>\n<li style=\"text-align: justify;\">des syst\u00e8mes et proc\u00e9d\u00e9s de structuration d&rsquo;un r\u00e9seau dynamique peer-to-peer (P2P) pour la distribution de fichiers volumineux<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Cooperative Entertainment, Inc. v. Kollective Technology, Inc., 50 F.4th 127 (Fed. Cir. 2022).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-127\" href=\"#footnote-279-127\" aria-label=\"Footnote 127\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[127]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0;<\/li>\n<li style=\"text-align: justify;\">un proc\u00e9d\u00e9 d&rsquo;authentification d&rsquo;un utilisateur \u00e0 une transaction sur un terminal<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"CosmoKey Solutions GmbH &amp; Co. KG v. Duo Security LLC, 15 F.4th 1091 (Fed. Cir. 2021).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-128\" href=\"#footnote-279-128\" aria-label=\"Footnote 128\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[128]<\/sup><\/a>;<\/li>\n<li style=\"text-align: justify;\">des appareils et proc\u00e9d\u00e9s de surveillance de paquets \u00e9chang\u00e9s sur un r\u00e9seau informatique en classant des paquets de donn\u00e9es en fonction d&rsquo;un flux de donn\u00e9es associ\u00e9 \u00e0 certaines activit\u00e9s<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Packet Intelligence LLC v. NetScout Systems, Inc., 965 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2020).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-129\" href=\"#footnote-279-129\" aria-label=\"Footnote 129\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[129]<\/sup><\/a>;<\/li>\n<li style=\"text-align: justify;\">un syst\u00e8me de communication qui permet \u00e0 la station primaire d&rsquo;envoyer des messages d&rsquo;enqu\u00eate et d&rsquo;effectuer des sondages simultan\u00e9ment<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Uniloc USA, Inc. v. LG Electronics USA, Inc., 957 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2020).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-130\" href=\"#footnote-279-130\" aria-label=\"Footnote 130\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[130]<\/sup><\/a>;<\/li>\n<li style=\"text-align: justify;\">un proc\u00e9d\u00e9 et des dispositifs de d\u00e9tection d&rsquo;erreurs de transmission dans des flux de donn\u00e9es et des paquets de donn\u00e9es<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Koninklijke KPN N.V. v. Gemalto M2M Gmbh, 942 F.3d 1143 (Fed. Cir. 2019).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-131\" href=\"#footnote-279-131\" aria-label=\"Footnote 131\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[131]<\/sup><\/a>;<\/li>\n<li style=\"text-align: justify;\">un proc\u00e9d\u00e9 de connexion d&rsquo;un dispositif de capture de donn\u00e9es, tel qu&rsquo;un appareil photo num\u00e9rique, \u00e0 un dispositif mobile afin qu&rsquo;un utilisateur puisse publier automatiquement du contenu \u00e0 partir du dispositif de capture de donn\u00e9es sur un site Web<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Cellspin Soft, Inc. v. FitBit, Inc., 927 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2019).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-132\" href=\"#footnote-279-132\" aria-label=\"Footnote 132\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[132]<\/sup><\/a>;<\/li>\n<li style=\"text-align: justify;\">une m\u00e9thode automatis\u00e9e de d\u00e9tection d&rsquo;intrusion dans le r\u00e9seau informatique qui utilise des moniteurs de r\u00e9seau dans le r\u00e9seau d&rsquo;entreprise, d\u00e9tecte les activit\u00e9s r\u00e9seau suspectes sur la base de l&rsquo;analyse des donn\u00e9es de trafic r\u00e9seau, g\u00e9n\u00e8re des rapports sur les activit\u00e9s suspectes et re\u00e7oit et int\u00e8gre automatiquement les rapports sur les activit\u00e9s suspectes<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"SRI Int\u2019l, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 918 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2019), modified 930 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2019).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-133\" href=\"#footnote-279-133\" aria-label=\"Footnote 133\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[133]<\/sup><\/a>;<\/li>\n<li style=\"text-align: justify;\">une m\u00e9thode de mise en \u0153uvre d&rsquo;une interface \u00e0 onglets de carnet, qui permet aux utilisateurs de naviguer facilement dans des feuilles de calcul \u00e9lectroniques tridimensionnelles<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Data Engine Techs. LLC v. Google LLC, 906 F.3d 999 (Fed. Cir. 2018).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-134\" href=\"#footnote-279-134\" aria-label=\"Footnote 134\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[134]<\/sup><\/a>;<\/li>\n<li style=\"text-align: justify;\">des syst\u00e8mes et proc\u00e9d\u00e9s de conception, de cr\u00e9ation et d&rsquo;importation de donn\u00e9es dans un formulaire consultable sur un ordinateur afin qu&rsquo;un utilisateur puisse manipuler les donn\u00e9es du formulaire et cr\u00e9er des formulaires et des rapports consultables<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc., 882 F.3d 1121 (Fed. Cir. 2018).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-135\" href=\"#footnote-279-135\" aria-label=\"Footnote 135\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[135]<\/sup><\/a>;<\/li>\n<li style=\"text-align: justify;\">des interfaces d&rsquo;affichage am\u00e9lior\u00e9es, en particulier pour les appareils \u00e9lectroniques dot\u00e9s de petits \u00e9crans, qui permettent \u00e0 l&rsquo;utilisateur d&rsquo;acc\u00e9der plus rapidement aux donn\u00e9es souhait\u00e9es stock\u00e9es dans le dispositif \u00e9lectronique et aux fonctions des applications incluses dans celui-ci<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Core Wireless Licensing v. LG Elecs., Inc., 880 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-136\" href=\"#footnote-279-136\" aria-label=\"Footnote 136\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[136]<\/sup><\/a>;<\/li>\n<li style=\"text-align: justify;\">une m\u00e9thode qui permet aux ordinateurs de produire une synchronisation labiale et des expressions faciales pr\u00e9cises et r\u00e9alistes dans des personnages anim\u00e9s qui n&rsquo;\u00e9taient auparavant produites que par des animateurs humains<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-137\" href=\"#footnote-279-137\" aria-label=\"Footnote 137\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[137]<\/sup><\/a>;<\/li>\n<li style=\"text-align: justify;\">une m\u00e9thode et un syst\u00e8me de filtrage du contenu Internet<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Bascom Global Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&amp;T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-138\" href=\"#footnote-279-138\" aria-label=\"Footnote 138\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[138]<\/sup><\/a>;<\/li>\n<li style=\"text-align: justify;\">des syst\u00e8mes et proc\u00e9d\u00e9s de g\u00e9n\u00e9ration d&rsquo;une page Web composite qui combine certains \u00e9l\u00e9ments visuels d&rsquo;un site Web \u00ab h\u00f4te \u00bb avec le contenu d&rsquo;un marchand tiers<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-139\" href=\"#footnote-279-139\" aria-label=\"Footnote 139\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[139]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>A l&rsquo;inverse, ont \u00e9t\u00e9 consid\u00e9r\u00e9es comme relevant d\u2019id\u00e9es abstraites non brevetables et d\u00e9pourvues de concept inventif:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\">un proc\u00e9d\u00e9 de visualisation de plusieurs images vid\u00e9o affich\u00e9es et stock\u00e9es simultan\u00e9ment sur le dispositif de visualisation \u00e0 distance d&rsquo;un syst\u00e8me de vid\u00e9osurveillance<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Hawk Tech. Sys., LLC v. Castle Retail, LLC, 60 F.4th 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2023).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-140\" href=\"#footnote-279-140\" aria-label=\"Footnote 140\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[140]<\/sup><\/a>;<\/span><\/li>\n<li style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\">une m\u00e9thode d&rsquo;affichage et de synchronisation de donn\u00e9es cartographiques<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Int\u2019l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. Zillow Group, Inc., 50 F.4th 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2022).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-141\" href=\"#footnote-279-141\" aria-label=\"Footnote 141\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[141]<\/sup><\/a>;<\/span><\/li>\n<li style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\">un syst\u00e8me et un proc\u00e9d\u00e9 algorithmique permettant de d\u00e9terminer l&rsquo;\u00e9ligibilit\u00e9 aux prestations d&rsquo;assurance invalidit\u00e9 de la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 sociale via un r\u00e9seau informatique<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"In re Killian, 45 F.4th 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2022).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-142\" href=\"#footnote-279-142\" aria-label=\"Footnote 142\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[142]<\/sup><\/a>;<\/span><\/li>\n<li style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\">un proc\u00e9d\u00e9 de s\u00e9curisation de paiements par voie \u00e9lectronique permettant l&rsquo;identification d&rsquo;une personne sans fourniture d&rsquo;informations personnelles<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Universal Secure Registry LLC v. Apple Inc., 10 F.4th 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2021).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-143\" href=\"#footnote-279-143\" aria-label=\"Footnote 143\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[143]<\/sup><\/a>;<\/span><\/li>\n<li style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\">un syst\u00e8me permettant d&rsquo;adresser \u00e0 un utilisateur de t\u00e9l\u00e9phone mobile de la publicit\u00e9 cibl\u00e9e sur la base des donn\u00e9es recueillies sur le t\u00e9l\u00e9viseur de l&rsquo;utilisateur.<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Free Stream Media Corp. v. Alphonso Inc., 996 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2021).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-144\" href=\"#footnote-279-144\" aria-label=\"Footnote 144\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[144]<\/sup><\/a>;<\/span><\/li>\n<li style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\">un syst\u00e8me et un proc\u00e9d\u00e9 permettant au client d&rsquo;un programme de fid\u00e9lit\u00e9 d&rsquo;\u00e9changer des points de fid\u00e9lit\u00e9 contre des r\u00e9compenses offertes par des vendeurs sans intervention humaine.<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"cxLoyalty, Inc. v. Maritz Holdings, Inc., 986 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2021).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-145\" href=\"#footnote-279-145\" aria-label=\"Footnote 145\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[145]<\/sup><\/a>;<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\">un syst\u00e8me informatis\u00e9 permettant d&rsquo;utiliser des graphiques pour cr\u00e9er des simulations orient\u00e9es objet sans programmation<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Simio, LLC v. FlexSim Software Products, Inc., 983 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2020).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-146\" href=\"#footnote-279-146\" aria-label=\"Footnote 146\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[146]<\/sup><\/a>;<\/span><\/li>\n<li style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\">un syst\u00e8me s\u00e9curis\u00e9 de notifcation permettant \u00e0 un utilisateur de communiquer avec des livreurs ou des personnes charg\u00e9es de l&rsquo;enl\u00e8vement d&rsquo;objets<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Electronic Commc\u2019n Tech., LLC v. ShoppersChoice.Com, LLC, 958 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2020).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-147\" href=\"#footnote-279-147\" aria-label=\"Footnote 147\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[147]<\/sup><\/a>;<\/span><\/li>\n<li style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\">un proc\u00e9d\u00e9 mis en \u0153uvre par ordinateur pour d\u00e9tecter une fraude dans des transactions financi\u00e8res pendant un processus de compensation de paiement<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Bozeman Financial LLC v. Federal Reserve Bank, 955 F.3d 971 (Fed. Cir. 2020).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-148\" href=\"#footnote-279-148\" aria-label=\"Footnote 148\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[148]<\/sup><\/a>;<\/span><\/li>\n<li style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\">une interface graphique utilisateur pour le trading par voie \u00e9lectronique<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Trading Tech. Int\u2019l, Inc. v. IBG LLC, 921 F.3d 1084 (Fed. Cir. 2019).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-149\" href=\"#footnote-279-149\" aria-label=\"Footnote 149\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[149]<\/sup><\/a>;<\/span><\/li>\n<li style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\">un syst\u00e8me de bornes de recharge pour v\u00e9hicules \u00e9lectriques connect\u00e9es et contr\u00f4l\u00e9es en r\u00e9seau<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"ChargePoint, Inc. v. SemaConnect, Inc., 920 F.3d 759 (Fed. Cir. 2019).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-150\" href=\"#footnote-279-150\" aria-label=\"Footnote 150\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[150]<\/sup><\/a>;<\/span><\/li>\n<li style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\">des m\u00e9thodes de filtrage d&rsquo;e-mails et de fichier pour d\u00e9tecter des contenus ind\u00e9sirables<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2016).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-151\" href=\"#footnote-279-151\" aria-label=\"Footnote 151\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[151]<\/sup><\/a>;<\/span><\/li>\n<li style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\">un\u00a0 syst\u00e8me mis en \u0153uvre par ordinateur permettant aux emprunteurs d&rsquo;obtenir de mani\u00e8re anonyme des pr\u00eats propos\u00e9s par une pluralit\u00e9 de pr\u00eateurs.<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Mortgage Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-152\" href=\"#footnote-279-152\" aria-label=\"Footnote 152\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[152]<\/sup><\/a>;<\/span><\/li>\n<li style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\">une m\u00e9thode d&rsquo;optimisation des prix dans un environnement d&rsquo;e-commerce<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2015).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-153\" href=\"#footnote-279-153\" aria-label=\"Footnote 153\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[153]<\/sup><\/a>;<\/span><\/li>\n<li style=\"text-align: justify;\"><span style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\">un proc\u00e9d\u00e9 de distribution de produits multim\u00e9dias prot\u00e9g\u00e9s par le droit d&rsquo;auteur sur Internet, dans lequel le consommateur re\u00e7oit gratuitement un produit multim\u00e9dia prot\u00e9g\u00e9 par le droit d&rsquo;auteur en \u00e9change de la visualisation d&rsquo;une publicit\u00e9, l&rsquo;annonceur payant pour le contenu prot\u00e9g\u00e9.<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-154\" href=\"#footnote-279-154\" aria-label=\"Footnote 154\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[154]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>370._ Les inventions dans le domaine de l\u2019IA _ <\/strong>Les inventions dans le domaine de l&rsquo;IA (relatives \u00e0 des m\u00e9thodes ou \u00e0 des syst\u00e8mes relevant de l&rsquo;IA, ou utilisant des syst\u00e8mes d&rsquo;IA) sont soumises au m\u00eame r\u00e9gime que les inventions logicielles impliquant une analyse de donn\u00e9es, et peuvent poser probl\u00e8me au regard de l&rsquo;exclusion de la brevetabilit\u00e9 des id\u00e9es abstraites. Rappelons cependant qu&rsquo;en application de la jurisprudence <em>Alice<\/em><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"V. supra, n\u00b0364.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-155\" href=\"#footnote-279-155\" aria-label=\"Footnote 155\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[155]<\/sup><\/a>, des revendications portant sur des id\u00e9es abstraites restent \u00e9ligibles \u00e0 la protection si elles contiennent des \u00e9l\u00e9ments compl\u00e9mentaires qui vont au-del\u00e0 d&rsquo;une id\u00e9e abstraite et rel\u00e8vent d&rsquo;un concept inventif. Des illustrations int\u00e9ressantes et d\u00e9taill\u00e9es sont donn\u00e9es par l&rsquo;USPTO dans son document \u00ab\u00a0Subject Matter Eligibility Examples\u00a0\u00bb de juillet 20024<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Subject Matter Eligibility Examples, July 2024.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-156\" href=\"#footnote-279-156\" aria-label=\"Footnote 156\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[156]<\/sup><\/a>, qui illustre l&rsquo;application du test de brevetabilit\u00e9 \u00e0 des revendications:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li style=\"text-align: justify;\">portant sur l&rsquo;utilisation d&rsquo;un r\u00e9seau de neurones artificiels pour identifier ou d\u00e9tecter des anomalies<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Exemple 47.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-157\" href=\"#footnote-279-157\" aria-label=\"Footnote 157\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[157]<\/sup><\/a>;<\/li>\n<li style=\"text-align: justify;\">\u00e9noncant des m\u00e9thodes bas\u00e9es sur l&rsquo;intelligence artificielle pour analyser les signaux vocaux et s\u00e9parer la parole souhait\u00e9e de la parole \u00e9trang\u00e8re ou de fond<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Exemple 48.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-158\" href=\"#footnote-279-158\" aria-label=\"Footnote 158\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[158]<\/sup><\/a>;<\/li>\n<li style=\"text-align: justify;\">et portant sur un mod\u00e8le d&rsquo;intelligence artificielle con\u00e7u pour aider \u00e0 personnaliser le traitement m\u00e9dical en fonction des caract\u00e9ristiques individuelles d&rsquo;un patient particulier<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Exemple 49.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-159\" href=\"#footnote-279-159\" aria-label=\"Footnote 159\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[159]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>La question des inventions g\u00e9n\u00e9r\u00e9es \u00e0 l&rsquo;aide ou au moyen de syst\u00e8mes d&rsquo;IA g\u00e9n\u00e9rative est \u00e9tudi\u00e9e plus loin<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"V. infra, n\u00b0390.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-160\" href=\"#footnote-279-160\" aria-label=\"Footnote 160\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[160]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>371._ Tableaux des d\u00e9cisions de la Cour supr\u00eame sur la brevetabilit\u00e9_ <\/strong>Le tableau ci-dessous, adapt\u00e9 d&rsquo;un tableau disponible sur le site de l&rsquo;USPTO<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Chart of Subject Matter Eligibility Court Decisions (updated October 17, 2019).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-161\" href=\"#footnote-279-161\" aria-label=\"Footnote 161\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[161]<\/sup><\/a>, reprend les principales d\u00e9cisions de la Cour supr\u00eame ayant valeur de pr\u00e9c\u00e9dent (<em>precedential<\/em>) rendues sur la question de la brevetabilit\u00e9, dont il a \u00e9t\u00e9 question ci-dessus.<\/p>\n<table class=\"shaded\" style=\"height: 1071px;\">\n<tbody>\n<tr style=\"height: 31px;\">\n<td style=\"width: 202.438px; height: 31px;\"><strong>Nom de l\u2019arr\u00eat<\/strong><\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 83.5625px; height: 31px;\"><strong>N\u00b0 brevet \/ demande<\/strong><\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 139.719px; height: 31px;\"><strong>Titre \/ objet<\/strong><\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 95.2812px; height: 31px;\"><strong>Type de revendication<\/strong><\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 76.5px; height: 31px;\"><strong>Type d\u2019exclusion<\/strong><\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 61.8594px; height: 31px;\"><strong>Solution<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr style=\"height: 142px;\">\n<td style=\"width: 202.438px; height: 142px;\"><em>Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int\u2019l<\/em><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 110 U.S.P.Q.2d 1976 (2014) .\" id=\"return-footnote-279-162\" href=\"#footnote-279-162\" aria-label=\"Footnote 162\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[162]<\/sup><\/a><\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 83.5625px; height: 142px;\">5,970,479<br \/>\n6,912,510<br \/>\n7,149,720<br \/>\n7,725,375<\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 139.719px; height: 142px;\">Formulation et n\u00e9gociation de contrats de gestion des risques<\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 95.2812px; height: 142px;\">Proc\u00e9d\u00e9s, syst\u00e8mes, supports lisibles par ordinateur<\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 76.5px; height: 142px;\">Id\u00e9e abstraite<\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 61.8594px; height: 142px;\"><em>Ineligible<br \/>\n\u2019479: asserted claims 33-34.<br \/>\n\u2019510, \u2019720, and \u2019375: all claims.<\/em><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr style=\"height: 237px;\">\n<td style=\"width: 202.438px; height: 237px;\"><em>Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.<\/em> <a class=\"footnote\" title=\"569 U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2107, 106 U.S.P.Q.2d 1972 (2013).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-163\" href=\"#footnote-279-163\" aria-label=\"Footnote 163\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[163]<\/sup><\/a><\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 83.5625px; height: 237px;\">5,747,282<br \/>\n5,837,492<br \/>\n5,693,473<\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 139.719px; height: 237px;\">G\u00e8ne pr\u00e9disposant au cancer du sein et de l&rsquo;ovaire<\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 95.2812px; height: 237px;\">Produits<\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 76.5px; height: 237px;\">Produit de la nature<\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 61.8594px; height: 237px;\"><em>Ineligible<br \/>\n\u2018282: claims 1, 5-6<br \/>\n\u2018473: claim 1<br \/>\n\u2018492: claims 1 &amp; 6<br \/>\nEligible<br \/>\n\u2018282: claims 2 &amp; 7<br \/>\n\u2018492: claim 7<\/em><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr style=\"height: 47px;\">\n<td style=\"width: 202.438px; height: 47px;\"><em>Bilski v. Kappos<\/em><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"561 U.S. 593, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001 (2010).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-164\" href=\"#footnote-279-164\" aria-label=\"Footnote 164\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[164]<\/sup><\/a><\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 83.5625px; height: 47px;\">08\/833,892<\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 139.719px; height: 47px;\">M\u00e9thode de gestion des risques \u00e9nerg\u00e9tiques<\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 95.2812px; height: 47px;\">M\u00e9thode<\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 76.5px; height: 47px;\">Id\u00e9e abstraite<\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 61.8594px; height: 47px;\"><em>Ineligible<\/em><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr style=\"height: 63px;\">\n<td style=\"width: 202.438px; height: 63px;\"><em>Diamond v. Chakrabarty<\/em><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"447 U.S. 303, 206 U.S.P.Q. 193 (1980).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-165\" href=\"#footnote-279-165\" aria-label=\"Footnote 165\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[165]<\/sup><\/a><\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 83.5625px; height: 63px;\">4 259 444<\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 139.719px; height: 63px;\">Micro-organisme ayant des plasmides et pr\u00e9paration de celui-ci<\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 95.2812px; height: 63px;\">Produit et m\u00e9thodes<\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 76.5px; height: 63px;\">Produit de la nature<\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 61.8594px; height: 63px;\"><em>Eligible<\/em><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr style=\"height: 63px;\">\n<td style=\"width: 202.438px; height: 63px;\"><em>Diamond v. Diehr<\/em><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"50 U.S. 175, 209 U.S.P.Q. 1 (1981).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-166\" href=\"#footnote-279-166\" aria-label=\"Footnote 166\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[166]<\/sup><\/a><\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 83.5625px; height: 63px;\">4 344 142<\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 139.719px; height: 63px;\">Contr\u00f4le num\u00e9rique direct des presses de moulage de caoutchouc<\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 95.2812px; height: 63px;\">M\u00e9thode<\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 76.5px; height: 63px;\">Abstract Idea<\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 61.8594px; height: 63px;\"><em>Eligible<\/em><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr style=\"height: 63px;\">\n<td style=\"width: 202.438px; height: 63px;\"><em>Eibel Process Co. v. Minnesota &amp; Ontario Paper Co.<\/em> <a class=\"footnote\" title=\"261 U.S. 45 (1923).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-167\" href=\"#footnote-279-167\" aria-label=\"Footnote 167\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[167]<\/sup><\/a><\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 83.5625px; height: 63px;\">845 224<\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 139.719px; height: 63px;\">Machine Fourdrinier pour la fabrication du papier<\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 95.2812px; height: 63px;\">Syst\u00e8me<\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 76.5px; height: 63px;\">Loi de la nature<\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 61.8594px; height: 63px;\"><em>Eligible<\/em><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr style=\"height: 63px;\">\n<td style=\"width: 202.438px; height: 63px;\"><em>Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.<\/em> <a class=\"footnote\" title=\"333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-168\" href=\"#footnote-279-168\" aria-label=\"Footnote 168\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[168]<\/sup><\/a><\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 83.5625px; height: 63px;\">2 200 532<\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 139.719px; height: 63px;\">Inoculant bact\u00e9rien pour l\u00e9gumineuses<\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 95.2812px; height: 63px;\">Produits<\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 76.5px; height: 63px;\">Produit de la nature<\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 61.8594px; height: 63px;\"><em>Ineligible<br \/>\nClaims 1, 3-8, 13 &amp; 14<\/em><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr style=\"height: 63px;\">\n<td style=\"width: 202.438px; height: 63px;\"><em>Gottschalk v. Benson<\/em><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"409 U.S. 63, 175 U.S.P.Q. 673 (1972) .\" id=\"return-footnote-279-169\" href=\"#footnote-279-169\" aria-label=\"Footnote 169\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[169]<\/sup><\/a><\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 83.5625px; height: 63px;\">04\/315,050<\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 139.719px; height: 63px;\">Conversion d&rsquo;informations num\u00e9riques<\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 95.2812px; height: 63px;\">M\u00e9thode<\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 76.5px; height: 63px;\">Id\u00e9e abstraite<\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 61.8594px; height: 63px;\"><em>Ineligible<\/em><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr style=\"height: 47px;\">\n<td style=\"width: 202.438px; height: 47px;\"><em>Mackay Radio &amp; Telegraph v. Radio Corp of Am.<\/em><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"306 U.S. 86, 40 U.S.P.Q. 199 (1939) .\" id=\"return-footnote-279-170\" href=\"#footnote-279-170\" aria-label=\"Footnote 170\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[170]<\/sup><\/a><\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 83.5625px; height: 47px;\">1 974 387<\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 139.719px; height: 47px;\">Antenne<\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 95.2812px; height: 47px;\">Produits<\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 76.5px; height: 47px;\">Id\u00e9e abstraite<\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 61.8594px; height: 47px;\"><em>Eligible<br \/>\nclaims 15 and 16<\/em><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr style=\"height: 142px;\">\n<td style=\"width: 202.438px; height: 142px;\"><em>Mayo Collaborative Svcs. v. Prometheus Labs.<\/em> <a class=\"footnote\" title=\"566 U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1289, 101 U.S.P.Q.2d 1961 (2012) .\" id=\"return-footnote-279-171\" href=\"#footnote-279-171\" aria-label=\"Footnote 171\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[171]<\/sup><\/a><\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 83.5625px; height: 142px;\">6,355,623<br \/>\n6,680,302<\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 139.719px; height: 142px;\">Optimisation de l&rsquo;efficacit\u00e9 th\u00e9rapeutique des m\u00e9dicaments pour le traitement des troubles gastro-intestinaux \u00e0 m\u00e9diation immunitaire<\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 95.2812px; height: 142px;\">M\u00e9thode<\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 76.5px; height: 142px;\">Loi de la nature<\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 61.8594px; height: 142px;\"><em>Ineligible<\/em><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr style=\"height: 47px;\">\n<td style=\"width: 202.438px; height: 47px;\"><em>Parker v. Flook<\/em><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"437 U.S. 584, 198 U.S.P.Q. 193 (1978) .\" id=\"return-footnote-279-172\" href=\"#footnote-279-172\" aria-label=\"Footnote 172\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[172]<\/sup><\/a><\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 83.5625px; height: 47px;\">05\/194,032<\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 139.719px; height: 47px;\">M\u00e9thode de mise \u00e0 jour des limites d&rsquo;alarme<\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 95.2812px; height: 47px;\">M\u00e9thode<\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 76.5px; height: 47px;\">Abstract Idea<\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 61.8594px; height: 47px;\"><em>Ineligible<\/em><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr style=\"height: 63px;\">\n<td style=\"width: 202.438px; height: 63px;\"><em>Tilghman v. Proctor<\/em><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"102 U.S. 707 (1881) .\" id=\"return-footnote-279-173\" href=\"#footnote-279-173\" aria-label=\"Footnote 173\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[173]<\/sup><\/a><\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 83.5625px; height: 63px;\">11 766<\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 139.719px; height: 63px;\">Obtention d&rsquo;acides gras libres et de glyc\u00e9rine \u00e0 partir de corps gras<\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 95.2812px; height: 63px;\">M\u00e9thode<\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 76.5px; height: 63px;\">Loi de la nature<\/td>\n<td style=\"width: 61.8594px; height: 63px;\"><em>Eligible<\/em><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>372._ L\u2019exigence d\u2019unit\u00e9 d\u2019invention (prohibition de la double brevetabilit\u00e9)_ <\/strong>Le droit des brevets US consacre l\u2019exigence d\u2019unit\u00e9 d\u2019invention au travers de la prohibition de la \u00ab double brevetabilit\u00e9 \u00bb. Cette prohibition est issue de la section 101 du Patent Act<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"35 U.S.C. \u00a7 101.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-174\" href=\"#footnote-279-174\" aria-label=\"Footnote 174\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[174]<\/sup><\/a>, qui dispose que l\u2019inventeur peut obtenir \u00ab un brevet \u00bb pour chaque invention (\u00ab Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, &#8230; may obtain\u00a0<em>a<\/em> patent therefor \u00bb)<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"V. sur ce point AbbVie Inc. v. Mathilda and Terence Kennedy Institute of Rheumatology, 764 F.3d 1366, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2014) : \u00ab While often described as a court-created doctrine, obviousness-type double patenting is grounded in the text of the Patent Act. See In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887, 892 (Fed.Cir.1985); see also Boehringer Ingelheim Int'l. GmbH v. Barr Labs., Inc., 592 F.3d 1340, 1346 (Fed.Cir.2010); Eli Lilly &amp; Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 967 (Fed.Cir.2001). Section 101 reads: \u201cWhoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, ... may obtain a patent therefor.\u201d 35 U.S.C. \u00a7 101 (emphasis added). Thus, \u00a7 101 forbids an individual from obtaining more than one patent on the same invention, i.e., double patenting. As this court has explained, \u201ca rejection based upon double patenting of the obviousness type\u201d is \u201cgrounded in public policy (a policy reflected in the patent statute).\u201d Longi, 759 F.2d at 892.\n\nThe courts have recognized this principle since the inception of our patent laws. In 1819, Justice Story explained, \u201cIt cannot be, that a patentee can have in use at the same time two valid patents for the same invention; and if he can successively take out at different times new patents for the same invention, he may perpetuate his exclusive right during a century.... If this proceeding could obtain countenance, it would completely destroy the whole consideration derived by the public for the grant of the patent, [ ] the right to use the invention at the expiration of the term specified in the original grant.\u201d Odiorne v. Amesbury Nail Factory, 18 F. Cas. 578, 579 (C.C.D.Mass.1819). The Supreme Court has reaffirmed the prohibition on double patenting on multiple occasions.\u00a0See\u00a0Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co.,\u00a0163 U.S. 169, 185,\u00a016 S.Ct. 1002,\u00a041 L.Ed. 118\u00a0(1896) (\u201cIt is self-evident that on the expiration of a patent the monopoly created by it ceases to exist, and the right to make the thing formerly covered by the patent becomes public property. It is upon this condition that the patent is granted.\u201d);\u00a0Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co.,\u00a0151 U.S. 186, 197\u201398,\u00a014 S.Ct. 310,\u00a038 L.Ed. 121\u00a0(1894);\u00a0Suffolk Co. v. Hayden,\u00a070 U.S. (3 Wall.) 315, 319, 18 L.Ed. 76 (1865). As this court recently reminded, \u201c[t]he bar against double patenting was created to preserve that bargained-for right held by the public.\u201d\u00a0Gilead Scis., Inc. v. Natco Pharma Ltd.,\u00a0753 F.3d 1208, 1212\u00a0(Fed.Cir.2014);\u00a0see also\u00a0Boehringer,\u00a0592 F.3d at 1346;\u00a0Longi,\u00a0759 F.2d at 892;\u00a0In re\u00a0\u00a0Robeson,\u00a051 CCPA 1271,\u00a0331 F.2d 610, 614\u00a0(1964). The ban on double patenting ensures that the public gets the benefit of the invention after the original period of monopoly expires.\u00bb\" id=\"return-footnote-279-175\" href=\"#footnote-279-175\" aria-label=\"Footnote 175\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[175]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Le droit US distingue deux types d&rsquo;interdictions de la double brevetabilit\u00e9, qui recoupent le champ de l\u2019article 82 CBE, et de l\u2019article L 612-4 du Code de la propri\u00e9t\u00e9 intellectuelle fran\u00e7ais<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"&quot;La demande de brevet ne peut concerner qu'une invention ou une pluralit\u00e9 d'inventions li\u00e9es entre elles de telle sorte qu'elles ne forment qu'un seul concept inventif g\u00e9n\u00e9ral&quot;.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-176\" href=\"#footnote-279-176\" aria-label=\"Footnote 176\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[176]<\/sup><\/a>: une prohibition l\u00e9gale, et une prohibition pr\u00e9torienne.<\/p>\n<p>La prohibition l\u00e9gale de la double brevetabilit\u00e9 (<em>statutory<\/em> ou <em>same invention double patenting law<\/em>), issue de la section 101 du Patent Act (35 U.S.C. \u00a7 101), interdit de conf\u00e9rer \u00e0 un demandeur plusieurs brevets pour une m\u00eame invention. Cette prohibition ne conna\u00eet aucune exception.<\/p>\n<p>La prohibition pr\u00e9torienne, dite <em>obviousness-type double patenting<\/em> (ODP), interdit de conf\u00e9rer \u00e0 un demandeur plusieurs brevets qui revendiquent des inventions diff\u00e9rentes mais\u00a0 li\u00e9es entre elles de telle sorte qu\u2019elles ne forment qu\u2019un seul concept inventif g\u00e9n\u00e9ral<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"V. AbbVie Inc., 764 F.3d, p. 1372 ; In re Hubbell, 709 F.3d 1140, 1145 (Fed. Cir. 2013); In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887, 892 (Fed. Cir. 1985).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-177\" href=\"#footnote-279-177\" aria-label=\"Footnote 177\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[177]<\/sup><\/a>. Cette seconde prohibition connait deux exceptions, en cas de renonciation aux revendications concern\u00e9es du brevet litigieux, et en cas d\u2019application du \u00ab safe harbor \u00bb pr\u00e9vu en cas de demande divisionnaire par la section 121 du Patent Act, permettant qu\u2019une demande divisionnaire ne puisse se voir opposer la demande parente<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"35. U.S.C. \u00a7 121: &quot;If two or more independent and distinct inventions are claimed in one application, the Director may require the application to be restricted to one of the inventions. If the other invention is made the subject of a divisional application which complies with the requirements of section 120 [claiming benefit of priority] it shall be entitled to the benefit of the filing date of the original application. A patent issuing on an application with respect to which a requirement for restriction under this section has been made, or on an application filed as a result of such a requirement, shall not be used as a reference either in the Patent and Trademark Office or in the courts against a divisional application or against the original application or any patent issued on either of them, if the divisional application is filed before the issuance of the patent on the other application. The validity of a patent shall not be questioned for failure of the Director to require the application to be restricted to one invention&quot;.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-178\" href=\"#footnote-279-178\" aria-label=\"Footnote 178\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[178]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>373._ La nouveaut\u00e9_<\/strong> La d\u00e9finition de la nouveaut\u00e9, et plus pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment des ant\u00e9riorit\u00e9s opposables (<em>prior art<\/em>), a \u00e9t\u00e9 profond\u00e9ment modifi\u00e9e par le Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA), \u00e0 effet en mars 2013. Auparavant, la section 102 disposait\u00a0:<\/p>\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\n<p>\u00ab\u00a0Une personne aura droit \u00e0 un brevet \u00e0 moins:<\/p>\n<p>(a) que l\u2019invention soit connue ou utilis\u00e9e par d\u2019autres dans ce pays, ou qu\u2019elle soit brevet\u00e9e ou d\u00e9crite dans une publication imprim\u00e9e dans ce pays ou \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9tranger, avant son invention par le demandeur au brevet, ou<\/p>\n<p>(b) que l\u2019invention soit brevet\u00e9e ou d\u00e9crite dans une publication imprim\u00e9e dans ce pays ou un pays \u00e9tranger ou soit utilis\u00e9e publiquement ou en vente dans ce pays, plus d\u2019un an avant la date de la demande de brevet aux \u00c9tats-Unis, ou<\/p>\n<p>(c) qu\u2019il ait abandonn\u00e9 l&rsquo;invention, ou<\/p>\n<p>(d) que l\u2019invention ait \u00e9t\u00e9 brevet\u00e9e (\u2026) par le demandeur ou ses repr\u00e9sentants l\u00e9gaux ou cessionnaires dans un pays \u00e9tranger (\u2026) plus de douze mois avant le d\u00e9p\u00f4t de la demande aux \u00c9tats-Unis, ou<\/p>\n<p>(\u2026)<\/p>\n<p>(f) qu&rsquo;il n&rsquo;ait pas invent\u00e9 lui-m\u00eame l&rsquo;invention \u00e0 breveter\u00a0; (\u2026)\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p>Cette d\u00e9finition avait notamment pour effet notable de r\u00e9duire le champ des ant\u00e9riorit\u00e9s \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9tranger, en les limitant aux seules inventions brevet\u00e9es ou d\u00e9crites dans une publication \u00e9crite<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Ainsi la connaissance ou l\u2019utilisation de l\u2019invention en dehors des \u00c9tats-Unis uniquement ne pouvait ant\u00e9rioriser l\u2019invention aux termes de 35\u00a0U.S.C. 102(a). In re Ekenstam, 256 F.2d 321, 118 USPQ 349 (CCPA 1958).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-179\" href=\"#footnote-279-179\" aria-label=\"Footnote 179\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[179]<\/sup><\/a>. Elle \u00e9tablissait \u00e9galement un d\u00e9lai de gr\u00e2ce d\u2019un an, qui constituait, et constitue toujours, sous sa forme modifi\u00e9e, une grande particularit\u00e9 du droit am\u00e9ricain des brevets.<\/p>\n<p>Le nouvel article 102(a), issu de l\u2019America Invents Act, tire toutes les cons\u00e9quences d\u2019un passage au syst\u00e8me de l\u2019inventeur premier d\u00e9posant. Il dispose d\u00e9sormais\u00a0:<\/p>\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\n<p>\u00ab\u00a0Une personne aura droit \u00e0 un brevet \u00e0 moins:<\/p>\n<p>(1) que l\u2019invention revendiqu\u00e9e soit brevet\u00e9e, d\u00e9crite dans une publication imprim\u00e9e, ou utilis\u00e9e publiquement, en vente, ou autrement mise \u00e0 la disposition du public avant la date effective de d\u00e9p\u00f4t de l\u2019invention revendiqu\u00e9e\u00a0; ou<\/p>\n<p>(2) que l\u2019invention revendiqu\u00e9e soit d\u00e9crite dans un brevet d\u00e9livr\u00e9 en application de la section 151, ou dans une demande de brevet publi\u00e9e ou pr\u00e9sum\u00e9e publi\u00e9e en application de la section 122(b), dans laquelle le brevet ou la demande, selon le cas, d\u00e9signe un autre inventeur et a \u00e9t\u00e9 effectivement d\u00e9pos\u00e9 avant la date effective de d\u00e9p\u00f4t de l\u2019invention revendiqu\u00e9e\u00a0\u00bb.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p>La nouveau paragraphe 102(a)(1) supprime les restrictions territoriales dans la d\u00e9finition de l\u2019art ant\u00e9rieur auparavant applicable.<\/p>\n<p>Le paragraphe 102(a)(2) vise quant \u00e0 lui les publications de demandes de brevets am\u00e9ricains, les brevets am\u00e9ricains et les publications de demandes PCT d\u00e9signant les \u00c9tats-Unis qui d\u00e9signent un autre inventeur. Sont ainsi compris dans l\u2019\u00e9tat de la technique les contenus de demandes de brevet qui ont une date effective de d\u00e9p\u00f4t ant\u00e9rieure au d\u00e9p\u00f4t de l\u2019invention et qui n\u2019ont \u00e9t\u00e9 publi\u00e9es qu&rsquo;\u00e0 cette date ou qu&rsquo;\u00e0 une date post\u00e9rieure<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Cette r\u00e8gle est similaire \u00e0 celle pos\u00e9e par l\u2019article L.611-11 alin\u00e9a 3 du Cpi et par l\u2019article 54(3) de la CBE 2000.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-180\" href=\"#footnote-279-180\" aria-label=\"Footnote 180\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[180]<\/sup><\/a>. Cette date est, pour les demandes revendiquant la priorit\u00e9 d\u2019une demande \u00e9trang\u00e8re, la date de priorit\u00e9<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"L\u2019America Invents Act met fin sur ce point (sous r\u00e9serve des r\u00e8gles transitoires) \u00e0 la jurisprudence qui, pour ces demandes, ignorait la date de priorit\u00e9 et ne prenait en compte que la date du d\u00e9p\u00f4t aux \u00c9tats-Unis.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-181\" href=\"#footnote-279-181\" aria-label=\"Footnote 181\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[181]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>374._ \u00ab L\u2019usage public \u00bb_<\/strong> Comme indiqu\u00e9, le texte de la section 102(a)1 issu de l\u2019AIA (35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1)) ne pose aucune limitation g\u00e9ographique \u00e0 l\u2019utilisation publique constitutive d\u2019un \u00e9tat de la technique ant\u00e9rieure du d\u00e9p\u00f4t. Selon les tribunaux :<\/p>\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\n<p>\u00ab Le test applicable pour d\u00e9terminer l&rsquo;usage public vis\u00e9 de l&rsquo;article 102 b) est de savoir si l&rsquo;usage pr\u00e9sum\u00e9 : (1) \u00e9tait accessible au public ou (2) a \u00e9t\u00e9 effectu\u00e9 \u00e0 des fins commerciales. L&rsquo;exploitation commerciale est une indication claire de l&rsquo;usage public, mais elle n\u00e9cessite probablement plus que, par exemple, une offre confidentielle \u00e0 la vente. Ainsi, le crit\u00e8re de l&rsquo;usage public implique l&rsquo;examen des \u00e9l\u00e9ments de preuve concernant l&rsquo;exp\u00e9rimentation et, entre autres, la nature de l&rsquo;activit\u00e9 qui s&rsquo;est d\u00e9roul\u00e9e en public, l&rsquo;acc\u00e8s du public \u00e0 l&rsquo;utilisation, les obligations de confidentialit\u00e9 impos\u00e9es aux membres du public qui ont observ\u00e9 l&rsquo;utilisation et l&rsquo;exploitation commerciale, voir Allied Colloids, Inc. c. Am. Cyanamid Co., 64 F.3d 1570, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Ces \u00e9l\u00e9ments de preuve sont pertinents pour d\u00e9terminer si l&rsquo;utilisation \u00e9tait un usage public susceptible de faire obstacle \u00e0 la brevetabilit\u00e9 \u00bb<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Invitrogen Corp. v. Biocrest Manufacturing L.P., 424 F.3d 1374, 76 USPQ2d 1741 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Egalement, Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333, 336 (1881): \u201c[T]o constitute the public use of an invention it is not necessary that more than one of the patent articles should be publicly used. The use of a great number may tend to strengthen the proof, but one well defined case of such use is just as effectual to annul the patent as many.\u201d Allied Colloids, Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co.,\u00a064 F.3d 1570, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1995).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-182\" href=\"#footnote-279-182\" aria-label=\"Footnote 182\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[182]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p>Un usage public a lieu lorsqu\u2019une machine ou un objet incorporant l\u2019invention est expos\u00e9 en public ou vendu au public, m\u00eame lorsque l\u2019invention est cach\u00e9e \u00e0 la vue du public<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"In re Blaisdell, 242 F.2d 779, 783, 113 USPQ 289, 292 (CCPA 1957); Hall v. Macneale, 107 U.S. 90, 96-97 (1882); Ex parte Kuklo, 25 USPQ2d 1387, 1390 (Bd. Pat. App. &amp; Inter. 1992).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-183\" href=\"#footnote-279-183\" aria-label=\"Footnote 183\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[183]<\/sup><\/a>, ou lorsque l\u2019inventeur permet \u00e0 un tiers d\u2019utiliser l\u2019invention sans restriction ou obligation de confidentialit\u00e9<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"In re Smith, 714 F.2d 1127, 1134, 218 USPQ 976, 983 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 793 F.2d 1261, 1265, 229 USPQ 805, 809 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333, 336 (1881).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-184\" href=\"#footnote-279-184\" aria-label=\"Footnote 184\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[184]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>375._ L\u2019offre \u00e0 la vente (<em>on sale bar<\/em>)_<\/strong><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Lindholm, Stephen Bruce, Revisiting the On-Sale Bar after Pfaff. disponible sur SSRN: https:\/\/ssrn.com\/abstract=656243.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-185\" href=\"#footnote-279-185\" aria-label=\"Footnote 185\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[185]<\/sup><\/a> Afin de constituer une ant\u00e9riorit\u00e9 opposable au sens de ce texte, une invention doit (1) \u00eatre l&rsquo;objet d&rsquo;une offre commerciale de vente \u00e0 des fins non exp\u00e9rimentales et (2) \u00eatre \u00e0 l&rsquo;\u00e9tat brevetable (<em>ready for patenting<\/em>)<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55 (1998): &quot;The on-sale bar applies when two conditions are satisfied before the critical date. First, the product must be the subject of a commercial offer for sale. Here, the acceptance of the purchase order prior to April 8, 1981, makes it clear that such an offer had been made, and there is no question that the sale was commercial. Second, the invention must be ready for patenting. That condition may be satisfied in at least two ways: by proof of reduction to practice before the critical date; or by proof that prior to the critical date the inventor had prepared drawings or other descriptions of the invention that were sufficiently specific to enable a person skilled in the art to practice the invention. This condition is satisfied here because the drawings sent to the manufacturer before the critical date fully disclosed the invention&quot;.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-186\" href=\"#footnote-279-186\" aria-label=\"Footnote 186\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[186]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>La d\u00e9termination de l\u2019existence d\u2019une offre \u00e0 la vente rel\u00e8ve des principes de droit des contrats<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"V. Linear Tech. Corp. v. Micrel, Inc., 275 F.3d 1040 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Group One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 254 F.3d 1041 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (&quot;As a general proposition, we will look to the Uniform Commercial Code (\u2018UCC\u2019) to define whether \u2026 a communication or series of communications rises to the level of a commercial offer for sale.&quot;).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-187\" href=\"#footnote-279-187\" aria-label=\"Footnote 187\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[187]<\/sup><\/a>, qui impliquent notamment l\u2019existence d\u2019une offre ferme<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"&quot;[A] communication that fails to constitute a definite offer to sell the product and to include material terms is not an \u2018offer\u2019 in the contract sense.&quot; Elan Corp., PLC v. Andrx Pharms. Inc., 366 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2004).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-188\" href=\"#footnote-279-188\" aria-label=\"Footnote 188\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[188]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Une vente au sens de cette disposition est un contrat par lequel le vendeur accepte \u00ab\u00a0de transf\u00e9rer des droits de propri\u00e9t\u00e9\u00a0\u00bb en contrepartie d&rsquo;un paiement ou d&rsquo;une promesse de paiement de l&rsquo;acheteur<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"In re Caveney, 761 F.2d 671 (Fed. Cir. 1985).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-189\" href=\"#footnote-279-189\" aria-label=\"Footnote 189\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[189]<\/sup><\/a>. Une cession licence de droits ne constitue pas non plus une vente au sens de ce texte, sauf si elle s\u2019accompagne d\u2019un transfert du produit, ce qui sera par exemple le cas des licences de logiciels standard<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"In re Kollar, 286 F.3d 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2002).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-190\" href=\"#footnote-279-190\" aria-label=\"Footnote 190\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[190]<\/sup><\/a>.\u00a0L\u2019offre \u00e0 la vente constitue une ant\u00e9riorit\u00e9 m\u00eame si elle est conditionnelle<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Strong v. General Elec. Co., 434 F.2d 1042 (5th Cir. 1970).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-191\" href=\"#footnote-279-191\" aria-label=\"Footnote 191\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[191]<\/sup><\/a>, ou unique<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Consolidated Fruit-Jar Co. v. Wright, 94 U.S. 92 (1876); Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 970 F.2d 834 (Fed. Cir. 1992).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-192\" href=\"#footnote-279-192\" aria-label=\"Footnote 192\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[192]<\/sup><\/a>.\u00a0Par ailleurs la vente d\u00e9truit la nouveaut\u00e9 m\u00eame lorsque l\u2019inventeur n\u2019y a pas consenti et qu\u2019elle est le fait d\u2019un tiers qui a obtenu l\u2019invention de l\u2019inventeur<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Electric Storage Battery Co. v. Shimadzu, 307 U.S. 5 (1939); In re Blaisdell, 242 F.2d 779 (CCPA 1957); CTS Corp. v. Electro Materials Corp. of America, 469 F. Supp. 801, 819, 202 USPQ 22, 38 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-193\" href=\"#footnote-279-193\" aria-label=\"Footnote 193\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[193]<\/sup><\/a>. <span style=\"font-size: 1em;\">Enfin, la vente n\u2019a pas non plus \u00e0 \u00eatre publique. <\/span><\/p>\n<p>En 2024, dans l\u2019affaire \u00a0<em>Celanese Intl. <\/em><em>Corp. v. Intl. Trade Comm\u2019n<\/em><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Celanese Intl. Corp. v. Intl. Trade Comm\u2019n,\u00a0 22-01827 (Fed. Cir. August 12, 2024).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-194\" href=\"#footnote-279-194\" aria-label=\"Footnote 194\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[194]<\/sup><\/a><em>, <\/em>le Circuit F\u00e9d\u00e9ral a rendu une d\u00e9cision importante sur l\u2019interpr\u00e9tation du texte de la section 102 issu de l\u2019AIA, en confirmant l\u2019application des principes ant\u00e9rieurs \u00e0 l\u2019AIA, et plus pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment la possibilit\u00e9 d\u2019ant\u00e9rioriser un d\u00e9p\u00f4t par la vente d\u2019un produit fabriqu\u00e9 \u00e0 l\u2019aide d\u2019un proc\u00e9d\u00e9 tenu secret.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>376._ \u00ab Autrement accessible au public \u00bb_ <\/strong>Le Manual of Patent Examining Procedure <a class=\"footnote\" title=\"MPEP \u00a7 2152.02(e).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-195\" href=\"#footnote-279-195\" aria-label=\"Footnote 195\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[195]<\/sup><\/a> donne comme exemple d\u2019inventions autrement accessibles au public au sens de la section 102 l&rsquo;accessibilit\u00e9 au travers d&rsquo;une th\u00e8se d\u00e9pos\u00e9e dans une biblioth\u00e8que universitaire<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"In re Cronyn, 890 F.2d 1158, 13 USPQ2d 1070 (Fed. Cir. 1989); In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 228 USPQ 453 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (&quot;that competent evidence of the general library practice may be relied upon to establish an approximate time when a thesis became accessible&quot;); In re Bayer, 568 F.2d 1357, 196 USPQ 670 (CCPA 1978): une \u00a0th\u00e8se conserv\u00e9e, mais ni mise en rayon, ni catalogu\u00e9e, dans une biblioth\u00e8que universitaire n'est pas accessible au public; MPEP \u00a7 2128.01, I.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-196\" href=\"#footnote-279-196\" aria-label=\"Footnote 196\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[196]<\/sup><\/a>, des affiches ou d&rsquo;autres communications \u00e0 l&rsquo;occasion d&rsquo;une r\u00e9union scientifique<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"In re Klopfenstein, 380 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2004): &quot;In October 1998, the appellants, along with colleague M. Liu, presented a printed slide presentation (...) at a meeting of the American Association of Cereal Chemists (&quot;AACC&quot;). The fourteen-slide presentation was printed and pasted onto poster boards. The printed slide presentation was displayed continuously for two and a half days at the AACC meeting. (...) Both parties agree that the Liu reference presented (...)\u00a0 disclosed every limitation of the invention disclosed in the '950 patent application. Furthermore, at neither presentation was there a disclaimer or notice to the intended audience prohibiting note-taking or copying of the presentation.&quot; ; Massachusetts Institute of Technology v. AB Fortia, 774 F.2d 1104 (Fed. Cir. 1985): &quot;The Birmingham paper was orally presented by Dr. Levine of the MIT group to the First International Cell Culture Congress in Birmingham, Alabama, September 21-25, 1975. The conference was attended by 50 to 500 cell culturists. Prior to the conference Dr. Levine gave a copy of the paper to the head of the conference. Afterward, copies were distributed on request, without any restrictions, to as many as six persons, more than one year before the filing date of the '534 and '654 patents&quot;; Jazz Pharm., Inc. v. Amneal Pharm., LLC, 895 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2018), MPEP \u00a7 2128.01, IV.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-197\" href=\"#footnote-279-197\" aria-label=\"Footnote 197\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[197]<\/sup><\/a>, une invention visible dans une demande de brevet<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"In re Wyer, 655 F.2d 221 (CCPA 1981); Bruckelmyer v. Ground Heaters, Inc., 445 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2006): dessins dans le dossier de brevet, accessibles au public.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-198\" href=\"#footnote-279-198\" aria-label=\"Footnote 198\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[198]<\/sup><\/a>, ou un document accessible sur un site Web<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Voter Verified, Inc. v. Premier Election Solutions, Inc., 698 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ; In re Lister, 583 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2009): archive accessible sur une base de donn\u00e9es en ligne; mais v. SRI Int'l, Inc. v. Internet Sec. Sys., Inc., 511 F.3d (Fed. Cir. 2008): document sur un site FTP, mais non catalogu\u00e9 ni index\u00e9.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-199\" href=\"#footnote-279-199\" aria-label=\"Footnote 199\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[199]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>377._ Les divulgations non opposables_<\/strong> Les divulgations non opposables sont d\u00e9finies \u00e0 la section 102(b), qui vise le d\u00e9lai de gr\u00e2ce et d\u2019autres divulgations non opposables.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>378._ Le d\u00e9lai de gr\u00e2ce_<\/strong> La section 102(b)(1), modifi\u00e9e par le Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA) r\u00e9forme le d\u00e9lai de gr\u00e2ce (<em>Grace Period Inventor-Originated Disclosure Exception<\/em>), qui demeure une particularit\u00e9 notable du droit des brevets US (notamment au regard de son r\u00e9gime)<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"V. MPEP, \u00a7 2153.01(a).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-200\" href=\"#footnote-279-200\" aria-label=\"Footnote 200\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[200]<\/sup><\/a>. Elle pr\u00e9voit qu\u2019une divulgation faite un an ou moins avant la date effective de d\u00e9p\u00f4t d\u2019une invention revendiqu\u00e9e n\u2019est pas opposable si elle est le fait de l\u2019inventeur, du coinventeur ou d\u2019un tiers ayant obtenu de l\u2019inventeur ou du coinventeur, directement ou indirectement, l\u2019\u00e9l\u00e9ment divulgu\u00e9, et \u00e9carte \u00e9galement toute divulgation intercalaire d\u2019un tiers:<\/p>\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\n<p>\u00ab Une divulgation faite 1 an ou moins avant la date de d\u00e9p\u00f4t effective d&rsquo;une invention revendiqu\u00e9e ne constitue pas un \u00e9tat de la technique par rapport \u00e0 l&rsquo;invention revendiqu\u00e9e en vertu du paragraphe (a) (1) si (A) la divulgation a \u00e9t\u00e9 faite par l&rsquo;inventeur ou le co-inventeur ou par un autre qui a obtenu l&rsquo;objet divulgu\u00e9 directement ou indirectement de l&rsquo;inventeur ou d&rsquo;un co-inventeur ; ou (B) l&rsquo;objet divulgu\u00e9 avait, avant cette divulgation, \u00e9t\u00e9 divulgu\u00e9 publiquement par l&rsquo;inventeur ou un co-inventeur ou une autre personne ayant obtenu l&rsquo;objet divulgu\u00e9 directement ou indirectement de l&rsquo;inventeur ou d&rsquo;un co-inventeur \u00bb.<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"\u00ab A disclosure made 1 year or less before the effective filing date of a claimed invention shall not be prior art to the claimed invention under subsection (a)(1) if(A) the disclosure was made by the inventor or joint inventor or by another who obtained the subject matter disclosed directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor; or (B) the subject matter disclosed had, before such disclosure, been publicly disclosed by the inventor or a joint inventor or another who obtained the subject matter disclosed directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor \u00bb.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-201\" href=\"#footnote-279-201\" aria-label=\"Footnote 201\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[201]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p>On notera que la p\u00e9riode de douze mois est calcul\u00e9e \u00e0 partir de la date effective de priorit\u00e9, am\u00e9ricaine ou \u00e9trang\u00e8re; et donc, notamment, \u00e0 partir de la date d&rsquo;une demande provisoire &#8211; <em>provisional application<\/em><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"V. infra, n\u00b0388.[footnote].\n\nUne d\u00e9claration peut \u00eatre jointe \u00e0 la demande permettant d'\u00e9tablir qu'une divulgation est bien couverte par le d\u00e9lai de gr\u00e2ce. Le d\u00e9lai de gr\u00e2ce d'un an pr\u00e9vu est prolong\u00e9 jusqu'au jour ouvrable suivant s'il expire un samedi, un dimanche ou un jour f\u00e9ri\u00e9 f\u00e9d\u00e9ral[footnote]35 U.S.C. \u00a7 21(b).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-202\" href=\"#footnote-279-202\" aria-label=\"Footnote 202\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[202]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>379._ Autres divulgations non opposables_ <\/strong><span style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\">La section 102(b)(2) (\"divulgations issues de demandes et de brevets\" - <\/span><em style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\">disclosures appearing in applications and patents<\/em><span style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\">) pr\u00e9voit quant \u00e0 elle des exceptions correspondantes \u00e0 la r\u00e8gle pr\u00e9vue \u00e0 la section 102(a)(2)<\/span><span style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"\u00ab Une personne aura droit \u00e0 un brevet \u00e0 moins: (...) (2) que l\u2019invention revendiqu\u00e9e soit d\u00e9crite dans un brevet d\u00e9livr\u00e9 en application de la section 151, ou dans une demande de brevet publi\u00e9e ou pr\u00e9sum\u00e9e publi\u00e9e en application de la section 122(b), dans laquelle le brevet ou la demande, selon le cas, d\u00e9signe un autre inventeur et a \u00e9t\u00e9 effectivement d\u00e9pos\u00e9e avant la date effective de d\u00e9p\u00f4t de l\u2019invention revendiqu\u00e9e \u00bb.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-203\" href=\"#footnote-279-203\" aria-label=\"Footnote 203\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[203]<\/sup><\/a>. Elle dispose :<\/span><\/p>\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\n<p>\u00ab Une divulgation ne constitue pas un \u00e9tat de la technique d'une invention revendiqu\u00e9e en vertu du paragraphe (a)(2) si (A) l'objet divulgu\u00e9 a \u00e9t\u00e9 obtenu directement ou indirectement aupr\u00e8s de l'inventeur ou d'un co-inventeur ; (B) l'objet divulgu\u00e9 avait, avant qu'il ne soit effectivement d\u00e9pos\u00e9 en vertu du paragraphe (a)(2), \u00e9t\u00e9 divulgu\u00e9 publiquement par l'inventeur ou un co-inventeur ou une autre personne qui a obtenu l'objet divulgu\u00e9 directement ou indirectement de l'inventeur ou un co-inventeur ; ou (C) l'objet divulgu\u00e9 et l'invention revendiqu\u00e9e, au plus tard \u00e0 la date de d\u00e9p\u00f4t effective de l'invention revendiqu\u00e9e, appartenaient \u00e0 la m\u00eame personne ou \u00e9taient soumis \u00e0 une obligation de cession \u00e0 la m\u00eame personne<span style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\">\u00a0\u00bb<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"\u00ab A disclosure shall not be prior art to a claimed invention under subsection (a)(2) if (A)the subject matter disclosed was obtained directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor; (B)the subject matter disclosed had, before such subject matter was effectively filed under subsection (a)(2), been publicly disclosed by the inventor or a joint inventor or another who obtained the subject matter disclosed directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor; or (C)the subject matter disclosed and the claimed invention, not later than the effective filing date of the claimed invention, were owned by the same person or subject to an obligation of assignment to the same person \u00bb.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-204\" href=\"#footnote-279-204\" aria-label=\"Footnote 204\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[204]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>Le paragraphe A (\"<em>Inventor-Originated Disclosure Exception<\/em>\") exclut tout du champ de la section 102(a)(2) les divulgations portant sur un objet obtenu directement ou indirectement aupr\u00e8s de l'inventeur ou d'un co-inventeur.<\/p>\n<p>Le paragraphe B (\"<em>Inventor-Originated Prior Public Disclosure Exception<\/em>\") exclut ensuite les divulgations issues de d\u00e9p\u00f4ts par un tiers apr\u00e8s que l'invention ait \u00e9t\u00e9 divulgu\u00e9e publiquement par l'inventeur, un co-inventeur ou une autre personne qui a obtenu l'objet directement ou indirectement de l'inventeur ou du co-inventeur.<\/p>\n<p>Le paragraphe C (\"<em>Common Ownership or Obligation of Assignment Exception<\/em>\") exclut enfin l'invention divulgu\u00e9e dans les brevets et demandes vis\u00e9s si l'objet divulgu\u00e9 et l'invention revendiqu\u00e9e, au plus tard \u00e0 la date de d\u00e9p\u00f4t effective de l'invention revendiqu\u00e9e, \"\u00e9taient la propri\u00e9t\u00e9 de la m\u00eame personne ou soumis \u00e0 une obligation de cession \u00e0 la m\u00eame personne\".<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>380._ Effets sur la d\u00e9termination de l'activit\u00e9 inventive_<\/strong> L'\u00e9tat de la technique <span style=\"font-size: 1em;\">\u00e0 consid\u00e9rer pour l\u2019appr\u00e9ciation de l\u2019activit\u00e9 inventive est le m\u00eame que celui d\u00e9fini pour la nouveaut\u00e9<\/span><span style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"35 U.S.C. \u00a7 103.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-205\" href=\"#footnote-279-205\" aria-label=\"Footnote 205\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[205]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>381._ La seconde application th\u00e9rapeutique_<\/strong> Aux \u00c9tats-Unis les secondes applications th\u00e9rapeutiques de produits connus (y compris les nouveaux dosages d\u2019un m\u00e9dicament connu pour traiter une maladie connue) sont brevetables si elles satisfont aux conditions de nouveaut\u00e9 et d\u2019activit\u00e9 inventive. Comme en Europe, la revendication ne peut pas prendre un format dit de type suisse (\u00ab utilisation d\u2019une substance X pour fabriquer un m\u00e9dicament destin\u00e9 \u00e0 soigner la maladie Y \u00bb). La forme sera celle dite de la \u00ab m\u00e9thode de traitement \u00bb (m\u00e9thode de traitement d\u2019un patient souffrant d\u2019une maladie Y par l\u2019administration d\u2019un dosage ad\u00e9quat du composant ancien Y). Rappelons que les \u00ab praticiens m\u00e9dicaux exer\u00e7ant dans le cadre d\u2019une activit\u00e9 m\u00e9dicale \u00bb et les institutions qui les emploient b\u00e9n\u00e9ficient d\u2019une limitation de responsabilit\u00e9, \u00e9galement applicable dans le cadre de la contrefa\u00e7on de brevets portant sur les secondes applications th\u00e9rapeutiques brevet\u00e9es<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"35 U.S.C. \u00a7 287(c). \u00ab\u00a0The term \u201cmedical activity\u201d means the performance of a medical or surgical procedure on a body, but shall not include (i) the use of a patented machine, manufacture, or composition of matter in violation of such patent, (ii) the practice of a patented use of a composition of matter in violation of such patent, or (iii) the practice of a process in violation of a biotechnology patent.\u00a0\u00bb Ibid.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-206\" href=\"#footnote-279-206\" aria-label=\"Footnote 206\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[206]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>382._ L\u2019utilit\u00e9 (application industrielle)_<\/strong> La condition d\u2019utilit\u00e9 a un fondement constitutionnel, la clause de copyright et de brevet de la Constitution f\u00e9d\u00e9rale visant express\u00e9ment la promotion des \u00ab arts utiles \u00bb (<em>useful arts<\/em>)<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Renishaw PLC, 945 F.2d 1173, 20 USPQ2d 1094 (Fed. Cir. 1991)\" id=\"return-footnote-279-207\" href=\"#footnote-279-207\" aria-label=\"Footnote 207\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[207]<\/sup><\/a>. Le crit\u00e8re d\u2019utilit\u00e9 est cit\u00e9 \u00e0 la section 101, mais ne fait pas l\u2019objet d\u2019une d\u00e9finition l\u00e9gale<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"V. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 529, 148 USPQ 689, 693 (1966) (relevant la difficult\u00e9 de d\u00e9finir le concept).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-208\" href=\"#footnote-279-208\" aria-label=\"Footnote 208\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[208]<\/sup><\/a>. La jurisprudence exige une \u00ab utilit\u00e9 sp\u00e9cifique \u00bb (<em>specific utility<\/em>), c\u2019est-\u00e0-dire sp\u00e9cifique \u00e0 l\u2019invention revendiqu\u00e9e et susceptible d\u2019apporter un b\u00e9n\u00e9fice bien d\u00e9fini au public<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1371, 76 USPQ2d 1225, 1230 (Fed. Cir. 2005).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-209\" href=\"#footnote-279-209\" aria-label=\"Footnote 209\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[209]<\/sup><\/a>. L\u2019utilit\u00e9 doit \u00e9galement concerner l\u2019invention telle que divulgu\u00e9e, et apporter un b\u00e9n\u00e9fice imm\u00e9diat au public (<em>practical<\/em> ou <em>substantial utility<\/em>)<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Ibid\u00a0: \u00ab [A]n application must show that an invention is useful to the public as disclosed in its current form, not that it may prove useful at some future date after further research. Simply put, to satisfy the \u2018substantial\u2019 utility requirement, an asserted use must show that the claimed invention has a significant and presently available benefit to the public \u00bb.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-210\" href=\"#footnote-279-210\" aria-label=\"Footnote 210\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[210]<\/sup><\/a>. Pour satisfaire \u00e0 cette condition, le demandeur doit d\u00e9montrer en quoi l\u2019invention revendiqu\u00e9e pr\u00e9sente une utilit\u00e9 sp\u00e9cifique et substantielle, explicitement ou implicitement.<\/p>\n<p>Une invention qui ne produit pas les effets revendiqu\u00e9s n\u2019est pas une invention utile et n\u2019est pas brevetable. Cependant, pour \u00eatre ainsi exclue de la brevetabilit\u00e9 l\u2019invention doit \u00eatre \u00ab\u00a0totalement incapable de produit un effet utile\u00a0\u00bb<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555, 1571, 24 USPQ2d 1401, 1412 (Fed. Cir. 1992). V. \u00e9galement E.I. du Pont De Nemours and Co. v. Berkley and Co., 620 F.2d 1247, 1260 n.17, 205 USPQ 1, 10 n.17 (8th Cir. 1980) (\u00abA small degree of utility is sufficient (\u2026). The claimed invention must only be capable of performing some beneficial function (\u2026). An invention does not lack utility merely because the particular embodiment disclosed in the patent lacks perfection or performs crudely (\u2026). A commercially successful product is not required (\u2026). Nor is it essential that the invention accomplish all its intended functions (\u2026) or operate under all conditions (\u2026) partial success being sufficient to demonstrate patentable utility (\u2026). In short, the defense of non-utility cannot be sustained without proof of total incapacity.\u00a0\u00bb, cit\u00e9 dans le MPEP, \u00a7 2107.01).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-211\" href=\"#footnote-279-211\" aria-label=\"Footnote 211\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[211]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Ces r\u00e8gles sont \u00e9galement applicables dans le domaine des m\u00e9dicaments et des inventions biotechnologiques. Le demandeur doit cependant fournir des \u00e9l\u00e9ments qui permettent raisonnablement de soutenir l\u2019utilit\u00e9 de l\u2019invention<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"V. MPEP, \u00a7 2107.03: \u00ab As a general matter, evidence of pharmacological or other biological activity of a compound will be relevant to an asserted therapeutic use if there is a reasonable correlation between the activity in question and the asserted utility. Cross v. Iizuka, 753 F.2d 1040, 224 USPQ 739 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re Jolles, 628 F.2d 1322, 206 USPQ 885 (CCPA 1980); Nelson v. Bowler, 626 F.2d 853, 206 USPQ 881 (CCPA 1980). An applicant can establish this reasonable correlation by relying on statistically relevant data documenting the activity of a compound or composition, arguments or reasoning, documentary evidence (e.g., articles in scientific journals), or any combination thereof. The applicant does not have to prove that a correlation exists between a particular activity and an asserted therapeutic use of a compound as a matter of statistical certainty, nor does he or she have to provide actual evidence of success in treating humans where such a utility is asserted. Instead, as the courts have repeatedly held, all that is required is a reasonable correlation between the activity and the asserted use. Nelson v. Bowler, 626 F.2d 853, 857, 206 USPQ 881, 884 (CCPA 1980) \u00bb.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-212\" href=\"#footnote-279-212\" aria-label=\"Footnote 212\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[212]<\/sup><\/a>, ce qui peut l\u2019amener \u00e0 produire des essais cliniques.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>383._ L\u2019activit\u00e9 inventive (nonobviousness)_<\/strong> Le crit\u00e8re d\u2019activit\u00e9 inventive a \u00e9t\u00e9 codifi\u00e9 dans la section 103 du Patent Act 1952. Ce texte, tel que modifi\u00e9 par l\u2019AIA, dispose\u00a0:<\/p>\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\n<p>\u00ab Un brevet pour une invention revendiqu\u00e9e ne peut pas \u00eatre obtenu, nonobstant le fait que l\u2019invention revendiqu\u00e9e n\u2019est pas divulgu\u00e9e de fa\u00e7on identique aux termes de la section 102, si les diff\u00e9rences entre l\u2019invention revendiqu\u00e9e et l\u2019art ant\u00e9rieur son telle que l\u2019invention revendiqu\u00e9e dans son ensemble \u00e9tait \u00e9vidente avant sa date de d\u00e9p\u00f4t effective pour une personne ayant des connaissances techniques ordinaires dans le domaine d\u2019application de l\u2019invention. La brevetabilit\u00e9 ne doit pas \u00eatre refus\u00e9e en consid\u00e9ration de la fa\u00e7on dont l\u2019invention a \u00e9t\u00e9 r\u00e9alis\u00e9e \u00bb<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"\u00ab A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made \u00bb.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-213\" href=\"#footnote-279-213\" aria-label=\"Footnote 213\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[213]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p>Dans sa d\u00e9cision <em>Graham v. John Deere Co.<\/em>,<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-214\" href=\"#footnote-279-214\" aria-label=\"Footnote 214\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[214]<\/sup><\/a> la Cour Supr\u00eame a d\u00e9fini le test d\u2019activit\u00e9 inventive comme suit (\u00ab\u00a0<em>Graham test<\/em>\u00a0\u00bb ou \u00ab\u00a0<em>Graham factors<\/em>\u00a0\u00bb):<\/p>\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\n<p>\u00ab la condition pos\u00e9e par le paragraphe 103, qui n\u2019est qu\u2019une des trois conditions [de brevetabilit\u00e9] \u00e0 satisfaire, implique l\u2019examen de plusieurs \u00e9l\u00e9ments de fait. En application du \u00a7 103, le champ et le contenu de l\u2019art ant\u00e9rieur doivent \u00eatre d\u00e9termin\u00e9s; les diff\u00e9rences entre l\u2019art ant\u00e9rieur et les revendications litigieuses doivent \u00eatre appr\u00e9ci\u00e9es; et la question du niveau des connaissances techniques ordinaires dans le domaine pertinent r\u00e9solue. Sur ces bases, le caract\u00e8re \u00e9vident ou non de invention est d\u00e9termin\u00e9. Des consid\u00e9rations secondaires telles que le succ\u00e8s commercial, un besoin exprim\u00e9 de longue date mais jamais satisfait, les \u00e9checs d\u2019autres inventeurs, etc., peuvent \u00eatre utilis\u00e9es pour \u00e9clairer les circonstances entourant l\u2019origine de l\u2019invention objet de la demande. En tant qu\u2019indices d\u2019activit\u00e9 inventives, ces questions peuvent \u00eatre pertinentes \u00bb<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"383 U.S., 17-18.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-215\" href=\"#footnote-279-215\" aria-label=\"Footnote 215\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[215]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p>Ce test a \u00e9t\u00e9 repris et pr\u00e9cis\u00e9 par la Cour Supr\u00eame en 2007 dans son arr\u00eat <em>KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc. (KSR)<\/em><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc. (KSR), 550 U.S. 398, 82 USPQ2d 1385 (2007).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-216\" href=\"#footnote-279-216\" aria-label=\"Footnote 216\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[216]<\/sup><\/a>, notamment au regard du niveau comp\u00e9tence \u00ab\u00a0ordinaire\u00a0\u00bb exig\u00e9 de l\u2019homme de l\u2019art.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>384._ Le r\u00e9gime sp\u00e9cifique applicable \u00e0 certains proc\u00e9d\u00e9s biotechnologiques_<\/strong> Depuis 1995 et jusqu\u2019\u00e0 r\u00e9cemment, le droit des brevets aux \u00c9tats-Unis avait mis en place un r\u00e9gime tr\u00e8s particulier concernant la brevetabilit\u00e9 des proc\u00e9d\u00e9s en mati\u00e8re de biotechnologie, curieusement peu comment\u00e9e en Europe. Ce r\u00e9gime, issu du Biotechnology Process Patent Act 1995<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Pub. L. No. 104-41; B. Alley, The Biotechnology Process Patent Act of 1995: Providing Unresolved and Unrecognized Dilemmas in U.S. Patent Law, 12 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 229 (2004).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-217\" href=\"#footnote-279-217\" aria-label=\"Footnote 217\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[217]<\/sup><\/a>, \u00e9tait int\u00e9gr\u00e9 \u00e0 la section 103 du Patent Act, et permettait, sous certaines conditions de ne pas appliquer le crit\u00e8re d\u2019activit\u00e9 inventive \u00e0 un proc\u00e9d\u00e9 dans le domaine de la biotechnologie.<\/p>\n<p>Un proc\u00e9d\u00e9 biotechnologique, tel que d\u00e9fini par la loi<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Le proc\u00e9d\u00e9 \u00e9tait d\u00e9fini comme suit par 35 U.S.C. \u00a7 103(b): \u00ab \u201cbiotechnological process\u201d means (A) a process of genetically altering or otherwise inducing a single- or multi-celled organism to(i) express an exogenous nucleotide sequence, (ii) inhibit, eliminate, augment, or alter expression of an endogenous nucleotide sequence, or (iii) express a specific physiological characteristic not naturally associated with said organism; (B) cell fusion procedures yielding a cell line that expresses a specific protein, such as a mono-clonal antibody; and (C) a method of using a product produced by a process defined by subparagraph (A) or (B), or a combination of subparagraphs (A) and (B). \u00bb\" id=\"return-footnote-279-218\" href=\"#footnote-279-218\" aria-label=\"Footnote 218\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[218]<\/sup><\/a>, pouvait \u00eatre consid\u00e9r\u00e9 comme inventif s\u2019il utilisait ou s\u2019il r\u00e9sultait dans une composition de mati\u00e8re elle-m\u00eame nouvelle et inventive et donc brevetable. Les seules conditions pos\u00e9es \u00e9taient que les demandes visant le proc\u00e9d\u00e9 et le produit correspondant soient d\u00e9pos\u00e9es simulan\u00e9ment, et que les deux inventions aient le m\u00eame inventeur<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Le texte pr\u00e9voyait que les deux brevets expirent \u00e0 la m\u00eame date.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-219\" href=\"#footnote-279-219\" aria-label=\"Footnote 219\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[219]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Ce r\u00e9gime constituait un avantage certain pour l\u2019industrie locale du m\u00e9dicament, notamment dans le cas d\u2019un brevet portant sur un proc\u00e9d\u00e9 non inventif appliqu\u00e9 pour la premi\u00e8re fois \u00e0 une mol\u00e9cule brevet\u00e9e, et aboutissant \u00e0 une mol\u00e9cule non brevetable. Il permettait en effet (et permet toujours), dans cette hypoth\u00e8se, au titulaire du brevet de proc\u00e9d\u00e9 de s\u2019opposer \u00e0 importations des mol\u00e9cules non brevet\u00e9es issues de l\u2019utilisation du proc\u00e9d\u00e9 non inventif \u00e0 l\u2019\u00e9tranger (par hypoth\u00e8se en relation avec la mol\u00e9cule brevet\u00e9e aux \u00c9tats-Unis, mais non brevet\u00e9e dans ces pays).<\/p>\n<p>Ce r\u00e9gime a \u00e9t\u00e9 supprim\u00e9 pour l\u2019avenir par l\u2019America Invents Act, et n\u2019est plus applicable aux demandes d\u00e9pos\u00e9es \u00e0 partir du 16 mars 2013. Il ne remet cependant pas en cause les brevets d\u00e9j\u00e0 accord\u00e9s.<\/p>\n<h3><strong>B. Les conditions de forme<\/strong><\/h3>\n<p><strong>385._ Patent agents and patent attorneys_<\/strong> Aux \u00c9tats-Unis la pr\u00e9paration, le d\u00e9p\u00f4t et le suivi des demandes de brevet doivent \u00eatre effectu\u00e9s par des professionnels qualifi\u00e9s et autoris\u00e9s aupr\u00e8s du Patents and Trademark Office, les <em>patent agents<\/em> et les <em>patent attorneys<\/em>. Les <em>patent agents<\/em> font partie du <em>patent bar<\/em>. Les <em>patents attor<\/em>neys ont les m\u00eames qualifications professionnelles que les <em>patent agents<\/em>, mais sont \u00e9galement des avocats inscrit \u00e0 l\u2019un des barreaux des Etats de l\u2019Union.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>386._ L\u2019US Patents and Trademark Office_<\/strong> L\u2019United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) est une agence des \u00c9tats-Unis, \u00e9tablie au sein du minist\u00e8re du Commerce. Il est responsable de l'octroi et la d\u00e9livrance des brevets et de l'enregistrement des marques, de la diffusion de l'information du public dans ce domaine. Il \u00e9tablit les r\u00e8glements de proc\u00e9dure applicables. Son Directeur, nomm\u00e9 par le Pr\u00e9sident et le S\u00e9nat, dirige l\u2019office et la d\u00e9livrance des brevets, ainsi que l'enregistrement des marques.<\/p>\n<p>L\u2019USPTO a \u00e9galement un pouvoir de contr\u00f4le et de suspension des agents de brevets.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>387._ La demande (g\u00e9n\u00e9ral)_<\/strong><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"V. USPTO, A Guide to Filing a Utility Patent Application.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-220\" href=\"#footnote-279-220\" aria-label=\"Footnote 220\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[220]<\/sup><\/a> Une demande de brevet doit \u00eatre faite ou autoris\u00e9e par l\u2019inventeur<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"35 U.S.C. \u00a7 111(a)(1). Les coinventeurs doivent demander un brevet conjointement (35 U.S.C. \u00a7 116, qui traite \u00e9galement des relations entre coinventeurs).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-221\" href=\"#footnote-279-221\" aria-label=\"Footnote 221\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[221]<\/sup><\/a>. Elle peut \u00e9galement \u00eatre d\u00e9pos\u00e9e par une personne \u00e0 qui l'inventeur a c\u00e9d\u00e9 ou accept\u00e9 par \u00e9crit de c\u00e9der l'invention<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"35 USC 118.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-222\" href=\"#footnote-279-222\" aria-label=\"Footnote 222\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[222]<\/sup><\/a>. Elle doit contenir<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"35 U.S.C. \u00a7 111(a)(2).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-223\" href=\"#footnote-279-223\" aria-label=\"Footnote 223\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[223]<\/sup><\/a> : (1) des \u00ab sp\u00e9cifications \u00bb (<em>specification<\/em>), en deux parties\u00a0: la premi\u00e8re consiste dans une description proprement dite de l\u2019invention (avec ou sans r\u00e9sum\u00e9), la seconde contient les revendications (au moins une)<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"35 U.S.C. \u00a7 112.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-224\" href=\"#footnote-279-224\" aria-label=\"Footnote 224\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[224]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0; (2) un dessin, si n\u00e9cessaire \u00e0 la compr\u00e9hension de l\u2019invention; (3) et une d\u00e9claration sous serment de l\u2019inventeur ou, \u00e0 d\u00e9faut, par le requ\u00e9rant<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"35 U.S.C. \u00a7 115. 37 C.F.R. \u00a7 1.64.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-225\" href=\"#footnote-279-225\" aria-label=\"Footnote 225\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[225]<\/sup><\/a>. Elle s\u2019accompagne du paiement d\u2019une redevance de d\u00e9p\u00f4t (<em>filing fee<\/em>)<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"35 U.S.C. \u00a7 111.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-226\" href=\"#footnote-279-226\" aria-label=\"Footnote 226\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[226]<\/sup><\/a>. La date de d\u00e9p\u00f4t est celle du d\u00e9p\u00f4t des sp\u00e9cifications et du dessin (s\u2019il est n\u00e9cessaire)<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"37 C.F.R. \u00a7 1.53(b).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-227\" href=\"#footnote-279-227\" aria-label=\"Footnote 227\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[227]<\/sup><\/a>, la d\u00e9claration et le paiement de la redevance du d\u00e9p\u00f4t pouvant intervenir dans un d\u00e9lai notifi\u00e9 par l'USPTO<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"37 C.F.R. \u00a7 1.53(f).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-228\" href=\"#footnote-279-228\" aria-label=\"Footnote 228\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[228]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>388._ Les demandes provisoires, divisionnaires, continues et de continuation partielles_ <\/strong>Depuis le 8 juin 1995 il est possible de d\u00e9poser de mani\u00e8re simplifi\u00e9e une demande provisoire de brevet (<em>provisional application for patent<\/em>)<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"35 U.S.C. \u00a7 111(b).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-229\" href=\"#footnote-279-229\" aria-label=\"Footnote 229\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[229]<\/sup><\/a>. Cette demande ne contient pas de revendications ni de d\u00e9claration sous serment. Elle ne fait pas l\u2019objet d\u2019un examen des conditions de protection, et permet, si un d\u00e9p\u00f4t complet intervient dans les 12 mois<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Une conversion de la demande provisoire en demande d\u00e9finitive peut \u00e9galement \u00eatre demand\u00e9e, mais qui fait perdre le b\u00e9n\u00e9fice de la premi\u00e8re date de d\u00e9p\u00f4t.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-230\" href=\"#footnote-279-230\" aria-label=\"Footnote 230\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[230]<\/sup><\/a>, d\u2019obtenir le b\u00e9n\u00e9fice de la date du d\u00e9p\u00f4t provisoire. A d\u00e9faut de d\u00e9p\u00f4t ou de conversion dans les 12 mois, l\u2019entier b\u00e9n\u00e9fice du d\u00e9p\u00f4t est perdu. La demande provisoire permet de b\u00e9n\u00e9ficier du d\u00e9lai de priorit\u00e9 de la Convention de Paris. Elle d\u00e9clenche \u00e9galement le calcul du d\u00e9lai de gr\u00e2ce d'un an<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"V. supra, n\u00b0378.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-231\" href=\"#footnote-279-231\" aria-label=\"Footnote 231\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[231]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Aux \u00c9tats-Unis les demandes divisionnaires, de continuation, mais \u00e9galement de <em>continuation\u2013in\u2013part<\/em> sont admises.<\/p>\n<p>Une demande divisionnaire<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"35 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 121.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-232\" href=\"#footnote-279-232\" aria-label=\"Footnote 232\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[232]<\/sup><\/a> est une demande comportant la m\u00eame divulgation qu'une demande ant\u00e9rieure ou parente, et revendiquant une invention ind\u00e9pendante ou distincte.<\/p>\n<p>La demande divisionnaire doit \u00e9noncer au moins la partie de la divulgation ant\u00e9rieure qui se rapporte \u00e0 l'invention telle que revendiqu\u00e9e dans la demande divisionnaire. Une demande divisionnaire d\u00e9pos\u00e9e \u00ab avant la d\u00e9livrance du brevet, l\u2019abandon ou la cl\u00f4ture de la proc\u00e9dure relative \u00e0 la demande ant\u00e9rieure ou \u00e0 une demande b\u00e9n\u00e9ficient \u00e9galement de la date de d\u00e9p\u00f4t de la demande ant\u00e9rieure \u00bb<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"35 U.S.C. \u00a7 120 (Benefit of earlier filing date in the United States): &quot;An application for patent for an invention disclosed in the manner provided by section 112(a) (other than the requirement to disclose the best mode) in an application previously filed in the United States, or as provided by section 363 or 385, which names an inventor or joint inventor in the previously filed application shall have the same effect, as to such invention, as though filed on the date of the prior application, if filed before the patenting or abandonment of or termination of proceedings on the first application or on an application similarly entitled to the benefit of the filing date of the first application and if it contains or is amended to contain a specific reference to the earlier filed application. No application shall be entitled to the benefit of an earlier filed application under this section unless an amendment containing the specific reference to the earlier filed application is submitted at such time during the pendency of the application as required by the Director. The Director may consider the failure to submit such an amendment within that time period as a waiver of any benefit under this section. The Director may establish procedures, including the requirement for payment of the fee specified in section 41(a)(7), to accept an unintentionally delayed submission of an amendment under this section&quot;.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-233\" href=\"#footnote-279-233\" aria-label=\"Footnote 233\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[233]<\/sup><\/a> b\u00e9n\u00e9ficie de la date de d\u00e9p\u00f4t de la demande initiale. Ces demandes reprennent fr\u00e9quemment des revendications exclues de la demande parente (ce qui sera le cas si la demande revendique plusieurs inventions distinctes et ind\u00e9pendantes), et peuvent contenir des revendications compl\u00e9mentaires.<\/p>\n<p>Les demandes de continuation\u00a0portent \u00e9galement sur un objet divulgu\u00e9\u00a0 dans une demande pr\u00e9alablement d\u00e9pos\u00e9e. La divulgation dans la demande de continuation ne doit pas inclure une mati\u00e8re nouvelle par rapport \u00e0 la demande parente. Elle b\u00e9n\u00e9ficie \u00e9galement de la date de d\u00e9p\u00f4t de la demande initiale lorsqu'elle est d\u00e9pos\u00e9e \u00ab avant la d\u00e9livrance du brevet, l\u2019abandon ou la cl\u00f4ture de la proc\u00e9dure relative \u00e0 la demande ant\u00e9rieure ou \u00e0 une demande b\u00e9n\u00e9ficient \u00e9galement de la date de d\u00e9p\u00f4t de la demande ant\u00e9rieure \u00bb<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"35 U.S.C. \u00a7 120.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-234\" href=\"#footnote-279-234\" aria-label=\"Footnote 234\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[234]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Une demande de <em>continuation-in-part<\/em> peut ajouter une mati\u00e8re nouvelle par rapport \u00e0 la demande parente. Cependant le mat\u00e9riel nouveau ne peut alors b\u00e9n\u00e9ficier de la date de priorit\u00e9 de la demande parente.<\/p>\n<p>La loi am\u00e9ricaine n'impose pas de contrainte particuli\u00e8re dans la r\u00e9daction des revendications dans le cas de demandes divisionnaires ou de continuation, similaires \u00e0 celles impos\u00e9es en Europe<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Comp. CBE, art. 123.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-235\" href=\"#footnote-279-235\" aria-label=\"Footnote 235\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[235]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>389._ L'inventeur_<\/strong><span style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\">L'inventeur, et chaque co-inventeur dans le cas d'une invention conjointe doit \u00eatre d\u00e9sign\u00e9s dans la demande<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Le MPEP pr\u00e9cise que &quot;Pursuant to\u00a035 U.S.C. 119(a), the foreign application must have been filed by the same applicant as the applicant in the United States, or by applicant's legal representatives or assigns. Consistent with longstanding Office policy, this is interpreted to mean that the U.S. and foreign applications must name the same inventor or have at least one joint inventor in common&quot;\" id=\"return-footnote-279-236\" href=\"#footnote-279-236\" aria-label=\"Footnote 236\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[236]<\/sup><\/a>. Chaque inventeur ou coinventeur doit signer une d\u00e9claration sous serment<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Une d\u00e9claration peut cependant \u00eatre fournie si l'inventeur est d\u00e9c\u00e9d\u00e9, incapable, a refus\u00e9 de signer le serment ou la d\u00e9claration ou ne peut pas \u00eatre retrouv\u00e9 ou joint \u00e0 la suite de d\u00e9marches diligentes: 37 CFR 1.64.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-237\" href=\"#footnote-279-237\" aria-label=\"Footnote 237\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[237]<\/sup><\/a>. Les fausses d\u00e9clarations sont punies d'une peine d'amende ou d'emprisonnement<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1001:&quot;(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States, knowingly and willfully: (1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact; (2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation; or (3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry; shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years (...)&quot;.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-238\" href=\"#footnote-279-238\" aria-label=\"Footnote 238\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[238]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Le paragraphe 100 du Patent Act<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"35 U.S.C. 100(f).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-239\" href=\"#footnote-279-239\" aria-label=\"Footnote 239\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[239]<\/sup><\/a> d\u00e9finit l'inventeur et le coinventeur (<em>joint inventor<\/em>) comme suit:<\/p>\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\n<p>(f) The term \"inventor\" means the individual or, if a joint invention, the individuals collectively who invented or discovered the subject matter of the invention.<\/p>\n<p>(g) The terms \"joint inventor\" and \"coinventor\" mean any 1 of the individuals who invented or discovered the subject matter of a joint invention.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p>L'inventeur est d\u00e9fini par la jurisprudence comme celui qui contribue \u00e0 la conception de l'invention<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"\u201cThe threshold question in determining inventorship is who conceived the invention. Unless a person contributes to the conception of the invention, he is not an inventor. \u2026 Insofar as defining an inventor is concerned, reduction to practice, per se,\u00a0is irrelevant [except for simultaneous conception and reduction to practice,\u00a0Fiers v. Revel,\u00a0984 F.2d 1164, 1168, 25\u00a0USPQ2d 1601, 1604-05 (Fed. Cir. 1993)]. One must contribute to the conception to be an inventor.\u201d\u00a0In re Hardee, 223 USPQ 1122, 1123 (Comm\u2019r Pat. 1984), extrait du MPEP, qui cite \u00e9galement In re VerHoef, 888 F.3d 1362, 1366-67, 126 F.2d 1561, 1564-65 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Board of Education ex rel. Board of Trustees of Florida State Univ. v. American Bioscience Inc., 333 F.3d 1330, 1340, 67 USPQ2d 1252, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (\u201cInvention requires conception.\u201d\u00a0 V. MPEP \u00a7\u00a02138.04\u00a0-\u00a0\u00a7 2138.05 pour la question des preuves \u00e0 fournir.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-240\" href=\"#footnote-279-240\" aria-label=\"Footnote 240\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[240]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Aux termes de la section 116 du Patent Act<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"35 U.S.C. 116.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-241\" href=\"#footnote-279-241\" aria-label=\"Footnote 241\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[241]<\/sup><\/a> les coinventeurs <\/span>doivent d\u00e9poser une demande de brevet conjointement et pr\u00eater chacune le serment requis. Les inventeurs peuvent demander un brevet conjointement m\u00eame si (1) ils n'ont pas travaill\u00e9 physiquement ensemble ou en m\u00eame temps, (2) chacun n'a pas apport\u00e9 le m\u00eame type ou le m\u00eame montant de contribution, ou (3) chacun n'a pas apport\u00e9 de contribution \u00e0 l'objet de chaque revendication du brevet.<\/p>\n<p>L'inventeur est n\u00e9cessairement une personne physique. La solution pouvait sembler acquise \u00e0 la lecture du texte du Patent Act<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"V. MPEP, \u00a7 2109: &quot;The Patent statute is replete with language indicating that an inventor is a natural person. For example, as noted supra,\u00a035 U.S.C. 100(f)\u00a0defines the term \u201cinventor\u201d as \u201cthe individual or, if a joint invention, the individuals collectively who invented or discovered the subject matter of the invention.\u201d\u00a035 U.S.C. 101\u00a0also provides \u201c[w]hoever\u00a0invents or discovers\u2026may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.\u201d (emphasis added). Additionally,\u00a035 U.S.C. 102(a)\u00a0states, \u201cA\u00a0person\u00a0shall be entitled to a patent unless\u2026\u201d (emphasis added).\u00a035 U.S.C. 115(b)(2) further provides, in pertinent part, \u201c[a]n oath or declaration under subsection (a) shall contain statements that\u2026such individual believes himself or herself to be the original inventor or an original joint inventor of a claimed invention in the application\u201d (emphasis added)&quot;.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-242\" href=\"#footnote-279-242\" aria-label=\"Footnote 242\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[242]<\/sup><\/a>, et avait \u00e9t\u00e9 formul\u00e9e \u00e0 l'occasion d'affaire portant sur des d\u00e9signations de personnes morales<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Univ. of Utah v. Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Forderung der Wissenschaften E.V., 734 F.3d 1315, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (\u201c[I]nventors must be natural persons and cannot be corporations or sovereigns.\u201d); Beech Aircraft Corp. v. EDO Corp., 990 F.2d 1237, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (\u201c[O]nly natural persons can be \u2018inventors.\u2019\u201d) cit\u00e9s in Thaler v. Vidal, ci dessous.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-243\" href=\"#footnote-279-243\" aria-label=\"Footnote 243\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[243]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n<p>Elle \u00e9t\u00e9 confirm\u00e9e en des termes tr\u00e8s clairs (et semble-t-il l\u00e9g\u00e8rement irrit\u00e9s) par le Circuit f\u00e9d\u00e9ral en 2022 dans l'affaire <em>Thaler v. Vidal<\/em><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Thaler v. Vidal, 43 F.4th 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2022), cert denied, 143 S. Ct. 1783 (2023).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-244\" href=\"#footnote-279-244\" aria-label=\"Footnote 244\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[244]<\/sup><\/a>, version locale des nombreuses tentatives de Stephen Thaler d'obtenir, notamment en Europe, un brevet pour une invention au nom de son intelligence artificielle DABUS<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"V. nos d\u00e9veloppements supra, n\u00b0312.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-245\" href=\"#footnote-279-245\" aria-label=\"Footnote 245\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[245]<\/sup><\/a>:<\/p>\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\n<p>\u00ab Cette affaire pose la question de savoir qui, ou quoi, peut \u00eatre un inventeur. Plus pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment, on nous demande de d\u00e9cider si un syst\u00e8me logiciel d'intelligence artificielle (IA) peut \u00eatre inscrit comme inventeur sur une demande de brevet. \u00c0 premi\u00e8re vue, il pourrait sembler que la r\u00e9solution de cette question impliquerait une enqu\u00eate abstraite sur la nature de l'invention ou les droits, le cas \u00e9ch\u00e9ant, des syst\u00e8mes d'IA. En fait, cependant, nous n'avons pas besoin de r\u00e9fl\u00e9chir \u00e0 ces questions m\u00e9taphysiques. Au lieu de cela, notre t\u00e2che commence \u2013 et se termine \u2013 par l'examen de la d\u00e9finition applicable dans la loi pertinente.\u00a0(...)<\/p>\n<p>La Loi sur les brevets pr\u00e9voit express\u00e9ment que les inventeurs sont des \u00ab individus \u00bb. Depuis 2011, avec l'adoption du LeahySmith America Invents Act, la loi sur les brevets d\u00e9finit un \u00ab inventeur \u00bb comme \u00ab l'individu ou, s'il s'agit d'une invention conjointe, les individus qui ont\u00a0<span style=\"font-size: 1em; word-spacing: normal;\">\u00a0<\/span><span style=\"font-size: 1em; word-spacing: normal;\">collectivement <\/span><span style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em; word-spacing: normal;\">invent\u00e9 ou d\u00e9couvert l'objet de l'invention \u00bb. 35 U.S.C. \u00a7 100(f). De m\u00eame, la Loi d\u00e9finit les termes \u00ab inventeur conjoint \u00bb et \u00ab co-inventeur \u00bb comme \u00ab l'une quelconque des personnes qui ont invent\u00e9 ou d\u00e9couvert l'objet d'une invention conjointe \u00bb. \u00a7 100(g). En d\u00e9crivant les d\u00e9clarations exig\u00e9es d'un inventeur lorsqu'il d\u00e9pose une demande de brevet, la loi fait syst\u00e9matiquement r\u00e9f\u00e9rence aux inventeurs et aux co-inventeurs comme \u00e0 des \u00ab individus \u00bb. Voir \u00a7 115. La Loi sur les brevets ne d\u00e9finit pas le terme \u00ab individu \u00bb. Cependant, comme l'a expliqu\u00e9 la Cour supr\u00eame, lorsqu'il est utilis\u00e9 \u00ab comme un nom, le terme \u00ab individu \u00bb signifie ordinairement un \u00eatre humain, une personne \u00bb. Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 566 U.S. 449, 454 (2012) (modification interne et guillemets omis). Cela est conforme \u00e0 la \u00ab fa\u00e7on dont nous utilisons le mot dans le langage courant \u00bb : \u00ab Nous disons \u00ab l'individu est all\u00e9 au magasin \u00bb, \u00ab l'individu a quitt\u00e9 la pi\u00e8ce \u00bb et \u00ab l'individu a pris la voiture \u00bb, chaque fois se r\u00e9f\u00e9rant sans \u00e9quivoque \u00e0 une personne physique. \u00bb Id. Les dictionnaires confirment qu'il s'agit de l'interpr\u00e9tation courante du mot. (...)<\/span><\/p>\n<p>Par cons\u00e9quent, la Cour supr\u00eame a statu\u00e9 que, lorsqu'il est utilis\u00e9 dans les lois, le mot \u00ab individu \u00bb fait r\u00e9f\u00e9rence \u00e0 des \u00eatres humains, \u00e0 moins qu'il n'existe \u00ab une indication que le Congr\u00e8s l'entendait autrement \u00bb. Id., p. 455 (italiques omis). Rien dans la Loi sur les brevets n'indique que le Congr\u00e8s avait l'intention de s'\u00e9carter du sens commun. Au contraire, le reste de la Loi sur les brevets confirme que le terme \u00ab individu \u00bb dans la Loi d\u00e9signe les \u00eatres humains. (...)<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>390._ Les lignes directrices de l'USPTO sur la qualit\u00e9 d'inventeur pour les inventions assist\u00e9es par IA_<\/strong>Le Circuit f\u00e9d\u00e9ral\u00a0 dans l'arr\u00eat Thaler n'a cependant pas abord\u00e9 l'hypoth\u00e8se d'inventions <em>assist\u00e9es<\/em> par IA. Faisant suite \u00e0 <span style=\"font-size: 1em;\">une consultation publique sur l'IA lanc\u00e9e par l'USPTO en 2019, l'USPTO a adopt\u00e9 le 12\u00a0<\/span>f\u00e9vrier 2023 des lignes directrices sur les inventions assist\u00e9es par intelligence artificielle<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Inventorship Guidance for AI-assisted Inventions, Docket n\u00b0\u00a0 PTO-P-2023-0043; qui\u00a0s'ajoutent \u00e0 celles d\u00e9j\u00e0 publi\u00e9es en mati\u00e8re de copyright par le Copyright Office le 10\u00a0mai 2023 (V. P. Kamina, Comm. com. \u00e9lectr. 2023, comm. 29).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-246\" href=\"#footnote-279-246\" aria-label=\"Footnote 246\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[246]<\/sup><\/a> L'USPTO y confirme que ces inventions entrent dans le champ de la brevetabilit\u00e9 si une personne physique y contribue <em>\u00ab\u00a0de mani\u00e8re significative\u00a0\u00bb<\/em> (une contribution significative \u00e0 une seule revendication est suffisante\u00a0; cependant chaque revendication doit porter sur un \u00e9l\u00e9ment invent\u00e9 par un des inventeurs (personne physique) d\u00e9sign\u00e9s dans le brevet). L'USPTO rappelle les facteurs \u00e0 prendre en compte dans cette d\u00e9termination, issus de l'arr\u00eat <em>Pannu v.\u00a0Iolab Corp<\/em>.<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Pannu v.\u00a0Iolab Corp., 155 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 1998)\" id=\"return-footnote-279-247\" href=\"#footnote-279-247\" aria-label=\"Footnote 247\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[247]<\/sup><\/a><em>(\u00ab\u00a0Pannu\u00a0factors\u00a0\u00bb)<\/em> : \u00e0 savoir, si chaque inventeur (1) contribue d'une mani\u00e8re significative \u00e0 la conception ou \u00e0 la mise en pratique de l'invention, (2) apporte \u00e0 l'invention revendiqu\u00e9e une contribution qui n'est pas n\u00e9gligeable en qualit\u00e9, lorsque cette contribution est mesur\u00e9e par rapport \u00e0 l'invention compl\u00e8te, et (3) fait plus que simplement expliquer des concepts bien connus et\/ou l'\u00e9tat actuel de la technique. L'Office propose alors cinq principes permettant d'appliquer ces facteurs dans le cas d'inventions assist\u00e9es par IA\u00a0:<\/p>\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\n<p>\"1. L'utilisation par une personne physique d'un syst\u00e8me d'IA dans la cr\u00e9ation d'une invention assist\u00e9e par l'IA n'exclut pas les contributions de la personne en tant qu'inventeur (\u00ab does not negate the person\u2019s contributions as an inventor \u00bb) [note omise]. La personne physique peut \u00eatre inscrite en tant qu'inventeur ou co-inventeur si elle contribue de mani\u00e8re significative \u00e0 l'invention assist\u00e9e par l'IA.<\/p>\n<p class=\"marginTopBottom14 editable\">2. Le simple fait de reconna\u00eetre un probl\u00e8me ou d'avoir un objectif g\u00e9n\u00e9ral ou un plan de recherche \u00e0 poursuivre n\u2019\u00e9quivaut pas \u00e0 une acte de conception. [note omise] Une personne physique qui ne pr\u00e9sente un probl\u00e8me qu'\u00e0 un syst\u00e8me d'IA peut ne pas \u00eatre l\u2019inventeur ou le co-inventeur d'une invention identifi\u00e9e \u00e0 partir de la sortie du syst\u00e8me d'IA. Cependant, une contribution significative pourrait r\u00e9sulter de la fa\u00e7on dont elle construit les commandes (prompts) dans le but d\u2019obtenir du syst\u00e8me d\u2019IA une solution particuli\u00e8re \u00e0 un probl\u00e8me sp\u00e9cifique envisag\u00e9 (\u00ab by the way the person constructs the prompt in view of a specific problem to elicit a particular solution from the AI system \u00bb).<\/p>\n<p class=\"marginTopBottom14 editable\">3. La mise en pratique d\u2019une invention n'est pas \u00e0 elle seule une contribution significative suffisante pour caract\u00e9riser l\u2019inventivit\u00e9. [note omise] Par cons\u00e9quent, une personne physique qui se contente de reconna\u00eetre et d'appr\u00e9cier la production d'un syst\u00e8me d'IA en tant qu'invention, en particulier lorsque les propri\u00e9t\u00e9s et l'utilit\u00e9 de cette production sont \u00e9videntes pour ceux qui ont des comp\u00e9tences ordinaires, n'est pas n\u00e9cessairement un inventeur. [note omise] Cependant, une personne qui utilise les r\u00e9sultats d'un syst\u00e8me d'IA et y contribue de mani\u00e8re significative pour cr\u00e9er une invention peut \u00eatre un v\u00e9ritable inventeur. Par ailleurs, dans certaines situations, une personne qui m\u00e8ne une exp\u00e9rience r\u00e9ussie en utilisant les r\u00e9sultats du syst\u00e8me d'IA pourrait d\u00e9montrer qu'elle a apport\u00e9 une contribution importante \u00e0 l'invention, m\u00eame si elle n'est pas en mesure d'\u00e9tablir la conception tant que l'invention n'a pas \u00e9t\u00e9 mise en pratique. [note omise]<\/p>\n<p class=\"marginTopBottom14 editable\">4. Une personne physique qui met au point un \u00e9l\u00e9ment essentiel \u00e0 partir duquel l'invention revendiqu\u00e9e est d\u00e9riv\u00e9e peut \u00eatre consid\u00e9r\u00e9e comme ayant apport\u00e9 une contribution importante \u00e0 la conception de l'invention revendiqu\u00e9e, m\u00eame si elle n'\u00e9tait pas pr\u00e9sente ou n'a pas particip\u00e9 \u00e0 chaque activit\u00e9 qui a conduit \u00e0 la conception de l'invention revendiqu\u00e9e. [note omise] Dans certaines situations, la ou les personnes physiques qui con\u00e7oivent, construisent ou entra\u00eenent un syst\u00e8me d'IA pour obtenir une solution particuli\u00e8re \u00e0 un probl\u00e8me sp\u00e9cifique peuvent \u00eatre inventeurs, lorsque la conception, la construction ou l'entra\u00eenement du syst\u00e8me d'IA constitue une contribution significative \u00e0 l'invention cr\u00e9\u00e9e avec le syst\u00e8me d'IA.<\/p>\n<p class=\"marginTopBottom14 editable\">5. Le seul maintien, par une personne, d'une \u00ab domination intellectuelle \u00bb sur un syst\u00e8me d'IA, ne fait pas de celle-ci un inventeur des d'inventions cr\u00e9\u00e9es par l'utilisation du syst\u00e8me d'IA. [note omise] Par cons\u00e9quent, le simple fait de poss\u00e9der ou de superviser un syst\u00e8me d'IA utilis\u00e9 dans la cr\u00e9ation d'une invention, sans apporter une contribution importante \u00e0 la conception de l'invention, ne fait pas de cette personne un inventeur.\"<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p>Les lignes directrices abordent \u00e9videmment la question d\u00e9licate (et cruciale) de la sinc\u00e9rit\u00e9 des d\u00e9p\u00f4ts, appliqu\u00e9e \u00e0 l'hypoth\u00e8se d'inventions assist\u00e9es par IA. L'Office rappelle sur ce point aux d\u00e9posants les devoirs qui leur incombent<em> (duty of disclosure, duty of reasonable inquiry, <\/em>que l'Office n'envisage pas de modifier<em>), <\/em>ainsi que les pouvoirs de l'Office de demander des informations compl\u00e9mentaires, qu'il entend exercer en relation avec cette cat\u00e9gorie d'inventions, ou en cas de doute.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>391._ La description, les revendications et le dessin_<\/strong> Les sp\u00e9cifications doivent contenir une description \u00e9crite de l'invention, de son proc\u00e9d\u00e9 de fabrication et de son utilisation, dans des termes complets, clairs, concis et exacts (<em>adequate written description<\/em>)<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"MPEP, \u00a7 2161.01: \u00ab\u00a0The function of the written description requirement is to ensure that the inventor had possession of, as of the filing date of the application relied on, the specific subject matter later claimed by him or her; how the specification accomplishes this is not material. In re Herschler, 591 F.2d 693, 700-01, 200 USPQ 711, 717 (CCPA 1979) and further reiterated in In re Kaslow, 707 F.2d 1366, 707 F.2d 1366, 217 USPQ 1089 (Fed. Cir. 1983)\u00a0\u00bb. Ibid., \u00a7 2103: \u00ab\u00a0For the written description requirement, an applicant\u2019s specification must reasonably convey to those skilled in the art that the applicant was in possession of the claimed invention as of the date of invention\u00a0\u00bb.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-248\" href=\"#footnote-279-248\" aria-label=\"Footnote 248\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[248]<\/sup><\/a> qui permettent \u00e0 toute personne vers\u00e9e dans l'art auquel elle se rapporte, ou dans l\u2019art le plus proche, de la fabriquer de l\u2019utiliser (<em>enablement requirement<\/em>)<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"MPEP, \u00a7 2103: \u00ab\u00a0An applicant\u2019s specification must enable a person skilled in the art to make and use the claimed inven\u00adtion without undue experimentation. The fact that experimentation is complex, however, will not make it undue if a person of skill in the art typically engages in such complex experimentation.\u00a0\u00bb Ibid., \u00a7 2161.01: \u00ab\u00a0When basing a rejection on the failure of the appli\u00adcant\u2019s disclosure to meet the enablement provisions of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112, USPTO person\u00adnel must establish on the record a reasonable basis for questioning the adequacy of the disclosure to enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to make and use the claimed invention without resorting to undue experi\u00admentation. See In re Brown, 477 F.2d 946, 177 USPQ 691 (CCPA 1973); In re Ghiron, 442 F.2d 985, 169 USPQ 723 (CCPA 1971). Once USPTO personnel have advanced a reasonable basis for questioning the adequacy of the disclosure, it becomes incumbent on the applicant to rebut that challenge and factually demonstrate that his or her application disclosure is in fact sufficient. See In re Doyle, 482 F.2d 1385, 1392, 179 USPQ 227, 232 (CCPA 1973); In re Scarbrough, 500 F.2d 560, 566, 182 USPQ 298, 302 (CCPA 1974); In re Ghiron, supra.\u00a0\u00bb\" id=\"return-footnote-279-249\" href=\"#footnote-279-249\" aria-label=\"Footnote 249\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[249]<\/sup><\/a>, et doivent indiquer la meilleure mani\u00e8re envisag\u00e9e par l'inventeur de r\u00e9aliser son invention (<em>best mode requirement<\/em>)<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"MPEP, \u00a7 2165: \u00ab\u00a0The purpose of the best mode requirement is to \u201crestrain inventors from applying for patents while at the same time concealing from the public the pre\u00adferred embodiments of their inventions which they have in fact conceived.\u00a0\u00bb In re Gay, 309 F.2d 769, 772, 135 USPQ 311, 315 (CCPA 1962). Only evidence of concealment, \u201cwhether accidental or intentional,\u201d is considered in judging the adequacy of the disclosure for compliance with the best mode requirement. Spec\u00adtra-Physics, Inc. v.\u00a0Coherent, Inc.,827 F.2d 1524, 1535, 3 USPQ 2d 1737, 1745 (Fed. Cir. 1987). That evidence, in order to result in affirmance of a best mode rejection, must tend to show that the quality of an applicant\u2019s best mode disclosure is so poor as to effectively result in concealment.\u201d In re Sherwood, 613 F.2d 809, 816-817, 204\u00a0USPQ 537, 544 (CCPA 1980). Also, see White Consol. Indus. v. Vega Servo-Control Inc., 214 USPQ 796, 824 (S.D. Mich. 1982), aff\u2019d on related grounds, 713 F.2d 788, 218 USPQ 961 (Fed. Cir. 1983). See also MPEP \u00a7 2165 - \u00a7\u00a02165.04.There are two factual inquiries to be made in deter\u00admining whether a specification satisfies the best mode requirement. First, there must be a subjective determi\u00adnation as to whether at the time the application was filed, the inventor knew of a best mode of practicing the invention. Second, if the inventor had a best mode of practicing the invention in mind, there must be an objective determination as to whether that best mode was disclosed in sufficient detail to allow one skilled in the art to practice it. Fonar Corp. v. General Elec\u00adtric Co., 107 F.3d 1543, 41 USPQ2d 1801, 1804 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Chemcast Corp. v. Arco Industries, 913 F.2d 923, 927-28, 16 USPQ2d 1033, 1036 (Fed. Cir. 1990). \u201cAs a general rule, where software constitutes part of a best mode of carrying out an invention, description of such a best mode is satisfied by a dis\u00adclosure of the functions of the software. This is because, normally, writing code for such software is within the skill of the art, not requiring undue experi\u00admentation, once its functions have been disclosed. . . . [F]low charts or source code listings are not a require\u00adment for adequately disclosing the functions of soft\u00adware.\u201d Fonar Corp., 107 F.3d at 1549, 41 USPQ2d at 1805 (citations omitted).Determining compliance with the best mode requirement requires a two-prong inquiry:1)at the time the application was filed, did the inventor possess a best mode for practicing the inven\u00adtion; and 2)if the inventor did possess a best mode, does the written description disclose the best mode such that a person skilled in the art could practice it.\u00a0\u00bb\" id=\"return-footnote-279-250\" href=\"#footnote-279-250\" aria-label=\"Footnote 250\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[250]<\/sup><\/a>. Ces trois exigences sont distinctes. Depuis l\u2019America Invents Act, le d\u00e9faut ou l\u2019insuffisance de description du <em>best mode<\/em> n\u2019est plus une cause de nullit\u00e9 du brevet. L\u2019exigence a donc \u00e9t\u00e9 maintenue, mais n\u2019est plus sanctionn\u00e9e<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"V. Jan Wolfe, Patent Reform's Reduced 'Best Mode' Requirement Creates Uncertainty, law.com, October 10, 2011.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-251\" href=\"#footnote-279-251\" aria-label=\"Footnote 251\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[251]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Les sp\u00e9cifications doivent se conclure avec une ou plusieurs revendications \u00ab mettant pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment en \u00e9vidence et revendiquant distinctement l'objet que le requ\u00e9rant consid\u00e8re comme son invention \u00bb<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"35 U.S.C. \u00a7 112.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-252\" href=\"#footnote-279-252\" aria-label=\"Footnote 252\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[252]<\/sup><\/a>. Aux \u00c9tats-Unis comme ailleurs, les revendications d\u00e9terminent la port\u00e9e de l\u2019invention, et le titulaire du brevet n\u2019a aucun droit sur des \u00e9l\u00e9ments non revendiqu\u00e9s, quand bien m\u00eame seraient-ils inclus dans la description ou le dessin. L\u2019ordre, le format de pr\u00e9sentation et la structure des revendications sont pr\u00e9cis\u00e9s par l\u2019USPTO<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"37 C.F.R. \u00a7 1.75: \u00ab (\u2026) (e) Where the nature of the case admits, as in the case of an improvement, any independent claim should contain in the following order: (1) A preamble comprising a general description of all the elements or steps of the claimed combination which are conventional or known, (2) A phrase such as \u201cwherein the improvement comprises,\u201d and (3) Those elements, steps and\/or relationships which constitute that portion of the claimed combination which the applicant considers as the new or improved portion. (f) If there are several claims, they shall be numbered consecutively in Arabic numerals. (g) The least restrictive claim should be presented as claim number 1, and all dependent claims should be grouped together with the claim or claims to which they refer to the extent practicable. (h) The claim or claims must commence on a separate physical sheet or electronic page. Any sheet including a claim or portion of a claim may not contain any other parts of the application or other material. (i) Where a claim sets forth a plurality of elements or steps, each element or step of the claim should be separated by a line indentation\u00a0\u00bb.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-253\" href=\"#footnote-279-253\" aria-label=\"Footnote 253\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[253]<\/sup><\/a>. Les exigences de r\u00e9daction sont l\u00e9g\u00e8rement plus souples que celles en vigueur en Europe<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"V. sur ce point Cabinet Regimbeau, Demandes de continuation : Conseils aux d\u00e9posants europ\u00e9ens pour la cr\u00e9ation d\u2019un portefeuille de brevets am\u00e9ricains, en ligne.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-254\" href=\"#footnote-279-254\" aria-label=\"Footnote 254\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[254]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Les revendications multiples sont possibles, \u00e0 la condition qu\u2019elles soient diff\u00e9rentes (<em>provided they differ substantially<\/em>) et qu\u2019elles ne soit pas indument multipli\u00e9es<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"37 C.F.R. \u00a7 1.75(b).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-255\" href=\"#footnote-279-255\" aria-label=\"Footnote 255\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[255]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Une ou plusieurs revendications peuvent \u00eatre pr\u00e9sent\u00e9es sous forme d\u00e9pendante. Une revendication d\u00e9pendante inclut tous les \u00e9l\u00e9ments de la revendication dont elle d\u00e9pend, et est pr\u00e9sum\u00e9e valide (si le brevet est d\u00e9livr\u00e9) m\u00eame si elle d\u00e9pend d\u2019une revendication invalide<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"35 U.S.C. \u00a7 282.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-256\" href=\"#footnote-279-256\" aria-label=\"Footnote 256\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[256]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Le demandeur doit fournir un dessin s\u2019il est n\u00e9cessaire \u00e0 la compr\u00e9hension de l'invention<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"35 U.S.C \u00a7 113.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-257\" href=\"#footnote-279-257\" aria-label=\"Footnote 257\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[257]<\/sup><\/a>. Le Directeur peut \u00e9galement exiger du demandeur de fournir un mod\u00e8le de l\u2019invention<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"35 U.S.C \u00a7 114.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-258\" href=\"#footnote-279-258\" aria-label=\"Footnote 258\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[258]<\/sup><\/a>. Lorsque l'invention consiste en une composition de mati\u00e8re, le directeur peut exiger du demandeur de fournir des \u00e9chantillons ou des ingr\u00e9dients<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"35 U.S.C \u00a7 114.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-259\" href=\"#footnote-279-259\" aria-label=\"Footnote 259\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[259]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>392._ Le d\u00e9p\u00f4t et l\u2019acc\u00e8s au mat\u00e9riel_<\/strong> Comme indiqu\u00e9, si l\u2019invention ne peut \u00eatre r\u00e9alis\u00e9e sans acc\u00e8s \u00e0 un \u00e9l\u00e9ment ou mat\u00e9riel auquel le public ne peut avoir acc\u00e8s, un d\u00e9p\u00f4t ou une fourniture d\u2019information permettant d\u2019acc\u00e9der \u00e0 cet \u00e9l\u00e9ment peuvent \u00eatre exig\u00e9s, sur le fondement de la condition d\u2019<em>enablement<\/em>. Cette exigence est strictement appliqu\u00e9e dans le domaine des biotechnologies<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Mais \u00e9galement en mati\u00e8re d\u2019informatique, V. White Consolidated Indus., Inc. v. Vega Servo-Control, Inc., 713 F.2d 788 (Fed. Cir. 1983); In re Ghiron, 442 F.2d 985, 991 (CCPA 1971).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-260\" href=\"#footnote-279-260\" aria-label=\"Footnote 260\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[260]<\/sup><\/a>. Cependant, elle n\u2019implique pas n\u00e9cessairement un d\u00e9p\u00f4t physique<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (pas de violation de l\u2019exigence de best mode en cas d\u2019absencce de d\u00e9p\u00f4t de cellules transform\u00e9es par la s\u00e9quence d\u2019ADN brevet\u00e9e).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-261\" href=\"#footnote-279-261\" aria-label=\"Footnote 261\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[261]<\/sup><\/a>. Par exemple, dans une affaire impliquant la brevetabilit\u00e9 d\u2019\u00e9l\u00e9ments biochimiques naturels issus d\u2019un organisme marin, la condition d\u2019<em>enablement<\/em> a \u00e9t\u00e9 jug\u00e9e satisfaite par la fourniture, par le titulaire du brevet, d\u2019informations d\u00e9taill\u00e9es sur la localisation g\u00e9ographique et l\u2019habitat de l\u2019organisme marin source<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Ex parte Rinehart, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1719, 1720 (Bd. Pat. App. &amp; Int\u2019f 1989)\" id=\"return-footnote-279-262\" href=\"#footnote-279-262\" aria-label=\"Footnote 262\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[262]<\/sup><\/a>. En revanche, des d\u00e9p\u00f4ts seront exig\u00e9s si l\u2019organisme source ne peut pas \u00eatre identifi\u00e9 ou d\u00e9crit avec suffisamment de pr\u00e9cision.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>393._ L\u2019examen, la publication et la d\u00e9livrance du brevet_<\/strong> La proc\u00e9dure d\u2019obtention du brevet prend la forme d\u2019une \u00ab\u00a0instruction\u00a0\u00bb (<em>prosecution<\/em>) men\u00e9e par un examinateur d\u00e9sign\u00e9 par l\u2019USPTO. La proc\u00e9dure entra\u00eene paiement de plusieurs redevances, ind\u00e9pendamment des honoraires du <em>patent agent <\/em>ou du <em>patent attorney<\/em>.<\/p>\n<p>L\u2019examen porte sur toutes les conditions de brevetabilit\u00e9. Il donne lieu \u00e0 l\u2019envoi par l\u2019examinateur d\u2019un document \u00e9crit d\u00e9nomm\u00e9 \u00ab\u00a0<em>office action<\/em>\u00a0\u00bb, qui pr\u00e9cise et justifie sa d\u00e9cision (acceptation ou rejet) au regard de chaque revendication. Ces <em>office actions<\/em> peuvent \u00eatre d\u00e9finitives ou non d\u00e9finitives (<em>final <\/em>ou <em>non final<\/em>), ce qui a des cons\u00e9quences sur les possibilit\u00e9s de r\u00e9ponse ou de recours. Si l\u2019<em>office action <\/em>est d\u00e9finitive, le d\u00e9posant peut soit faire appel aupr\u00e8s du Board of Patent Appels et Interferences<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Puis, le cas \u00e9ch\u00e9ant devant la Cour d\u2019Appel pour le Circuit f\u00e9d\u00e9ral ou la Cour de District pour le District de Columbia. 35 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 141, 145.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-263\" href=\"#footnote-279-263\" aria-label=\"Footnote 263\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[263]<\/sup><\/a>, soit apporter les modifications n\u00e9cessaires \u00e0 sa demande. Si elle est provisoire, le d\u00e9posant peut r\u00e9pondre et solliciter un nouvel examen. Ce dernier a en principe six mois pour r\u00e9pondre \u00e0 l\u2019examinateur, mais la dur\u00e9e est en pratique plus courte (de un \u00e0 trois mois).<\/p>\n<p>Le d\u00e9posant \u00e0 l\u2019obligation de communiquer \u00e0 l\u2019examinateur tous les \u00e9l\u00e9ments pertinents dont il a connaissance permettant d\u2019appr\u00e9cier la validit\u00e9 de l\u2019invention (<em>duty of candor<\/em>). A d\u00e9faut, sa conduite pourra \u00eatre jug\u00e9 fautive (<em>inequitable conduct<\/em>), et entra\u00eener la perte de ses droits. La pratique favorise la communication d\u2019un document reprenant ces informations (<em>information disclosure statement<\/em>).<\/p>\n<p>La possibilit\u00e9 de modifier les sp\u00e9cifications apr\u00e8s le d\u00e9p\u00f4t est fortement limit\u00e9e par l\u2019interdiction d\u2019introduire de nouveaux \u00e9l\u00e9ments dans la demande, pos\u00e9e par la section 132 du Patent act<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"35 U.S.C. \u00a7 132(a) (\u00ab\u00a0No amendment shall introduce new matter into the disclosure of the invention.\u00a0\u00bb).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-264\" href=\"#footnote-279-264\" aria-label=\"Footnote 264\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[264]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Chaque demande de brevet doit \u00eatre publi\u00e9e, conform\u00e9ment aux proc\u00e9dures fix\u00e9es par le Directeur, \u00e0 bref d\u00e9lai apr\u00e8s l'expiration d'une p\u00e9riode de dix-huit mois \u00e0 compter de la date de d\u00e9p\u00f4t. \u00c0 la demande du d\u00e9posant, une demande peut \u00eatre publi\u00e9e plus t\u00f4t que la fin de cette p\u00e9riode de 18 mois<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"35 U.S.C \u00a7 122(b)(1)(A).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-265\" href=\"#footnote-279-265\" aria-label=\"Footnote 265\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[265]<\/sup><\/a>. Cette publication permet au demander de b\u00e9n\u00e9ficier de \u00ab <em>provisional rights<\/em>\u00a0\u00bb avant d\u00e9livrance du brevet<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"C\u2019est-\u00e0-dire du droit de demander une redevance raisonnable \u00e0 toute personne qui exploite l\u2019invention jusqu\u2019\u00e0 la d\u00e9livrance du brevet. V. infra, n\u00b0364.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-266\" href=\"#footnote-279-266\" aria-label=\"Footnote 266\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[266]<\/sup><\/a>. Ne sont pas publi\u00e9es<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"35 U.S.C. \u00a7 122(b)(2).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-267\" href=\"#footnote-279-267\" aria-label=\"Footnote 267\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[267]<\/sup><\/a> les demandes qui ne sont plus en cours, et les demandes couvertes par une ordonnance de secret requise par le Gouvernement<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"35 U.S.C. \u00a7 181.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-268\" href=\"#footnote-279-268\" aria-label=\"Footnote 268\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[268]<\/sup><\/a> ou dont la divulgation serait contraire \u00e0 la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale. Le d\u00e9posant peut \u00e9galement demander que la demande ne soit pas publi\u00e9e s\u2019il certifie qu\u2019aucun d\u00e9p\u00f4t de la m\u00eame invention ne sera effectu\u00e9 dans un autre pays ou au travers d\u2019une convention internationale qui requiert une telle publication<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"35 U.S.C. \u00a7 122(b)(2)(B).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-269\" href=\"#footnote-279-269\" aria-label=\"Footnote 269\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[269]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Avant publication, les demandes de brevets doivent \u00eatre conserv\u00e9es \u00e0 titre confidentiel par le PTO, et aucune information les concernant ne peut \u00eatre donn\u00e9e sans l'autorisation du d\u00e9posant ou du titulaire<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"35 U.S.C. \u00a7 122(a). Sauf mise en oeuvre d\u2019une disposition l\u00e9gale ou dans des circonstances particuli\u00e8res d\u00e9termin\u00e9es par le Directeur.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-270\" href=\"#footnote-279-270\" aria-label=\"Footnote 270\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[270]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Le Patent Act ne pr\u00e9voit pas de proc\u00e9dure d\u2019opposition pendant la phase d\u2019examen, mais l\u2019America Invents Act a introduit une possibilit\u00e9 pour les tiers de pr\u00e9senter \u00e0 l\u2019Office des brevets, des demandes de brevets et des publications pertinentes avant d\u00e9livrance d\u2019un brevet (<em>third party preissuance submissions<\/em>)<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"35 U.S.C. 122(e).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-271\" href=\"#footnote-279-271\" aria-label=\"Footnote 271\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[271]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>394._ La proc\u00e9dure de r\u00e9examen_<\/strong>\u00a0L\u2019America Invents Act a modifi\u00e9 les proc\u00e9dures d\u2019opposition post d\u00e9livrance devant l\u2019USPTO (<em>reexamination procedures<\/em>). Trois proc\u00e9dures sont d\u00e9sormais disponibles. Une proc\u00e9dure ex parte (<em>ex parte reexamination<\/em>)<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"35 U.S.C. \u00a7 302. Proc\u00e9dure initialement introduite en 1981.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-272\" href=\"#footnote-279-272\" aria-label=\"Footnote 272\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[272]<\/sup><\/a>, ouverte au titulaire du brevet, aux tiers et au directeur de l\u2019USPTO, et ouverte uniquement en pr\u00e9sence d\u2019une question nouvelle importante affectant la brevetabilit\u00e9 (<em>substantial new question of patentability<\/em>), une nouvelle proc\u00e9dure d\u00e9nomm\u00e9e <em>post grant review<\/em><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"35 U.S.C. \u00a7 321-30.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-273\" href=\"#footnote-279-273\" aria-label=\"Footnote 273\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[273]<\/sup><\/a>, ouvertes pendant neuf mois \u00e0 compter de la d\u00e9livrance du brevet, et une proc\u00e9dure <em>inter partes<\/em> (<em>inter partes review<\/em>, qui se substitue \u00e0 l\u2019ancienne <em>inter partes reexamination<\/em>)<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"35 U.S.C. \u00a7 311-19.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-274\" href=\"#footnote-279-274\" aria-label=\"Footnote 274\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[274]<\/sup><\/a>, ouverte apr\u00e8s expiration du d\u00e9lai de la <em>post grant review<\/em>. Ces proc\u00e9dures ob\u00e9issent \u00e0 un r\u00e9gime diff\u00e9rent et \u00e0 des r\u00e8gles proc\u00e9durales distinctes. Les dispositions transitoires les concernant sont complexes. Un appel des d\u00e9cisions rendues est possible devant le Patent Trial and Appeal Board et le Circuit F\u00e9d\u00e9ral.<\/p>\n<p>En dehors de ces proc\u00e9dures, une action en d\u00e9claration d\u2019invalidit\u00e9 peut \u00eatre port\u00e9e devant les tribunaux. Cependant elle n\u2019est ouverte qu\u2019aux personnes qui utilisent l\u2019invention ou se pr\u00e9parent \u00e0 le faire. Bien \u00e9videmment, la validit\u00e9 du brevet peut toujours \u00eatre contest\u00e9e en d\u00e9fense \u00e0 une action en contrefa\u00e7on.<\/p>\n<h2>3. La propri\u00e9t\u00e9 et l'exploitation de l'invention<\/h2>\n<p><strong>395._ Plan_ <\/strong>Nous distinguerons les r\u00e8gles de titularit\u00e9 (A), l'\u00e9tendue de la protection (B) et les r\u00e8gles applicables \u00e0 l'exploitation du brevet.<\/p>\n<h3><strong>A. La titularit\u00e9 du brevet<\/strong><\/h3>\n<p><strong>396._ Du premier inventeur \u00e0 l\u2019inventeur premier d\u00e9posant : l\u2019America Invents Act _<\/strong> Comme indiqu\u00e9, une des \u00e9volutions les plus importantes du droit am\u00e9ricain des brevets depuis 1952 concerne le droit au brevet, et est issue du Leahy\u2013Smith America Invents Act de 2011, qui substitue au syst\u00e8me traditionnel du premier inventeur (<em>first to invent<\/em>) un syst\u00e8me d\u2019inventeur premier d\u00e9posant (<em>first inventor to file<\/em>)<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"V. supra, n\u00b0357.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-275\" href=\"#footnote-279-275\" aria-label=\"Footnote 275\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[275]<\/sup><\/a>, au travers notamment de la modification de la section 102(a)(1) du Patent Act<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Qui dispose qu' &quot;une demande de brevet doit \u00eatre faite ou autoris\u00e9e \u00e0 \u00eatre faite, par l'inventeur, sauf disposition contraire dans le pr\u00e9sent titre, par \u00e9crit au directeur.&quot; Le texte ant\u00e9rieur disposait : Une personne a droit \u00e0 un brevet sauf si l'invention a \u00e9t\u00e9 connue ou utilis\u00e9e par d'autres dans ce pays ou brevet\u00e9e ou d\u00e9crite dans une publication imprim\u00e9e dans ce pays ou \u00e0 l'\u00e9tranger, avant l'invention de celui-ci par le demandeur de brevet&quot;; V. MPEP, \u00a7 2131 \u00e0 2138.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-276\" href=\"#footnote-279-276\" aria-label=\"Footnote 276\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[276]<\/sup><\/a>. Les principales dispositions de cette r\u00e9forme sont entr\u00e9es en vigueur le 16 mars 2013. Elles n\u2019ont pas d\u2019effet r\u00e9troactif.&gt;<\/p>\n<p>Dans le syst\u00e8me ant\u00e9rieur \u00e0 la r\u00e9forme, une proc\u00e9dure sp\u00e9cifique complexe devant l\u2019USPTO, ob\u00e9issant \u00e0 des r\u00e8gles proc\u00e9durales propres, d\u00e9nomm\u00e9e proc\u00e9dure d\u2019interf\u00e9rence (<em>interference proceeding<\/em>) \u00e9tait destin\u00e9e \u00e0 r\u00e9soudre les questions de priorit\u00e9s entre inventeurs<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"V. MPEP, \u00a7 2301.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-277\" href=\"#footnote-279-277\" aria-label=\"Footnote 277\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[277]<\/sup><\/a>.\u00a0Pour les demandes d\u00e9pos\u00e9es apr\u00e8s cette date, l\u2019AIA a institu\u00e9 une nouvelle proc\u00e9dure devant l\u2019USPTO, dite <em>Derivations Proceedings<\/em>, destin\u00e9e \u00e0 d\u00e9terminer si le d\u00e9posant ou le brevet\u00e9 est bien inventeur ou ayant cause de l\u2019inventeur<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"V. MPEP, \u00a7 2310.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-278\" href=\"#footnote-279-278\" aria-label=\"Footnote 278\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[278]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>397._ Les inventions de salari\u00e9s_<\/strong> Aux \u00c9tats-Unis la question des inventions de salari\u00e9s, comme celle des contrats de transfert en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral, n\u2019est pas r\u00e9gie par la loi f\u00e9d\u00e9rale. Elle est donc r\u00e9gl\u00e9e au niveau des \u00c9tats, soit en application des principes de <em>common law<\/em>, soit par des lois \u00e9crites. Les solutions ne sont donc pas uniformes sur ce point.<\/p>\n<p>En <em>common law<\/em> la solution de principe consiste \u00e0 attribuer les droits \u00e0 l\u2019employ\u00e9 inventeur<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178 (1933).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-279\" href=\"#footnote-279-279\" aria-label=\"Footnote 279\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[279]<\/sup><\/a>. Les clauses expresses d\u2019attribution des droits \u00e0 l\u2019employeur sont cependant valables, et ne semblent pas faire l\u2019objet de restrictions particuli\u00e8res. En l\u2019absence de clause expresse, et dans certains cas, une licence ou, plus rarement, une cession tacite, peuvent \u00eatre d\u00e9couvertes<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Wommack v. Durham Pecan Co., Inc., 715 F.2d 962, 219 U.S.P.Q. 1153 (5th Cir. 1983); Tin Decorating Co. of Baltimore v. Metal Package Corp., 29 F.2d 1006 (S.D.N.Y. 1928), aff\u2019d on other grounds, 37 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1930); Wiegand v. Dover Mfg. Co., 292 F. 255 (N.D. Ohio 1923); Francklyn v. Guilford Packing Co., 695 F.2d 1158, 1160-61 (9th Cir. 1983); Kurt H. Volk, Inc. v. Foundation for Christian Living, 534 F. Supp. 1059, 1083-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-280\" href=\"#footnote-279-280\" aria-label=\"Footnote 280\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[280]<\/sup><\/a>. Les crit\u00e8res appliqu\u00e9s pour d\u00e9terminer l\u2019existence d\u2019une licence ou d\u2019une cession tacite rappellent ceux qui sont utilis\u00e9s dans nos r\u00e9gimes d\u2019inventions de salari\u00e9s\u00a0: nature de l\u2019activit\u00e9 de l\u2019employ\u00e9, instructions ou utilisation des ressources de l\u2019employeur, etc. Les dirigeants de l\u2019entreprise semblent \u00eatre soumis \u00e0 une obligation implicite de transf\u00e9rer leurs droits \u00e0 leur employeur. Une licence tacite peut \u00eatre exclusive ou non. Les r\u00e8gles de <em>common law<\/em> n\u2019imposent pas une r\u00e9mun\u00e9ration distincte du salaire vers\u00e9.<\/p>\n<p>Les lois \u00e9tatiques adopt\u00e9es par certains Etats f\u00e9d\u00e9r\u00e9s, soit codifient les solutions d\u00e9gag\u00e9es en <em>common law<\/em>, soit les alt\u00e8rent. Elles peuvent \u00e9tablir ou autoriser un <em>shop right<\/em> (droit de boutique), c\u2019est-\u00e0-dire un droit, non exclusif, conf\u00e9r\u00e9 \u00e0 l\u2019employeur d\u2019exploiter l\u2019invention concern\u00e9e pour son propre usage.<\/p>\n<p>La Loi de Californie, inscrite du Code du travail de l\u2019\u00c9tat<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Cal. Lab. Code \u00a7\u00a7 2870 \u00e0 2872.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-281\" href=\"#footnote-279-281\" aria-label=\"Footnote 281\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[281]<\/sup><\/a> pr\u00e9voit que les cessions de droits \u00e0 l\u2019employeur ne couvrent pas une invention que l'employ\u00e9 a con\u00e7ue enti\u00e8rement sur son temps libre sans utiliser l'\u00e9quipement, les fournitures, les installations ou les secrets commerciaux de l'employeur, \u00e0 l'exception des inventions qui : se rapportent au moment de la conception ou de l'utilisation aux activit\u00e9s de l'employeur (<em>employer\u2019s bunisess<\/em>) ou \u00e0 ses activit\u00e9s de recherche ou de d\u00e9veloppement r\u00e9elles ou pr\u00e9vues (<em>demonstrably anticipated<\/em>), ou r\u00e9sultent d'un travail effectu\u00e9 pour l'employeur.\u00a0 Le contrat de travail d\u00e9termine \u00e9galement les conditions de divulgation par l\u2019employ\u00e9 de ses inventions et de d\u00e9termination de leur classification (sous condition de confidentialit\u00e9). Des lois similaires ont \u00e9t\u00e9 adopt\u00e9s dans le Delaware<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"19 Del C. \u00a7 805).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-282\" href=\"#footnote-279-282\" aria-label=\"Footnote 282\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[282]<\/sup><\/a>, en Illinois<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"765 ILCS 1060\/1 \u00e0 1060\/3.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-283\" href=\"#footnote-279-283\" aria-label=\"Footnote 283\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[283]<\/sup><\/a>, au Kansas<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"K.S.A. 44-130\" id=\"return-footnote-279-284\" href=\"#footnote-279-284\" aria-label=\"Footnote 284\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[284]<\/sup><\/a>, dans le Minnesota<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Minn. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 181.78.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-285\" href=\"#footnote-279-285\" aria-label=\"Footnote 285\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[285]<\/sup><\/a>, au Nevada<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"NRS 600.500.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-286\" href=\"#footnote-279-286\" aria-label=\"Footnote 286\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[286]<\/sup><\/a>, dans le New Jersey<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"N.J.S.A. 34:1B-265.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-287\" href=\"#footnote-279-287\" aria-label=\"Footnote 287\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[287]<\/sup><\/a>, en Caroline du Nord<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 66-57.1 et 66-57.2.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-288\" href=\"#footnote-279-288\" aria-label=\"Footnote 288\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[288]<\/sup><\/a>, dans l\u2019Utah<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Utah Code \u00a7\u00a7 34-39-1 \u00e0 34-39-3.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-289\" href=\"#footnote-279-289\" aria-label=\"Footnote 289\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[289]<\/sup><\/a> et dans l\u2019\u00c9tat de Washington<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"RCW 49.44.140 et 49.44.150.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-290\" href=\"#footnote-279-290\" aria-label=\"Footnote 290\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[290]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>398._ Propri\u00e9t\u00e9 et copropri\u00e9t\u00e9 du brevet_<\/strong> Aux termes du paragraphe 261 du Patent Act les brevets ont \u00ab\u00a0les attributs de la propri\u00e9t\u00e9 personnelle\u00a0\u00bb (<em>the attributes of personal property<\/em>). Les demandes de brevets, les brevets, ou tout int\u00e9r\u00eat y aff\u00e9rent, sont cessibles et peuvent faire l\u2019objet de licences, exclusives ou non.<\/p>\n<p>Les coinventeurs ont un droit indivis dans le brevet. En l'absence de toute convention contraire, chacun des copropri\u00e9taires d'un brevet peut fabriquer, utiliser, offrir \u00e0 la vente, ou vendre l'invention brevet\u00e9e aux \u00c9tats-Unis, ou importer l'invention brevet\u00e9e aux \u00c9tats-Unis, sans le consentement des autres propri\u00e9taires<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"35 U.S.C.\u00a7 262.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-291\" href=\"#footnote-279-291\" aria-label=\"Footnote 291\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[291]<\/sup><\/a>. Il peut \u00e9galement librement c\u00e9der sa quote-part dans le brevet.<\/p>\n<p>De mani\u00e8re g\u00e9n\u00e9rale, les questions relatives \u00e0 la propri\u00e9t\u00e9 et au transfert du brevet sont r\u00e9gies par les loi \u00e9tatiques<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Farmland Irrigation Co., Inc. v. Dopplmaier, 48 Cal. 2d 208, 308 P.2d 732 (1957).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-292\" href=\"#footnote-279-292\" aria-label=\"Footnote 292\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[292]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<h3><strong>B. L'\u00e9tendue de la protection<\/strong><\/h3>\n<p><strong>399._ Les droits exclusifs du brevet\u00e9_<\/strong> Le monopole du brevet\u00e9 est d\u00e9fini de mani\u00e8re n\u00e9gative, comme le droit d\u2019interdire aux tiers d\u2019effectuer certains actes sur l\u2019invention<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"V. par exemple TransCore, L.P. v. Electronic Transaction Consultants Corp., 563 F.3d 1271, 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. v. Cooper Industries, Inc., 131 F.3d 1011, 1015 (Fed. Cir. 1997).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-293\" href=\"#footnote-279-293\" aria-label=\"Footnote 293\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[293]<\/sup><\/a>. Aux termes du paragraphe 154(1)(a) du Patent Act, tout brevet conf\u00e8re au brevet\u00e9, \u00e0 ses h\u00e9ritiers ou ayants droit, le droit d'interdire \u00e0 toute pertsonne de fabriquer, utiliser, offrir \u00e0 la vente, ou de vendre l'invention \u00e0 travers les \u00c9tats-Unis ou d'importer l'invention aux \u00c9tats-Unis, et, si l'invention est un proc\u00e9d\u00e9, le droit d'emp\u00eacher autrui d'utiliser, offrir \u00e0 la vente ou \u00e0 la vente aux \u00c9tats-Unis, ou d'importer aux \u00c9tats-Unis, les produits fabriqu\u00e9s par ce proc\u00e9d\u00e9, se r\u00e9f\u00e9rant \u00e0 la sp\u00e9cification des indications de ceux-ci<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"\u00ab Every patent shall contain a short title of the invention and a grant to the patentee, his heirs or assigns, of the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States or importing the invention into the United States, and, if the invention is a process, of the right to exclude others from using, offering for sale or selling throughout the United States, or importing into the United States, products made by that process, referring to the specification for the particulars thereof\u00a0\u00bb.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-294\" href=\"#footnote-279-294\" aria-label=\"Footnote 294\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[294]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>La d\u00e9finition des actes contrefaisants est pr\u00e9cis\u00e9e aux paragraphes 271(a) et 271(g) du Patent Act, qui disposent\u00a0:<\/p>\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\n<p>\u00ab 271. - (a) Sauf disposition contraire dans le pr\u00e9sent titre [35 USCS 1 et suiv. ], quiconque sans autorisation fabrique, utilise, offre de vendre ou vend une invention brevet\u00e9e, aux \u00c9tats-Unis ou importe aux \u00c9tats-Unis une invention brevet\u00e9e pendant la dur\u00e9e du brevet correspondant, contrefait le brevet<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"&quot;(a) Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States, or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent&quot;.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-295\" href=\"#footnote-279-295\" aria-label=\"Footnote 295\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[295]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>(\u2026)<\/p>\n<p>(g) Quiconque, sans autorisation, les importations aux \u00c9tats-Unis ou des offres de vente, vend ou utilise aux \u00c9tats-Unis un produit qui est fabriqu\u00e9 par un proc\u00e9d\u00e9 brevet\u00e9 aux \u00c9tats-Unis seront responsables comme un contrefacteur, si l'importation, l'offre \u00e0 vente, la vente ou l'utilisation du produit survient pendant la dur\u00e9e d'un tel brevet de proc\u00e9d\u00e9. Dans une action en contrefa\u00e7on d'un brevet de proc\u00e9d\u00e9, aucun recours ne peut \u00eatre accord\u00e9 pour infraction en raison de l'usage non commercial ou vente au d\u00e9tail d'un produit moins qu'il n'y ait pas de recours ad\u00e9quat en vertu du pr\u00e9sent titre pour infraction en raison de l'importation ou de toute autre utilisation, l'offre de vendre, ou de la vente de ce produit. Un produit qui est fabriqu\u00e9 par un proc\u00e9d\u00e9 brevet\u00e9 sera, aux fins du pr\u00e9sent titre, ne peut \u00eatre consid\u00e9r\u00e9 comme fait apr\u00e8s<\/p>\n<p>(1) il est sensiblement modifi\u00e9 par les processus ult\u00e9rieurs; ou<\/p>\n<p>(2) il devient un \u00e9l\u00e9ment trivial et non essentiel d'un autre produit\u00a0\u00bb<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Traduction OMPI. \u201c(g) Whoever without authority imports into the United States or offers to sell, sells, or uses within the United States a product which is made by a process patented in the United States shall be liable as an infringer, if the importation, offer to sell, sale, or use of the product occurs during the term of such process patent. In an action for infringement of a process patent, no remedy may be granted for infringement on account of the noncommercial use or retail sale of a product unless there is no adequate remedy under this title for infringement on account of the importation or other use, offer to sell, or sale of that product. A product which is made by a patented process will, for purposes of this title, not be considered to be so made after \u2014 (1) it is materially changed by subsequent processes; or (2) it becomes a trivial and nonessential component of another product.\u00a0\u00bb\" id=\"return-footnote-279-296\" href=\"#footnote-279-296\" aria-label=\"Footnote 296\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[296]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>Chacun de ces actes constitue un acte distinct de contrefa\u00e7on directe (primaire).<\/p>\n<p>L\u2019importation est vis\u00e9e de mani\u00e8re g\u00e9n\u00e9rale comme un acte primaire de contrefa\u00e7on depuis 1994<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"35 U.S.C. \u00a7 271(a).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-297\" href=\"#footnote-279-297\" aria-label=\"Footnote 297\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[297]<\/sup><\/a>, sous r\u00e9serve de l\u2019application de la doctrine de <em>first sale<\/em><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"V. infra, n\u00b0400.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-298\" href=\"#footnote-279-298\" aria-label=\"Footnote 298\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[298]<\/sup><\/a>. Le titulaire du brevet peut \u00e9galement, en vertu de la Section 337 du Tariff Act du 1930, demander \u00e0 l\u2019United States International Trade Commission (ITC) une injonction interdisant l\u2019importation contrefaisante<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"19 U.S.C. \u00a7 1337(a).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-299\" href=\"#footnote-279-299\" aria-label=\"Footnote 299\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[299]<\/sup><\/a>. L\u2019ITC ne peut cependant accorder de dommages et int\u00e9r\u00eat. Deux proc\u00e9dures sont donc souvent lanc\u00e9es en parall\u00e8le, devant l\u2019ITC et les tribunaux.<\/p>\n<p>La loi consid\u00e8re \u00e9galement comme actes de contrefa\u00e7on primaire (a) le d\u00e9p\u00f4t d\u2019une demande d\u2019autorisation relative \u00e0 un m\u00e9dicament couvert par un brevet (sous r\u00e9serve d\u2019exceptions limit\u00e9es en mati\u00e8re de biotechnologies)<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"35 U.S.C. \u00a7 271(e) point 2 et suivants\u00a0: \u00ab\u00a0(e) (1) It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell within the United States or import into the United States a patented invention (other than a new animal drug or veterinary biological product (as those terms are used in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Act of March 4, 1913) which is primarily manufactured using recombinant DNA, recombinant RNA, hybridoma technology, or other processes involving site specific genetic manipulation techniques) solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products. (2) It shall be an act of infringement to submit \u2014 (A) an application under section 505(j) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act or described in section 505(b)(2) of such Act for a drug claimed in a patent or the use of which is claimed in a patent, (B) an application under section 512 of such Act or under the Act of March 4, 1913 (21 U.S.C. 151 - 158) for a drug or veterinary biological product which is not primarily manufactured using recombinant DNA, recombinant RNA, hybridoma technology, or other processes involving site specific genetic manipulation techniques and which is claimed in a patent or the use of which is claimed in a patent, or (C) (i) with respect to a patent that is identified in the list of patents described in section 351(l)(3) of the Public Health Service Act (including as provided under section 351(l)(7) of such Act), an application seeking approval of a biological product, or(ii) if the applicant for the application fails to provide the application and information required under section 351(l)(2)(A) of such Act, an application seeking approval of a biological product for a patent that could be identified pursuant to section 351(l)(3)(A)(i) of such Act, if the purpose of such submission is to obtain approval under such Act to engage in the commercial manufacture, use, or sale of a drug, veterinary biological product, or biological product claimed in a patent or the use of which is claimed in a patent before the expiration of such patent.\u00a0\u00bb V. Eli Lilly and Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990); Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-300\" href=\"#footnote-279-300\" aria-label=\"Footnote 300\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[300]<\/sup><\/a>, (b) depuis une modification de 1984, le fait de fournir aux \u00c9tats-Unis ou \u00e0 partir des \u00c9tats-Unis une partie substantielle des composants, non combin\u00e9s, d'une invention brevet\u00e9e, de mani\u00e8re \u00e0 induire activement la combinaison de ces composants \u00e0 l'ext\u00e9rieur des \u00c9tats-Unis d'une mani\u00e8re qui porterait atteinte au brevet si une telle combinaison \u00e9tait effectu\u00e9e aux \u00c9tats-Unis<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"35 U.S.C. \u00a7 271(f). V. Microsoft Corp. v. AT&amp;T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-301\" href=\"#footnote-279-301\" aria-label=\"Footnote 301\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[301]<\/sup><\/a>, et (c) depuis 1988 (r\u00e9forme issue du Process Patents Amendments Act de 1988) l\u2019importation, l\u2019offre \u00e0 la vente, la vente ou l\u2019utilisation aux \u00c9tats-Unis d\u2019un produit fabriqu\u00e9 en dehors des \u00c9tats-Unis au moyen d\u2019un proc\u00e9d\u00e9 brevet\u00e9 aux \u00c9tats-Unis<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"35 U.S.C. \u00a7 271(g): \u00ab\u00a0Whoever without authority imports into the United States or offers to sell, sells, or uses within the United States a product which is made by a process patented in the United States shall be liable as an infringer, if the importation, offer to sell, sale, or use of the product occurs during the term of such process patent. In an action for infringement of a process patent, no remedy may be granted for infringement on account of the noncommercial use or retail sale of a product unless there is no adequate remedy under this title for infringement on account of the importation or other use, offer to sell, or sale of that product. A product which is made by a patented process will, for purposes of this title, not be considered to be so made after \u2014 (1) it is materially changed by subsequent processes; or (2) it becomes a trivial and nonessential component of another product.\u00a0\u00bb\" id=\"return-footnote-279-302\" href=\"#footnote-279-302\" aria-label=\"Footnote 302\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[302]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>La contrefa\u00e7on secondaire (<em>indirect<\/em> ou <em>dependent infringement<\/em>) est vis\u00e9e aux paragraphes 271(b) et (c), et consiste dans l\u2019incitation \u00e0 la contrefa\u00e7on (<em>active inducement<\/em>) et la fourniture de moyens contrefaisants (<em>contributory infingement<\/em>)<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"\u00ab (b) Quiconque induit activement contrefa\u00e7on d'un brevet est responsable comme un contrefacteur.(c) Celui qui offre de vendre ou vend aux \u00c9tats-Unis ou des importations aux \u00c9tats-Unis une composante d'une machine brevet\u00e9e, la fabrication, la combinaison ou la composition, ou d'un mat\u00e9riau ou d'un appareil pour une utilisation dans la pratique d'un proc\u00e9d\u00e9 brevet\u00e9, constituant une partie de la mati\u00e8re de l'invention, que l'on sait \u00eatre sp\u00e9cialement con\u00e7u ou sp\u00e9cialement adapt\u00e9 pour une utilisation \u00e0 une violation de ce brevet, et non un article de base ou d'un produit du commerce adapt\u00e9 \u00e0 une utilisation importante de contrefaisant, est responsable comme un contrefacteur \u00bb.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-303\" href=\"#footnote-279-303\" aria-label=\"Footnote 303\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[303]<\/sup><\/a>. L\u2019incitation \u00e0 la contrefa\u00e7on requiert la preuve d\u2019un encouragement actif et intentionnel ou d\u2019une aide apport\u00e9e \u00e0 la r\u00e9alisation de la contrefa\u00e7on<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"DSU Medical Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1305-06 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Systems, Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Water Technologies Corp. v. Calco, Ltd., 850 F.2d 660, 668 (Fed. Cir. 1988).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-304\" href=\"#footnote-279-304\" aria-label=\"Footnote 304\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[304]<\/sup><\/a>. La contrefa\u00e7on indirecte ou secondaire implique n\u00e9cessairement l\u2019existence d\u2019un acte de contrefa\u00e7on primaire associ\u00e9<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336 (1961).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-305\" href=\"#footnote-279-305\" aria-label=\"Footnote 305\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[305]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>400._ L\u2019\u00e9puisement des droits_<\/strong> En mati\u00e8re de brevet la th\u00e9orie de l'\u00e9puisement des droits (<em>first sale doctrine<\/em>), d\u00e9velopp\u00e9e en <em>common law,<\/em> ne fait l'objet d'aucune disposition dans le Patent Act.<\/p>\n<p>La Cour supr\u00eame l'a consacr\u00e9 pour la premi\u00e8re fois en mati\u00e8re de brevets dans son arr\u00eat <em>Adams v. Burke<\/em> de 1873<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall) 453 1873.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-306\" href=\"#footnote-279-306\" aria-label=\"Footnote 306\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[306]<\/sup><\/a>, qui concernait des restrictions territoriales \u00e0 l'int\u00e9rieur des \u00c9tats-Unis impos\u00e9es par un vendeur de cercueils, jug\u00e9es en l'esp\u00e8ce inopposables aux utilisateurs. La Cour y fonde la th\u00e9orie sur l'id\u00e9e qu'une vente autoris\u00e9e doit n\u00e9cessairement entra\u00eener le droit d'utiliser, de la mani\u00e8re la plus compl\u00e8te, le produit vendu\u00a0:<\/p>\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\n<p>\u00ab\u00a0Le fondement r\u00e9el de ces d\u00e9cisions est que la vente par une personne qui poss\u00e8de le droit de fabriquer, vendre et utiliser une machine entra\u00eene le droit d'utiliser cette machine de la fa\u00e7on la plus compl\u00e8te qui soit\u00a0\u00bb<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"\u00ab\u00a0The true ground on which these decisions rest is that the sale by a person who has the full right to make, sell, and use such a machine carries with it the right to the use of that machine to the full extent to which it can be used in point of time.\u00a0\u00bb Adams v. Burke, ibid.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-307\" href=\"#footnote-279-307\" aria-label=\"Footnote 307\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[307]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p>De l\u00e0 vient l'expression <em>first sale doctrine<\/em>, th\u00e9orie de la premi\u00e8re vente, qui correspond \u00e0 la th\u00e9orie de l'\u00e9puisement des droits d\u00e9gag\u00e9e (import\u00e9e?) par Kohler en Allemagne \u00e0 la m\u00eame \u00e9poque<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Kohler proposera en Allemagne la th\u00e9orie des licences tacites d\u00e8s 1878 (Dans son trait\u00e9 Deutsches Patentrecht..., Verlag von J. Bensheimer, 1878. \u00ab\u00a0vendre le produit sans conc\u00e9der le droit d'usage n'aurait pas de sens\u00a0\u00bb, p 162-163, cit\u00e9 et traduit in B. Castell, L'\u00e9puisement des droits intellectuels, Puf 1989, p 54), mais ne semble avoir formul\u00e9 la th\u00e9orie de l'\u00e9puisement (automatique) que plus tard (Handbuch des Deutscher patentrechts rechtvergleichender darstellung, Manheim, 1900). La proximit\u00e9 des raisonnements est frappante.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-308\" href=\"#footnote-279-308\" aria-label=\"Footnote 308\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[308]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>La Cour supr\u00eame est revenue \u00e0 plusieurs reprises sur cette doctrine en mati\u00e8re de brevets<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Notamment American Cotton Tie Supply Co. v. Simmons, 106 U.S. 89 (1882).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-309\" href=\"#footnote-279-309\" aria-label=\"Footnote 309\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[309]<\/sup><\/a>, qu'elle a red\u00e9finie comme suit en 1942 dans l'arr\u00eat <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/316\/241\/\"><em>US v Univis Lens Co<\/em><\/a><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"316 US 241, 250 (1942).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-310\" href=\"#footnote-279-310\" aria-label=\"Footnote 310\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[310]<\/sup><\/a>:<\/p>\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\n<p>\u00ab Le brevet\u00e9 peut se d\u00e9partir de son monopole en totalit\u00e9 par la vente de son brevet ou en partie par la vente d'un article incorporant l'invention\u2026 Mais la vente de cet article \u00e9puise le monopole qui y subsiste et le brevet\u00e9 ne peut pas d\u00e8s lors, sur le fondement de son brevet, contr\u00f4ler l'utilisation ou la cession de l'article \u00bb<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"\u00ab The patentee may surrender his monopoly in whole by the sale of his patent or in part by the sale of an article embodying the invention... But sale of it exhausts the monopoly in that article and the patentee may not thereafter, by virtue of his patent, control the use or disposition of the article \u00bb.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-311\" href=\"#footnote-279-311\" aria-label=\"Footnote 311\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[311]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p>Contrairement au m\u00e9canisme de licence tacite, \u00e9galement applicable<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"V. infra, n\u00b0402.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-312\" href=\"#footnote-279-312\" aria-label=\"Footnote 312\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[312]<\/sup><\/a> l'\u00e9puisement issu de la doctrine de <em>first sale<\/em> vaut \u00e9galement en pr\u00e9sence de clause contraire. La Cour Supr\u00eame a ainsi jug\u00e9, dans son arr\u00eat <span style=\"orphans: 1;\"><em>Impression Products, Inc. v. Lexmark International, Inc.<\/em><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Impression Products, Inc. v. Lexmark International, Inc.,\u00a0137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-313\" href=\"#footnote-279-313\" aria-label=\"Footnote 313\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[313]<\/sup><\/a><\/span><span style=\"font-size: 1em; orphans: 1; text-align: initial;\">,\u00a0que la d\u00e9cision d'un titulaire de brevet de vendre un produit \u00e9puise tous ses droits de brevet sur cet article, quelles que soient les restrictions que le titulaire du brevet pr\u00e9tend imposer \u00e0 ses clients, m\u00eame si les restrictions sont claires et applicables en vertu du droit des contrats.<\/span><\/p>\n<p>L'\u00e9puisement s'applique en cas de vente, mais \u00e9galement dans l'hypoth\u00e8se d'une licence, ou encore d'un engagement inconditionnel d'une soci\u00e9t\u00e9 de ne pas agir en contrefa\u00e7on contre un concurrent qui commercialise des produits couverts par ses brevets<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"TransCore, LP v Electronic Transaction Consultants Corp., 563 F.3d 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Les licences sont g\u00e9n\u00e9ralement assilil\u00e9es \u00e0 des engagements de ne pas agir en contrefa\u00e7on. La Cour Supr\u00eame l'a notamment affirm\u00e9 dans son arr\u00eat e Forest Radio Telephone Telegraph Co. v. United States,\u00a0273 U.S. 236, 242\u00a0(1927) (&quot;As a license passes no interest in the monopoly, it has been described as a mere waiver of the right to sue by the patentee.&quot;).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-314\" href=\"#footnote-279-314\" aria-label=\"Footnote 314\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[314]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Par ailleurs, dans son arr\u00eat <em>Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc. <\/em>de 2008<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-315\" href=\"#footnote-279-315\" aria-label=\"Footnote 315\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[315]<\/sup><\/a><em>,\u00a0<\/em>la Cour supr\u00eame a jug\u00e9 que l'\u00e9puisement s'appliquait \u00e9galement aux brevets de proc\u00e9d\u00e9s<em>. <\/em>Elle en a d\u00e9duit que, dans l'hypoth\u00e8se o\u00f9 un contrat de licence autorise la vente de composants issu de ces proc\u00e9d\u00e9s, le titulaire ne pouvait plus faire valoir ses droits de brevets contre une combinaison incorporant ces composants et des composants tiers.<\/p>\n<p>Enfin, en 2013, dans son arr\u00eat <em>Bowman v. Monsanto<\/em><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 569 U.S. 278 (2013)\" id=\"return-footnote-279-316\" href=\"#footnote-279-316\" aria-label=\"Footnote 316\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[316]<\/sup><\/a>, elle a jug\u00e9, \u00e0 propos de semences brevet\u00e9es, que la doctrine de la premi\u00e8re vente s'applique aux semences vendues mais qu'elle ne couvre pas leur reproduction, notamment par r\u00e9ensemencement.<\/p>\n<p><span style=\"font-size: 1em;\">Le domaine <\/span>d\u2019application de la doctrine dans l\u2019ordre interne concerne les r\u00e9parations, en principe licites<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Wilbur-Ellis Co. v. Kuther, 377 U.S. 422 (1964); Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336 (1961); General Elec. Co. v. United States, 572 F.2d 745, 778-86 (Ct. Cl. 1978); Jazz Photo Corp. v. International Trade Commission, 264 F.3d \u00e0 1101, 1105-07; Porter v. Farmers Supply Service, Inc., 790 F.2d 882 (Fed. Cir. 1986).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-317\" href=\"#footnote-279-317\" aria-label=\"Footnote 317\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[317]<\/sup><\/a>, et les reconstructions, en principe non couvertes par l\u2019\u00e9puisement<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"American Cotton-Tie Co. v. Simmons, 106 U.S. (16 Otto.) 89 (1882); Hydril Co. v. Crossman Engineering, Inc., 152 U.S.P.Q. 171 (E.D. Tex. 1966); Sandvik Aktiebolag v. E.J. Co., 121 F.3d 669 (Fed. Cir. 1997).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-318\" href=\"#footnote-279-318\" aria-label=\"Footnote 318\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[318]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>401._ L\u2019\u00e9puisement international_<\/strong> La question de l'\u00e9puisement international du brevet a \u00e9t\u00e9 longtemps d\u00e9battue aux \u00c9tats-Unis, la Cour supr\u00eame ne s'\u00e9tant pas prononc\u00e9e sur la question<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Boesch v. Graff, 133 U.S. 697 (1890) \u00e9tait quelquefois cit\u00e9e, mais en l'esp\u00e8ce le produit import\u00e9 n'avait pas \u00e9t\u00e9 fabriqu\u00e9 ou mis sur le march\u00e9 avec l'autorisation du titulaire du brevet US, et \u00e9manait d'un concurrent.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-319\" href=\"#footnote-279-319\" aria-label=\"Footnote 319\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[319]<\/sup><\/a>. Apr\u00e8s avoir \u00e9t\u00e9 appliqu\u00e9 par certaines cours f\u00e9d\u00e9rales<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Holiday v. Mattheson, 24 F. 185, 185 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1885), Dickerson v. Mattheson, 57 F. 524, 527 (2d Cir.1893); Curtiss Aeroplane &amp; Motor Corp. v. United Aircraft Eng\u2019g Corp., 266 F. 71, 78\u201379 (2d Cir. 1920).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-320\" href=\"#footnote-279-320\" aria-label=\"Footnote 320\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[320]<\/sup><\/a>, le principe d'\u00e9puisement international a \u00e9t\u00e9 clairement \u00e9cart\u00e9 par la Cour f\u00e9d\u00e9rale d'appel pour le circuit f\u00e9d\u00e9ral (institu\u00e9e en 1982 et ayant comp\u00e9tence exclusive en mati\u00e8re de brevets) depuis sa d\u00e9cision <em>Jazz Camera Photo v. International Trade Commission<\/em> de 2001<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Jazz Camera Photo v. International Trade Commission, 264 F.3d 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2001), portant sur l'importation aux \u00c9tats-Unis d'appareils photos jetables achet\u00e9s aux \u00c9tats-Unis et reconditionn\u00e9s en Chine. Dans cette d\u00e9cision la Cour pr\u00e9cise notamment la distinction entre les simples r\u00e9parations couvertes par l'\u00e9puisement et les reconstructions soumises au monopole. V. \u00e9galement Fuji Photo Film Co. v Jazz Photo Corp., 394 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2005):\u00a0\u00ab Les droits de brevet conf\u00e9r\u00e9s aux \u00c9tats-Unis ne sont pas \u00e9puis\u00e9s par des produits en provenance de l'\u00e9tranger. Pour invoquer la protection de la doctrine de first sale, la premi\u00e8re vente autoris\u00e9e doit avoir \u00e9t\u00e9 faite sous l'empire du brevet am\u00e9ricain \u00bb.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-321\" href=\"#footnote-279-321\" aria-label=\"Footnote 321\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[321]<\/sup><\/a>.\u00a0Cette position a \u00e9t\u00e9 r\u00e9affirm\u00e9e en 2012 par la m\u00eame Cour f\u00e9d\u00e9rale de district dans l'affaire <em>Ninestar Technology Co., Ltd. v. International Trade Com'n<\/em><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Ninestar Technology Co., Ltd. v. International Trade Com'n, 667 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Newman, J.).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-322\" href=\"#footnote-279-322\" aria-label=\"Footnote 322\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[322]<\/sup><\/a>. Le refus de la Cour supr\u00eame de recevoir l'appel de cette d\u00e9cision le 25 mars 2013<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Supreme Court No. 12-552.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-323\" href=\"#footnote-279-323\" aria-label=\"Footnote 323\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[323]<\/sup><\/a>, donc post\u00e9rieurement \u00e0 son arr\u00eat <em>Kirtsaeng<\/em><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"V. Tome 1, n\u00b0 229.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-324\" href=\"#footnote-279-324\" aria-label=\"Footnote 324\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[324]<\/sup><\/a>, laissait ainsi perdurer, pour les brevets, l'exclusion de l'\u00e9puisement international pour les produits fabriqu\u00e9s \u00e0 l'\u00e9tranger.<\/p>\n<p>L'\u00e9puisement international en mati\u00e8re de brevets sera finalement consacr\u00e9 par la Cour Supr\u00eame en 2017, dans son arr\u00eat <span style=\"orphans: 1;\"><em>Impression Products, Inc. v. Lexmark International, Inc. <\/em>pr\u00e9cit\u00e9<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Impression Products, Inc. v. Lexmark International, Inc.,\u00a0137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-325\" href=\"#footnote-279-325\" aria-label=\"Footnote 325\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[325]<\/sup><\/a>. La r\u00e8gle est d\u00e9sormais clairement pos\u00e9e: une vente par le titulaire des droits ou avec son consentement en dehors du territoire des \u00c9tats-Unis emporte \u00e9puisement du droit du titulaire du brevet de la m\u00eame fa\u00e7on qu'une vente sur le territoire des \u00c9tats-Unis.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>402._ Les licences tacites_<\/strong> Dans la mesure o\u00f9 une licence peut \u00eatre tacite, la d\u00e9couverte par le juge d\u2019une licence tacite peut permettre de valider des usages autrement contrefaisants<span style=\"font-size: 1em;\"><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Comme l'a indiqu\u00e9 la Cour supr\u00eame: &quot;No formal granting of a license\u00a0is necessary in order to give it effect. Any language used by the owner of the patent or any conduct on his part exhibited to another, from which that other may properly infer that the owner consents to his use of the patent in making or using it, or selling it, upon which the other acts, constitutes a\u00a0license and a defense to an action for a tort.&quot; DeForest Radio Tel. &amp; Tel. Co. v. United States, 47 U.S. 366 (1927). Sur le r\u00e9gime et les conditions des licences tacites V. \u00e9galement General Motors Corp. v. Dailey, 93 F.2d 938, 941 (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1937); Sanofi, S.A. v. Med-Tech Veterinarian Products, Inc., 565 F. Supp. 931, 940 (D.N.J. 1983); Stickle v. Heublein, Inc., 716 F.2d 1550, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Winbond Electronics Corp. v. International Trade Com'n, 262 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2001), opinion corrected, 275 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Teter v. Glass Onion, Inc., 723 F. Supp. 2d 1138 (W.D. Mo. 2010);\u00a0Corbello v. DeVito, 777 F.3d 1058, 1067 (9th Cir. 2015); Atkins v. Fischer, 331 F.3d 988 (D.C. Cir. 2003).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-326\" href=\"#footnote-279-326\" aria-label=\"Footnote 326\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[326]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>403._ Les exceptions (g\u00e9n\u00e9ral)_<\/strong> Le Patent Act ne contient pas d\u2019exceptions pour usage \u00e0 titre priv\u00e9 et non commercial et pour usage \u00e0 titre exp\u00e9rimental. Cependant ces usages sont largement consid\u00e9r\u00e9s comme non contrefaisants, \u00e0 conditions, pour les usages \u00e0 titre exp\u00e9rimental, qu\u2019ils ne s\u2019int\u00e8grent pas dans le cadre d\u2019une activit\u00e9 commerciale<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Madey v. Duke University, 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Pitcairn v. United States, 547 F.2d 1106 (Ct. Cl. 1976).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-327\" href=\"#footnote-279-327\" aria-label=\"Footnote 327\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[327]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Le droit de possession personnelle ant\u00e9rieure, qui repose en l\u2019esp\u00e8ce sur l\u2019usage ant\u00e9rieur, est codifi\u00e9 \u00e0 la section 273 du Patent Act<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"35 U.S.C. \u00a7273.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-328\" href=\"#footnote-279-328\" aria-label=\"Footnote 328\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[328]<\/sup><\/a>, et sa port\u00e9e a \u00e9t\u00e9 \u00e9largie par l\u2019America Invents Act<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Cette d\u00e9fense ne s\u2019appliquait auparavant qu\u2019aux methodes commerciales.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-329\" href=\"#footnote-279-329\" aria-label=\"Footnote 329\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[329]<\/sup><\/a>. Ce droit peut \u00eatre invoqu\u00e9 par quiconque a utilis\u00e9 dans le commerce<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Certains usages non commerciaux par des entit\u00e9s non commerciales sont \u00e9galement \u00e9ligibles.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-330\" href=\"#footnote-279-330\" aria-label=\"Footnote 330\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[330]<\/sup><\/a>, de bonne foi, l\u2019invention concern\u00e9e, au moins un an avant la date de d\u00e9p\u00f4t de l\u2019invention ou avant la date \u00e0 laquelle elle a \u00e9t\u00e9 divulgu\u00e9e au public.<\/p>\n<p>Les autres exceptions concernent certaines utilisations d\u2019inventions brevet\u00e9es li\u00e9es aux obligations issues de la r\u00e9glementation f\u00e9d\u00e9rale en mati\u00e8re de m\u00e9dicament<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"35 U.S.C. \u00a7 271(e)(1).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-331\" href=\"#footnote-279-331\" aria-label=\"Footnote 331\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[331]<\/sup><\/a> et le transit sur le territoire des \u00c9tats-Unis d\u2019aeronefs, de bateaux et de v\u00e9hicules utilisant une invention brevet\u00e9e<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"35 U.S.C. \u00a7 272.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-332\" href=\"#footnote-279-332\" aria-label=\"Footnote 332\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[332]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>A noter enfin qu\u2019en mati\u00e8re de brevet le principe d\u2019immunit\u00e9 des institutions f\u00e9d\u00e9rales (<em>sovereign immunity<\/em>) a \u00e9t\u00e9 \u00e9cart\u00e9, sous r\u00e9serve d\u2019exceptions, par la loi<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1498(a).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-333\" href=\"#footnote-279-333\" aria-label=\"Footnote 333\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[333]<\/sup><\/a>. La loi limite cependant les rem\u00e8des offerts au titulaire du brevet (principalement \u00e0 des dommages et int\u00e9r\u00eats). La Cour Supr\u00eame a r\u00e9affirm\u00e9 l\u2019application de ce principe aux \u00c9tats et aux institutions des \u00c9tats f\u00e9d\u00e9r\u00e9s<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999).\u00a0\" id=\"return-footnote-279-334\" href=\"#footnote-279-334\" aria-label=\"Footnote 334\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[334]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>404._ Les exceptions relatives aux m\u00e9dicaments g\u00e9n\u00e9riques_ <\/strong>Le Hatch-Waxman Act<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"P.L. 98-417, Title II, 98 Stat. 1585; 21 U.S.C. \u00a7 355 and 35 U.S.C. \u00a7 271(e)(1). V. supra, n\u00b0356.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-335\" href=\"#footnote-279-335\" aria-label=\"Footnote 335\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[335]<\/sup><\/a> a introduit une exception b\u00e9n\u00e9fice des fabricants de m\u00e9dicaments g\u00e9n\u00e9riques, qui couvre les actes raisonnablement li\u00e9s au d\u00e9veloppement et \u00e0 la soumission de toute information \u00e0 la FDA, y compris le d\u00e9veloppement d'une demande de m\u00e9dicament g\u00e9n\u00e9rique<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"35 U.S.C. \u00a7 271(e)(1): &quot;It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell within the United States or import into the United States a patented invention (other than a new animal drug or veterinary biological product (as those terms are used in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Act of March 4, 1913) which is primarily manufactured using recombinant DNA, recombinant RNA, hybridoma technology, or other processes involving site specific genetic manipulation techniques) solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products&quot;. V. Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 202 (2005) and Eli Lilly &amp; Co. Inc., 496 U.S. \u00e0 671; Momenta Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA Inc., 809 F.3d 610, 620-21 (Fed Cir. 2015); Amgen Inc. v. Hospira, Inc., 944 F.3d 1327, 1340 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2019).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-336\" href=\"#footnote-279-336\" aria-label=\"Footnote 336\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[336]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n<p>On notera que des r\u00e8gles proc\u00e9durales sp\u00e9ciales sont pr\u00e9vues par le Hatch-Waxman Act en mati\u00e8re d\u2019action contre des fabricants de m\u00e9dicaments g\u00e9n\u00e9riques, et notamment des d\u00e9lais d\u2019actions sp\u00e9cifiques et des possibilit\u00e9s de suspension de l\u2019approbation de la FDA<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"V. 21 U.S.C. \u00a7 355, et notamment (c)(3)(D)\" id=\"return-footnote-279-337\" href=\"#footnote-279-337\" aria-label=\"Footnote 337\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[337]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>405._ La dur\u00e9e des droits du brevet\u00e9_<\/strong> Le Patent Act de 1952 pr\u00e9voyait \u00e0 l\u2019origine une dur\u00e9e de protection de dix-sept ans \u00e0 compter de la date de d\u00e9livrance du brevet<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Ou vingt ans \u00e0 compter de la date de d\u00e9p\u00f4t d\u2019une demande nationale ou PCT assortie du d\u00e9lai de priorit\u00e9 (dans ce cas le d\u00e9lai le plus long s\u2019appliquait). La dur\u00e9e de dix-sept ans avait \u00e9t\u00e9 institu\u00e9e en 1861.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-338\" href=\"#footnote-279-338\" aria-label=\"Footnote 338\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[338]<\/sup><\/a>. Cette dur\u00e9e a \u00e9t\u00e9 modifi\u00e9e en 1995 conform\u00e9ment aux dispositions de l\u2019accord ADPIC, et a \u00e9t\u00e9 port\u00e9e \u00e0 vingt ans \u00e0 compter du d\u00e9p\u00f4t<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"35 U.S.C. \u00a7 154 (a)(2).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-339\" href=\"#footnote-279-339\" aria-label=\"Footnote 339\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[339]<\/sup><\/a>. La dur\u00e9e ancienne continuait \u00e0 s\u2019appliquer aux brevets d\u00e9livr\u00e9s en vertu de demandes d\u00e9pos\u00e9es avant le 8 juin 1995, d\u00e9sormais expir\u00e9s.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>406._ Les extensions. <\/strong>Depuis l\u2019entr\u00e9e en vigueur de l\u2019AIA, le dur\u00e9e de protection peut \u00eatre \u00e9tendue cas (a) de retard dans la d\u00e9livrance en raison d\u2019un retard de l\u2019USPTO au regard de certains d\u00e9lais, pour une dur\u00e9e \u00e9quivalente \u00e0 ce retard<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"35 U.S.C. \u00a7 154(b)(1)(A).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-340\" href=\"#footnote-279-340\" aria-label=\"Footnote 340\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[340]<\/sup><\/a>, (b) de d\u00e9passement d\u2019un d\u00e9lai de trois ans apr\u00e8s le d\u00e9p\u00f4t pour la d\u00e9livrance du brevet (sous r\u00e9serve de suspensions ou de demandes de d\u00e9lai par le demandeur), pour une dur\u00e9e \u00e9quivalente au d\u00e9passement de ce d\u00e9lai<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"35 U.S.C. \u00a7 154(b)(1)(B).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-341\" href=\"#footnote-279-341\" aria-label=\"Footnote 341\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[341]<\/sup><\/a>, ou (c) en pr\u00e9sence de retard li\u00e9s \u00e0 des proc\u00e9dures d\u2019interf\u00e9rences, \u00e0 l\u2019application d\u2019une ordonnance de secret, ou \u00e0 un appel, pour la dur\u00e9e des proc\u00e9dures concern\u00e9es (sous r\u00e9serve d\u2019une r\u00e9duction en fonction de l\u2019attitude du d\u00e9posant)<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"35 U.S.C. \u00a7 154(b)(1)(C).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-342\" href=\"#footnote-279-342\" aria-label=\"Footnote 342\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[342]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Cette dur\u00e9e peut \u00e9galement \u00eatre \u00e9tendue, pour un m\u00e9dicament \u00e0 usage humain, un mat\u00e9riel m\u00e9dical, un additif ou un colorant alimentaire, un\u00a0m\u00e9dicaments pour animaux ou un produit biologique v\u00e9t\u00e9rinaire pour une dur\u00e9e \u00e9quivalente aux dur\u00e9es n\u00e9cessaires \u00e0 l\u2019obtention d\u2019une autorisation administrative de mise sur le march\u00e9 du produit concern\u00e9<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"35 U.S.C. \u00a7 156. V. MPEP, \u00a7 2750.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-343\" href=\"#footnote-279-343\" aria-label=\"Footnote 343\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[343]<\/sup><\/a>. Les r\u00e8gles de calcul et d\u2019application de ces extensions sont tr\u00e8s complexes.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>407._ Les exclusivit\u00e9s. <\/strong>Des exclusivit\u00e9s sur les donn\u00e9es d\u2019essai (<em>market exclusivities<\/em>) sont \u00e9galement pr\u00e9vues par le Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA)<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Codifi\u00e9 dans 21 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 301\u2013397.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-344\" href=\"#footnote-279-344\" aria-label=\"Footnote 344\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[344]<\/sup><\/a>, jusqu\u2019\u00e0 cinq ans pour les nouveaux m\u00e9dicaments (<em>new chemical entity exclusivities<\/em>)<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"21 U.S.C. \u00a7 355(c)(3)(E)(ii), (j)(5)(F)(ii)).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-345\" href=\"#footnote-279-345\" aria-label=\"Footnote 345\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[345]<\/sup><\/a>, et jusqu\u2019\u00e0 trois ans pour les donn\u00e9es de test cliniques pr\u00e9sent\u00e9es au soutien de modifications de produit existants (<em>clinical investigation exclusivities<\/em>)<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"21 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 355, 360cc et 35 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 271, 282.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-346\" href=\"#footnote-279-346\" aria-label=\"Footnote 346\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[346]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Des exclusivit\u00e9s sont \u00e9galement donn\u00e9es pour les m\u00e9dicaments destin\u00e9s au traitement de maladies orphelines ou rares, en application de l\u2019Orphan Drug Act de 1983<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"V. 21 U.S.C. \u00a7 360aa \u00e0 360ee, et 42 U.S.C \u00a7 236; \u00e9galement 21 C.F.R. Part 316.La loi concerne les \u00ab maladies ou affections rares \u00bb, d\u00e9finies comme celles qui affectent moins de 200 000 personnes aux \u00c9tats-Unis, ou pour lesquelles il n'existe aucune perspective raisonnable de r\u00e9cup\u00e9ration des co\u00fbts de d\u00e9veloppement et de mise \u00e0 disposition aux \u00c9tats-Unis, 21 U.S.C. \u00a7 360bb.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-347\" href=\"#footnote-279-347\" aria-label=\"Footnote 347\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[347]<\/sup><\/a>, et pour des d\u00e9veloppements en faveur du traitement des enfants (<em>pediatric exclusivities<\/em>) (6 mois suppl\u00e9mentaires)<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Introduites par le Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act 2007 (BPCA), Pub. L. No. 11\u2013185.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-348\" href=\"#footnote-279-348\" aria-label=\"Footnote 348\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[348]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<h3><strong>C. L'exploitation du brevet<\/strong><\/h3>\n<p><strong>408._ Les contrats_<\/strong> Les demandes de brevets, les brevets et tous droits les concernant sont cessibles et peuvent faire l\u2019objet de licences, exclusives ou non. Les licences sont assimil\u00e9es \u00e0 des renonciations \u00e0 agir en contrefa\u00e7on<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"De: Forest Radio Telephone Telegraph Co. v. United States,\u00a0273 U.S. 236, 242,\u00a047 S.Ct. 366,\u00a071 L.Ed. 625 (1927)(&quot;As a license passes no interest in the monopoly, it has been described as a mere waiver of the right to sue by the patentee.&quot;).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-349\" href=\"#footnote-279-349\" aria-label=\"Footnote 349\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[349]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/span><\/span>\u00a0Les cessions doivent \u00eatre \u00e9tablies par \u00e9crit<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"35 U.S.C. \u00a7 261.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-350\" href=\"#footnote-279-350\" aria-label=\"Footnote 350\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[350]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Les cessions, transferts de propri\u00e9t\u00e9 et constitutions de s\u00fbret\u00e9s doivent \u00eatre inscrits dans les trois mois de leur signature au registre tenu par l\u2019USPTO, sous peine d\u2019inopposabilit\u00e9 aux tiers<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Ibid. \u00ab\u00a0An interest that constitutes an assignment, grant, or conveyance shall be void as against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for a valuable consideration, without notice, unless it is recorded in the Patent and Trademark Office within three months from its date or prior to the date of such subsequent purchase or mortgage \u00bb.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-351\" href=\"#footnote-279-351\" aria-label=\"Footnote 351\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[351]<\/sup><\/a>. Cette r\u00e8gle ne s\u2019applique pas aux licences.<\/p>\n<p>De mani\u00e8re g\u00e9n\u00e9rale, les questions relatives \u00e0 la propri\u00e9t\u00e9 et au transfert du brevet sont r\u00e9gl\u00e9es par les lois \u00e9tatiques<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Farmland Irrigation Co., Inc. v. Dopplmaier, 48 Cal. 2d 208, 308 P.2d 732 (1957), qui juge qu'un\u00a0contrat de licence de brevet est cessible en vertu de la politique \u00ab clairement manifest\u00e9e \u00bb par \u00ab les lois de cet \u00c9tat (...) en faveur de la libre transf\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 de tous les types de biens, y compris les droits d\u00e9coulant des contrats \u00bb, sauf si les les termes ou l\u2019objet du contrat d\u00e9montrent qu'il \u00e9tait incessible\" id=\"return-footnote-279-352\" href=\"#footnote-279-352\" aria-label=\"Footnote 352\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[352]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>409._ Les licences obligatoires_<\/strong> Le Patent Act ne pr\u00e9voit pas de licences obligatoires<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"V. cependant infra, n\u00b0355. Le refus d\u2019accorder une injonction en cas de contrefa\u00e7on aboutit, de facto, \u00e0 imposer une licence au brevet\u00e9.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-353\" href=\"#footnote-279-353\" aria-label=\"Footnote 353\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[353]<\/sup><\/a>. Cependant des licences obligatoires sont institu\u00e9es par certaines l\u00e9gislations en dehors du Patent Act, comme par exemple l\u2019Atomic Energy Act<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2183.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-354\" href=\"#footnote-279-354\" aria-label=\"Footnote 354\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[354]<\/sup><\/a> ou le Clean Air Act<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"42 U.S.C. \u00a7 7608.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-355\" href=\"#footnote-279-355\" aria-label=\"Footnote 355\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[355]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>410._ Aspects antitrust (renvoi)_<\/strong> Les principes g\u00e9n\u00e9raux dans ce domaine ont \u00e9t\u00e9 d\u00e9crits en introduction \u00e0 cet ouvrage<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"V. Tome 1, n\u00b0\" id=\"return-footnote-279-356\" href=\"#footnote-279-356\" aria-label=\"Footnote 356\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[356]<\/sup><\/a>. Les r\u00e8gles applicables sont \u00e9galement d\u00e9taill\u00e9es dans deux documents produits par la DOJ et la FTC, intitul\u00e9s Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual Property Rights: Promoting Innovation and Competition (2007) (IP Report) et Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property (2017) (IP Guidelines), auxquels nous renvoyons le lecteur. \u00a0Rappelons simplement qu\u2019aux \u00c9tats-Unis, quatre lois f\u00e9d\u00e9rales de concurrence s'appliquent au domaine de la propri\u00e9t\u00e9 intellectuelle: le <em>Sherman Act<\/em><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"15 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1-7.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-357\" href=\"#footnote-279-357\" aria-label=\"Footnote 357\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[357]<\/sup><\/a>, dont la section 1 interdit les pratiques restrictives du commerce (<em>unreasonable restraints of trade<\/em>) et la section 2 les abus de position dominante (<em>monopolization and attempts to monopolize<\/em>); le <em>Clayton Act<\/em><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"15 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 12-27 et 29 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 52-53.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-358\" href=\"#footnote-279-358\" aria-label=\"Footnote 358\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[358]<\/sup><\/a>, qui interdit les acquisitions restrictives de concurrence<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"15 U.S.C.\u00a0\u00a7 18.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-359\" href=\"#footnote-279-359\" aria-label=\"Footnote 359\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[359]<\/sup><\/a> et certaines clauses d'exclusivit\u00e9s associ\u00e9es \u00e0 la vente de produits<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"15 U.S.C. \u00a7 14.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-360\" href=\"#footnote-279-360\" aria-label=\"Footnote 360\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[360]<\/sup><\/a>; le <em>Federal Trade Commission Act<\/em> (FTC Act)<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"15 U.S.C. \u00a7 41.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-361\" href=\"#footnote-279-361\" aria-label=\"Footnote 361\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[361]<\/sup><\/a>, qui sanctionne certaines pratiques d\u00e9loyales<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"15 U.S.C. 45.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-362\" href=\"#footnote-279-362\" aria-label=\"Footnote 362\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[362]<\/sup><\/a>; et le <em>Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976<\/em> (HSR)<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"15 U.S.C. \u00a7 18a.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-363\" href=\"#footnote-279-363\" aria-label=\"Footnote 363\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[363]<\/sup><\/a>, qui permet la suspension pour examen de certains projets de fusion ou d'acquisitions.<\/p>\n<p>La jurisprudence dans ce domaine est \u00e0 la fois riche et ancienne, et sanctionne les agissements des titulaires de droits contraires aux r\u00e8gles ou aux principes pos\u00e9s par ces textes<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"V. notamment notre compte rendu de l\u2019affaire USA v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001), Com. Comm. \u00c9lectr. n\u00b0 10, Octobre 2001, act. 106. Egalement, M. A. Einhorn, \u00ab Intellectual Property and Antitrust: Music Performing Rights in Broadcasting \u00bb, 24 Colum.-VLA J.L. &amp; Arts 349 (2000-2001) ; S. F. Anthony, \u00ab Antitrust and Intellectual Property Law: From Adversaries to Partners \u00bb, 28 AIPLA Q. J. 1 (2000) ; D. A. Balto, A. M. Wolman, \u00ab Intellectual Property and Antitrust : General Principles \u00bb, 43 IDEA 395 (2003) ; S. B. Opi, \u00ab The Application of the Essential Facilities Doctrine to Intellectual Property Licensing in the European Union and the United States: Are Intellectual Property Rights Till Sacrosanct \u00bb, 11 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media &amp; Ent. L.J. 409 (2000-2001); E. T. Sullivan, \u00ab The Confluence of Antitrust and Intellectual Property at the New Century \u00bb, 1 Minn. Intell. Prop. Rev. [iii] (2000) ; R. A. Posner, \u00ab Transaction Costs and Antitrust Concerns in the Licensing of Intellectual Property \u00bb, 4 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. [i] (2004-2005) ; pour un article ancien, A.C. Hugin, \u00ab Intellectual Property and the Antitrust Laws \u00bb 30 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 450, 513, 601, 654, 867 (1948).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-364\" href=\"#footnote-279-364\" aria-label=\"Footnote 364\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[364]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>411._ Les obligations du brevet\u00e9_<\/strong> Le titulaire du brevet doit payer les redevances (<em>maintenance fee<\/em>) sous peine d\u2019expiration du brevet. La loi pr\u00e9voit des possibilit\u00e9s limit\u00e9es de restaurer un brevet expir\u00e9 pour d\u00e9faut de paiement de la <em>maintenance fee<\/em>. La redevance n\u2019est pas payable annuellement, mais \u00e0 trois reprises pendant la dur\u00e9e du brevet, entre trois ans et trois ans et demi, sept ans et sept and et demi et onze ans et onze ans et demi apr\u00e8s la date de d\u00e9livrance.<\/p>\n<table>\n<thead>\n<tr>\n<td><strong>Description<\/strong><\/td>\n<td><strong>redevance<\/strong><\/td>\n<td><strong>Petite entreprise<\/strong><\/td>\n<td><strong>Micro entreprise<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td>3,5 ans<\/td>\n<td>2.000 $<\/td>\n<td>800 $<\/td>\n<td>400 $<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>7,5 ans<\/td>\n<td>3.760 $<\/td>\n<td>1.504 $<\/td>\n<td>752 $<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>11.5 years<\/td>\n<td>7.700 $<\/td>\n<td>3.080 $<\/td>\n<td>1.540 $<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<p>Le Patent Act ne pr\u00e9voit pas d\u2019obligation d\u2019exploiter le brevet. Cependant dans le cas d\u2019une contrefa\u00e7on de brevets, depuis la d\u00e9cision de la Cour supr\u00eame dans l\u2019affaire <em>eBay Inc. V. MercExchange L.L.C<\/em>.<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"eBay Inc. V. MercExchange L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-365\" href=\"#footnote-279-365\" aria-label=\"Footnote 365\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[365]<\/sup><\/a>, une injonction n\u2019est plus automatiquement accord\u00e9e par les tribunaux, notamment lorsque le brevet\u00e9 n\u2019exploite pas l\u2019invention<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"V. infra, n\u00b0418.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-366\" href=\"#footnote-279-366\" aria-label=\"Footnote 366\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[366]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<h2>4. La d\u00e9fense des droits<\/h2>\n<p><strong>412._ La contrefa\u00e7on_<\/strong> La contrefa\u00e7on consiste dans l\u2019exercice, sans le consentement du titulaire du brevet ni l\u00e9gitimation, de l\u2019un des droits du brevet\u00e9 d\u00e9finis par la loi<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"V. supra, n\u00b0399.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-367\" href=\"#footnote-279-367\" aria-label=\"Footnote 367\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[367]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>La contrefa\u00e7on (primaire) de brevet \u00e9tant une <em>strict liability offense<\/em>, l\u2019intention et la bonne foi sont inop\u00e9rantes<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Thurber Corp. v. Fairchild Motor Corp., 269 F.2d 841, 845, 849 (5th Cir. 1959).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-368\" href=\"#footnote-279-368\" aria-label=\"Footnote 368\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[368]<\/sup><\/a>.\u00a0En revanche, l\u2019\u00e9l\u00e9ment intentionnel est requis pour les actes de contrefa\u00e7on secondaires, peut \u00e9galement affecter le calcul des dommages et int\u00e9r\u00eats. De m\u00eame, les actes de contrefa\u00e7on secondaire (<em>indirect<\/em> ou <em>dependent infringement<\/em>), c\u2019est-\u00e0-dire l\u2019incitation \u00e0 la contrefa\u00e7on (<em>inducement<\/em>) et la fourniture de moyens (<em>contributory infringement<\/em>) impliquent\u00a0 la connaissance du brevet et de l\u2019acte primaire de contrefa\u00e7on.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>413._ Le droit d\u2019agir en contrefa\u00e7on_<\/strong> En principe, seul le titulaire du brevet peut agir en contrefa\u00e7on<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"V. Morrow v. Microsoft Corp., 499 F.3d 1332, 1339 (Fed.Cir. 2007); WiAV Sols. LLC v. Motorola, Inc., 631 F.3d 1257, 1264\u201365 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Sont plus pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment vis\u00e9es les seules personnes \u00ab\u00a0with exclusionary rights to a patent\u00a0\u00bb.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-369\" href=\"#footnote-279-369\" aria-label=\"Footnote 369\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[369]<\/sup><\/a>. Le licenci\u00e9 ne peut agir en contrefa\u00e7on, \u00e0 moins qu\u2019il se soit vu conc\u00e9der \u00ab tous les droits essentiels \u00bb (<em>all substantial rights<\/em>) dans le brevet<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"V. Luminara Worldwide, LLC. V. Liown Elecs. Co., 814 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2016), 118 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1148 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 29, 2016)\" id=\"return-footnote-279-370\" href=\"#footnote-279-370\" aria-label=\"Footnote 370\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[370]<\/sup><\/a>. Ainsi, la jurisprudence consid\u00e8re qu'une licence non exclusive ne donne pas droit \u00e0 agir au licenci\u00e9. Ce dernier ne peut non plus se joindre \u00e0 une action initi\u00e9e par le conc\u00e9dant. Le licenci\u00e9 exclusif ne pourra agir que s'il d\u00e9tient tous les droits essentiels dans le brevet. Cette d\u00e9termination doit \u00eatre faite au cas par cas, en examinant les termes de la licence. La jurisprudence semble assez stricte sur ce point<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Par exemple, elle refuse de consid\u00e9rer qu'un licenci\u00e9 exclusif disposant des droits d'exploitation les plus larges avait tous les droits essentiels du brevet\u00e9 \u00ab lorsqu'il ne poss\u00e9dait pas le droit exclusif d'assigner en contrefa\u00e7on du brevet conc\u00e9d\u00e9 sans le consentement du conc\u00e9dant \u00bb, et ce, alors m\u00eame lorsque le conc\u00e9dant ne retenait aucun droit d'exploiter le brevet pour son compte. V. \u00e9galement la d\u00e9cision de la Cour d'appel f\u00e9d\u00e9rale du 18 octobre 2005 dans l'affaire Sicom v. Agilent Tech (427 F.3d 971 (Fed. Cir. 2005)) : En l'esp\u00e8ce, la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 Sicom \u00e9tait licenci\u00e9e exclusive d'un brevet. La licence accordait \u00e0 Sicom \u00ab le droit exclusif d'assigner en contrefa\u00e7on du brevet \u00bb, mais le conc\u00e9dant se r\u00e9servait le droit de continuer \u00e0 exploiter la technologie brevet\u00e9e, ainsi que d'autres droits, et notamment celui de s'opposer \u00e0 la cession de ses droits par le licenci\u00e9. La Cour de district avait jug\u00e9 que la clause du contrat de licence accordant \u00e0 Sicom le droit exclusif d'assigner en contrefa\u00e7on du brevet \u00ab ne conc\u00e8de pas \u00e0 Sicom les droits exclusifs n\u00e9cessaires pour transformer sa licence en cession de droits \u00bb, et ne lui permettait donc pas d'agir en contrefa\u00e7on. Elle relevait \u00e9galement au soutien de cette constatation l'absence d'autorisation d'assigner pour des actes de contrefa\u00e7on ant\u00e9rieurs au contrat. La Cour d'appel confirme, en relevant \u00e9galement d'autres droits retenus par le conc\u00e9dant, et notamment les restrictions de cession ou de sous-licence impos\u00e9es au licenci\u00e9.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-371\" href=\"#footnote-279-371\" aria-label=\"Footnote 371\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[371]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Le titulaire du brevet doit \u00eatre partie (volontaire ou forc\u00e9e) \u00e0 toute action en contrefa\u00e7on intent\u00e9e par un licenci\u00e9 exclusif.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>414._ La comp\u00e9tence (renvoi)_<\/strong> Les r\u00e8gles de comp\u00e9tence ont \u00e9t\u00e9 abord\u00e9es en introduction \u00e0 cet ouvrage<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"V. Tome 1, n\u00b050.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-372\" href=\"#footnote-279-372\" aria-label=\"Footnote 372\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[372]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>415._ L\u2019appr\u00e9ciation de la contrefa\u00e7on : l\u2019interpr\u00e9tation des revendications_<\/strong>\u00a0Dans son arr\u00eat <em>Markman v. Westview Instruments Inc <\/em>de 1996<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Markman v. Westview Instruments Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 391 (1996).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-373\" href=\"#footnote-279-373\" aria-label=\"Footnote 373\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[373]<\/sup><\/a>, la Cour supr\u00eame a pos\u00e9 comme principe que l'interpr\u00e9tation des revendications est une question de droit et non de fait (qui ne rel\u00e8ve donc pas de la comp\u00e9tence d'un jury). Cette d\u00e9cision a eu notamment pour cons\u00e9quence l'institution par les cours de district d'audience et de d\u00e9cisions sp\u00e9ciales sur les questions d'interpr\u00e9tation des revendications (respectivement <em>Markman hearings<\/em> et <em>Markman orders<\/em>).<\/p>\n<p>Les standards d'interpr\u00e9tation, qui sont les m\u00eames pour appr\u00e9cier la validit\u00e9 et la contrefa\u00e7on d'un brevet, ont \u00e9t\u00e9 d\u00e9crits en d\u00e9tail par le Circuit f\u00e9d\u00e9ral dans une affaire <em>Phillips<\/em> de 2005<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc); auparavant, V. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,\u00a052 F.3d 967, 979-81\u00a0(Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc),\u00a0aff'd,\u00a0517 U.S. 370,\u00a0116 S.Ct. 1384,\u00a0134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996); Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc.,\u00a090 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Innova\/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Systems, Inc.,\u00a0381 F.3d 1111 (Fed. Cir. 2004)\" id=\"return-footnote-279-374\" href=\"#footnote-279-374\" aria-label=\"Footnote 374\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[374]<\/sup><\/a>. La m\u00e9thodologie applicable peut \u00eatre r\u00e9sum\u00e9e comme suit:<\/p>\n<p>Les tribunaux doivent d'abord s'attacher aux \u00e9l\u00e9ments intrins\u00e8ques (revendications, descriptions, <em>prosecution history<\/em>), avant d'avoir recours, le cas \u00e9ch\u00e9ant, aux \u00e9l\u00e9ments extrins\u00e8ques (Principes scientifiques pertinents, signification des termes techniques, \u00e9tat de la technique).<\/p>\n<p>S'agissant des \u00e9l\u00e9ments intrins\u00e8ques, les tribunaux doivent donner aux mots utilis\u00e9s dans les revendications leur sens ordinaire et habituel pour un homme de l'art \u00e0 l'\u00e9poque de l'invention (\"a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention\", \"POSITA\"), c'est-\u00e0-dire \u00e0 la date de d\u00e9p\u00f4t:<\/p>\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\n<p id=\"pa71\" class=\"paragraph\">\"S'interroger sur le point de savoir comment une personne de l'art (<em>a person of ordinary skill in the art<\/em>) comprend les termes d'une revendication constitue une base objective \u00e0 partir de laquelle il faut commencer l'interpr\u00e9tation des revendications. <i>See Innova,<\/i>\u00a0<a class=\"raw-ref\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/innovapure-water-v-safari-water-filtr#p1116\">381 F.3d at 1116<\/a>. Ce point de d\u00e9part se fonde sur le constat fait de longue date que les inventeurs sont typiquement des personnes vers\u00e9es dans le domaine de l'invention et que les brevets sont destin\u00e9s \u00e0 lus par d'autres personnes vers\u00e9es dans le domaine technique pertinent. <i>See Verve, LLC v. Crane Cams, Inc.,<\/i>\u00a0<a class=\"raw-ref\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/verve-llc-v-crane-cams-inc#p1119\">311 F.3d 1116, 1119<\/a> (Fed. Cir. 2002) (les documents de brevet sont cens\u00e9s \u00eatre \"un expos\u00e9 concis destin\u00e9 aux personnes dans le domaine concern\u00e9\"); <i>In re Nelson,<\/i>\u00a0<a class=\"raw-ref\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/application-of-nelson\">47 C.C.P.A. 1031<\/a>,\u00a0<a class=\"raw-ref\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/application-of-nelson#p181\">280 F.2d 172, 181<\/a> (1960) (\"Les descriptions dans les brevets ne sont pas destin\u00e9es au public en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral, aux juristes ou aux juges, mais, comme le dit la section 112, aux personnes vers\u00e9es dans le domaine technique concern\u00e9 ou dans celui dont l'invention est la plus proche.\").<\/p>\n<p id=\"pa72\" class=\"paragraph\">Par ailleurs, la personne de l'art est suppos\u00e9e lire les termes de la revendication non pas au seul regard de la revendication particuli\u00e8re dans laquelle le terme appara\u00eet, mais au vu de la demande dans son ensemble, incluant les sp\u00e9cifications (...)\"<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005); V. \u00e9galement Dayco Products, Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 258 F.3d 1317, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (\u00ab\u00a0If an argument offered in support of a particular claim construction is so convoluted and artificial that it would not be apparent to a skilled artisan reading the patent and the prosecution history, the argument is simply unhelpful to the performance of our task.\u00a0\u00bb)\" id=\"return-footnote-279-375\" href=\"#footnote-279-375\" aria-label=\"Footnote 375\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[375]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p>Les revendications \"doivent \u00e9galement \u00eatre lues \u00e0 la lumi\u00e8re de la description, dont elles font partie\"<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Markman,\u00a052 F.3d \u00e0 978. Bell Atlantic Network Services, Inc. v. Covad Communications Gp., Inc., 262 F.3d 1258, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (les sp\u00e9cifications \u201cmust clearly redefine a claim term \u2018so as to put a reasonable competitor or one reasonably skilled in the art on notice that the patentee intended to so redefine that claim term.&quot;).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-376\" href=\"#footnote-279-376\" aria-label=\"Footnote 376\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[376]<\/sup><\/a>. Elles peuvent \u00e9galement \u00eatre interpr\u00e9t\u00e9es par r\u00e9f\u00e9rence \u00e0 d\u2019autres revendications<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"V. Phillips v. AWH Corp., pr\u00e9cit\u00e9e (\u00ab Because claim terms are normally used consistently throughout the patent, the usage of a term in one claim can often illuminate the meaning of the same term in other claims (\u2026). Differences among claims can also be a useful guide in understanding the meaning of particular claim terms \u00bb).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-377\" href=\"#footnote-279-377\" aria-label=\"Footnote 377\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[377]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>L'historique du dossier d'examen (<em>prosecution history<\/em>, qui inclut les ant\u00e9riorit\u00e9s cit\u00e9es et toutes les affirmations ou remarques faites par le demandeur) peut ensuite fournir des indications importantes sur l'\u00e9tendue des revendications (et m\u00eame aboutir \u00e0 r\u00e9duire leur port\u00e9e)<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Phillips, pr\u00e9cit\u00e9: &quot;In addition to consulting the specification, we have held that a court &quot;should also consider the patent's prosecution history, if it is in evidence.&quot; Markman,\u00a052 F.3d \u00e0 980;\u00a0see also Graham v. John Deere Co.,\u00a0383 U.S. 1, 33,\u00a086 S.Ct. 684,\u00a015 L.Ed.2d 545\u00a0(1966) (&quot;[A]n invention is construed not only in the light of the claims, but also with reference to the file wrapper or prosecution history in the Patent Office.&quot;). The prosecution history, which we have designated as part of the &quot;intrinsic evidence,&quot; consists of the complete record of the proceedings before the PTO and includes the prior art cited during the examination of the patent.\u00a0Autogiro,\u00a0384 F.2d \u00e0 399. Like the specification, the prosecution history provides evidence of how the PTO and the inventor understood the patent.\u00a0See Lemelson v. Gen. Mills, Inc.,\u00a0968 F.2d 1202, 1206\u00a0(Fed. Cir. 1992). Furthermore, like the specification, the prosecution history was created by the patentee in attempting to explain and obtain the patent. Yet because the prosecution history represents an ongoing negotiation between the PTO and the applicant, rather than the final product of that negotiation, it often lacks the clarity of the specification and thus is less useful for claim construction purposes.\u00a0See Inverness Med. Switz. GmbH v. Warner Lambert Co.,\u00a0309 F.3d 1373, 1380-82\u00a0(Fed. Cir. 2002) (the ambiguity of the prosecution history made it less relevant to claim construction);\u00a0Athletic Alternatives, Inc. v. Prince Mfg., Inc.,\u00a073 F.3d 1573, 1580\u00a0(Fed. Cir. 1996) (the ambiguity of the prosecution history made it &quot;unhelpful as an interpretive resource&quot; for claim construction). Nonetheless, the prosecution history can often inform the meaning of the claim language by demonstrating how the inventor understood the invention and whether the inventor limited the invention in the course of prosecution, making the claim scope narrower than it would otherwise be.\u00a0Vitronics,\u00a090 F.3d at 1582-83;\u00a0see also Chimie v. PPG Indus., Inc.,\u00a0402 F.3d 1371, 1384\u00a0(Fed. Cir. 2005) (&quot;The purpose of consulting the prosecution history in construing a claim is to 'exclude any interpretation that was disclaimed during prosecution.'&quot;),\u00a0quoting ZMI Corp. v. Cardiac Resuscitator Corp.,\u00a0844 F.2d 1576, 1580\u00a0(Fed. Cir. 1988);\u00a0Southwall Techs., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co.,\u00a054 F.3d 1570, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1995)&quot;.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-378\" href=\"#footnote-279-378\" aria-label=\"Footnote 378\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[378]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Lorsque les \u00e9l\u00e9ments intrins\u00e8ques ne permettent pas d'obtenir une interpr\u00e9tation claire des revendications, les tribunaux peuvent recourir \u00e0 des \u00e9l\u00e9ments extrins\u00e8ques, en s'aidant de dictionnaires, de traites scientifiques ou d'experts<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d \u00e0 1317-18.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-379\" href=\"#footnote-279-379\" aria-label=\"Footnote 379\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[379]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Enfin, en cas d\u2019ambigu\u00eft\u00e9, et dans la mesure du possible, une revendication doit \u00eatre interpr\u00e9t\u00e9e de fa\u00e7on \u00e0 pr\u00e9server sa validit\u00e9<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 911 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural Resources, Inc., 279 F.3d 1357, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Articulate Sys., Inc., 234 F.3d 14, 24 (Fed. Cir. 2000).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-380\" href=\"#footnote-279-380\" aria-label=\"Footnote 380\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[380]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>416._ Contrefa\u00e7on litt\u00e9rale et par \u00e9quivalent_<\/strong> La contrefa\u00e7on peut \u00eatre litt\u00e9rale (<em>literal infringement<\/em>) ou par \u00e9quivalent. La contrefa\u00e7on litt\u00e9rale implique la reprise de tous les \u00e9l\u00e9ments d\u2019une revendication dans le produit ou le proc\u00e9d\u00e9 argu\u00e9 de contrefa\u00e7on<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Becton, Dickinson &amp; Co. v. Tyco Healthcare Group, LP, 616 F.3d 1249, 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Southwall Technologies, Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1995).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-381\" href=\"#footnote-279-381\" aria-label=\"Footnote 381\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[381]<\/sup><\/a>. L\u2019ajout d\u2019\u00e9l\u00e9ments (y compris les am\u00e9liorations \u00e9ventuelles) par le contrefacteur est indiff\u00e9rent.<\/p>\n<p>La doctrine des \u00e9quivalents permet de s\u2019\u00e9carter de l\u2019interpr\u00e9tation litt\u00e9rale des revendications pour y inclure certains \u00ab\u00a0\u00e9quivalents\u00a0\u00bb. Elle prot\u00e8ge ainsi le titulaire du brevet en permettant d\u2019\u00e9viter qu\u2019un contrefacteur n\u2019\u00e9chappe au brevet en proc\u00e9dant \u00e0 des changements mineurs (ce qu\u2019une interpr\u00e9tation purement litt\u00e9rale des revendications pourrait permettre). Bien qu\u2019elle soit source d\u2019incertitudes sur l\u2019\u00e9tendue r\u00e9elle du brevet, elle a toujours \u00e9t\u00e9 r\u00e9affirm\u00e9e en jurisprudence.<\/p>\n<p>La doctrine des \u00e9quivalents a \u00e9t\u00e9 reconnue pour la premi\u00e8re fois par la Cour Supr\u00eame en 1853 dans son arr\u00eat <em>Winans v. Denmead<\/em><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1853)\" id=\"return-footnote-279-382\" href=\"#footnote-279-382\" aria-label=\"Footnote 382\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[382]<\/sup><\/a>. La d\u00e9cision principale de la Cour Supr\u00eame sur la doctrine des \u00e9quivalents est la d\u00e9cision <em>Graver Tank &amp; Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co de 1952<\/em><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Graver Tank &amp; Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co, 339 U.S. 605 (1950).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-383\" href=\"#footnote-279-383\" aria-label=\"Footnote 383\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[383]<\/sup><\/a><em>. <\/em>La Cour Supr\u00eame y d\u00e9finit la doctrine comme suit\u00a0:<\/p>\n<p>\u00ab\u00a0si deux dispositifs font la m\u00eame chose d\u2019une mani\u00e8re substantiellement identique, et aboutissent \u00e0 un r\u00e9sultat substantiellement identique, ils sont identiques\u00a0\u00bb<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"\u00ab\u00a0if two devices do the same work in substantially the same way, and accomplish substantially the same result, they are the same\u00a0\u00bb.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-384\" href=\"#footnote-279-384\" aria-label=\"Footnote 384\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[384]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Ce test est dit de \u00ab\u00a0triple identit\u00e9\u00a0\u00bb (fonction \/ mani\u00e8re \/ r\u00e9sultat)\u00a0: les diff\u00e9rences entre les revendications sont ignor\u00e9es si le second moyen (1) remplit la m\u00eame fonction, (2) d\u2019une fa\u00e7on substantiellement identique (3) et avec un r\u00e9sultat substantiellement identique. Le test est appliqu\u00e9 sur chaque revendication, et non pas sur l\u2019invention dans son ensemble.<\/p>\n<p>Une limite importante \u00e0 la doctrine des \u00e9quivalents se trouve dans r\u00e8gle dite du <em>prosecution history estoppel<\/em>, consacr\u00e9e par la Cour supr\u00eame dans sa d\u00e9cision <em>Warner-Jenkinson Co.<\/em> v. <em>Hilton Davis Chemical Co. <\/em>de 1997<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-385\" href=\"#footnote-279-385\" aria-label=\"Footnote 385\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[385]<\/sup><\/a>, qui requiert que les revendications soient interpr\u00e9t\u00e9es \u00e0 la lumi\u00e8re de la proc\u00e9dure d\u2019examen devant le Patent and Trademark Office (PTO)\u00a0(<em>prosecution history<\/em>). Plus pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment, elle signifie que lorsque le titulaire du brevet a r\u00e9duit ses revendications \u00e0 la suite d\u2019un refus de l\u2019examinateur, il ne peut plus pr\u00e9tendre aux \u00e9quivalents correspondant \u00e0 la part des revendications abandonn\u00e9e ou r\u00e9duite. Le concurrent peut ainsi se fonder sur l\u2019historique des modifications des revendications pour d\u00e9terminer plus pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment la port\u00e9e des \u00e9quivalents couverts par le brevet. Dans son arr\u00eat rendu le 28 mai 2002 dans l\u2019affaire <em>Festo Corp. V. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd.<\/em> (n\u00b000-1543)<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-386\" href=\"#footnote-279-386\" aria-label=\"Footnote 386\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[386]<\/sup><\/a>, la Cour supr\u00eame a confirm\u00e9 que la doctrine peut s\u2019appliquer \u00e0 toute modification des revendications faite pour satisfaire aux exigences l\u00e9gales, et non pas seulement \u00e0 celles fond\u00e9es sur l\u2019existence d\u2019ant\u00e9riorit\u00e9s. Elle consid\u00e8re cependant que la doctrine n\u2019a pas n\u00e9cessairement pour effet d\u2019emp\u00eacher le brevet\u00e9 de s\u2019opposer \u00e0 tout \u00e9quivalent de la revendication modifi\u00e9e : bien que l\u2019<em>estoppel<\/em> puisse faire obstacle \u00e0 la prise en compte d\u2019un large ensemble d\u2019\u00e9quivalents, la d\u00e9termination de sa port\u00e9e r\u00e9elle n\u00e9cessite un examen au cas par cas des abandons effectu\u00e9s par les revendications modifi\u00e9es.<\/p>\n<p>Notons enfin que les tribunaux ont d\u00e9velopp\u00e9 une contrepartie \u00e0 la doctrine des \u00e9quivalents\u00a0d\u00e9nomm\u00e9e <em>reverse doctrine of equivalents<\/em>, qui permet cette fois de consid\u00e9rer comme non contrefaisant un dispositif d\u00e9crit litt\u00e9ralement dans un brevet\u00a0(donc contrefaisant en principe) s\u2019il a \u00e9t\u00e9 modifi\u00e9 dans son principe de mani\u00e8re \u00e0 fonctionner de mani\u00e8re substantiellement diff\u00e9rente<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Graver Tank &amp; Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608\u201309 (1950) (\u00ab\u00a0The wholesome realism of [the doctrine of equivalents] is not always applied in favor of a patentee but is sometimes used against him. Thus, where a device is so far changed in principle from a patented article that it performs the same or a similar function in a substantially different way, but nevertheless falls within the literal words of the claim, the doctrine of equivalents may be used to restrict the claim and defeat the patentee\u2019s action for infringement\u00a0\u00bb); SRI Int\u2019l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-387\" href=\"#footnote-279-387\" aria-label=\"Footnote 387\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[387]<\/sup><\/a>. Cependant cette r\u00e8gle est tr\u00e8s rarement appliqu\u00e9e<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"V. Roche Palo Alto, LLC v. Apotex, Inc., 531 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2008) : \u00ab The reverse doctrine of equivalents is rarely applied, and this court has never affirmed a finding of non-infringement under the reverse doctrine of equivalents\u00a0\u00bb. Pour des applications, V. par exemple Precision Metal Fabricators Inc. v. Jetstream Sys. Co., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1704 (N.D. Cal.1988); Lesona Corp. v. United States, 530 F.2d 896, 905\u201306 (Ct. Cl. 1976).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-388\" href=\"#footnote-279-388\" aria-label=\"Footnote 388\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[388]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>417._ Les moyens de d\u00e9fense_<\/strong> Le d\u00e9fendeur \u00e0 une action en contrefa\u00e7on a \u00e0 sa disposition plusieurs moyens de d\u00e9fense.<\/p>\n<p>Il peut tout d\u2019abord, bien s\u00fbr, invoquer un motif d\u2019invalidit\u00e9 du brevet<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"35 U.S.C. \u00a7 282(b)(2).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-389\" href=\"#footnote-279-389\" aria-label=\"Footnote 389\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[389]<\/sup><\/a>. La loi \u00e9tablissant une pr\u00e9somption de validit\u00e9 du brevet et de chacune des revendications, prise ind\u00e9pendamment<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"35 U.S.C. \u00a7 282.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-390\" href=\"#footnote-279-390\" aria-label=\"Footnote 390\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[390]<\/sup><\/a>, la charge de la preuve de l\u2019invalidit\u00e9 du brevet ou d\u2019une revendication incombe au d\u00e9fendeur. A noter que la doctrine dite de l\u2019<em>assignor estoppel<\/em> (estoppel du cessionnaire) interdit au cessionnaire de contester la validit\u00e9 du brevet<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Diamond Scientific Co. v. Ambico, Inc., 848 F.2d 1220,1225 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Pandrol USA, LP v. Airboss Railway Prods., Inc., 424 F.3d 1161, 1166 (Fed. Cir. 2005).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-391\" href=\"#footnote-279-391\" aria-label=\"Footnote 391\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[391]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Il peut ensuite invoquer une exception ou limite aux droits exclusifs, et d\u00e9montrer l\u2019absence de contrefa\u00e7on litt\u00e9rale ou par \u00e9quivalent<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"35 U.S.C. \u00a7 282(b)(1).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-392\" href=\"#footnote-279-392\" aria-label=\"Footnote 392\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[392]<\/sup><\/a>, plusieurs autres moyens de d\u00e9fense sont envisageables.<\/p>\n<p>Mais le droit f\u00e9d\u00e9ral lui permet \u00e9galement d'invoquer la fraude ou une conduite in\u00e9quitable (<em>inequitable conduct<\/em>) du demandeur pendant l\u2019examen du brevet, par exemple en cas de violation par ce dernier de son devoir de divulgation de l\u2019information n\u00e9cessaire \u00e0 l\u2019examen<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"37 C.F.R. 1.56(a), (b).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-393\" href=\"#footnote-279-393\" aria-label=\"Footnote 393\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[393]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Une autre d\u00e9fense, propre au syst\u00e8me am\u00e9ricain, est constitu\u00e9e par la doctrine de <em>patent misuse<\/em>, qui constitue l\u2019extension au brevet de la doctrine \u00e9quitable d\u2019<em>unclean hands<\/em>. Le titulaire du brevet ne peut pas b\u00e9n\u00e9ficier des r\u00e9parations pr\u00e9vues par la loi en cas de contrefa\u00e7on s\u2019il a exploit\u00e9 son brevet de mani\u00e8re fautive (<em>patent misuse<\/em>). Les cas de <em>patent misuse<\/em> correspondent le plus souvent \u00e0 des cas de violation des r\u00e8gles de concurrence<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"V. par exemple United States Gypsum v. National Gypsum, 352 U.S. 457 (1957) (prix impos\u00e9s), Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seiffhart, 803 F.2d 661 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (ventes li\u00e9es).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-394\" href=\"#footnote-279-394\" aria-label=\"Footnote 394\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[394]<\/sup><\/a>. Cependant, la section 271(d) vient exclure ou limiter l\u2019application de la doctrine dans plusieurs hypoth\u00e8ses, couvrant notamment le refus de licence et, sauf si le titulaire du brevet d\u00e9tient une position dominante (<em>market power<\/em>) sur le march\u00e9, les ventes li\u00e9es<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"35 U.S.C. \u00a7 271(d): \u00ab\u00a0No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or contributory infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by reason of his having done one or more of the following: (1) derived revenue from acts which if performed by another without his consent would constitute contributory infringement of the patent; (2) licensed or authorized another to perform acts which if performed without his consent would constitute contributory infringement of the patent; (3) sought to enforce his patent rights against infringement or contributory infringement; (4) refused to license or use any rights to the patent; or (5) conditioned the license of any rights to the patent or the sale of the patented product on the acquisition of a license to rights in another patent or purchase of a separate product, unless, in view of the circumstances, the patent owner has market power in the relevant market for the patent or patented product on which the license or sale is conditioned\u00a0\u00bb.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-395\" href=\"#footnote-279-395\" aria-label=\"Footnote 395\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[395]<\/sup><\/a>. A noter que cette d\u00e9fense peut \u00eatre invoqu\u00e9e par le d\u00e9fenseur m\u00eame s\u2019il n\u2019est pas directement victime du <em>patent misuse<\/em>.<\/p>\n<p>Les autres moyens de d\u00e9fense incluent l\u2019application des doctrines \u00e9quitables de <em>laches<\/em> et d\u2019<em>estoppel<\/em>, d\u00e9j\u00e0 d\u00e9crites<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"V. Tome 1, n\u00b0263.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-396\" href=\"#footnote-279-396\" aria-label=\"Footnote 396\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[396]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>A noter enfin que le paragraphe 286 du Patent Act pr\u00e9cise que le titulaire ne peut pas obtenir de dommages et int\u00e9r\u00eats pour des faits de contrefa\u00e7on ant\u00e9rieurs de plus de six ans au d\u00e9p\u00f4t de son assignation en contrefa\u00e7on<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"35 U.S.C. \u00a7 286.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-397\" href=\"#footnote-279-397\" aria-label=\"Footnote 397\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[397]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>418._ Rem\u00e8des et sanctions (renvoi partiel)_<\/strong> Les rem\u00e8des disponibles incluent les injonctions, les dommages et int\u00e9r\u00eats et <em>attorney fees<\/em><a class=\"footnote\" title=\"V. Tome 1, n\u00b065.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-398\" href=\"#footnote-279-398\" aria-label=\"Footnote 398\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[398]<\/sup><\/a>. A noter que depuis la d\u00e9cision de la Cour supr\u00eame de 2006 dans l\u2019affaire <em>eBay Inc. V. MercExchange L.L.C<\/em>.<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"eBay Inc. V. MercExchange L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-399\" href=\"#footnote-279-399\" aria-label=\"Footnote 399\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[399]<\/sup><\/a>, une injonction n\u2019est plus automatiquement accord\u00e9e par les tribunaux en mati\u00e8re de contrefa\u00e7on de brevet. Ainsi, dans certains cas, notamment lorsque le brevet\u00e9 n\u2019exploite pas l\u2019invention (et par exemple dans le cas de <em>patent trolls<\/em>), la mise en balance de l\u2019int\u00e9r\u00eat public et des int\u00e9r\u00eats du brevet\u00e9 peut aboutir au refus d\u2019accorder une injonction, ce qui, <em>de facto<\/em>, impose une licence au brevet\u00e9.<\/p>\n<p>En cas d\u2019importations contrefaisantes, d\u2019autres rem\u00e8des peuvent \u00eatre obtenus aupr\u00e8s de l\u2019United States International Trade Commission<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Ibid.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-400\" href=\"#footnote-279-400\" aria-label=\"Footnote 400\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[400]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>419._ Le marquage et l\u2019information du contrefacteur_<\/strong> Aux termes du paragraphe 287(a) du Patent Act, les titulaire de brevets et les personnes qui fabriquent, importent, offrent \u00e0 la vente ou vendent aux \u00c9tats-Unis un article brevet\u00e9 peuvent notifier au public le caract\u00e8re brevet\u00e9 de l\u2019article, soit en apposant sur ce dernier le mot \u00ab\u00a0patent \u00bb ou l'abr\u00e9viation \u00ab\u00a0pat.\u00a0\u00bb et le num\u00e9ro du brevet, soit en apposant sur ce dernier le mot \u00ab\u00a0patent\u00a0\u00bb ou l'abr\u00e9viation \u00ab\u00a0pat.\u00a0\u00bb en y associant une adresse accessible au public sur l\u2019Internet contenant le num\u00e9ro du brevet, soit encore (si l\u2019apposition sur le produit n\u2019est pas possible) en ins\u00e9rant ces informations sur une \u00e9tiquette appos\u00e9e sur le produit ou son emballage. Les marquages frauduleux sont sanctionn\u00e9s<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"35 U.S.C. \u00a7 292(a).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-401\" href=\"#footnote-279-401\" aria-label=\"Footnote 401\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[401]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>A d\u00e9faut de marquage, aucun dommages-int\u00e9r\u00eats ne peut \u00eatre obtenu, sauf si s\u2019il est d\u00e9montr\u00e9 que le contrefacteur s\u2019est vu notifier la contrefa\u00e7on et a continu\u00e9 \u00e0 contrefaire les droits du brevet\u00e9 (auquel cas les dommages et int\u00e9r\u00eats ne peuvent \u00eatre recouvr\u00e9s que pour les actes post\u00e9rieurs \u00e0 cette notification). L\u2019assignation en contrefa\u00e7on \u00e9quivaut \u00e0 une telle information.<\/p>\n<p>L\u2019expression <em>patent pending<\/em> est utilis\u00e9e par la pratique pour informer d\u2019une demande de brevet en cours d\u2019examen, mais n\u2019a pas d\u2019effets juridiques.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>420._ La d\u00e9fense des droits avant d\u00e9livrance (les <em>provisional rights<\/em>)_<\/strong> Les brevets ne prennent effet qu\u2019apr\u00e8s d\u00e9livrance. Cependant, apr\u00e8s d\u00e9livrance, le titulaire du brevet peut obtenir une redevance \u00e9quitable (<em>reasonable royalty<\/em>) de toute personne qui, prenant la p\u00e9riode allant de la publication de la demande \u00e0 la d\u00e9livrance, a commis des actes de contrefa\u00e7on, \u00e0 condition qu\u2019elle se soit vue notifier cette publication<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"35 U.S.C. \u00a7 154(d) (\u00ab\u00a0provisional rights\u00a0\u00bb).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-402\" href=\"#footnote-279-402\" aria-label=\"Footnote 402\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[402]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>421._ L\u2019action en d\u00e9claration de non-contrefa\u00e7on_<\/strong> Aux \u00c9tats-Unis, l\u2019article III de la Constitution f\u00e9d\u00e9rale restreint le pouvoir judiciaire \u00e0 la seule adjudication des \u00ab\u00a0litiges\u00a0\u00bb ou \u00ab\u00a0controverses\u00a0\u00bb (<em>cases or controversies<\/em>). Les actions en d\u00e9claration de non-contrefa\u00e7on sont possibles dans le cadre du Declaratory Judgment Act<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2201.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-403\" href=\"#footnote-279-403\" aria-label=\"Footnote 403\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[403]<\/sup><\/a>, dont les dispositions ont \u00e9t\u00e9 interpr\u00e9t\u00e9es par la Cour supr\u00eame au regard de l\u2019exigence constitutionnelle d\u2019une \u00ab controverse \u00bb<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227, 240 (1937).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-404\" href=\"#footnote-279-404\" aria-label=\"Footnote 404\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[404]<\/sup><\/a>. La Cour supr\u00eame a notamment consid\u00e9r\u00e9 qu\u2019aucune controverse n\u2019existe lorsque le demandeur tente d\u2019obtenir un jugement pr\u00e9matur\u00e9 sur des d\u00e9fenses potentielles qui seraient typiquement jug\u00e9es dans le cadre d\u2019un litige futur<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Coffman v. Breeze Corps., 323 U.S. 316 (1945).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-405\" href=\"#footnote-279-405\" aria-label=\"Footnote 405\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[405]<\/sup><\/a>. La simple existence d\u2019un brevet g\u00eanant ne suffit pas. A l\u2019inverse, une menace d\u2019action en contrefa\u00e7on formul\u00e9e par le titulaire du brevet n\u2019est pas indispensable. Selon la Cour supr\u00eame<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-406\" href=\"#footnote-279-406\" aria-label=\"Footnote 406\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[406]<\/sup><\/a>, le demandeur doit d\u00e9montrer \u00ab\u00a0que les faits all\u00e9gu\u00e9s dans les circonstances de l\u2019affaire d\u00e9montrent l\u2019existence d\u2019une controverse entre les parties ayant des int\u00e9r\u00eats juridiques oppos\u00e9s d\u2019une imm\u00e9diatet\u00e9 et d\u2019une r\u00e9alit\u00e9 suffisantes pour garantir la prise d\u2019un jugement d\u00e9claratoire\u00a0\u00bb<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"En l\u2019esp\u00e8ce, jug\u00e9 qu\u2019un licenci\u00e9 n\u2019a pas \u00e0 r\u00e9silier ou cesser d\u2019ex\u00e9cuter sa licence avant de placer sa demande de jgement d\u00e9claratoire d\u2019invalidit\u00e9 ou de non contrefa\u00e7on.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-407\" href=\"#footnote-279-407\" aria-label=\"Footnote 407\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[407]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Un risque, li\u00e9 au comportement actif du titulaire du brevet, de pr\u00e9judice caus\u00e9 \u00e0 l\u2019activit\u00e9 du demandeur, suffit. Les conditions d\u2019acc\u00e8s \u00e0 un jugement d\u00e9claratoire, notamment dans l\u2019hypoth\u00e8se d\u2019une licence, ont \u00e9t\u00e9 pr\u00e9cis\u00e9es par la Cour Supr\u00eame en 2007 et par des jugements ult\u00e9rieurs<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Les conditions d\u2019acc\u00e8s \u00e0 un jugement d\u00e9claratoire, notamment dans l\u2019hypoth\u00e8se d\u2019une licence, ont \u00e9t\u00e9 pr\u00e9cis\u00e9es par des d\u00e9cisions ult\u00e9rieures, V. M. Donovan, The Impact of MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc. and Its Progeny on Technology Licensing, 3 J. Bus. Entrepreneurship &amp; L. Iss. 1 (2009).\" id=\"return-footnote-279-408\" href=\"#footnote-279-408\" aria-label=\"Footnote 408\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[408]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><strong>422._ La l\u00e9gislation sur les Patent trolls_<\/strong> Au cours de ces derni\u00e8res ann\u00e9es, le d\u00e9veloppement de l\u2019activit\u00e9 des \u00ab patent trolls \u00bb (autrement d\u00e9nomm\u00e9es non-practicing entities, non-performing entities ou patent assertion entities) a concentr\u00e9 une partie de l\u2019activit\u00e9 l\u00e9gislative. Plusieurs propositions de lois f\u00e9d\u00e9rales destin\u00e9es \u00e0 encadrer leurs activit\u00e9s ont \u00e9t\u00e9 d\u00e9pos\u00e9s<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"V. par exemple H.R. 9, \u00ab Innovation Act \u00bb, qui proposait d\u2019imposer aux tribunaux de se prononcer sur la validit\u00e9 d\u2019un brevet d\u00e8s le d\u00e9but d\u2019une proc\u00e9dure pour \u00e9viter que les trolls de brevets ne puissent pas faire durer les proc\u00e8s pendant des ann\u00e9es sur le fondement de revendications invalides.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-409\" href=\"#footnote-279-409\" aria-label=\"Footnote 409\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[409]<\/sup><\/a>, et de nombreux \u00c9tats f\u00e9d\u00e9r\u00e9s (\u00e0 l\u2019exception notable de la Californie) ont adopt\u00e9 des lois destin\u00e9es \u00e0 sanctionner les demandes et mises en demeures abusives des entit\u00e9s non exploitantes. La premi\u00e8re loi de ce type a \u00e9t\u00e9 adopt\u00e9e dans l\u2019\u00c9tat du Vermont en 2013<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"9 VSA \u00a7 4195 et suivants.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-410\" href=\"#footnote-279-410\" aria-label=\"Footnote 410\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[410]<\/sup><\/a>. La loi a pour but de sanctionner les \u00ab demandes en contrefa\u00e7on faite de mauvaise foi \u00bb (bad faith assertions of patent infringement). Elle \u00e9num\u00e8re les facteurs permettant au juge de d\u00e9terminer si une demande est form\u00e9e de mauvaise foi<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"9 VSA, \u00a7 4197, qui dispose : \u00ab (a) A person shall not make a bad faith assertion of patent infringement.\n\n(b) A court may consider the following factors as evidence that a person has made a bad faith assertion of patent infringement:\n\n(1) The demand letter does not contain the following information:\n\n(A) the patent number;\n\n(B) the name and address of the patent owner or owners and assignee or assignees, if any; and\n\n(C) factual allegations concerning the specific areas in which the target\u2019s products, services, and technology infringe the patent or are covered by the claims in the patent.\n\n(2) Prior to sending the demand letter, the person fails to conduct an analysis comparing the claims in the patent to the target\u2019s products, services, and technology, or such an analysis was done but does not identify specific areas in which the products, services, and technology are covered by the claims in the patent.\n\n(3) The demand letter lacks the information described in subdivision (1) of this subsection, the target requests the information, and the person fails to provide the information within a reasonable period of time.\n\n(4) The demand letter demands payment of a license fee or response within an unreasonably short period of time.\n\n(5) The person offers to license the patent for an amount that is not based on a reasonable estimate of the value of the license.\n\n(6) The claim or assertion of patent infringement is meritless, and the person knew, or should have known, that the claim or assertion is meritless.\n\n(7) The claim or assertion of patent infringement is deceptive.\n\n(8) The person or its subsidiaries or affiliates have previously filed or threatened to file one or more lawsuits based on the same or similar claim of patent infringement (...):\n\n(9) Any other factor the court finds relevant (...)\u201d\" id=\"return-footnote-279-411\" href=\"#footnote-279-411\" aria-label=\"Footnote 411\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[411]<\/sup><\/a>. Elle pr\u00e9voit \u00e9galement <a class=\"footnote\" title=\"9 VSA, \u00a7 4198.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-412\" href=\"#footnote-279-412\" aria-label=\"Footnote 412\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[412]<\/sup><\/a> qu\u2019\u00e0 la demande du destinataire de la demande et s\u2019il apparait au tribunal que le demandeur \u00e9tabli avec une probabilit\u00e9 raisonnable que l\u2019all\u00e9gation de contrefa\u00e7on de brevet a \u00e9t\u00e9 faite de mauvaise foi, le tribunal peut exiger de l\u2019exp\u00e9diteur qu'il d\u00e9pose un cautionnement d'un montant \u00e9gal \u00e0 une estimation de bonne foi des frais de justice que le destinataire cibl\u00e9 devra avancer pour se d\u00e9fendre (le cautionnement \u00e9tant plafonn\u00e9 \u00e0 250 000 $). Le tribunal peut refuser le cautionnement s'il estime que la personne concern\u00e9e dispose d'actifs disponibles \u00e9gaux au montant de la caution propos\u00e9e. Enfin, l\u2019Attorney General est charg\u00e9 de l\u2019application de la loi, et peut notamment conduire des enqu\u00eates et mener des actions, et le d\u00e9fendeur peut intenter une action sur le seul fondement de la violation de cette loi et se voir allouer des dommages et int\u00e9r\u00eats \u00e0 ce titre<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"9 VSA, \u00a7 4199 (Enforcement; remedies; damages), qui dispose : \u00ab (a) The Attorney General shall have the same authority under this chapter to make rules, conduct civil investigations, bring civil actions, and enter into assurances of discontinuance as provided under chapter 63 of this title. In an action brought by the Attorney General under this chapter, the court may award or impose any relief available under chapter 63 of this title.\n\n(b) A target of conduct involving assertions of patent infringement, or a person aggrieved by a violation of this chapter or by a violation of rules adopted under this chapter, may bring an action in Superior Court. A court may award the following remedies to a plaintiff who prevails in an action brought pursuant to this subsection:\n\n(1) equitable relief;\n\n(2) damages;\n\n(3) costs and fees, including reasonable attorney\u2019s fees; and\n\n(4) exemplary damages in an amount equal to $50,000.00 or three times the total of damages, costs, and fees, whichever is greater.\n\n(c) This chapter shall not be construed to limit rights and remedies available to the State of Vermont or to any person under any other law and shall not alter or restrict the Attorney General\u2019s authority under chapter 63 of this title with regard to conduct involving assertions of patent infringement. (Added 2013, No. 44, \u00a7 6; 2013, No. 47, \u00a7 2, eff. May 24, 2013.)\u00a0\u00bb\" id=\"return-footnote-279-413\" href=\"#footnote-279-413\" aria-label=\"Footnote 413\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[413]<\/sup><\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Une autre loi notable est celle du Texas, adopt\u00e9e en 2015, et codifi\u00e9e au Code de commerce local<a class=\"footnote\" title=\"Tex Bus &amp; Com Code Ann \u00a7 17952, Added by Acts 2015, Texas Acts of the 84th Leg. - Regular Session, ch. 856,Sec. 1, eff. 9\/1\/2015. La section 17.952 du Code de commerce prohibe les demandes en contrefa\u00e7on mauvaise de foi (Bad Faith Claim of Patent Infringement), et dispose :\n\n\u201c(a)\u00a0A person may not send to an end user located or doing business in this state a written or electronic communication that is a bad faith claim of patent infringement.\n\n(b)\u00a0A communication is a bad faith claim of patent infringement if the communication includes a claim that the end user or a person affiliated with the end user has infringed a patent and is liable for that infringement and:\n\n(1)\u00a0the communication falsely states that the sender has filed a lawsuit in connection with the claim;\n\n(2)\u00a0the claim is objectively baseless because:(A)\u00a0the sender or a person the sender represents does not have a current right to license the patent to or enforce the patent against the end user;(B)\u00a0the patent has been held invalid or unenforceable in a final judgment or administrative decision; or(C)\u00a0the infringing activity alleged in the communication occurred after the patent expired; or\n\n(3) the communication is likely to materially mislead a reasonable end user because the communication does not contain information sufficient to inform the end user of:(A) the identity of the person asserting the claim;(B) the patent that is alleged to have been infringed; and(C) at least one product, service, or technology obtained by the end user that is alleged to infringe the patent or the activity of the end user that is alleged to infringe the patent\u201d.\" id=\"return-footnote-279-414\" href=\"#footnote-279-414\" aria-label=\"Footnote 414\"><sup class=\"footnote\">[414]<\/sup><\/a>. Contrairement \u00e0 la loi du Vermont, la loi du Texas ne consacre pas de droit d\u2019agir au civil, ni de pouvoir sp\u00e9ciaux confi\u00e9s \u00e0 l\u2019Attorney General.<\/p>\n<p>On notera que l\u2019adoption de ces lois ne semble pas avoir fait dispara\u00eetre les demandes d\u2019intervention sur le sujet au niveau f\u00e9d\u00e9ral.<\/p>\n<hr class=\"before-footnotes clear\" \/><div class=\"footnotes\"><ol><li id=\"footnote-279-1\">Source statistiques OMPI, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.wipo.int\/en\/ipfactsandfigures\/patents\">IP Facts and Figures<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-1\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 1\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-2\">54 % de toutes les demandes de brevets d\u2019utilit\u00e9 en 2020.\u200b Source: statistiques <a href=\"https:\/\/www.uspto.gov\/learning-and-resources\/statistics\/patent-statistics\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">USPTO<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-2\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 2\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-3\">Sur les textes internationaux et leur int\u00e9gration aux \u00c9tats-Unis, v. Tome 1, n\u00b041. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-3\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 3\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-4\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.govinfo.gov\/content\/pkg\/PLAW-112publ211\/html\/PLAW-112publ211.htm\">Patent Law Treaties Implementation Act<\/a>, Pub. L. 112-211, 126 Stat. 1527 (2012). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-4\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 4\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-5\">V. Tome 1, n\u00b066. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-5\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 5\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-6\">V. cependant, dans le domaine du design, le Vessel Hull Design Protection Act, T. 1, n\u00b0297. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-6\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 6\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-7\">V. <em>supra<\/em>, n\u00b0307. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-7\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 7\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-8\">La premi\u00e8re sera la Caroline du Sud en 1784. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-8\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 8\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-9\">Affaire des brevets concurrents sur les bateaux \u00e0 vapeur (<em>steamboat patents<\/em>), d\u00e9livr\u00e9s respectivement \u00e0 John Fitch et James Rumsey, qui se disputaient l'invention. A. Sutcliffe, Steam: The Untold Story of America's First Great Invention. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. Les deux recevront des brevets f\u00e9d\u00e9raux en 1791. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-9\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 9\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-10\">L\u2019expression vise de mani\u00e8re g\u00e9n\u00e9rale les technologies. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-10\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 10\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-11\">V. Tome 1, n\u00b038 et s. (cadre constitutionnel). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-11\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 11\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-12\"><em>Ibid<\/em>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-12\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 12\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-13\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.ipmall.info\/sites\/default\/files\/hosted_resources\/lipa\/patents\/Patent_Act_of_1790.pdf\">Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-13\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 13\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-14\">Section 1. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-14\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 14\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-15\"><em>Ibid.<\/em> <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-15\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 15\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-16\"><em>Ibid.<\/em> <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-16\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 16\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-17\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.ipmall.info\/sites\/default\/files\/hosted_resources\/lipa\/patents\/Patent_Act_of_1793.pdf\">Act of Febr. 21, 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318-323<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-17\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 17\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-18\">Section 1: \u00ab any new and useful art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement on any art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, not known or used before the application<em> \u00bb.<\/em> <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-18\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 18\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-19\"> \u00ab By 1865, the U.S. per capita patenting rate was more than triple that of Britain\u2019s, according to the annual reports from the commissioners of patents in both countries, and by 1885, it was more than quadruple that of Britain. Each U.S. patentee was also far more prolific than their British counterpart, so by mid-century, the United States was patenting five times the number of inventions as Britain each year, even though the populations were then equal in size\u00a0\u00bb D. Kline, D. Kappos, <a href=\"https:\/\/openstax.org\/details\/books\/introduction-intellectual-property\/\">Introduction to Intellectual Property<\/a>, Openstax 2021 (CC BY 4.0), Patents Basics, p. 24. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-19\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 19\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-20\">Patent Act of 1793, sec. 1. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-20\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 20\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-21\">V. Report Accompanying Senate Bill No. 239, S. Doc. No. 24\u2013338, at 3 (1836). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-21\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 21\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-22\"><a href=\"https:\/\/patentlyo.com\/media\/docs\/2008\/03\/Patent_Act_of_1836.pdf\">Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-22\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 22\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-23\">Section 1. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-23\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 23\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-24\">Section 6: <em>\u00ab<\/em>\u00a0before any inventor shall receive a patent for any such new invention or discovery, he shall deliver a written description of his invention or discovery, and of the manner and process of making, constructing, using, and compounding the same, in such full, clear, and exact terms, avoiding unnecessary prolixity, as to enable any person skilled in the art or science to which it appertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make, construct, compound, and use the same; and in case of any machine, he shall fully explain the principle and the several modes in which he has contemplated the application of that principle or character by which it may be distinguished from other inventions; <span style=\"text-decoration: underline;\">and shall particularly specify and point out the part, improvement, or combination, which he claims as his own invention or discovery<\/span>. He shall, furthermore, accompany the whole with a drawing, or drawings, and written references, where the nature of the case admits of drawings, or with specimens of ingredients, and of the composition of matter, sufficient in quantity for the purpose of experiment, where the invention or discovery is of a composition of matter<em>\u00bb.<\/em> <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-24\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 24\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-25\">Section 7. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-25\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 25\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-26\"><a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/52\/248\/\">52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1850)<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-26\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 26\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-27\"><a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/56\/330\/\">56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1853)<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-27\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 27\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-28\">City of Elizabeth v. American Nicholson Pavement Co. <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/97\/126\/\">97 U.S. (7 Otto.) 126 (1877)<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-28\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 28\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-29\">Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Development Corp., <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/283\/27\/\">283 U.S. 27 (1931)<\/a> ; Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co. <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/320\/661\/\">320 U.S. 661 (1944)<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-29\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 29\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-30\">V. <em>infra, <\/em>n\u00b0431. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-30\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 30\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-31\">Public Law 593, July 19, 1952, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.govinfo.gov\/content\/pkg\/STATUTE-66\/pdf\/STATUTE-66-Pg792.pdf\">66 Stat. 792<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-31\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 31\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-32\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/cfr\/text\/37\">37 C.F.R.<\/a> <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-32\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 32\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-33\">\u00e0 partir de Gottschalk v. Benson, <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/409\/63\/\">409 U.S. 63 (1972)<\/a> (algorithmes math\u00e9matiques non brevetables). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-33\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 33\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-34\"><a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/447\/303\/\">447 U.S. 303 (1980)<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-34\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 34\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-35\">P.L. 98-417, Title II, 98 Stat. 1585; <a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/21\/355\">21 U.S.C. \u00a7 355<\/a> and <a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/271\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 271(e)(1)<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-35\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 35\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-36\">P.L. 100-73, 102 Stat. 4674. La loi ajoutant deux sous-sections \u00e0 <a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/271\">35 U.S.C. Section 271(d)<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-36\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 36\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-37\">Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, P.L. 100-418, Title IX, Subtitle A, 102 Stat. 1563. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-37\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 37\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-38\">Uruguay Round Agreements Act (Public Law 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994)). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-38\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 38\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-39\">V. <em>infra, <\/em>n\u00b0384. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-39\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 39\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-40\">Dispositions codifi\u00e9es au <a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/122\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 122<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-40\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 40\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-41\">Sur cette question, V. <em>infra<\/em>, n\u00b0422. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-41\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 41\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-42\"><em>Ibid.<\/em> <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-42\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 42\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-43\">La premi\u00e8re loi de ce type a \u00e9t\u00e9 adopt\u00e9e dans l\u2019\u00c9tat du Vermont en 2013, 9 VSA \u00a7 4195. <em>Ibid.<\/em> <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-43\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 43\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-44\">\u00ab Invention \u00bb est d\u00e9finie au paragraphe 100 comme signifiant \u00ab une invention ou une d\u00e9couverte \u00bb. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-44\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 44\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-45\">\u00ab whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof\u2026 \u00bb. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-45\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 45\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-46\"><a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/447\/303\/\">Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980)<\/a> \u00e0 308-309. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-46\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 46\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-47\">\u00ab\u00a0<em>T<\/em>he Committee Reports accompanying the 1952 Act inform us that Congress intended statutory subject matter to \"include anything under the sun that is made by man\u00a0\u00bb. S. Rep. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1952); H. R. Rep. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1952). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-47\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 47\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-48\"><a style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/in-re-nuijten\"><em>In re<\/em> Nuijten<\/a><span style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\">, 500 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007) : \u201cthe four categories together describe the exclusive reach of patentable subject matter. If a claim covers material not found in any of the four statutory categories, that claim falls outside the plainly expressed scope of \u00a7 101 even if the subject matter is otherwise new and useful\".<\/span> <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-48\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 48\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-49\">\"a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a given result. It is an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a different state or thing.\" <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/409\/63\/\">Gottschalk v. Benson<\/a>, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972) (citant <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/94\/780\/\">Cochrane v. Deener<\/a>, 94 U.S. 780 (1876)). Egalement <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/in-re-nuijten\">In Re Nuijten<\/a>, 500 F.3d \u00e0 1355 (\"The Supreme Court and this court have consistently interpreted the statutory term \u2018process\u2019 to require action\"); <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/ntp-inc-v-research-in-motion-ltd-4\">NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd.<\/a>, 418 F.3d 1282, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (\"[A] process is a series of acts.\"). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-49\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 49\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-50\"><a style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\" href=\"https:\/\/www.bitlaw.com\/source\/cases\/patent\/Digitech.html#:~:text=3d%201344,-All%20Patent%20Cases&amp;text=The%20apparatus%20claims%20covered%20%22device,as%20non%2Dstatutory%20under%20Nuitjen.\">Digitech Image Techs. v. Electronics for Imaging<\/a><span style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\">, 758 F.3d 1344, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (\"For all categories except process claims, the eligible subject matter must exist in some physical or tangible form\"). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-50\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 50\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-51\">\"a concrete thing, consisting of parts, or of certain devices and combination of devices.\" <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bitlaw.com\/source\/cases\/patent\/Digitech.html#:~:text=3d%201344,-All%20Patent%20Cases&amp;text=The%20apparatus%20claims%20covered%20%22device,as%20non%2Dstatutory%20under%20Nuitjen.\">Digitech<\/a>, 758 F.3d \u00e0 1348-49\u00a0 (citant <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/68\/531\/\">Burr v. Duryee<\/a>, 68 U.S. 531, 570, (1863). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-51\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 51\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-52\">\"every mechanical device or combination of mechanical powers and devices to perform some function and produce a certain effect or result.\" <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/68\/531\/\">In Re Nuijten<\/a>, pr\u00e9cit\u00e9 (citant <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/56\/252\/\">Corning v. Burden<\/a>, 56 U.S. 252, 267 (1854)).  <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-52\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 52\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-53\">\"a tangible article that is given a new form, quality, property, or combination through man-made or artificial means.\" <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bitlaw.com\/source\/cases\/patent\/Digitech.html#:~:text=3d%201344,-All%20Patent%20Cases&amp;text=The%20apparatus%20claims%20covered%20%22device,as%20non%2Dstatutory%20under%20Nuitjen.\">Digitech<\/a>, pr\u00e9cit\u00e9 (citant Diamond v. Chakrabarty). Les produits fabriqu\u00e9s incluent \u00e9galement les pi\u00e8ces d'une machine prises s\u00e9par\u00e9ment de la machine: <\/span><a style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/samsung-elecs-co-v-apple-inc\">Samsung Electronics Co. v. Apple Inc.<\/a><span style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\">, 137 S. Ct. 429, 120\u00a0 (2016). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-53\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 53\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-54\">\"a combination of two or more substances and includes all composite articles.\" <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bitlaw.com\/source\/cases\/patent\/Digitech.html#:~:text=3d%201344,-All%20Patent%20Cases&amp;text=The%20apparatus%20claims%20covered%20%22device,as%20non%2Dstatutory%20under%20Nuitjen.\">Digitech<\/a>, pr\u00e9cit\u00e9. La cat\u00e9gorie comprend toutes les compositions de plus de deux substances, \"'whether they be the results of chemical union or of mechanical mixture, or whether they be gases, fluids, powders or solids.\" <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/447\/303\/\">Chakrabarty<\/a>, pr\u00e9cit\u00e9. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-54\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 54\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-55\"><\/span><a style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/in-re-nuijten\"><em>In re<\/em> Nuijten<\/a><span style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\">, pr\u00e9cit\u00e9. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-55\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 55\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-56\"><\/span><a style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/in-re-ferguson-4?q=In%20re%20Ferguson&amp;sort=relevance&amp;p=1&amp;type=case\"><em>In re<\/em> Ferguson<\/a><span style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\">, 558 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (cert. denied). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-56\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 56\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-57\"><\/span><em style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\">Ibid.<\/em><span style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\"> <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-57\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 57\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-58\"><\/span><a style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\" href=\"https:\/\/law.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/appellate-courts\/F2\/418\/1392\/295156\/\"><em>In re Miller<\/em><\/a><em style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\">,<\/em><span style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\"> 418 F.2d 1392, 1396 (CCPA 1969). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-58\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 58\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-59\">assimilable \u00e0 une id\u00e9e sans incarnation physique, V. <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/550\/437\/\">Microsoft Corp. v. AT&amp;T Corp.<\/a>, 550 U.S. 437, 449;\u00a0 \u00e9galement <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/409\/63\/\">Gottschalk v. Benson<\/a>, 409 U.S. 67 (une id\u00e9e n'est pas brevetable). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-59\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 59\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-60\"><\/span><a style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\" href=\"https:\/\/www.bitlaw.com\/source\/cases\/patent\/Digitech.html\">Digitech<\/a><span style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\">, pr\u00e9cit\u00e9. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-60\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 60\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-61\">V. <em>infra<\/em>, n\u00b0364. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-61\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 61\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-62\">V. notamment l\u2019arr\u00eat Chakrabarty: <em>\u00ab<\/em>\u00a0a new mineral discovered in the earth or a new plant found in the wild is not patentable subject matter. Likewise, Einstein could not patent his celebrated law that E=mc2; nor could Newton have patented the law of gravity<em>.\u00a0\u00bb<\/em> (447 U.S. \u00e0 309, 206 USPQ, point 197); <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/437\/584\/\"><em>Parker<\/em> v. <\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/437\/584\/\"><em>Flook<\/em><\/a><em>,<\/em> 437 U.S. 584 (1978) \u00e0 585 (formule math\u00e9matique, m\u00eame nouvelle et utile); <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/56\/62\/\">O\u2019Reilly v. Morse<\/a>, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 113-114 (1853) (citant l\u2019\u00e9lectromagn\u00e9tisme ou la puissance vapeur); <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/333\/127\/\">Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.<\/a>, 333 U.S. 127 (1948) (citant les qualit\u00e9s d\u2019une bact\u00e9rie, la chaleur du soleil, l\u2019\u00e9lectricit\u00e9 ou les propri\u00e9t\u00e9s de m\u00e9taux). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-62\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 62\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-63\"><a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/447\/303\/\">Diamond v. <\/a><span style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\"><a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/447\/303\/\">Chakrabarty<\/a>, 447 U.S. 303: \"In enacting the Plant Patent Act, Congress addressed both of these concerns. It explained at length its belief that the work of the plant breeder \"in aid of nature\" was patentable invention. S.Rep. No. 315, 71st Cong., 2d Sess., 8 (1930); H.R.Rep. No. 1129, 71st Cong., 2d Sess., 7-9 (1930). And it relaxed the written description requirement in favor of \"a description . . . as complete as is reasonably possible.\" 35 U.S.C. \u00a7 162. No Committee or Member of Congress, however, expressed the broader view, now urged by the petitioner, that the terms \"manufacture\" or \"composition of matter\" exclude living things. The sole support for that position in the legislative history of the 1930 Act is found in the conclusory statement of Secretary of Agriculture Hyde, in a letter to the Chairmen of the House and Senate Committees considering the 1930 Act, that \"the patent laws . . . at the present time are understood to cover only inventions or discoveries in the field of inanimate nature.\" See S.Rep. No. 315, supra at Appendix A; H.R.Rep. No. 1129, supra at Appendix A. Secretary Hyde's opinion, however, is not entitled to controlling weight. His views were solicited on the administration of the new law. and not on the scope of patentable subject matter -- an area beyond his competence. Moreover, there is language in the House and Senate Committee Reports suggesting that, to the extent Congress considered the matter, it found the Secretary's dichotomy unpersuasive. The Reports observe: \"There is a clear and logical distinction between the discovery of a new variety of plant and of certain inanimate things, such, for example, as a new and useful natural mineral. The mineral is created wholly by nature unassisted by man. . . . On the other hand, a plant discovery resulting from cultivation is unique, isolated, and is not repeated by nature, nor can it be reproduced by nature unaided by man. . . .\"\u00a0 S.Rep. No. 315, supra at 6; H.R.Rep. No. 1129, supra at 7 (emphasis added). Congress thus recognized that the relevant distinction was not between living and inanimate things, but between products of nature, whether living or not, and human-made inventions. Here, respondent's micro-organism is the result of human ingenuity and research. Hence, the passage of the Plant Patent Act affords the Government no support\". <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-63\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 63\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-64\"><a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/in-re-institution\"><em>In re <\/em>Roslin Institute (Edinburgh)<\/a>, 750 F.3d 1333, 1336, 110 USPQ2d 1668, 1671 (Fed. Cir. 2014). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-64\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 64\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-65\">42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2181(a) <em>\u00ab\u00a0<\/em>No patent shall hereafter be granted for any invention or discovery which is useful solely in the utilization of special nuclear material or atomic energy in an atomic weapon. Any patent granted for any such invention or discovery is revoked, and just compensation shall be made therefor.<em>\u00a0\u00bb <\/em>Les termes \"atomic energy\" et \"special nuclear material\" sont d\u00e9finis \u00e0 la section 11 de cette loi (42 U.S.C. 2014). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-65\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 65\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-66\">Public Law 112-29. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-66\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 66\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-67\">\u00ab\u00a0<\/span>Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no patent may issue on a claim directed to or encompassing a human organism\u00a0<em style=\"font-size: 1em;\">\u00bb.<\/em><span style=\"font-size: 1em;\"> <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-67\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 67\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-68\">V. <\/span>Animals Patentability, 1077 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 24 (April 21, 1987), qui indiquait d\u00e9j\u00e0 l'impossibilit\u00e9 de breveter des organismes humains. Selon le MPEP, section 2105: Patent Eligible Subject Matter \u2014 Living Subject Matter [R-10.2019]:\u201cIf the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claimed invention as a whole encompasses a human organism, then a rejection under 35 U.S.C. 101 and AIA sec. 33(a) must be made indicating that the claimed invention is directed to a human organism and is therefore nonstatutory subject matter. Furthermore, the claimed invention must be examined with regard to all issues pertinent to patentability, and any applicable rejections under 35 U.S.C. 102, 103, or 112 must also be made\u201d. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-68\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 68\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-69\"><a href=\"https:\/\/law.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/appellate-courts\/F3\/185\/1364\/609214\/\">Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc.<\/a>, 185 F.3d 1364, 1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 1999): \"The invention claimed in the '405 patent is a post-mix beverage dispenser that is designed to look like a pre-mix beverage dispenser. The claims require the post-mix dispenser to have a transparent bowl that is filled with a fluid that simulates the appearance of the dispensed beverage and is resistant to bacterial growth. The claims also require that the dispenser create the visual impression that the bowl is the principal source of the dispensed beverage, although in fact the beverage is mixed immediately before it is dispensed, as in conventional post-mix dispensers.. The district court in this case held a patent invalid for lack of utility on the ground that the patented invention was designed to deceive customers by imitating another product and thereby increasing sales of a particular good. We reverse and remand. (...) Of course, Congress is free to declare particular types of inventions unpatentable for a variety of reasons, including deceptiveness. Cf. 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2181(a) (exempting from patent protection inventions useful solely in connection with special nuclear material or atomic weapons). Until such time as Congress does so, however, we find no basis in section 101 to hold that inventions can be ruled unpatentable for lack of utility simply because they have the capacity to fool some members of the public.<em>\" <\/em>Le MPEP n\u2019aborde pas la question de la lic\u00e9it\u00e9 des inventions ou de leur application. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-69\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 69\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-70\"><a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/450\/175\/\">Diamond v. Diehr<\/a>, 450 U.S. 175 (1981) \u00e0 185; <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/447\/303\/\">Diamond v. Chakrabarty<\/a>, 447 U.S. 303 (1980), \u00e0 309; <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/437\/584\/\">Parker v. Flook<\/a>, 437 U.S. 584, 589, 198 USPQ 193, 197 (1978); <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/409\/63\/\">Gottschalk v. Benson<\/a>, 409 U.S. 63 (1972), \u00e0 67-68; <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/333\/127\/\">Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.<\/a>, 333 U.S. 127 (1948) \u00e0 130; <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/55\/156\/\">Le Roy v. Tatham<\/a>, 55 U.S. 156 (1852), \u00e0 175. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-70\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 70\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-71\"><a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/application-of-musgrave\"><em>In re<\/em> Musgrave<\/a>, 431 F.2d 882 (CCPA 1970) (les proc\u00e9d\u00e9s impliquant des <em>mental steps<\/em> ne sont pas en eux-m\u00eames exclus de la brevetabilit\u00e9); mais dans un sens beaucoup plus restrictif, voir <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/in-re-comiskey-2\"><em>In re<\/em> Comiskey<\/a>, 499 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (exclusion d\u2019une m\u00e9thode d\u2019arbitrage\u00a0: \u00abmental processes \u2013 or processes of human thinking \u2013 standing alone are not patentable even if they have pratical application\u00a0\u00bb). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-71\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 71\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-72\"> <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/566\/66\/#opinions\">Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.<\/a>, 566 U.S. 66 (2012). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-72\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 72\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-73\"><a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/573\/208\/#opinions\">Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International<\/a>, 573 U.S. 208 (2014). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-73\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 73\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-74\">Plus pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment, une m\u00e9thode permettant d'optimiser le traitement de patients atteints de maladies auto-immunes en d\u00e9terminant si une dose de m\u00e9dicaments \u00e0 base de thiopurine est trop faible ou trop \u00e9lev\u00e9e, en s'appuyant sur la <span style=\"font-size: 1em;\">corr\u00e9lation des m\u00e9tabolites du m\u00e9dicament dans le corps pour d\u00e9terminer l'efficacit\u00e9 ou la toxicit\u00e9 du m\u00e9dicament<\/span><span style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\">. La Cour supr\u00eame avait consid\u00e9r\u00e9 que la m\u00e9thode revendiqu\u00e9e ne faisait que r\u00e9citer une loi de la nature<\/span>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-74\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 74\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-75\">En l'esp\u00e8ce, u<\/span>ne m\u00e9thode mise en \u0153uvre par ordinateur pour att\u00e9nuer le \u00ab risque de r\u00e8glement \u00bb (risque qu'une seule partie \u00e0 une transaction financi\u00e8re paie ce qu'elle doit) en utilisant un interm\u00e9diaire tiers. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-75\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 75\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-76\">\"In Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U. S. ___ (2012), we set forth a framework for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts. First, we determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 8). If so, we then ask, \u201c[w]hat else is there in the claims before us?\u201d Id., at ___ (slip op., at 9). To answer that question, we consider the elements of each claim both individually and \u201cas an ordered combination\u201d to determine whether the additional elements \u201ctransform the nature of the claim\u201d into a patent-eligible application. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 10, 9). We have described step two of this analysis as a search for an \u201c \u2018inventive concept\u2019 \u201d\u2014i.e., an element or combination of elements that is \u201csufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.\u201d Id., at ___ (slip op., at 3)\". Alice, 573 U.S., para. 217-18. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-76\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 76\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-77\">Le dernier en date est le <a href=\"https:\/\/www.federalregister.gov\/documents\/2024\/07\/17\/2024-15377\/2024-guidance-update-on-patent-subject-matter-eligibility-including-on-artificial-intelligence\">2024 Guidance Update on Patent Subject Matter Eligibility, Including on Artificial Intelligence<\/a>. On soulignera que ces guides, comme le MPEP, ne lient pas le Circuit f\u00e9d\u00e9ral. In re Rudy, 956 F.3d 1379, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2020); Cleveland Clinic Found. v. True Health Diagnostics LLC, 760 F. App\u2019x. 1013, 1020 (Fed. Cir. 2019)). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-77\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 77\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-78\">\u00a7 2103-2106.07(c). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-78\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 78\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-79\">Site USPTO: <a href=\"https:\/\/www.uspto.gov\/patents\/laws\/examination-policy\/subject-matter-eligibility\">Subject matter eligibility<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-79\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 79\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-80\">La liste comprend: Removing Malicious Code from Email; Generating a Composite Webpage; Digital Image Processing (RCT); Global Positioning System; Digital Image Processing (Digitech); Game of Bingo; E-Commerce transactions; Distribution of Products over the Internet; Gunpowder &amp; Fireworks; Pomelo Juice; Amazonic Acid Purified Proteins; Genetically Modified Bacterium; Bacterial Mixtures; Nucleic Acids Antibodies; Cells; Food; Hip Prosthesis; Robotic Arm Assembly; Transmission of Stock Quote Data; GUI for Meal Planning; GUI for Relocating Obscured Text; Updating Alarm Limits; Rubber Manufacturing; Internal Combustion Engine; BIOS System Software; Vaccines; Diagnosing and Treating Julitis; Dietary Sweeteners; Screening of Gene Alterations; Paper-making Machine; Hydrolysis of Fat; Filtering Internet Content; ATM Transactions; Tracking Inventory; Relocation of Icons on GUI; Simulating an Analog Audio Mixer; Facial Recognition; Network Traffic Monitoring; Cryptographic Communications; Medical Record Updates; Treating Kidney Disease; Denveric Acid; Controller for Injection Mold; Livestock Management; Training a Neural Network to Predict Anomalies; Speech Separation; Fibrosis Treatment. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-80\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 80\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-81\">V. <em>supra, <\/em>n\u00b0361. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-81\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 81\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-82\">447 U.S. 303 (1980). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-82\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 82\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-83\">Des brevets avaient d\u00e9j\u00e0 \u00e9t\u00e9 accord\u00e9s pour des proc\u00e9d\u00e9s utilisant de la mati\u00e8re vivante. V. par exemple <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/application-of-mancy\"><em>In re<\/em> Mancy<\/a>, 499 F.2d 1289 (CCPA 1974). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-83\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 83\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-84\">Ex Parte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1425 (BPAI 1987), aff\u2019d, <\/em><a href=\"https:\/\/law.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/appellate-courts\/F2\/846\/77\/397098\/\"><em>846 F.2d 877<\/em><\/a><em> (Fed. Cir. 1988). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-84\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 84\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-85\">L\u2019affaire portait sur une huitre g\u00e9n\u00e9tiquement modif\u00e9e. Le brevet sera refus\u00e9 pour d\u00e9faut d\u2019activit\u00e9 inventive. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-85\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 85\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-86\"><em>Policy announcement<\/em> par Donald J. Quigg, Assistant Secretary and Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks (7 avril 1987), 69 J. Pat. &amp; Trademark Off. Soc'Y 328 (1987). L\u2019annonce intervenait quatre jours apr\u00e8s la d\u00e9cision du Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences dans <em>Ex parte Allen<\/em>, ci-dessus. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-86\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 86\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-87\"><a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/534\/124\/\">J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int\u2019l, Inc.<\/a>, 534 U.S. 124 (2001). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-87\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 87\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-88\">V. <em>infra<\/em>, n\u00b0430 et 431. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-88\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 88\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-89\"><a style=\"font-size: 1em;\" href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/569\/576\/\">Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.<\/a><span style=\"font-size: 1em;\">, 569 U.S. 576 (2013).<\/span> <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-89\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 89\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-90\"><a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/association-for-mol-pathol-v-us-patent-tm-off\">Association for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office<\/a>, No. 09-cv-4515, 94 USPQ2d 1683 (S.D.N.Y. March 29, 2010). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-90\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 90\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-91\"><span style=\"font-size: 1em;\"><a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/the-assn-for-molecular-pathology-v-united-states-patent\">Ass\u2019n for Molecular Pathology v. US Patent &amp; Trademark Office<\/a>, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Myriad Genetics I).<\/span><span style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\"> <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-91\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 91\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-92\"> V. <em>supra,<\/em> n\u00b0364. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-92\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 92\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-93\"><a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/assn-for-molecular-pathology-v-us-patent-trademark-office\">Ass\u2019n for Molecular Pathology v. US Patent &amp; Trademark Office<\/a>, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Myriad G<span style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\">enetics II). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-93\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 93\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-94\">\u00ab La distinction entre un produit de la nature [non brevetable] et une invention humaine au sens du paragraphe 101 [du Patent Act sur la brevetabilit\u00e9] tient \u00e0 un changement dans l'identit\u00e9 de la composition revendiqu\u00e9e, compar\u00e9 \u00e0 ce qui existe dans la nature. Plus pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment, la Cour Supr\u00eame a trac\u00e9 une ligne entre les compositions [de mati\u00e8re] qui, m\u00eame si elles sont combin\u00e9es ou modifi\u00e9es d'une mani\u00e8re qui ne se retrouve pas dans la nature, ont des caract\u00e9ristiques similaires aux m\u00eames compositions dans la nature, et les compositions auxquelles l'intervention humaine a donn\u00e9 des caract\u00e9ristiques \"manifestement diff\u00e9rentes\" ou \"distinctives\" (...) Il n'est pas contest\u00e9 que l'ADN isol\u00e9 revendiqu\u00e9 par Myriad existe sous une forme chimique distincte\/distinctive - en tant que mol\u00e9cules chimiques diff\u00e9rentes - de l'ADN pr\u00e9sent dans le corps humain, c'est-\u00e0-dire l'ADN humain \u00bb. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-94\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 94\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-95\">\"Myriad found the location of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, but that discovery, by itself, does not render the BRCA genes \u201cnew . . . composition[s] of matter,\u201d \u00a7101, that are patent eligible (...)\". <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-95\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 95\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-96\">\"cDNA does not present the same obstacles to patentability as naturally occurring, isolated DNA segments. As already explained, creation of a cDNA sequence from mRNA results in an exons-only molecule that is not naturally occurring. Petitioners concede that cDNA differs from natural DNA in that \u201cthe non-coding regions have been removed.\u201d Brief for Petitioners 49. They nevertheless argue that cDNA is not patent eligible because \u201c[t]he nucleotide sequence of cDNA is dictated by nature, not by the lab technician.\u201d Id., at 51. That may be so, but the labtechnician unquestionably creates something new when cDNA is made. cDNA retains the naturally occurring exons of DNA, but it is distinct from the DNA from which it was derived. As a result, cDNA is not a \u201cproduct of nature\u201d and is patent eligible under \u00a7101, except insofar as very short series of DNA may have no intervening introns to remove when creating cDNA. In that situation, a short strand of cDNA may be indistinguishable from natural DNA\". <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-96\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 96\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-97\"><span style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\">\"It is important to note what is not implicated by this decision. First, there are no method claims before this\u00a0<\/span>Court. Had Myriad created an innovative method of manipulating genes while searching for the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, it could possibly have sought a method patent. But the processes used by Myriad to isolate DNA were well understood by geneticists at the time of Myriad\u2019s patents \u201cwere well understood, widely used, and fairly uniform insofar as any scientist engaged in the search for a gene would likely have utilized a similar approach, 702F. Supp. 2d, at 202\u2013203, and are not at issue in this case\". <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-97\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 97\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-98\">\"Similarly, this case does not involve patents on new applications of knowledge about the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes. Judge Bryson aptly noted that, \u201c[a]s the first party with knowledge of the [BRCA1 and BRCA2] sequences, Myriad was in an excellent position to claim applications of that knowledge. Many of its unchallenged claims are limited to such applications.\u201d 689 F. 3d, at 1349\". <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-98\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 98\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-99\"><\/span><span style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\">\"Nor do we consider the patentability of DNA in which the order of the naturally occurring nucleotides has been\u00a0<\/span>altered. Scientific alteration of the genetic code presents a different inquiry, and we express no opinion about the application of \u00a7101 to such endeavors. We merely hold that genes and the information they encode are not patent eligible under \u00a7101 simply because they have been isolated from the surrounding genetic material\". <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-99\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 99\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-100\"><\/span><a style=\"font-size: 1em;\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/illumina-inc-v-ariosa-diagnostics-inc-2\">Illumina, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc.<\/a><span style=\"font-size: 1em;\">, 952 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2020) <\/span><em style=\"font-size: 1em;\">modified<\/em><span style=\"font-size: 1em;\">\u00a0967 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2020). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-100\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 100\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-101\"><a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/endo-pharms-inc-v-teva-pharms-usa-inc-1\"><em>Endo Pharm. Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc.<\/em><\/a>, 919 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2019). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-101\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 101\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-102\"><a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/vanda-pharms-inc-v-west-ward-pharms-intl-ltd\">Vanda Pharm. Inc. v. West-Ward Pharm. Int\u2019l Ltd<\/a>, 887 F.3d 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2018). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-102\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 102\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-103\"><a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/rapid-litig-mgmt-ltd-v-cellzdirect-inc\">Rapid Litig. Mgmt. Ltd. v. Cellzdirect, Inc.<\/a>, 827 F.3d 1042 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Le proc\u00e9d\u00e9 en cause consistait dans : (a) la soumission soumettant des cellules pr\u00e9alablement congel\u00e9es et d\u00e9congel\u00e9es \u00e0 un fractionnement par gradient de densit\u00e9 pour s\u00e9parer les cellules viables des cellules non viables ; (B) la r\u00e9cup\u00e9ration des cellules viables ; et (C) la recong\u00e9lation des cellules viables. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-103\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 103\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-104\">V. par exemple, pour les plus r\u00e9centes: <a style=\"font-size: 1em;\" href=\"https:\/\/cafc.uscourts.gov\/opinions-orders\/22-1027.OPINION.7-18-2022_1979207.pdf\">CareDx, Inc. v. Natera, Inc.<\/a>,\u00a0<span style=\"font-size: 1em;\">40 F.4th 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2022): <\/span><span id=\"tgtAlignment_1\" class=\"ts-alignment-element\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\" data-is-focusable=\"true\">m\u00e9thodes<\/span> <span id=\"tgtAlignment_2\" class=\"ts-alignment-element\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\" data-is-focusable=\"true\">de<\/span> <span id=\"tgtAlignment_3\" class=\"ts-alignment-element\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\" data-is-focusable=\"true\">d\u00e9tection<\/span> <span id=\"tgtAlignment_4\" class=\"ts-alignment-element\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\" data-is-focusable=\"true\">du<\/span> <span id=\"tgtAlignment_5\" class=\"ts-alignment-element\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\" data-is-focusable=\"true\">rejet<\/span> <span id=\"tgtAlignment_6\" class=\"ts-alignment-element\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\" data-is-focusable=\"true\">de<\/span> <span id=\"tgtAlignment_7\" class=\"ts-alignment-element\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\" data-is-focusable=\"true\">greffe<\/span><span id=\"tgtAlignment_8\" class=\"ts-alignment-element\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\" data-is-focusable=\"true\">,<\/span><span style=\"font-size: 1em;\"> du <\/span><span id=\"tgtAlignment_9\" class=\"ts-alignment-element\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\" data-is-focusable=\"true\">dysfonctionnement<\/span> <span id=\"tgtAlignment_10\" class=\"ts-alignment-element\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\" data-is-focusable=\"true\">du<\/span> <span id=\"tgtAlignment_11\" class=\"ts-alignment-element\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\" data-is-focusable=\"true\">greffon<\/span> <span id=\"tgtAlignment_12\" class=\"ts-alignment-element\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\" data-is-focusable=\"true\">ou<\/span> <span id=\"tgtAlignment_13\" class=\"ts-alignment-element\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\" data-is-focusable=\"true\">de<\/span> <span id=\"tgtAlignment_14\" class=\"ts-alignment-element\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\" data-is-focusable=\"true\">la<\/span> <span id=\"tgtAlignment_15\" class=\"ts-alignment-element\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\" data-is-focusable=\"true\">d\u00e9faillance<\/span> <span id=\"tgtAlignment_16\" class=\"ts-alignment-element\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\" data-is-focusable=\"true\">d<\/span><span id=\"tgtAlignment_17\" class=\"ts-alignment-element\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\" data-is-focusable=\"true\">\u2019<\/span><span id=\"tgtAlignment_18\" class=\"ts-alignment-element\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\" data-is-focusable=\"true\">un<\/span> <span id=\"tgtAlignment_19\" class=\"ts-alignment-element\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\" data-is-focusable=\"true\">organe<\/span><span id=\"tgtAlignment_20\" class=\"ts-alignment-element\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\" data-is-focusable=\"true\">,<\/span> <span id=\"tgtAlignment_21\" class=\"ts-alignment-element\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\" data-is-focusable=\"true\">jug\u00e9es<\/span><span style=\"font-size: 1em;\"> relevant de lois de la nature, et comprenant les <\/span><span id=\"tgtAlignment_30\" class=\"ts-alignment-element\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\" data-is-focusable=\"true\">\u00e9tapes<\/span> <span id=\"tgtAlignment_31\" class=\"ts-alignment-element\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\" data-is-focusable=\"true\">conventionnelles<\/span> <span id=\"tgtAlignment_32\" class=\"ts-alignment-element\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\" data-is-focusable=\"true\">permettant<\/span> <span id=\"tgtAlignment_33\" class=\"ts-alignment-element\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\" data-is-focusable=\"true\">de<\/span> <span id=\"tgtAlignment_34\" class=\"ts-alignment-element\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\" data-is-focusable=\"true\">d\u00e9tecter<\/span> <span id=\"tgtAlignment_35\" class=\"ts-alignment-element\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\" data-is-focusable=\"true\">ou<\/span> <span id=\"tgtAlignment_36\" class=\"ts-alignment-element\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\" data-is-focusable=\"true\">de<\/span> <span id=\"tgtAlignment_37\" class=\"ts-alignment-element\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\" data-is-focusable=\"true\">quantifier<\/span> <span id=\"tgtAlignment_38\" class=\"ts-alignment-element\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\" data-is-focusable=\"true\">la<\/span> <span id=\"tgtAlignment_39\" class=\"ts-alignment-element\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\" data-is-focusable=\"true\">manifestation<\/span> <span id=\"tgtAlignment_40\" class=\"ts-alignment-element\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\" data-is-focusable=\"true\">de<\/span> <span id=\"tgtAlignment_41\" class=\"ts-alignment-element\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\" data-is-focusable=\"true\">cette<\/span> <span id=\"tgtAlignment_42\" class=\"ts-alignment-element\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\" data-is-focusable=\"true\">loi; <\/span><a style=\"font-size: 1em;\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/genetic-veterinary-scis-inc-v-laboklin-gmbh-co-6\">Genetic Veterinary Sciences, Inc. v. Laboklin GmbH &amp; Co. KG<\/a><span style=\"font-size: 1em;\">, 933 F.3d 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2019): <\/span><span style=\"font-size: 1em;\">m\u00e9thodes in vitro de g\u00e9notypage des chiens Labrador, afin de d\u00e9couvrir s'ils peuvent \u00eatre porteurs d'une maladie;\u00a0 <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/athena-diagnostics-inc-v-mayo-collaborative-servs-llc-3\">Athena Diagnostics, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Services, LLC<\/a><em>,<\/em> 915 F.3d 743 (Fed. Cir. 2019): m\u00e9thode pour diagnostiquer des d\u00e9sordres neurologiques, fond\u00e9e sur la corr\u00e9lation entre certains anticorps naturels et les maladies concern\u00e9es; \u00e9galement, <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/roche-molecular-sys-inc-v-cepheid\">Roche Molecular Sys., Inc. v. Cepheid<\/a><em>, <\/em>905 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2018); <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bitlaw.com\/source\/cases\/patent\/Cleveland-Clinic.html\">Cleveland Clinic Found. v. True Health Diagnostics LLC<\/a>, 859 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2017); <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/genetic-techs-ltd-v-merial-llc\">Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Merial LLC<\/a>, 818 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2016); <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/ariosa-diagnostics-inc-v-sequenom-inc\">Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc.<\/a>, 788 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2015); <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bitlaw.com\/source\/cases\/patent\/BRCA1_BRCA2.html\">In re BRCA1- and BRCA2-Based Hereditary Cancer Test<\/a>, 774 F.3d 755 (Fed. Cir. 2014). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-104\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 104\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-105\">Certaines d\u00e9cisions ont exclu la brevetabilit\u00e9 de telles m\u00e9thodes, ou du moins de m\u00e9thodes dont la brevetabilit\u00e9 \u00e9tait recherch\u00e9e \u00ab\u00a0en tant que telles\u00a0\u00bb\u00a0: V. <a href=\"https:\/\/patentlyo.com\/patent\/2016\/05\/security-checking-lorraine.html\">Hotel Security Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co.<\/a>, 160 F. 467 (2d Cir. 1908) (m\u00e9thode de gestion des factures de restaurants); <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/application-of-johnston\"><em>In re<\/em> Johnston<\/a>, 502 F.2d 765 (CCPA 1974), <em>rev\u2019d, on other grounds sub nom<\/em>. <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/425\/219\/\">Dann v. Johnston<\/a>, 425 U.S. 219 (1976) (m\u00e9thode de gestion automatique de ch\u00e8ques et de d\u00e9p\u00f4ts, mais la d\u00e9cision porte sur l\u2019activit\u00e9 inventive)\u00a0; <a href=\"https:\/\/law.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/district-courts\/FSupp\/564\/1358\/1407627\/\">Paine, Webber, Jackson &amp; Curtis, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &amp; Smith<\/a>, 564 F. Supp. 1358 (D. Del. 1983) (m\u00e9thode commerciale brevetable, car mises en oeuvre par un ordinateur)\u00a0; ex parte Murray, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d 1819 (PTO Bd. Pat. App. &amp; Int. 1988) (m\u00e9thode comptable non brevetable). Le circuit f\u00e9d\u00e9ral a rejet\u00e9 l\u2019exception dans <a href=\"https:\/\/law.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/appellate-courts\/F3\/149\/1368\/560460\/\">State Street Bank &amp; Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.<\/a>, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (pas d'exclusion de principe pour une m\u00e9thode financi\u00e8re relative \u00e0 l'administration d'un fonds mutuel: \"As an alternative ground for invalidating the '056 patent under \u00a7 101, the court relied on the judicially-created, so-called \"business method\" exception to statutory subject matter. We take this opportunity to lay this ill-conceived exception to rest. Since its inception, the \"business method\" exception has merely represented the application of some general, but no longer applicable legal principle, perhaps arising out of the \"requirement for invention\"--which was eliminated by \u00a7 103. Since the 1952 Patent Act, business methods have been, and should have been, subject to the same legal requirements for patentability as applied to any other process or method\"). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-105\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 105\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-106\"><a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/561\/593\/\">Bilski v. Kappos<\/a>, 561 U.S. 593 (2010). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-106\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 106\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-107\"><a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/in-re-bilski\"><em>In re<\/em> Bilski<\/a>, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed.Cir. 2008). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-107\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 107\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-108\">Ainsi en 2001 la Cour d'appel pour le circuit f\u00e9d\u00e9ral a censur\u00e9 sur ces fondements l'injonction accord\u00e9e par une Cour de District dans l'affaire <em>Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com (<\/em><a href=\"https:\/\/caselaw.findlaw.com\/court\/us-federal-circuit\/1453970.html\">Amazon. com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble. com, Inc.<\/a>,<em> 337 F.3d 1024 (Fed. Cir., 2001); V. Com. com. \u00e9lectr. janv. 2000, actu. n\u00b0 18)<\/em>. La Cour F\u00e9d\u00e9rale pour le District Ouest de Washington (<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/amazoncom-inc-v-barnesandnoblecom-inc\">73 F. Supp. 2d 1228<\/a> (W.D. Wash. 1999)) avait en effet accord\u00e9 \u00e0 la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 Amazon une ordonnance pr\u00e9liminaire enjoignant son concurrent, le libraire Barnes and Noble, de cesser la contrefa\u00e7on du brevet d'Amazon prot\u00e9geant son syst\u00e8me de prise d'achats en ligne (syst\u00e8me permettant de placer un ordre d'achat par un seul \"click\"). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-108\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 108\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-109\">La premi\u00e8re d\u00e9cision dans ce sens est une d\u00e9cision du Board of Appel du Patent Office de 1954, <em>Ex parte<\/em> Scherer, 103 U.S.P.Q. 107 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1954), qui renverse la jurisprudence ,ancienne du Patent Office Ex Parte Brinkerhoff, 27 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 797 (1883); les tribunaux suivront plus tardivement (v. notamment les r\u00e9ticences exprim\u00e9e sur le fondement de l'ordre public par Martin v. Wyeth, Inc., 96 F. Supp. 689 (D. Md. 1951), aff\u2019d 193 F.2d 58 (4th Cir. 1951): \"professional ethics of doctors and surgeons are more consistent with the widespread use of their medical and surgical discoveries for the benefit of mankind than in obtaining a monopoly to control their discoveries for personal commercial advantage. In this respect it would seem also that public interest is here involved\"). V. <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/prometheus-laboratories-inc-v-mayo-collaborative-serv\">Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Services<\/a>, 628 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (M\u00e9thodes de d\u00e9termination de la posologie optimale de m\u00e9dicaments \u00e0 base de thiopurine utilis\u00e9s pour traiter les maladies auto-immunes gastro-intestinales et non gastro-intestinales). Des exemples plus r\u00e9cents de m\u00e9thodes de traitement jug\u00e9es brevetables incluent : une m\u00e9thode d'utilisation de l'oxymorphone pour traiter la douleur chez des patients pr\u00e9sentant une insuffisance r\u00e9nale (<a style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/endo-pharms-inc-v-teva-pharms-usa-inc-1\">Endo Pharms., Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc.<\/a><span style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\">, 919 F.3d 1347, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2019)); d<\/span>es m\u00e9thodes de r\u00e9gulation des concentrations d'ions hydronium dans un tissu humain ou d'augmentation de la capacit\u00e9 de travail ana\u00e9robie chez un sujet humain par l'administration de quantit\u00e9s efficaces de b\u00eata-alanine (<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/natural-alternatives-intl-inc-v-creative-compounds-llc-1\">Natural Alternatives Int\u2019l, Inc. v. Creative Compounds, LLC<\/a>, 918 F.3d 1338, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2019)); ou encore une m\u00e9thode de traitement des patients schizophr\u00e8nes avec de l'ilop\u00e9ridone, qui base la posologie sur le g\u00e9notype du patient (<a style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\" href=\"https:\/\/cafc.uscourts.gov\/sites\/default\/files\/16-2707.Opinion.4-12-2018.1_0.pdf\">Vanda Pharms. Inc. v. West-Ward Pharms. Int\u2019l Ltd<\/a><span style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\">., 887 F.3d 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2018)). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-109\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 109\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-110\">V. par exemple <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/law.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/appellate-courts\/cafc\/17-2508\/17-2508-2019-02-06.html\">Athena Diagnostics v. Mayo Collaborative Services<\/a>, 915 F.3d 743, 751-53 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (m\u00e9thodes de diagnostics de maladies neurologique); <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/roche-molecular-sys-inc-v-cepheid\">Roche Molecular Sys., Inc. v. Cepheid<\/a>, 905 F.3d 1363, 1370-74 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (m\u00e9thode de d\u00e9tection de la bact\u00e9rie pathog\u00e8ne Mycobacterium tuberculosis); <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bitlaw.com\/source\/cases\/patent\/Cleveland-Clinic.html\">Cleveland Clinic Foundation v. True Health Diagnostics LLC<\/a>, 859 F.3d 1352, 1361-62 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (test de diagnostic de risques cardiovasculaires); <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/genetic-techs-ltd-v-merial-llc\">Genetic Technologies, Ltd. v. Merial LLC<\/a>, 818 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2016); <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/ariosa-diagnostics-inc-v-sequenom-inc\">Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc.<\/a>, 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015); <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bitlaw.com\/source\/cases\/patent\/BRCA1_BRCA2.html\">In re BRCA1- &amp; BRCA2-Based Hereditary Cancer Test<\/a>, 774 F.3d 755, 765 (Fed. Cir. 2014). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-110\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 110\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-111\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/287\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 287(c)<\/a>. <em>\u00ab\u00a0<\/em>The term \u201cmedical activity\u201d means the performance of a medical or surgical procedure on a body, but shall not include (i) the use of a patented machine, manufacture, or composition of matter in violation of such patent, (ii) the practice of a patented use of a composition of matter in violation of such patent, or (iii) the practice of a process in violation of a biotechnology patent.\u00a0<em>\u00bb<\/em> <em>Ibid.<\/em> <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-111\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 111\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-112\">V. <em>infra<\/em>, n\u00b0381. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-112\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 112\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-113\">Le MPEP (8\u00e8me \u00e9d. 2001) pr\u00e9cisait qu\u2019 \u00ab a computer program is merely a set of instructions capable of being executed by a computer \u00bb (\u00a7 2106.IV.B.1(a)). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-113\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 113\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-114\"><em>Ibid<\/em>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-114\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 114\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-115\"><a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/409\/63\/\">Gottschalk v. Benson<\/a>, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). V. Chisum, The Patentability of Algorithms, 47 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 959 (1986). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-115\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 115\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-116\">Point 64. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-116\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 116\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-117\"><a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/437\/584\/\">Parker v. Flook<\/a>, 437 U.S. 584 (1978). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-117\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 117\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-118\">En l\u2019esp\u00e8ce l\u2019algorithme avait \u00e9t\u00e9 revendiqu\u00e9 uniquement en relation avec un processus technique, et le calcul \u00e9tait suivi par une activit\u00e9 post-solution (l\u2019ajustement du niveau d\u2019alarme). La Cour supr\u00eame a cependant rejet\u00e9 la brevetabilit\u00e9 au motif que le brevet porterait sur un id\u00e9e abstraite. La mauvaise r\u00e9daction des revendications semble expliquer en partie la solution. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-118\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 118\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-119\"><a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/450\/175\/\">D<\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/450\/175\/\">iamond v. Diehr<\/a>, 450 U.S. 175 (1981). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-119\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 119\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-120\">A cette occasion, elle op\u00e8re une distinction avec les faits de l\u2019affaire <em>Parker v. Flook, <\/em>en soulignant que la m\u00e9thode alors revendiqu\u00e9e portait sur un calcul, sans r\u00e9ellement mentionner les \u00e9tapes physiques associ\u00e9es au calcul. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-120\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 120\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-121\">Points 191-92. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-121\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 121\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-122\"><\/em><a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/573\/208\/\">Alice Corp. V. CLS Bank International<\/a>,<em> 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-122\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 122\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-123\">\u00ab the mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. Stating an abstract idea \u201cwhile adding the words \u2018apply it\u2019\u201d is not enough for patent eligibility.(\u2026) Nor is limiting the use of an abstract idea \u201c\u2018to a particular technological environment.\u2019\u201d (\u2026). Stating an abstract idea while adding the words \u201capply it with a computer\u201d simply combines those two steps, with the same deficient result. Thus, if a patent\u2019s recitation of a computer amounts to a mere instruction to\u201cimplemen[t]\u201d an abstract idea \u201con . . . a computer,\u201d (\u2026) that addition cannot impart patent eligibility \u00bb. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-123\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 123\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-124\">S. Callahan, Alice: <a href=\"http:\/\/www.ndtexblog.com\/?p=3550\">The Death of Software-Related Patents?<\/a>, 1er mai 2015, qui rel\u00e8ve que depuis l\u2019arr\u00eat <em>Alice<\/em>, sur les 76 d\u00e9cisions dans des affaires similaires, 57 ont invalid\u00e9 les brevets concern\u00e9 (contre 16 les ayant valid\u00e9 au fond). V. par exemple <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bitlaw.com\/source\/cases\/patent\/Digitech.html\">Digitech Image Technologies, LLC v. Electronics for Imaging, Inc.<\/a> 758 F. 3d 1344 (2014) (informations g\u00e9n\u00e9r\u00e9es sur une image et m\u00e9thodes pour g\u00e9n\u00e9rer ces informations)\u00a0; buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc, 765 F.3d 1350 (2014) (syst\u00e8me de s\u00e9curisation de transactins \u00e9lectronique en ligne)\u00a0; <a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/DDR_Holdings_v._Hotels.com\">DDR Holdings v. Hotels.com<\/a>, 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (syst\u00e8me g\u00e9n\u00e9rant des pages web d\u2019e-commerce\u00a0); <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/versata-dev-grp-inc-v-sap-am-inc-2\">Versata v. SAP America,Inc.,<\/a> 793 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 115 U.S.P.Q.2d 1681 (plusieurs brevets dont un valid\u00e9).V. \u00e9galement T. Teska, (The unfortunate) future of software patents under 35 USC \u00a7 101 and \u00a7 112, 2016 Journal of High Technology Law, p. 394; D. Taylor, Down the Rabbit Hole: Who will stand up for software patents after Alice?, 68 Me. L. Rev. 217 (2016). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-124\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 124\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-125\">2014 Interim Guidance on subject Matter Eligibility, disponible sur le site de l\u2019USPTO (www.uspto.gov). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-125\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 125\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-126\"><a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/weisner-v-google-llc-7\">Weisner v. Google LLC<\/a>, 51 F.4th 1073, 1084 (Fed. Cir. 2022). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-126\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 126\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-127\"><a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/coop-entmt-v-kollective-tech\">Cooperative Entertainment, Inc. v. Kollective Technology, Inc.<\/a>, 50 F.4th 127 (Fed. Cir. 2022). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-127\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 127\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-128\"><a href=\"https:\/\/cafc.uscourts.gov\/opinions-orders\/20-2043.opinion.10-4-2021_1843694.pdf\">CosmoKey Solutions GmbH &amp; Co. KG v. Duo Security LLC<\/a>, 15 F.4th 1091 (Fed. Cir. 2021). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-128\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 128\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-129\"><a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/packet-intelligence-llc-v-netscout-sys-6\">Packet Intelligence LLC v. NetScout Systems, Inc.<\/a>, 965 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2020). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-129\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 129\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-130\"><a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/uniloc-usa-inc-v-lg-elecs-usa-inc-3\">Uniloc USA, Inc. v. LG Electronics USA, Inc.<\/a>, 957 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2020). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-130\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 130\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-131\"><a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/koninklijke-kpn-nv-v-gemalto-m2m-gmbh\">Koninklijke KPN N.V. v. Gemalto M2M Gmbh<\/a>, 942 F.3d 1143 (Fed. Cir. 2019). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-131\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 131\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-132\"><a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/cellspin-soft-inc-v-fitbit-inc-3\">Cellspin Soft, Inc. v. FitBit, Inc.<\/a>, 927 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2019). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-132\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 132\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-133\"><a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/sri-intl-inc-v-cisco-sys-inc-7\">SRI Int\u2019l, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc.<\/a>, 918 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2019), modified 930 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2019). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-133\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 133\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-134\"><a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/data-engine-techs-llc-v-google-llc\">Data Engine Techs. LLC v. Google LLC<\/a>, 906 F.3d 999 (Fed. Cir. 2018). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-134\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 134\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-135\"><a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/aatrix-software-inc-v-green-shades-software-inc-1\">Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc.<\/a>, 882 F.3d 1121 (Fed. Cir. 2018). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-135\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 135\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-136\"><a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/core-wireless-licensing-sarl-v-lg-elecs-inc-16\">Core Wireless Licensing v. LG Elecs., Inc.<\/a>, 880 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-136\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 136\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-137\"><a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/mcro-inc-v-bandai-namco-games-am-inc-1\">McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc.<\/a>, 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-137\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 137\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-138\"><a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/bascom-global-internet-servs-inc-v-att-mobility-llc-1\">Bascom Global Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&amp;T Mobility LLC<\/a>, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-138\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 138\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-139\"><a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/ddr-holdings-llc-v-hotelscom-lp\">DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P.<\/a>, 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-139\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 139\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-140\"><a style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\" href=\"https:\/\/cafc.uscourts.gov\/opinions-orders\/22-1222.OPINION.2-17-2023_2082526.pdf\">Hawk Tech. Sys., LLC v. Castle Retail, LLC<\/a>, 60 F.4th 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2023). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-140\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 140\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-141\"><a style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/intl-bus-machs-corp-v-zillow-grp-10\">Int\u2019l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. Zillow Group, Inc.<\/a>, 50 F.4th 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2022).<\/span><span style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\"> <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-141\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 141\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-142\"><a style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/in-re-killian-12\">In re Killian<\/a>, 45 F.4th 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2022). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-142\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 142\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-143\"><a style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/universal-secure-registry-llc-v-apple-inc-3\">Universal Secure Registry LLC v. Apple Inc.<\/a>, 10 F.4th 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2021). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-143\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 143\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-144\"><a style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\" href=\"https:\/\/law.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/appellate-courts\/cafc\/19-1506\/19-1506-2021-05-11.html\">Free Stream Media Corp. v. Alphonso Inc.<\/a>, 996 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2021). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-144\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 144\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-145\"><a style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/cxloyalty-inc-v-maritz-holdings-inc\">cxLoyalty, Inc. v. Maritz Holdings, Inc.<\/a>, 986 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2021). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-145\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 145\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-146\"><a style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/simio-llc-v-flexsim-software-prods-inc-2\">Simio, LLC v. FlexSim Software Products, Inc.<\/a>, 983 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2020). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-146\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 146\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-147\"><a style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/elec-commcn-techs-llc-v-shopperschoicecom-llc\">Electronic Commc\u2019n Tech., LLC v. ShoppersChoice.Com, LLC<\/a>, 958 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2020). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-147\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 147\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-148\"><a style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/bozeman-fin-llc-v-fed-reserve-bank-of-atlanta\">Bozeman Financial LLC v. Federal Reserve Bank<\/a>, 955 F.3d 971 (Fed. Cir. 2020). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-148\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 148\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-149\"><a style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/trading-techs-intl-inc-v-ibg-llc\">Trading Tech. Int\u2019l, Inc. v. IBG LLC<\/a>, 921 F.3d 1084 (Fed. Cir. 2019). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-149\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 149\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-150\"><a style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/chargepoint-inc-v-semaconnect-inc-1\">ChargePoint, Inc. v. SemaConnect, Inc.<\/a>, 920 F.3d 759 (Fed. Cir. 2019). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-150\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 150\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-151\"><a style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\" href=\"https:\/\/www.bitlaw.com\/source\/cases\/patent\/IV-Symantec.html\">Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp.<\/a>, 838 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2016). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-151\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 151\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-152\"><a style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/mortg-grader-inc-v-first-choice-loan-servs-inc\">Mortgage Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc.<\/a>, 811 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2016). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-152\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 152\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-153\"><a style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\" href=\"https:\/\/www.casemine.com\/judgement\/us\/5914fa4cadd7b049349a7444\">OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.<\/a>, 788 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2015). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-153\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 153\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-154\"><a style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/ultramercial-inc-v-hulu\">Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC<\/a>, 772 F.3d 709 (Fed. Cir. 2014). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-154\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 154\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-155\">V. <em>supra,<\/em> n\u00b0364. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-155\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 155\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-156\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.uspto.gov\/sites\/default\/files\/documents\/2024-AI-SMEUpdateExamples47-49.pdf\">Subject Matter Eligibility Examples<\/a>, July 2024. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-156\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 156\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-157\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.uspto.gov\/sites\/default\/files\/documents\/2024-AI-SMEUpdateExamples47-49.pdf\">Exemple 47<\/a>.  <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-157\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 157\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-158\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.uspto.gov\/sites\/default\/files\/documents\/2024-AI-SMEUpdateExamples47-49.pdf\">Exemple 48<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-158\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 158\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-159\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.uspto.gov\/sites\/default\/files\/documents\/2024-AI-SMEUpdateExamples47-49.pdf\">Exemple 49<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-159\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 159\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-160\">V. <em>infra<\/em>, n\u00b0390. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-160\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 160\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-161\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.uspto.gov\/sites\/default\/files\/documents\/ieg-sme_crt_dec.xlsx\">Chart of Subject Matter Eligibility Court Decisions<\/a> (updated October 17, 2019). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-161\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 161\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-162\"><a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/573\/208\/\">573 U.S. __<\/a>, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 110 U.S.P.Q.2d 1976 (2014) . <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-162\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 162\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-163\"><a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/569\/576\/\">569 U.S. __<\/a>, 133 S. Ct. 2107, 106 U.S.P.Q.2d 1972 (2013). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-163\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 163\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-164\"><a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/561\/593\/\">561 U.S. 593<\/a>, 95 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001 (2010). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-164\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 164\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-165\"><a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/447\/303\/\">447 U.S. 303<\/a>, 206 U.S.P.Q. 193 (1980). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-165\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 165\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-166\"><a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/450\/175\/\">50 U.S. 175<\/a>, 209 U.S.P.Q. 1 (1981). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-166\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 166\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-167\"><a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/261\/45\/\">261 U.S. 45<\/a> (1923). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-167\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 167\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-168\"><a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/333\/127\/\">333 U.S. 127<\/a>, 131 (1948). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-168\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 168\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-169\"><a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/409\/63\/\">409 U.S. 63<\/a>, 175 U.S.P.Q. 673 (1972) . <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-169\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 169\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-170\"><a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/306\/86\/\">306 U.S. 86<\/a>, 40 U.S.P.Q. 199 (1939) . <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-170\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 170\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-171\"><a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/566\/66\/\">566 U.S. __<\/a>, 132 S. Ct. 1289, 101 U.S.P.Q.2d 1961 (2012) . <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-171\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 171\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-172\"><a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/437\/584\/\">437 U.S. 584<\/a>, 198 U.S.P.Q. 193 (1978) . <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-172\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 172\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-173\"><a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/102\/707\/\">102 U.S. 707<\/a> (1881) . <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-173\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 173\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-174\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/101\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 101<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-174\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 174\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-175\">V. sur ce point <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/abbvie-inc-v-mathilda-terence-kennedy-inst-of-rheumatology-trust\">AbbVie Inc. v. Mathilda and Terence Kennedy Institute of Rheumatology<\/a>, 764 F.3d 1366, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2014) : \u00ab While often described as a court-created doctrine, obviousness-type double patenting is grounded in the text of the Patent Act. See In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887, 892 (Fed.Cir.1985); see also Boehringer Ingelheim Int'l. GmbH v. Barr Labs., Inc., 592 F.3d 1340, 1346 (Fed.Cir.2010); Eli Lilly &amp; Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 967 (Fed.Cir.2001). Section 101 reads: \u201cWhoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, ... may obtain a patent therefor.\u201d 35 U.S.C. \u00a7 101 (emphasis added). Thus, \u00a7 101 forbids an individual from obtaining more than one patent on the same invention, i.e., double patenting. As this court has explained, \u201ca rejection based upon double patenting of the obviousness type\u201d is \u201cgrounded in public policy (a policy reflected in the patent statute).\u201d Longi, 759 F.2d at 892.\r\n\r\nThe courts have recognized this principle since the inception of our patent laws. In 1819, Justice Story explained, \u201cIt cannot be, that a patentee can have in use at the same time two valid patents for the same invention; and if he can successively take out at different times new patents for the same invention, he may perpetuate his exclusive right during a century.... If this proceeding could obtain countenance, it would completely destroy the whole consideration derived by the public for the grant of the patent, [ ] the right to use the invention at the expiration of the term specified in the original grant.\u201d Odiorne v. Amesbury Nail Factory, 18 F. Cas. 578, 579 (C.C.D.Mass.1819). The Supreme Court has reaffirmed the prohibition on double patenting on multiple occasions.\u00a0<em>See\u00a0Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co.,<\/em>\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/singer-mfg-co-v-june-mfg-co#p185\">163 U.S. 169, 185<\/a>,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/singer-mfg-co-v-june-mfg-co\">16 S.Ct. 1002<\/a>,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/singer-mfg-co-v-june-mfg-co\">41 L.Ed. 118<\/a>\u00a0(1896) (\u201cIt is self-evident that on the expiration of a patent the monopoly created by it ceases to exist, and the right to make the thing formerly covered by the patent becomes public property. It is upon this condition that the patent is granted.\u201d);\u00a0<em>Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co.,<\/em>\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/miller-v-eagle-manufacturing-co#p197\">151 U.S. 186, 197\u201398<\/a>,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/miller-v-eagle-manufacturing-co\">14 S.Ct. 310<\/a>,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/miller-v-eagle-manufacturing-co\">38 L.Ed. 121<\/a>\u00a0(1894);\u00a0<em>Suffolk Co. v. Hayden,<\/em>\u00a070 U.S. (3 Wall.) 315, 319, 18 L.Ed. 76 (1865). As this court recently reminded, \u201c[t]he bar against double patenting was created to preserve that bargained-for right held by the public.\u201d\u00a0<em>Gilead Scis., Inc. v. Natco Pharma Ltd.,<\/em>\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/gilead-scis-3#p1212\">753 F.3d 1208, 1212<\/a>\u00a0(Fed.Cir.2014);\u00a0<em>see also\u00a0Boehringer,<\/em>\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/boehringer-ingelheim-v-barr-labor#p1346\">592 F.3d at 1346<\/a>;\u00a0<em>Longi,<\/em>\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/longi-in-re-2#p892\">759 F.2d at 892<\/a>;\u00a0<em>In re\u00a0<\/em>\u00a0<em>Robeson,<\/em>\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/application-of-robeson\">51 CCPA 1271<\/a>,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/application-of-robeson#p614\">331 F.2d 610, 614<\/a>\u00a0(1964). The ban on double patenting ensures that the public gets the benefit of the invention after the original period of monopoly expires.\u00bb <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-175\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 175\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-176\">\"La demande de brevet ne peut concerner qu'une invention ou une pluralit\u00e9 d'inventions li\u00e9es entre elles de telle sorte qu'elles ne forment qu'un seul concept inventif g\u00e9n\u00e9ral\". <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-176\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 176\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-177\">V. <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/abbvie-inc-v-mathilda-terence-kennedy-inst-of-rheumatology-trust\">AbbVie Inc.<\/a>, 764 F.3d, p. 1372 ; <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/in-re-hubbell-3\">In re Hubbell<\/a>, 709 F.3d 1140, 1145 (Fed. Cir. 2013); <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/longi-in-re-2\">In re Longi<\/a>, 759 F.2d 887, 892 (Fed. Cir. 1985). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-177\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 177\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-178\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/121\">35. U.S.C. \u00a7 121<\/a>:<em> \"<\/em>If two or more independent and distinct inventions are claimed in one application, the Director may require the application to be restricted to one of the inventions. If the other invention is made the subject of a divisional application which complies with the requirements of section 120 [claiming benefit of priority] it shall be entitled to the benefit of the filing date of the original application. A patent issuing on an application with respect to which a requirement for restriction under this section has been made, or on an application filed as a result of such a requirement, shall not be used as a reference either in the Patent and Trademark Office or in the courts against a divisional application or against the original application or any patent issued on either of them, if the divisional application is filed before the issuance of the patent on the other application. The validity of a patent shall not be questioned for failure of the Director to require the application to be restricted to one invention\". <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-178\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 178\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-179\">Ainsi la connaissance ou l\u2019utilisation de l\u2019invention en dehors des \u00c9tats-Unis uniquement ne pouvait ant\u00e9rioriser l\u2019invention aux termes de <a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/102\">35\u00a0U.S.C. 102(a)<\/a>. <em>In re Ekenstam<\/em>, 256 F.2d 321, 118 USPQ 349 (CCPA 1958). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-179\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 179\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-180\">Cette r\u00e8gle est similaire \u00e0 celle pos\u00e9e par l\u2019article L.611-11 alin\u00e9a 3 du Cpi et par l\u2019article 54(3) de la CBE 2000. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-180\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 180\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-181\">L\u2019America Invents Act met fin sur ce point (sous r\u00e9serve des r\u00e8gles transitoires) \u00e0 la jurisprudence qui, pour ces demandes, ignorait la date de priorit\u00e9 et ne prenait en compte que la date du d\u00e9p\u00f4t aux \u00c9tats-Unis. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-181\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 181\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-182\"><a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/invitrogen-corp-v-biocrest-mfg-lp-2\">Invitrogen Corp. v. Biocrest Manufacturing L.P.<\/a>, 424 F.3d 1374, 76 USPQ2d 1741 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Egalement, Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333, 336 (1881): \u201c[T]o constitute the public use of an invention it is not necessary that more than one of the patent articles should be publicly used. The use of a great number may tend to strengthen the proof, but one well defined case of such use is just as effectual to annul the patent as many.\u201d <em>Allied Colloids, Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co.,<\/em>\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/allied-colloids-inc-v-american-cyanamid-co#p1574\">64 F.3d 1570, 1574<\/a> (Fed. Cir. 1995). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-182\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 182\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-183\"><a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/application-of-blaisdell\">In re Blaisdell<\/a>, 242 F.2d 779, 783, 113 USPQ 289, 292 (CCPA 1957); <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/hall-v-macneale\">Hall v. Macneale<\/a>, 107 U.S. 90, 96-97 (1882); Ex parte Kuklo, 25 USPQ2d 1387, 1390 (Bd. Pat. App. &amp; Inter. 1992). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-183\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 183\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-184\"><a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/smith-in-re-9\">In re Smith<\/a>, 714 F.2d 1127, 1134, 218 USPQ 976, 983 (Fed. Cir. 1983); <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/moleculon-research-corp-v-cbs-inc-2\">Moleculon Research Corp. v. CBS, Inc.<\/a>, 793 F.2d 1261, 1265, 229 USPQ 805, 809 (Fed. Cir. 1986); <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/104\/333\/\">Egbert v. Lippmann<\/a>, 104 U.S. 333, 336 (1881). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-184\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 184\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-185\">Lindholm, Stephen Bruce, Revisiting the On-Sale Bar after Pfaff. disponible sur SSRN: <a href=\"https:\/\/ssrn.com\/abstract=656243.%5b\/footnote\">https:\/\/ssrn.com\/abstract=656243<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-185\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 185\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-186\"><a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/525\/55\/\">Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc.<\/a>, 525 U.S. 55 (1998): \"The on-sale bar applies when two conditions are satisfied before the critical date. First, the product must be the subject of a commercial offer for sale. Here, the acceptance of the purchase order prior to April 8, 1981, makes it clear that such an offer had been made, and there is no question that the sale was commercial. Second, the invention must be ready for patenting. That condition may be satisfied in at least two ways: by proof of reduction to practice before the critical date; or by proof that prior to the critical date the inventor had prepared drawings or other descriptions of the invention that were sufficiently specific to enable a person skilled in the art to practice the invention. This condition is satisfied here because the drawings sent to the manufacturer before the critical date fully disclosed the invention\". <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-186\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 186\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-187\">V. <a href=\"https:\/\/law.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/appellate-courts\/F3\/275\/1040\/592286\/\">Linear Tech. Corp. v. Micrel, Inc.<\/a>, 275 F.3d 1040 (Fed. Cir. 2001); <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/group-one-ltd-v-hallmark-cards-inc-2\">Group One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc.<\/a>, 254 F.3d 1041 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (\"As a general proposition, we will look to the Uniform Commercial Code (\u2018UCC\u2019) to define whether \u2026 a communication or series of communications rises to the level of a commercial offer for sale.\"). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-187\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 187\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-188\">\"[A] communication that fails to constitute a definite offer to sell the product and to include material terms is not an \u2018offer\u2019 in the contract sense.\" <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/elan-corp-v-andrx-pharmaceuticals-inc\">Elan Corp., PLC v. Andrx Pharms. Inc.<\/a>, 366 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2004). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-188\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 188\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-189\"><a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/in-re-caveney\">In re Caveney<\/a>, 761 F.2d 671 (Fed. Cir. 1985). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-189\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 189\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-190\"><a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/in-re-kollar-2\">In re Kollar<\/a>, 286 F.3d 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2002). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-190\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 190\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-191\"><a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/strong-v-general-electric-company-2\">Strong v. General Elec. Co.<\/a>, 434 F.2d 1042 (5th Cir. 1970). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-191\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 191\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-192\"><a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/94\/92\/\">Consolidated Fruit-Jar Co. v. Wright<\/a>, 94 U.S. 92 (1876); <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/atlantic-thermoplastics-co-v-faytex-corp-2\">Atlantic Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp.<\/a>, 970 F.2d 834 (Fed. Cir. 1992). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-192\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 192\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-193\"><a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/307\/5\/\">Electric Storage Battery Co. v. Shimadzu<\/a>, 307 U.S. 5 (1939); <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/application-of-blaisdell\">In re Blaisdell<\/a>, 242 F.2d 779 (CCPA 1957); <a href=\"https:\/\/law.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/district-courts\/FSupp\/469\/801\/1582273\/\">CTS Corp. v. Electro Materials Corp. of America<\/a>, 469 F. Supp. 801, 819, 202 USPQ 22, 38 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-193\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 193\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-194\"><a href=\"https:\/\/cdn.patentlyo.com\/media\/2024\/08\/22-1827.OPINION.8-12-2024_23654021.pdf\"><em>Celanese Intl. Corp. v. Intl. Trade Comm\u2019n<\/em><\/a>,\u00a0 22-01827 (Fed. Cir. August 12, 2024). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-194\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 194\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-195\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.uspto.gov\/web\/offices\/pac\/mpep\/s2152.html\">MPEP \u00a7 2152.02(e)<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-195\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 195\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-196\"><a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/in-re-cronyn\">In re Cronyn<\/a>, 890 F.2d 1158, 13 USPQ2d 1070 (Fed. Cir. 1989); <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/in-re-hall-12\">In re Hall<\/a>, 781 F.2d 897, 228 USPQ 453 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (\"that competent evidence of the general library practice may be relied upon to establish an approximate time when a thesis became accessible\"); <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/application-of-bayer\">In re Bayer<\/a>, 568 F.2d 1357, 196 USPQ 670 (CCPA 1978): une \u00a0th\u00e8se conserv\u00e9e, mais ni mise en rayon, ni catalogu\u00e9e, dans une biblioth\u00e8que universitaire n'est pas accessible au public; <a href=\"https:\/\/www.uspto.gov\/web\/offices\/pac\/mpep\/s2128.html\">MPEP \u00a7 2128.01<\/a>, I. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-196\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 196\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-197\"><a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/in-re-klopfenstein\">In re Klopfenstein<\/a>, 380 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2004): \"In October 1998, the appellants, along with colleague M. Liu, presented a printed slide presentation (...) at a meeting of the American Association of Cereal Chemists (\"AACC\"). The fourteen-slide presentation was printed and pasted onto poster boards. The printed slide presentation was displayed continuously for two and a half days at the AACC meeting. (...) Both parties agree that the Liu reference presented (...)\u00a0 disclosed every limitation of the invention disclosed in the '950 patent application. Furthermore, at neither presentation was there a disclaimer or notice to the intended audience prohibiting note-taking or copying of the presentation.\" ; <a href=\"https:\/\/law.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/appellate-courts\/F2\/774\/1104\/10468\/\">Massachusetts Institute of Technology v. AB Fortia<\/a>, 774 F.2d 1104 (Fed. Cir. 1985): \"The Birmingham paper was orally presented by Dr. Levine of the MIT group to the First International Cell Culture Congress in Birmingham, Alabama, September 21-25, 1975. The conference was attended by 50 to 500 cell culturists. Prior to the conference Dr. Levine gave a copy of the paper to the head of the conference. Afterward, copies were distributed on request, without any restrictions, to as many as six persons, more than one year before the filing date of the '534 and '654 patents\"; <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/jazz-pharms-inc-v-amneal-pharms-llc-1\">Jazz Pharm., Inc. v. Amneal Pharm., LLC<\/a>, 895 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2018), <a href=\"https:\/\/www.uspto.gov\/web\/offices\/pac\/mpep\/s2128.html\">MPEP \u00a7 2128.01<\/a>, IV. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-197\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 197\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-198\"><a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/in-re-wyer\">In re Wyer<\/a>, 655 F.2d 221 (CCPA 1981); <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/bruckelmyer-v-ground-heaters-inc\">Bruckelmyer v. Ground Heaters, Inc.<\/a>, 445 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2006): dessins dans le dossier de brevet, accessibles au public. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-198\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 198\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-199\"><a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/voter-verified-inc-v-premier-election-solutions-inc\">Voter Verified, Inc. v. Premier Election Solutions<\/a>, Inc., 698 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ; <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/in-re-lister-2\">In re Lister<\/a>, 583 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2009): archive accessible sur une base de donn\u00e9es en ligne; mais v. <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/sri-intl-v-internet-sec\">SRI Int'l, Inc. v. Internet Sec. Sys., Inc.<\/a>, 511 F.3d (Fed. Cir. 2008): document sur un site FTP, mais non catalogu\u00e9 ni index\u00e9. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-199\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 199\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-200\">V. MPEP, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.uspto.gov\/web\/offices\/pac\/mpep\/s2153.html\">\u00a7 2153.01(a)<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-200\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 200\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-201\">\u00ab A disclosure made 1 year or less before the effective filing date of a claimed invention shall not be prior art to the claimed invention under subsection (a)(1) if(A) the disclosure was made by the inventor or joint inventor or by another who obtained the subject matter disclosed directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor; or (B) the subject matter disclosed had, before such disclosure, been publicly disclosed by the inventor or a joint inventor or another who obtained the subject matter disclosed directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor<em> \u00bb.<\/em> <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-201\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 201\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-202\">V. <em>infra, <\/em>n\u00b0388.[footnote].\r\n\r\nUne d\u00e9claration peut \u00eatre jointe \u00e0 la demande permettant d'\u00e9tablir qu'une divulgation est bien couverte par le d\u00e9lai de gr\u00e2ce. Le d\u00e9lai de gr\u00e2ce d'un an pr\u00e9vu est prolong\u00e9 jusqu'au jour ouvrable suivant s'il expire un samedi, un dimanche ou un jour f\u00e9ri\u00e9 f\u00e9d\u00e9ral[footnote]<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/21\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 21(b)<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-202\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 202\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-203\">\u00ab Une personne aura droit \u00e0 un brevet \u00e0 moins: (...) (2) que l\u2019invention revendiqu\u00e9e soit d\u00e9crite dans un brevet d\u00e9livr\u00e9 en application de la section 151, ou dans une demande de brevet publi\u00e9e ou pr\u00e9sum\u00e9e publi\u00e9e en application de la section 122(b), dans laquelle le brevet ou la demande, selon le cas, d\u00e9signe un autre inventeur et a \u00e9t\u00e9 effectivement d\u00e9pos\u00e9e avant la date effective de d\u00e9p\u00f4t de l\u2019invention revendiqu\u00e9e \u00bb. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-203\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 203\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-204\"><\/span><span style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\">\u00ab A disclosure shall not be prior art to a claimed invention under subsection (a)(2) if (A)the subject matter disclosed was obtained directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor; (B)the subject matter disclosed had, before such subject matter was effectively filed under subsection (a)(2), been publicly disclosed by the inventor or a joint inventor or another who obtained the subject matter disclosed directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor; or (C)the subject matter disclosed and the claimed invention, not later than the effective filing date of the claimed invention, were owned by the same person or subject to an obligation of assignment to the same person<\/span><em style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\"> \u00bb.<\/em><span style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\"> <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-204\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 204\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-205\"><\/span><a style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\" href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/103\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 103<\/a><span style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\">. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-205\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 205\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-206\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/287\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 287(c)<\/a>. <em>\u00ab\u00a0<\/em>The term \u201cmedical activity\u201d means the performance of a medical or surgical procedure on a body, but shall not include (i) the use of a patented machine, manufacture, or composition of matter in violation of such patent, (ii) the practice of a patented use of a composition of matter in violation of such patent, or (iii) the practice of a process in violation of a biotechnology patent.<em>\u00a0\u00bb<\/em> <em>Ibid.<\/em> <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-206\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 206\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-207\"><a href=\"https:\/\/law.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/appellate-courts\/F2\/945\/1173\/289654\/\">Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Renishaw PLC<\/a>, 945 F.2d 1173, 20 USPQ2d 1094 (Fed. Cir. 1991) <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-207\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 207\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-208\">V. <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/383\/519\/\">Brenner v. Manson<\/a>, 383 U.S. 519, 529, 148 USPQ 689, 693 (1966) (relevant la difficult\u00e9 de d\u00e9finir le concept). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-208\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 208\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-209\"><a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/in-re-fisher-6\"><em>In re<\/em> Fisher<\/a>, 421 F.3d 1365, 1371, 76 USPQ2d 1225, 1230 (Fed. Cir. 2005). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-209\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 209\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-210\"><em>Ibid<\/em>\u00a0: <em>\u00ab<\/em> [A]n application must show that an invention is useful to the public as disclosed in its current form, not that it may prove useful at some future date after further research. Simply put, to satisfy the \u2018substantial\u2019 utility requirement, an asserted use must show that the claimed invention has a significant and presently available benefit to the public<em> \u00bb.<\/em> <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-210\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 210\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-211\"><a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/brooktree-corp-v-advanced-micro-devices\">Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.<\/a>, 977 F.2d 1555, 1571, 24 USPQ2d 1401, 1412 (Fed. Cir. 1992). V. \u00e9galement <a href=\"https:\/\/law.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/appellate-courts\/F2\/620\/1247\/394447\/\">E.I. du Pont De Nemours and Co. v. Berkley and Co.<\/a>, 620 F.2d 1247, 1260 n.17, 205 USPQ 1, 10 n.17 (8th Cir. 1980) (\u00abA small degree of utility is sufficient (\u2026). The claimed invention must only be capable of performing some beneficial function (\u2026). An invention does not lack utility merely because the particular embodiment disclosed in the patent lacks perfection or performs crudely (\u2026). A commercially successful product is not required (\u2026). Nor is it essential that the invention accomplish all its intended functions (\u2026) or operate under all conditions (\u2026) partial success being sufficient to demonstrate patentable utility (\u2026). In short, the defense of non-utility cannot be sustained without proof of total incapacity<em>.\u00a0\u00bb, <\/em>cit\u00e9 dans le MPEP, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.uspto.gov\/web\/offices\/pac\/mpep\/s2107.html\">\u00a7 2107.01<\/a>). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-211\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 211\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-212\">V. MPEP, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.uspto.gov\/web\/offices\/pac\/mpep\/s2107.html\">\u00a7 2107.03<\/a>: \u00ab As a general matter, evidence of pharmacological or other biological activity of a compound will be relevant to an asserted therapeutic use if there is a reasonable correlation between the activity in question and the asserted utility. Cross v. Iizuka, 753 F.2d 1040, 224 USPQ 739 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re Jolles, 628 F.2d 1322, 206 USPQ 885 (CCPA 1980); Nelson v. Bowler, 626 F.2d 853, 206 USPQ 881 (CCPA 1980). An applicant can establish this reasonable correlation by relying on statistically relevant data documenting the activity of a compound or composition, arguments or reasoning, documentary evidence (e.g., articles in scientific journals), or any combination thereof. The applicant does not have to prove that a correlation exists between a particular activity and an asserted therapeutic use of a compound as a matter of statistical certainty, nor does he or she have to provide actual evidence of success in treating humans where such a utility is asserted. Instead, as the courts have repeatedly held, all that is required is a reasonable correlation between the activity and the asserted use. Nelson v. Bowler, 626 F.2d 853, 857, 206 USPQ 881, 884 (CCPA 1980) \u00bb. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-212\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 212\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-213\">\u00ab A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made<em> \u00bb.<\/em> <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-213\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 213\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-214\"><a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/383\/1\/\">Graham v. John Deere Co.<\/a>, 383 U.S. 1 (1966). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-214\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 214\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-215\">383 U.S., 17-18. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-215\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 215\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-216\"><a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/550\/398\/\"><em>KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc. (KSR)<\/em><\/a><em>, <\/em>550 U.S. 398, 82 USPQ2d 1385 (2007). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-216\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 216\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-217\">Pub. L. No. 104-41; B. Alley, <a href=\"https:\/\/digitalcommons.law.uga.edu\/jipl\/vol12\/iss1\/8\">The Biotechnology Process Patent Act of 1995: Providing Unresolved and Unrecognized Dilemmas in U.S. Patent Law<\/a>, 12 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 229 (2004). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-217\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 217\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-218\">Le proc\u00e9d\u00e9 \u00e9tait d\u00e9fini comme suit par 35 U.S.C. \u00a7 103(b):<em> \u00ab <\/em>\u201cbiotechnological process\u201d means (A) a process of genetically altering or otherwise inducing a single- or multi-celled organism to(i) express an exogenous nucleotide sequence, (ii) inhibit, eliminate, augment, or alter expression of an endogenous nucleotide sequence, or (iii) express a specific physiological characteristic not naturally associated with said organism; (B) cell fusion procedures yielding a cell line that expresses a specific protein, such as a mono-clonal antibody; and (C) a method of using a product produced by a process defined by subparagraph (A) or (B), or a combination of subparagraphs (A) and (B).<em> \u00bb <\/em> <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-218\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 218\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-219\">Le texte pr\u00e9voyait que les deux brevets expirent \u00e0 la m\u00eame date. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-219\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 219\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-220\">V. USPTO, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.uspto.gov\/patents\/basics\/apply\/utility-patent\">A Guide to Filing a Utility Patent Application<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-220\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 220\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-221\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/part-II\/chapter-11\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 111(a)(1)<\/a>. Les coinventeurs doivent demander un brevet conjointement (<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/part-II\/chapter-11\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 116<\/a>, qui traite \u00e9galement des relations entre coinventeurs). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-221\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 221\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-222\"><a href=\"https:\/\/uscode.house.gov\/view.xhtml?req=(title:35%20section:118%20edition:prelim)\">35 USC 118<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-222\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 222\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-223\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/111\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 111(a)(2)<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-223\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 223\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-224\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/part-II\/chapter-11\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 112<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-224\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 224\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-225\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/part-II\/chapter-11\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 115<\/a>. 37 C.F.R. \u00a7 1.64. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-225\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 225\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-226\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/part-II\/chapter-11\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 111<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-226\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 226\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-227\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/cfr\/text\/37\/1.53\">37 C.F.R. \u00a7 1.53(b)<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-227\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 227\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-228\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/cfr\/text\/37\/1.53\">37 C.F.R. \u00a7 1.53(f)<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-228\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 228\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-229\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/part-II\/chapter-11\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 111(b)<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-229\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 229\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-230\">Une conversion de la demande provisoire en demande d\u00e9finitive peut \u00e9galement \u00eatre demand\u00e9e, mais qui fait perdre le b\u00e9n\u00e9fice de la premi\u00e8re date de d\u00e9p\u00f4t. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-230\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 230\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-231\">V. <em>supra<\/em>, n\u00b0378. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-231\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 231\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-232\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/part-II\/chapter-11\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 121<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-232\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 232\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-233\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/part-II\/chapter-11\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 120<\/a><span style=\"background-color: #ffff00;\"><span style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\"> (Benefit of earlier filing date in the United States): \"An application for patent for an invention disclosed in the manner provided by section 112(a) (other than the requirement to disclose the best mode) in an application previously filed in the United States, or as provided by section 363 or 385, which names an inventor or joint inventor in the previously filed application shall have the same effect, as to such invention, as though filed on the date of the prior application, if filed before the patenting or abandonment of or termination of proceedings on the first application or on an application similarly entitled to the benefit of the filing date of the first application and if it contains or is amended to contain a specific reference to the earlier filed application. No application shall be entitled to the benefit of an earlier filed application under this section unless an amendment containing the specific reference to the earlier filed application is submitted at such time during the pendency of the application as required by the Director. The Director may consider the failure to submit such an amendment within that time period as a waiver of any benefit under this section. The Director may establish procedures, including the requirement for payment of the fee specified in section 41(a)(7), to accept an unintentionally delayed submission of an amendment under this section\".<\/span><\/span> <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-233\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 233\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-234\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/part-II\/chapter-11\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 120<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-234\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 234\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-235\">Comp. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.epo.org\/fr\/legal\/epc\/2020\/a123.html\">CBE, art. 123<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-235\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 235\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-236\">Le MPEP pr\u00e9cise que \"<\/span>Pursuant to\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.uspto.gov\/web\/offices\/pac\/mpep\/mpep-9015-appx-l.html#d0e302926\">35 U.S.C. 119(a)<\/a>, the foreign application must have been filed by the same applicant as the applicant in the United States, or by applicant's legal representatives or assigns. Consistent with longstanding Office policy, this is interpreted to mean that the U.S. and foreign applications must name the same inventor or have at least one joint inventor in common\" <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-236\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 236\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-237\">Une d\u00e9claration peut cependant \u00eatre fournie si l'inventeur est d\u00e9c\u00e9d\u00e9, incapable, a refus\u00e9 de signer le serment ou la d\u00e9claration ou ne peut pas \u00eatre retrouv\u00e9 ou joint \u00e0 la suite de d\u00e9marches diligentes: <a href=\"https:\/\/www.uspto.gov\/web\/offices\/pac\/mpep\/mpep-9020-appx-r.html#aia_d0e319924\">37 CFR 1.64<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-237\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 237\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-238\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/18\/1001\">18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1001<\/a>:\"(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States, knowingly and willfully: (1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact; (2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation; or (3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry; shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years (...)\". <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-238\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 238\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-239\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.uspto.gov\/web\/offices\/pac\/mpep\/mpep-9015-appx-l.html#d0e302367313\">35 U.S.C. 100(f)<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-239\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 239\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-240\">\u201cThe threshold question in determining inventorship is who conceived the invention. Unless a person contributes to the conception of the invention, he is not an inventor. \u2026 Insofar as defining an inventor is concerned, reduction to practice, <i>per se,<\/i>\u00a0is irrelevant [except for simultaneous conception and reduction to practice,\u00a0<i>Fiers v. Revel,<\/i>\u00a0984 F.2d 1164, 1168, 25\u00a0USPQ2d 1601, 1604-05 (Fed. Cir. 1993)]. One must contribute to the conception to be an inventor.\u201d\u00a0<i>In re Hardee,<\/i> 223 USPQ 1122, 1123 (Comm\u2019r Pat. 1984), extrait du MPEP, qui cite \u00e9galement <i>In re VerHoef,<\/i> 888 F.3d 1362, 1366-67, 126 F.2d 1561, 1564-65 (Fed. Cir. 2018); <i>Board of Education ex rel. Board of Trustees of Florida State Univ. v. American Bioscience Inc.,<\/i> 333 F.3d 1330, 1340, 67 USPQ2d 1252, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (\u201cInvention requires conception.\u201d\u00a0 V. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.uspto.gov\/web\/offices\/pac\/mpep\/s2138.html#d0e207607\">MPEP \u00a7\u00a02138.04<\/a>\u00a0-\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.uspto.gov\/web\/offices\/pac\/mpep\/s2138.html#d0e207753\">\u00a7 2138.05<\/a> pour la question des preuves \u00e0 fournir. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-240\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 240\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-241\"><a style=\"font-size: 1em;\" href=\"https:\/\/www.uspto.gov\/web\/offices\/pac\/mpep\/mpep-9015-appx-l.html#d0e302886912\">35 U.S.C. 116<\/a><span style=\"font-size: 1em;\">. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-241\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 241\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-242\">V. <a style=\"font-size: 1em;\" href=\"https:\/\/www.uspto.gov\/web\/offices\/pac\/mpep\/s2109.html\">MPEP, \u00a7 2109<\/a>: \"The Patent statute is replete with language indicating that an inventor is a natural person. For example, as noted <i>supra<\/i>,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.uspto.gov\/web\/offices\/pac\/mpep\/mpep-9015-appx-l.html#d0e302367313\">35 U.S.C. 100(f)<\/a>\u00a0defines the term \u201cinventor\u201d as \u201cthe individual or, if a joint invention, the individuals collectively who invented or discovered the subject matter of the invention.\u201d\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.uspto.gov\/web\/offices\/pac\/mpep\/mpep-9015-appx-l.html#d0e302376\">35 U.S.C. 101<\/a>\u00a0also provides \u201c[w]hoever\u00a0invents or discovers\u2026may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.\u201d (emphasis added). Additionally,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.uspto.gov\/web\/offices\/pac\/mpep\/mpep-9015-appx-l.html#al_d1d85b_11e72_2ee\">35 U.S.C. 102(a)<\/a>\u00a0states, \u201cA\u00a0person\u00a0shall be entitled to a patent unless\u2026\u201d (emphasis added).\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.uspto.gov\/web\/offices\/pac\/mpep\/mpep-9015-appx-l.html#al_d1d85b_2ae86_22c\">35 U.S.C. 115(b)(2)<\/a> further provides, in pertinent part, \u201c[a]n oath or declaration under subsection (a) shall contain statements that\u2026such individual believes himself or herself to be the original inventor or an original joint inventor of a claimed invention in the application\u201d (emphasis added)\". <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-242\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 242\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-243\"><span style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em;\">Univ. of Utah v. Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Forderung der Wissenschaften E.V., 734 F.3d 1315, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (\u201c[I]nventors must be natural persons and cannot be corporations or sovereigns.\u201d); Beech Aircraft Corp. v. EDO Corp., 990 F.2d 1237, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (\u201c[O]nly natural persons can be \u2018inventors.\u2019\u201d) cit\u00e9s in <a href=\"https:\/\/cafc.uscourts.gov\/opinions-orders\/21-2347.OPINION.8-5-2022_1988142.pdf\">Thaler v. Vidal<\/a>, ci dessous. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-243\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 243\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-244\"><a href=\"https:\/\/cafc.uscourts.gov\/opinions-orders\/21-2347.OPINION.8-5-2022_1988142.pdf\">Thaler v. Vidal<\/a>, <em>43 F.4th 1207 (Fed. Cir. 2022), cert denied, 143 S. Ct. 1783 (2023).<\/em> <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-244\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 244\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-245\">V. nos d\u00e9veloppements <em>supra<\/em>, n\u00b0312. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-245\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 245\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-246\"><em><a href=\"https:\/\/www.federalregister.gov\/documents\/2024\/02\/13\/2024-02623\/inventorship-guidance-for-ai-assisted-inventions\">Inventorship Guidance for AI-assisted Inventions<\/a>, Docket n\u00b0\u00a0 PTO-P-2023-0043; <\/em>qui\u00a0s'ajoutent \u00e0 celles d\u00e9j\u00e0 publi\u00e9es en mati\u00e8re de copyright par le Copyright Office le 10\u00a0mai 2023 <em>(V. P. Kamina, Comm. com. \u00e9lectr. 2023, comm. 29).<\/em> <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-246\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 246\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-247\"><a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/pannu-v-iolab-corp\">Pannu v.\u00a0Iolab<\/a> <em>Corp<\/em>., 155 F.3d 1344, 1351 <em>(Fed. Cir. 1998)<\/em> <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-247\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 247\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-248\">MPEP, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.uspto.gov\/web\/offices\/pac\/mpep\/s2161.html\">\u00a7 2161.01<\/a>: <em>\u00ab\u00a0<\/em>The function of the written description requirement is to ensure that the inventor had possession of, as of the filing date of the application relied on, the specific subject matter later claimed by him or her; how the specification accomplishes this is not material. In re Herschler, 591 F.2d 693, 700-01, 200 USPQ 711, 717 (CCPA 1979) and further reiterated in In re Kaslow, 707 F.2d 1366, 707 F.2d 1366, 217 USPQ 1089 (Fed. Cir. 1983)\u00a0\u00bb. Ibid., \u00a7 2103: \u00ab\u00a0For the written description requirement, an applicant\u2019s specification must reasonably convey to those skilled in the art that the applicant was in possession of the claimed invention as of the date of invention<em>\u00a0\u00bb.<\/em> <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-248\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 248\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-249\">MPEP, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.uspto.gov\/web\/offices\/pac\/mpep\/s2103.html\">\u00a7 2103<\/a>: <em>\u00ab\u00a0<\/em>An applicant\u2019s specification must enable a person skilled in the art to make and use the claimed inven\u00adtion without undue experimentation. The fact that experimentation is complex, however, will not make it undue if a person of skill in the art typically engages in such complex experimentation.\u00a0\u00bb Ibid., \u00a7 2161.01: \u00ab\u00a0When basing a rejection on the failure of the appli\u00adcant\u2019s disclosure to meet the enablement provisions of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112, USPTO person\u00adnel must establish on the record a reasonable basis for questioning the adequacy of the disclosure to enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to make and use the claimed invention without resorting to undue experi\u00admentation. See In re Brown, 477 F.2d 946, 177 USPQ 691 (CCPA 1973); In re Ghiron, 442 F.2d 985, 169 USPQ 723 (CCPA 1971). Once USPTO personnel have advanced a reasonable basis for questioning the adequacy of the disclosure, it becomes incumbent on the applicant to rebut that challenge and factually demonstrate that his or her application disclosure is in fact sufficient. See In re Doyle, 482 F.2d 1385, 1392, 179 USPQ 227, 232 (CCPA 1973); In re Scarbrough, 500 F.2d 560, 566, 182 USPQ 298, 302 (CCPA 1974); In re Ghiron, supra.\u00a0<em>\u00bb <\/em> <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-249\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 249\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-250\">MPEP, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.uspto.gov\/web\/offices\/pac\/mpep\/s2165.html\">\u00a7 2165<\/a>: <em>\u00ab\u00a0<\/em>The purpose of the best mode requirement is to \u201crestrain inventors from applying for patents while at the same time concealing from the public the pre\u00adferred embodiments of their inventions which they have in fact conceived.\u00a0\u00bb In re Gay, 309 F.2d 769, 772, 135 USPQ 311, 315 (CCPA 1962). Only evidence of concealment, \u201cwhether accidental or intentional,\u201d is considered in judging the adequacy of the disclosure for compliance with the best mode requirement. Spec\u00adtra-Physics, Inc. v.\u00a0Coherent, Inc.,827 F.2d 1524, 1535, 3 USPQ 2d 1737, 1745 (Fed. Cir. 1987). That evidence, in order to result in affirmance of a best mode rejection, must tend to show that the quality of an applicant\u2019s best mode disclosure is so poor as to effectively result in concealment.\u201d In re Sherwood, 613 F.2d 809, 816-817, 204\u00a0USPQ 537, 544 (CCPA 1980). Also, see White Consol. Indus. v. Vega Servo-Control Inc., 214 USPQ 796, 824 (S.D. Mich. 1982), aff\u2019d on related grounds, 713 F.2d 788, 218 USPQ 961 (Fed. Cir. 1983). See also MPEP \u00a7 2165 - \u00a7\u00a02165.04.There are two factual inquiries to be made in deter\u00admining whether a specification satisfies the best mode requirement. First, there must be a subjective determi\u00adnation as to whether at the time the application was filed, the inventor knew of a best mode of practicing the invention. Second, if the inventor had a best mode of practicing the invention in mind, there must be an objective determination as to whether that best mode was disclosed in sufficient detail to allow one skilled in the art to practice it. Fonar Corp. v. General Elec\u00adtric Co., 107 F.3d 1543, 41 USPQ2d 1801, 1804 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Chemcast Corp. v. Arco Industries, 913 F.2d 923, 927-28, 16 USPQ2d 1033, 1036 (Fed. Cir. 1990). \u201cAs a general rule, where software constitutes part of a best mode of carrying out an invention, description of such a best mode is satisfied by a dis\u00adclosure of the functions of the software. This is because, normally, writing code for such software is within the skill of the art, not requiring undue experi\u00admentation, once its functions have been disclosed. . . . [F]low charts or source code listings are not a require\u00adment for adequately disclosing the functions of soft\u00adware.\u201d Fonar Corp., 107 F.3d at 1549, 41 USPQ2d at 1805 (citations omitted).Determining compliance with the best mode requirement requires a two-prong inquiry:1)at the time the application was filed, did the inventor possess a best mode for practicing the inven\u00adtion; and 2)if the inventor did possess a best mode, does the written description disclose the best mode such that a person skilled in the art could practice it.\u00a0\u00bb  <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-250\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 250\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-251\">V. Jan Wolfe, Patent Reform's Reduced 'Best Mode' Requirement Creates Uncertainty, law.com, October 10, 2011. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-251\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 251\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-252\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/part-II\/chapter-11\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 112<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-252\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 252\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-253\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/cfr\/text\/37\/1.75\">37 C.F.R. \u00a7 1.75<\/a>: \u00ab (\u2026) (e) Where the nature of the case admits, as in the case of an improvement, any independent claim should contain in the following order: (1) A preamble comprising a general description of all the elements or steps of the claimed combination which are conventional or known, (2) A phrase such as \u201cwherein the improvement comprises,\u201d and (3) Those elements, steps and\/or relationships which constitute that portion of the claimed combination which the applicant considers as the new or improved portion. (f) If there are several claims, they shall be numbered consecutively in Arabic numerals. (g) The least restrictive claim should be presented as claim number 1, and all dependent claims should be grouped together with the claim or claims to which they refer to the extent practicable. (h) The claim or claims must commence on a separate physical sheet or electronic page. Any sheet including a claim or portion of a claim may not contain any other parts of the application or other material. (i) Where a claim sets forth a plurality of elements or steps, each element or step of the claim should be separated by a line indentation\u00a0<em>\u00bb.<\/em> <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-253\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 253\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-254\">V. sur ce point Cabinet Regimbeau, Demandes de continuation : Conseils aux d\u00e9posants europ\u00e9ens pour la cr\u00e9ation d\u2019un portefeuille de brevets am\u00e9ricains, <a href=\"https:\/\/regimbeau.eu\/insight\/demandes-de-continuation-conseils-aux-deposants-europeens-pour-la-creation-dun-portefeuille-de-brevets-americains\/#:~:text=Une%20demande%20de%20continuation-in,ou%20sur%20la%20mati%C3%A8re%20nouvelle\">en ligne<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-254\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 254\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-255\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/cfr\/text\/37\/1.75\">37 C.F.R. \u00a7 1.75(b)<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-255\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 255\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-256\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/part-III\/chapter-29\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 282<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-256\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 256\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-257\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/part-II\/chapter-11\">35 U.S.C \u00a7 113<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-257\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 257\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-258\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/part-II\/chapter-11\">35 U.S.C \u00a7 114<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-258\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 258\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-259\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/part-II\/chapter-11\">35 U.S.C \u00a7 114<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-259\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 259\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-260\">Mais \u00e9galement en mati\u00e8re d\u2019informatique, V. <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/white-consol-indus-v-vega-servo-control\">White Consolidated Indus., Inc. v. Vega Servo-Control, Inc.<\/a>, 713 F.2d 788 (Fed. Cir. 1983); <em>In re<\/em> Ghiron, 442 F.2d 985, 991 (CCPA 1971). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-260\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 260\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-261\"><a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/amgen-inc-v-chugai-pharmaceutical-co-ltd\">Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd.<\/a>, 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (pas de violation de l\u2019exigence de <em>best mode<\/em> en cas d\u2019absencce de d\u00e9p\u00f4t de cellules transform\u00e9es par la s\u00e9quence d\u2019ADN brevet\u00e9e). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-261\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 261\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-262\"><em>Ex parte<\/em> Rinehart, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1719, 1720 (Bd. Pat. App. &amp; Int\u2019f 1989) <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-262\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 262\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-263\">Puis, le cas \u00e9ch\u00e9ant devant la Cour d\u2019Appel pour le Circuit f\u00e9d\u00e9ral ou la Cour de District pour le District de Columbia. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/part-II\/chapter-13\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 141, 145<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-263\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 263\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-264\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/part-II\/chapter-12\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 132(a)<\/a> (<em>\u00ab\u00a0No amendment shall introduce new matter into the disclosure of the invention.\u00a0\u00bb<\/em>). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-264\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 264\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-265\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/122\">35 U.S.C \u00a7 122(b)(1)(A)<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-265\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 265\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-266\">C\u2019est-\u00e0-dire du droit de demander une redevance raisonnable \u00e0 toute personne qui exploite l\u2019invention jusqu\u2019\u00e0 la d\u00e9livrance du brevet. V. <em>infra, <\/em>n\u00b0364. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-266\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 266\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-267\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/part-II\/chapter-11\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 122(b)(2)<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-267\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 267\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-268\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/part-II\/chapter-17\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 181<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-268\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 268\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-269\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/part-II\/chapter-11\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 122(b)(2)(B)<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-269\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 269\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-270\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/part-II\/chapter-11\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 122(a)<\/a>. Sauf mise en oeuvre d\u2019une disposition l\u00e9gale ou dans des circonstances particuli\u00e8res d\u00e9termin\u00e9es par le Directeur. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-270\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 270\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-271\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/part-II\/chapter-11\">35 U.S.C. 122(e)<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-271\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 271\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-272\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/part-III\/chapter-30\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 302<\/a>. Proc\u00e9dure initialement introduite en 1981. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-272\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 272\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-273\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/part-III\/chapter-32\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 321-30.<\/a> <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-273\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 273\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-274\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/part-III\/chapter-31\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 311-19<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-274\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 274\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-275\">V. <em>supra, <\/em>n\u00b0357. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-275\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 275\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-276\">Qui dispose qu' \"une demande de brevet doit \u00eatre faite ou autoris\u00e9e \u00e0 \u00eatre faite, par l'inventeur, sauf disposition contraire dans le pr\u00e9sent titre, par \u00e9crit au directeur.\" Le texte ant\u00e9rieur disposait : Une personne a droit \u00e0 un brevet sauf si l'invention a \u00e9t\u00e9 connue ou utilis\u00e9e par d'autres dans ce pays ou brevet\u00e9e ou d\u00e9crite dans une publication imprim\u00e9e dans ce pays ou \u00e0 l'\u00e9tranger, avant l'invention de celui-ci par le demandeur de brevet\"; V. MPEP, \u00a7 2131 \u00e0 2138. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-276\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 276\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-277\"><span style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\">V. MPEP, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.uspto.gov\/web\/offices\/pac\/mpep\/s2301.html\">\u00a7 2301<\/a>.<\/span> <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-277\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 277\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-278\">V.<span style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\"> MPEP, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.uspto.gov\/web\/offices\/pac\/mpep\/s2310.html\">\u00a7 2310<\/a>.<\/span> <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-278\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 278\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-279\"><a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/289\/178\/\">United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp.<\/a>, 289 U.S. 178 (1933). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-279\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 279\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-280\"><a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/wommack-v-durham-pecan-co-inc\">Wommack v. Durham Pecan Co., Inc.<\/a>, 715 F.2d 962, 219 U.S.P.Q. 1153 (5th Cir. 1983); <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/tin-decorating-co-v-metal-package-corp\">Tin Decorating Co. of Baltimore v. Metal Package Corp.<\/a>, 29 F.2d 1006 (S.D.N.Y. 1928), <em>aff\u2019d on other grounds<\/em>, 37 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1930); Wiegand v. Dover Mfg. Co., 292 F. 255 (N.D. Ohio 1923); <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/francklyn-v-guilford-packing-co\">Francklyn v. Guilford Packing Co.<\/a>, 695 F.2d 1158, 1160-61 (9th Cir. 1983); <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/kurt-h-volk-v-found-for-christian-living\">Kurt H. Volk, Inc. v. Foundation for Christian Living<\/a>, 534 F. Supp. 1059, 1083-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-280\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 280\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-281\">Cal. Lab. Code \u00a7\u00a7 2870 \u00e0 2872. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-281\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 281\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-282\">19 Del C. \u00a7 805). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-282\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 282\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-283\">765 ILCS 1060\/1 \u00e0 1060\/3. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-283\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 283\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-284\">K.S.A. 44-130 <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-284\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 284\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-285\">Minn. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 181.78. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-285\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 285\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-286\">NRS 600.500. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-286\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 286\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-287\">N.J.S.A. 34:1B-265. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-287\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 287\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-288\">N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 66-57.1 et 66-57.2. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-288\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 288\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-289\">Utah Code \u00a7\u00a7 34-39-1 \u00e0 34-39-3. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-289\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 289\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-290\">RCW 49.44.140 et 49.44.150. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-290\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 290\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-291\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/part-III\/chapter-26\">35 U.S.C.\u00a7 262<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-291\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 291\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-292\"><a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/farmland-irrigation-co-v-dopplmaier\">Farmland Irrigation Co., Inc. v. Dopplmaier<\/a>, 48 Cal. 2d 208, 308 P.2d 732 (1957). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-292\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 292\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-293\">V. par exemple <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/transcore-v-electronic-transaction\">TransCore, L.P. v. Electronic Transaction Consultants Corp.<\/a>, 563 F.3d 1271, 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2009); <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/leatherman-tool-group-v-cooper-industries-2\">Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. v. Cooper Industries, Inc.<\/a>, 131 F.3d 1011, 1015 (Fed. Cir. 1997). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-293\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 293\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-294\">\u00ab Every patent shall contain a short title of the invention and a grant to the patentee, his heirs or assigns, of the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States or importing the invention into the United States, and, if the invention is a process, of the right to exclude others from using, offering for sale or selling throughout the United States, or importing into the United States, products made by that process, referring to the specification for the particulars thereof\u00a0<em>\u00bb.<\/em> <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-294\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 294\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-295\">\"(a) Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States, or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent\". <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-295\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 295\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-296\">Traduction OMPI. \u201c(g) Whoever without authority imports into the United States or offers to sell, sells, or uses within the United States a product which is made by a process patented in the United States shall be liable as an infringer, if the importation, offer to sell, sale, or use of the product occurs during the term of such process patent. In an action for infringement of a process patent, no remedy may be granted for infringement on account of the noncommercial use or retail sale of a product unless there is no adequate remedy under this title for infringement on account of the importation or other use, offer to sell, or sale of that product. A product which is made by a patented process will, for purposes of this title, not be considered to be so made after \u2014 (1) it is materially changed by subsequent processes; or (2) it becomes a trivial and nonessential component of another product.<em>\u00a0\u00bb <\/em> <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-296\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 296\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-297\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/271\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 271(a)<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-297\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 297\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-298\">V. <em>infra, <\/em>n\u00b0400. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-298\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 298\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-299\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/19\/1337\">19 U.S.C. \u00a7 1337(a)<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-299\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 299\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-300\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/271\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 271(e)<\/a> point 2 et suivants\u00a0: <em>\u00ab\u00a0<\/em>(e) (1) It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell within the United States or import into the United States a patented invention (other than a new animal drug or veterinary biological product (as those terms are used in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Act of March 4, 1913) which is primarily manufactured using recombinant DNA, recombinant RNA, hybridoma technology, or other processes involving site specific genetic manipulation techniques) solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products. (2) It shall be an act of infringement to submit \u2014 (A) an application under section 505(j) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act or described in section 505(b)(2) of such Act for a drug claimed in a patent or the use of which is claimed in a patent, (B) an application under section 512 of such Act or under the Act of March 4, 1913 (21 U.S.C. 151 - 158) for a drug or veterinary biological product which is not primarily manufactured using recombinant DNA, recombinant RNA, hybridoma technology, or other processes involving site specific genetic manipulation techniques and which is claimed in a patent or the use of which is claimed in a patent, or (C) (i) with respect to a patent that is identified in the list of patents described in section 351(l)(3) of the Public Health Service Act (including as provided under section 351(l)(7) of such Act), an application seeking approval of a biological product, or(ii) if the applicant for the application fails to provide the application and information required under section 351(l)(2)(A) of such Act, an application seeking approval of a biological product for a patent that could be identified pursuant to section 351(l)(3)(A)(i) of such Act, if the purpose of such submission is to obtain approval under such Act to engage in the commercial manufacture, use, or sale of a drug, veterinary biological product, or biological product claimed in a patent or the use of which is claimed in a patent before the expiration of such patent.\u00a0<em>\u00bb <\/em>V. <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/496\/661\/\">Eli Lilly and Co. v. Medtronic, Inc.<\/a>, 496 U.S. 661 (1990); <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/545\/193\/\">Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd.<\/a>, 545 U.S. 193 (2005). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-300\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 300\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-301\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/271\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 271(f)<\/a>. V. <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/550\/437\/\">Microsoft Corp. v. AT&amp;T Corp.<\/a>, 550 U.S. 437 (2007). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-301\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 301\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-302\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/271\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 271(g)<\/a>: <em>\u00ab<\/em>\u00a0Whoever without authority imports into the United States or offers to sell, sells, or uses within the United States a product which is made by a process patented in the United States shall be liable as an infringer, if the importation, offer to sell, sale, or use of the product occurs during the term of such process patent. In an action for infringement of a process patent, no remedy may be granted for infringement on account of the noncommercial use or retail sale of a product unless there is no adequate remedy under this title for infringement on account of the importation or other use, offer to sell, or sale of that product. A product which is made by a patented process will, for purposes of this title, not be considered to be so made after \u2014 (1) it is materially changed by subsequent processes; or (2) it becomes a trivial and nonessential component of another product.\u00a0<em>\u00bb <\/em> <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-302\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 302\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-303\">\u00ab (b) Quiconque induit activement contrefa\u00e7on d'un brevet est responsable comme un contrefacteur.(c) Celui qui offre de vendre ou vend aux \u00c9tats-Unis ou des importations aux \u00c9tats-Unis une composante d'une machine brevet\u00e9e, la fabrication, la combinaison ou la composition, ou d'un mat\u00e9riau ou d'un appareil pour une utilisation dans la pratique d'un proc\u00e9d\u00e9 brevet\u00e9, constituant une partie de la mati\u00e8re de l'invention, que l'on sait \u00eatre sp\u00e9cialement con\u00e7u ou sp\u00e9cialement adapt\u00e9 pour une utilisation \u00e0 une violation de ce brevet, et non un article de base ou d'un produit du commerce adapt\u00e9 \u00e0 une utilisation importante de contrefaisant, est responsable comme un contrefacteur \u00bb. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-303\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 303\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-304\"><a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/dsu-medical-corp-v-jms-co\">DSU Medical Corp. v. JMS Co.<\/a>, 471 F.3d 1293, 1305-06 (Fed. Cir. 2006); <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/manville-sales-corp-v-paramount-systems\">Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Systems, Inc.<\/a>, 917 F.2d 544, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1990); <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/water-technologies-corp-v-calco-ltd-3\">Water Technologies Corp. v. Calco, Ltd.<\/a>, 850 F.2d 660, 668 (Fed. Cir. 1988). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-304\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 304\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-305\"><a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/365\/336\/\">Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co.<\/a>, 365 U.S. 336 (1961). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-305\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 305\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-306\"><a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/84\/453\/\"><em>Adams v. Burke<\/em><\/a>, 84 U.S. (17 Wall) 453 1873. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-306\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 306\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-307\">\u00ab\u00a0The true ground on which these decisions rest is that the sale by a person who has the full right to make, sell, and use such a machine carries with it the right to the use of that machine to the full extent to which it can be used in point of time<em>.\u00a0\u00bb Adams v. Burke, ibid<\/em>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-307\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 307\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-308\">Kohler proposera en Allemagne la th\u00e9orie des licences tacites d\u00e8s 1878 (Dans son trait\u00e9 Deutsches Patentrecht..., Verlag von J. Bensheimer, 1878. \u00ab\u00a0vendre le produit sans conc\u00e9der le droit d'usage n'aurait pas de sens\u00a0\u00bb, p 162-163, cit\u00e9 et traduit<em> in<\/em> B. Castell, L'\u00e9puisement des droits intellectuels, Puf 1989, p 54), mais ne semble avoir formul\u00e9 la th\u00e9orie de l'\u00e9puisement (automatique) que plus tard (Handbuch des Deutscher patentrechts rechtvergleichender darstellung, Manheim, 1900). La proximit\u00e9 des raisonnements est frappante. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-308\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 308\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-309\">Notamment <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/106\/89\/\">American Cotton Tie Supply Co. v. Simmons<\/a>, 106 U.S. 89 (1882). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-309\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 309\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-310\">316 US 241, 250 (1942). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-310\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 310\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-311\">\u00ab The patentee may surrender his monopoly in whole by the sale of his patent or in part by the sale of an article embodying the invention... But sale of it exhausts the monopoly in that article and the patentee may not thereafter, by virtue of his patent, control the use or disposition of the article<em> \u00bb.<\/em> <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-311\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 311\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-312\">V. <em>infra<\/em>, n\u00b0402. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-312\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 312\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-313\"><\/span><span style=\"orphans: 1;\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.supremecourt.gov\/opinions\/16pdf\/15-1189_ebfj.pdf\">Impression Products, Inc. v. Lexmark International, Inc.<\/a>,\u00a0<\/span><span style=\"font-size: 1em; orphans: 1;\">137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-313\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 313\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-314\"><a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/transcore-v-electronic-transaction\">TransCore, LP v Electronic Transaction Consultants Corp.<\/a>, 563 F.3d 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Les licences sont g\u00e9n\u00e9ralement assilil\u00e9es \u00e0 des engagements de ne pas agir en contrefa\u00e7on. La Cour Supr\u00eame l'a notamment affirm\u00e9 dans son arr\u00eat <i style=\"font-size: 1em;\">e Forest Radio Telephone Telegraph Co. v. United States<\/i><span style=\"font-size: 1em;\">,<\/span><span style=\"font-size: 1em;\">\u00a0<\/span><a class=\"raw-ref\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/de-forest-co-v-united-states#p242\">273 U.S. 236, 242<\/a><span style=\"font-size: 1em;\">\u00a0<\/span><span style=\"font-size: 1em;\">(1927) (\"<\/span>As a license passes no interest in the monopoly, it has been described as a mere waiver of the right to sue by the patentee.\"). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-314\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 314\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-315\"><a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/553\/617\/\">Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc.<\/a>, 553 U.S. 617 (2008). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-315\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 315\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-316\"><a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/569\/278\/\">Bowman v. Monsanto Co.<\/a>, <em>569 U.S. 278 (2013)<\/em> <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-316\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 316\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-317\"><a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/377\/422\/\">Wilbur-Ellis Co. v. Kuther<\/a>, 377 U.S. 422 (1964); <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/365\/336\/\">Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co.<\/a>, 365 U.S. 336 (1961); <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/general-elec-co-v-united-states-7\">General Elec. Co. v. United States<\/a>, 572 F.2d 745, 778-86 (Ct. Cl. 1978); <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/jazz-photo-corp-v-intl-trade-comn\">Jazz Photo Corp. v. International Trade Commission<\/a>, 264 F.3d \u00e0 1101, 1105-07; <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/porter-v-farmers-supply-service-inc-2\">Porter v. Farmers Supply Service, Inc.<\/a>, 790 F.2d 882 (Fed. Cir. 1986). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-317\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 317\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-318\"><a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/106\/89\/\">American Cotton-Tie Co. v. Simmons<\/a>, 106 U.S. (16 Otto.) 89 (1882); Hydril Co. v. Crossman Engineering, Inc., 152 U.S.P.Q. 171 (E.D. Tex. 1966); <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/aktiebolag-v-ej-company\">Sandvik Aktiebolag v. E.J. Co.<\/a>, 121 F.3d 669 (Fed. Cir. 1997). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-318\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 318\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-319\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.casemine.com\/judgement\/us\/5914ab28add7b0493472ffc0\">Boesch v. Graff<\/a>, 133 U.S. 697 (1890) \u00e9tait quelquefois cit\u00e9e, mais en l'esp\u00e8ce le produit import\u00e9 n'avait pas \u00e9t\u00e9 fabriqu\u00e9 ou mis sur le march\u00e9 avec l'autorisation du titulaire du brevet US, et \u00e9manait d'un concurrent. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-319\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 319\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-320\">Holiday v. Mattheson, 24 F. 185, 185 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1885), Dickerson v. Mattheson, 57 F. 524, 527 (2d Cir.1893); Curtiss Aeroplane &amp; Motor Corp. v. United Aircraft Eng\u2019g Corp., 266 F. 71, 78\u201379 (2d Cir. 1920). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-320\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 320\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-321\"><a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/jazz-photo-corp-v-intl-trade-comn\">Jazz Camera Photo v. International Trade Commission<\/a>, 264 F.3d 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2001), portant sur l'importation aux \u00c9tats-Unis d'appareils photos jetables achet\u00e9s aux \u00c9tats-Unis et reconditionn\u00e9s en Chine. Dans cette d\u00e9cision la Cour pr\u00e9cise notamment la distinction entre les simples r\u00e9parations couvertes par l'\u00e9puisement et les reconstructions soumises au monopole. V. \u00e9galement <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/fuji-photo-film-co-v-jazz-photo-corp\">Fuji Photo Film Co. v Jazz Photo Corp.<\/a>, 394 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2005):\u00a0\u00ab Les droits de brevet conf\u00e9r\u00e9s aux \u00c9tats-Unis ne sont pas \u00e9puis\u00e9s par des produits en provenance de l'\u00e9tranger. Pour invoquer la protection de la doctrine de first sale, la premi\u00e8re vente autoris\u00e9e doit avoir \u00e9t\u00e9 faite sous l'empire du brevet am\u00e9ricain \u00bb. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-321\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 321\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-322\"><a href=\"https:\/\/law.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/appellate-courts\/cafc\/09-1549\/09-1549-2012-02-08.html\">Ninestar Technology Co., Ltd. v. International Trade Com'n<\/a>, 667 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Newman, J.). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-322\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 322\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-323\">Supreme Court No. 12-552. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-323\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 323\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-324\">V. Tome 1, n\u00b0 229. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-324\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 324\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-325\"><\/span><span style=\"orphans: 1;\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.supremecourt.gov\/opinions\/16pdf\/15-1189_ebfj.pdf\">Impression Products, Inc. v. Lexmark International, Inc.<\/a>,\u00a0<\/span><span style=\"font-size: 1em; orphans: 1;\">137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-325\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 325\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-326\"><\/span>Comme l'a indiqu\u00e9 la Cour supr\u00eame: <span style=\"font-size: 1em;\">\"No formal granting of a <\/span><span id=\"co_term_199\" class=\"co_searchTerm\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\">license<\/span><span style=\"font-size: 1em;\">\u00a0is necessary in order to give it effect. Any language used by the owner of the patent or any conduct on his part exhibited to another, from which that other may properly infer that the owner consents to his use of the patent in making or using it, or selling it, upon which the other acts, constitutes a\u00a0<\/span><span id=\"co_term_259\" class=\"co_searchTerm\" style=\"font-size: 1em;\">license<\/span><span style=\"font-size: 1em;\"> and a defense to an action for a tort.\" <\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/273\/236\/\">DeForest Radio Tel. &amp; Tel. Co. v. United States<\/a>, 47 U.S. 366 (1927). Sur le r\u00e9gime et les conditions des licences tacites V. \u00e9galement General Motors Corp. v. Dailey, 93 F.2d 938, 941 (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1937); <a href=\"https:\/\/law.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/district-courts\/FSupp\/565\/931\/1458241\/\">Sanofi, S.A. v. Med-Tech Veterinarian Products, Inc.<\/a>, 565 F. Supp. 931, 940 (D.N.J. 1983); Stickle v. Heublein, Inc., 716 F.2d 1550, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1983); <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/winbond-electronics-v-international-trade\">Winbond Electronics Corp. v. International Trade Com'n<\/a>, 262 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2001), opinion corrected, 275 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Teter v. Glass Onion, Inc., 723 F. Supp. 2d 1138 (W.D. Mo. 2010);\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/corbello-v-devito-21\">Corbello v. DeVito<\/a>, 777 F.3d 1058, 1067 (9th Cir. 2015); <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/atkins-v-fischer-2\">Atkins v. Fischer<\/a>, 331 F.3d 988 (D.C. Cir. 2003). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-326\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 326\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-327\"><a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/madey-v-duke-university-5\">Madey v. Duke University<\/a>, 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002); <a href=\"https:\/\/law.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/appellate-courts\/F2\/733\/858\/459501\/\">Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co.<\/a>, 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984); <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/pitcairn-v-united-states\">Pitcairn v. United States<\/a>, 547 F.2d 1106 (Ct. Cl. 1976). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-327\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 327\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-328\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/273\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7273<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-328\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 328\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-329\">Cette d\u00e9fense ne s\u2019appliquait auparavant qu\u2019aux methodes commerciales. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-329\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 329\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-330\">Certains usages non commerciaux par des entit\u00e9s non commerciales sont \u00e9galement \u00e9ligibles. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-330\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 330\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-331\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/271\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 271(e)(1)<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-331\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 331\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-332\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/272\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 272<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-332\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 332\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-333\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/28\/1498\">28 U.S.C. \u00a7 1498(a)<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-333\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 333\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-334\"><a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/527\/627\/\">Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank<\/a>, 527 U.S. 627 (1999).\u00a0 <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-334\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 334\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-335\">P.L. 98-417, Title II, 98 Stat. 1585; <a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/21\/355\">21 U.S.C. \u00a7 355<\/a> and <a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/271\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 271(e)(1)<\/a>. V. <em>supra<\/em>, n\u00b0356. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-335\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 335\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-336\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/271\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 271(e)(1)<\/a>: \"It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell within the United States or import into the United States a patented invention (other than a new animal drug or veterinary biological product (as those terms are used in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Act of March 4, 1913) which is primarily manufactured using recombinant DNA, recombinant RNA, hybridoma technology, or other processes involving site specific genetic manipulation techniques) solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products\". V. <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/545\/193\/\">Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd.<\/a>, 545 U.S. 193, 202 (2005) and <a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/496\/661\/\">Eli Lilly &amp; Co. Inc.<\/a>, 496 U.S. \u00e0 671; <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/momenta-pharms-inc-v-teva-pharms-us-inc\">Momenta Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA Inc.<\/a>, 809 F.3d 610, 620-21 (Fed Cir. 2015); <a href=\"https:\/\/cafc.uscourts.gov\/opinions-orders\/19-1067.opinion.12-16-2019.pdf\">Amgen Inc. v. Hospira, Inc.<\/a>, 944 F.3d 1327, 1340 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2019).<span style=\"font-size: 1em;\"> <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-336\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 336\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-337\">V. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/21\/355\">21 U.S.C. \u00a7 355<\/a>, et notamment (c)(3)(D) <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-337\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 337\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-338\">Ou vingt ans \u00e0 compter de la date de d\u00e9p\u00f4t d\u2019une demande nationale ou PCT assortie du d\u00e9lai de priorit\u00e9 (dans ce cas le d\u00e9lai le plus long s\u2019appliquait). La dur\u00e9e de dix-sept ans avait \u00e9t\u00e9 institu\u00e9e en 1861. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-338\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 338\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-339\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/154\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 154 (a)(2)<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-339\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 339\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-340\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/154\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 154(b)(1)(A)<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-340\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 340\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-341\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/154\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 154(b)(1)(B)<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-341\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 341\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-342\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/154\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 154(b)(1)(C)<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-342\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 342\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-343\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/156\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 156<\/a>. V. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.uspto.gov\/web\/offices\/pac\/mpep\/s2750.html\">MPEP, \u00a7 2750<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-343\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 343\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-344\">Codifi\u00e9 dans <a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/21\/chapter-9\">21 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 301\u2013397<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-344\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 344\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-345\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/21\/chapter-9\/subchapter-V\/part-A\">21 U.S.C. \u00a7 355(c)(3)(E)(ii), (j)(5)(F)(ii))<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-345\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 345\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-346\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/21\/chapter-9\">21 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 355, 360cc<\/a> et 35 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 <a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/271\">271<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/282\">282<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-346\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 346\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-347\">V. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/21\/chapter-9\/subchapter-V\/part-B\">21 U.S.C. \u00a7 360aa \u00e0 360ee<\/a>, et <a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/42\/236\">42 U.S.C \u00a7 236<\/a>; \u00e9galement 21 C.F.R. Part 316.La loi concerne les \u00ab maladies ou affections rares \u00bb, d\u00e9finies comme celles qui affectent moins de 200 000 personnes aux \u00c9tats-Unis, ou pour lesquelles il n'existe aucune perspective raisonnable de r\u00e9cup\u00e9ration des co\u00fbts de d\u00e9veloppement et de mise \u00e0 disposition aux \u00c9tats-Unis, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/21\/360bb\">21 U.S.C. \u00a7 360bb<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-347\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 347\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-348\">Introduites par le Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act 2007 (BPCA), Pub. L. No. 11\u2013185. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-348\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 348\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-349\"><span style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\"><i>De: Forest Radio Telephone Telegraph Co. v. United States<\/i>,\u00a0<a class=\"raw-ref\" style=\"font-size: 1em; background-color: #ffffff;\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/de-forest-co-v-united-states#p242\">273 U.S. 236, 242<\/a><span style=\"font-size: 1em; background-color: #ffffff;\">,\u00a0<\/span><a class=\"raw-ref\" style=\"font-size: 1em; background-color: #ffffff;\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/de-forest-co-v-united-states\">47 S.Ct. 366<\/a><span style=\"font-size: 1em; background-color: #ffffff;\">,\u00a0<\/span><a class=\"raw-ref\" style=\"font-size: 1em; background-color: #ffffff;\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/de-forest-co-v-united-states\">71 L.Ed. 625<\/a><span style=\"font-size: 1em; background-color: #ffffff;\"> (1927)(<\/span><span style=\"text-align: initial; font-size: 1em; background-color: #ffffff;\">\"As a license passes no interest in the monopoly, it has been described as a mere waiver of the right to sue by the patentee.\"). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-349\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 349\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-350\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/261\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 261<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-350\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 350\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-351\"><em>Ibid.<\/em> <em>\u00ab\u00a0<\/em>An interest that constitutes an assignment, grant, or conveyance shall be void as against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for a valuable consideration, without notice, unless it is recorded in the Patent and Trademark Office within three months from its date or prior to the date of such subsequent purchase or mortgage<em> \u00bb.<\/em> <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-351\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 351\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-352\"><a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/farmland-irrigation-co-v-dopplmaier\">Farmland Irrigation Co., Inc. v. Dopplmaier<\/a>, 48 Cal. 2d 208, 308 P.2d 732 (1957), qui juge qu'un\u00a0contrat de licence de brevet est cessible en vertu de la politique \u00ab clairement manifest\u00e9e \u00bb par \u00ab les lois de cet \u00c9tat (...) en faveur de la libre transf\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 de tous les types de biens, y compris les droits d\u00e9coulant des contrats \u00bb, sauf si les les termes ou l\u2019objet du contrat d\u00e9montrent qu'il \u00e9tait incessible <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-352\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 352\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-353\">V. cependant <em>infra<\/em>, n\u00b0355. Le refus d\u2019accorder une injonction en cas de contrefa\u00e7on aboutit, de facto, \u00e0 imposer une licence au brevet\u00e9. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-353\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 353\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-354\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/42\/2183\">42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2183<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-354\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 354\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-355\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/42\/7608\">42 U.S.C. \u00a7 7608<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-355\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 355\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-356\">V. Tome 1, n\u00b0  <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-356\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 356\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-357\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/15\">15 U.S.C.<\/a> \u00a7\u00a7 1-7. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-357\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 357\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-358\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/15\">15 U.S.C.<\/a> \u00a7\u00a7 12-27 et <a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/29\">29 U.S.C.<\/a> \u00a7\u00a7 52-53. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-358\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 358\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-359\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/15\">15 U.S.C.<\/a>\u00a0\u00a7 18. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-359\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 359\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-360\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/15\">15 U.S.C.<\/a> \u00a7 14. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-360\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 360\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-361\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/15\">15 U.S.C.<\/a> \u00a7 41. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-361\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 361\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-362\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/15\">15 U.S.C.<\/a> 45. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-362\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 362\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-363\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/15\">15 U.S.C.<\/a> \u00a7 18a. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-363\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 363\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-364\">V. notamment notre compte rendu de l\u2019affaire <a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/United_States_v._Microsoft_Corp.\">USA v. Microsoft<\/a>, <em>253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001), <\/em>Com. Comm. \u00c9lectr. n\u00b0 10, Octobre 2001, act. 106. Egalement, M. A. Einhorn, \u00ab Intellectual Property and Antitrust: Music Performing Rights in Broadcasting \u00bb, 24 Colum.-VLA J.L. &amp; Arts 349 (2000-2001) ; S. F. Anthony, \u00ab Antitrust and Intellectual Property Law: From Adversaries to Partners \u00bb, 28 AIPLA Q. J. 1 (2000) ; D. A. Balto, A. M. Wolman, \u00ab Intellectual Property and Antitrust : General Principles \u00bb, 43 IDEA 395 (2003) ; S. B. Opi, \u00ab The Application of the Essential Facilities Doctrine to Intellectual Property Licensing in the European Union and the United States: Are Intellectual Property Rights Till Sacrosanct \u00bb, 11 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media &amp; Ent. L.J. 409 (2000-2001); E. T. Sullivan, \u00ab The Confluence of Antitrust and Intellectual Property at the New Century \u00bb, 1 Minn. Intell. Prop. Rev. [iii] (2000) ; R. A. Posner, \u00ab Transaction Costs and Antitrust Concerns in the Licensing of Intellectual Property \u00bb, 4 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. [i] (2004-2005) ; pour un article ancien, A.C. Hugin, \u00ab Intellectual Property and the Antitrust Laws \u00bb 30 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 450, 513, 601, 654, 867 (1948). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-364\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 364\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-365\"><a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/547\/388\/\">eBay Inc. V. MercExchange L.L.C.<\/a>, 547 U.S. 388 (2006). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-365\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 365\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-366\">V. <em>infra, <\/em>n\u00b0418. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-366\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 366\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-367\">V. <em>supra, <\/em>n\u00b0399. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-367\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 367\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-368\"><a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/thurber-corporation-v-fairchild-motor-corp\">Thurber Corp. v. Fairchild Motor Corp.<\/a>, 269 F.2d 841, 845, 849 (5th Cir. 1959). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-368\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 368\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-369\">V. <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/morrow-v-microsoft-corp\">Morrow v. Microsoft Corp.<\/a>, 499 F.3d 1332, 1339 (Fed.Cir. 2007); <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/wiav-solutions-llc-v-motorola-inc\">WiAV Sols. LLC v. Motorola, Inc.<\/a>, 631 F.3d 1257, 1264\u201365 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Sont plus pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment vis\u00e9es les seules personnes \u00ab\u00a0with exclusionary rights to a patent\u00a0\u00bb. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-369\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 369\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-370\">V. <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/luminara-worldwide-llc-v-liown-elecs-co-4\">Luminara Worldwide, LLC. V. Liown Elecs. <\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/luminara-worldwide-llc-v-liown-elecs-co-4\">Co.<\/a>, 814 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2016), 118 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1148 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 29, 2016) <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-370\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 370\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-371\">Par exemple, elle refuse de consid\u00e9rer qu'un licenci\u00e9 exclusif disposant des droits d'exploitation les plus larges avait tous les droits essentiels du brevet\u00e9 \u00ab lorsqu'il ne poss\u00e9dait pas le droit exclusif d'assigner en contrefa\u00e7on du brevet conc\u00e9d\u00e9 sans le consentement du conc\u00e9dant \u00bb, et ce, alors m\u00eame lorsque le conc\u00e9dant ne retenait aucun droit d'exploiter le brevet pour son compte. V. \u00e9galement la d\u00e9cision de la Cour d'appel f\u00e9d\u00e9rale du 18 octobre 2005 dans l'affaire <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/sicom-systems-ltd-v-agilent-technologies-2\">Sicom v. Agilent Tech<\/a> (427 F.3d 971 (Fed. Cir. 2005))<em> : <\/em>En l'esp\u00e8ce, la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 Sicom \u00e9tait licenci\u00e9e exclusive d'un brevet. La licence accordait \u00e0 Sicom \u00ab le droit exclusif d'assigner en contrefa\u00e7on du brevet \u00bb, mais le conc\u00e9dant se r\u00e9servait le droit de continuer \u00e0 exploiter la technologie brevet\u00e9e, ainsi que d'autres droits, et notamment celui de s'opposer \u00e0 la cession de ses droits par le licenci\u00e9. La Cour de district avait jug\u00e9 que la clause du contrat de licence accordant \u00e0 Sicom le droit exclusif d'assigner en contrefa\u00e7on du brevet \u00ab ne conc\u00e8de pas \u00e0 Sicom les droits exclusifs n\u00e9cessaires pour transformer sa licence en cession de droits \u00bb, et ne lui permettait donc pas d'agir en contrefa\u00e7on. Elle relevait \u00e9galement au soutien de cette constatation l'absence d'autorisation d'assigner pour des actes de contrefa\u00e7on ant\u00e9rieurs au contrat. La Cour d'appel confirme, en relevant \u00e9galement d'autres droits retenus par le conc\u00e9dant, et notamment les restrictions de cession ou de sous-licence impos\u00e9es au licenci\u00e9. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-371\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 371\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-372\">V. Tome 1, n\u00b050. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-372\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 372\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-373\"><a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/517\/370\/\">Markman v. Westview Instruments Inc.<\/a>, 517 U.S. 370, 391 (1996). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-373\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 373\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-374\"><a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/phillips-v-awh-corp-3\">Phillips v. AWH Corp.<\/a>, 415 F.3d 1303, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (<em>en banc<\/em>); auparavant, V. <i>Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,<\/i>\u00a0<a class=\"raw-ref\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/markman-v-westview-instruments-inc#p979\">52 F.3d 967, 979-81<\/a>\u00a0(Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc),\u00a0<i>aff'd,<\/i>\u00a0<a class=\"raw-ref\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/markman-v-westview-instruments\">517 U.S. 370<\/a>,\u00a0<a class=\"raw-ref\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/markman-v-westview-instruments\">116 S.Ct. 1384<\/a>,\u00a0<a class=\"raw-ref\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/markman-v-westview-instruments\">134 L.Ed.2d 577<\/a> (1996); <i>Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc.,<\/i>\u00a0<a class=\"raw-ref\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/vitronics-corp-v-conceptronic-inc\">90 F.3d 1576<\/a> (Fed. Cir. 1996); <i>Innova\/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Systems, Inc.,<\/i>\u00a0<a class=\"raw-ref\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/innovapure-water-v-safari-water-filtr\">381 F.3d 1111<\/a> (Fed. Cir. 2004) <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-374\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 374\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-375\"><a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/phillips-v-awh-corp-3\">Phillips v. AWH Corp.<\/a>, 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005); V. \u00e9galement <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/dayco-prod-v-total-containment-inc\">Dayco Products, Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc.<\/a>, 258 F.3d 1317, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (<em>\u00ab\u00a0<\/em>If an argument offered in support of a particular claim construction is so convoluted and artificial that it would not be apparent to a skilled artisan reading the patent and the prosecution history, the argument is simply unhelpful to the performance of our task.<em>\u00a0\u00bb<\/em>) <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-375\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 375\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-376\"><i>Markman,<\/i>\u00a0<a class=\"raw-ref\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/markman-v-westview-instruments-inc#p978\">52 F.3d \u00e0 978<\/a>. <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/bell-atlantic-network-serv-v-covad-com\">Bell Atlantic Network Services, Inc. v. Covad Communications Gp., Inc.<\/a>, 262 F.3d 1258, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (les sp\u00e9cifications \u201cmust clearly redefine a claim term \u2018so as to put a reasonable competitor or one reasonably skilled in the art on notice that the patentee intended to so redefine that claim term.\"). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-376\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 376\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-377\">V. Phillips v. AWH Corp., pr\u00e9cit\u00e9e (\u00ab Because claim terms are normally used consistently throughout the patent, the usage of a term in one claim can often illuminate the meaning of the same term in other claims (\u2026). Differences among claims can also be a useful guide in understanding the meaning of particular claim terms \u00bb). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-377\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 377\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-378\"><em>Phillips<\/em>, pr\u00e9cit\u00e9: \"In addition to consulting the specification, we have held that a court \"should also consider the patent's prosecution history, if it is in evidence.\" <i>Markman,<\/i>\u00a0<a class=\"raw-ref\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/markman-v-westview-instruments-inc#p980\">52 F.3d \u00e0 980<\/a>;\u00a0<i>see also Graham v. John Deere Co.,<\/i>\u00a0<a class=\"raw-ref\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/graham-v-john-deere-company-of-kansas-city-calmar-inc-v-cook-chemical-company-company-v-cook-chemical-company#p33\">383 U.S. 1, 33<\/a>,\u00a0<a class=\"raw-ref\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/graham-v-john-deere-company-of-kansas-city-calmar-inc-v-cook-chemical-company-company-v-cook-chemical-company\">86 S.Ct. 684<\/a>,\u00a0<a class=\"raw-ref\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/graham-v-john-deere-company-of-kansas-city-calmar-inc-v-cook-chemical-company-company-v-cook-chemical-company\">15 L.Ed.2d 545<\/a>\u00a0(1966) (\"[A]n invention is construed not only in the light of the claims, but also with reference to the file wrapper or prosecution history in the Patent Office.\"). The prosecution history, which we have designated as part of the \"intrinsic evidence,\" consists of the complete record of the proceedings before the PTO and includes the prior art cited during the examination of the patent.\u00a0<i>Autogiro,<\/i>\u00a0<a class=\"raw-ref\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/autogiro-company-of-america-v-united-states#p399\">384 F.2d \u00e0 399<\/a>. Like the specification, the prosecution history provides evidence of how the PTO and the inventor understood the patent.\u00a0<i>See Lemelson v. Gen. Mills, Inc.,<\/i>\u00a0<a class=\"raw-ref\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/lemelson-v-general-mills-inc#p1206\">968 F.2d 1202, 1206<\/a>\u00a0(Fed. Cir. 1992). Furthermore, like the specification, the prosecution history was created by the patentee in attempting to explain and obtain the patent. Yet because the prosecution history represents an ongoing negotiation between the PTO and the applicant, rather than the final product of that negotiation, it often lacks the clarity of the specification and thus is less useful for claim construction purposes.\u00a0<i>See Inverness Med. Switz. GmbH v. Warner Lambert Co.,<\/i>\u00a0<a class=\"raw-ref\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/inverness-medical-v-warner-lambert-co#p1380\">309 F.3d 1373, 1380-82<\/a>\u00a0(Fed. Cir. 2002) (the ambiguity of the prosecution history made it less relevant to claim construction);\u00a0<i>Athletic Alternatives, Inc. v. Prince Mfg., Inc.,<\/i>\u00a0<a class=\"raw-ref\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/athletic-alternatives-inc-v-prince-mfg#p1580\">73 F.3d 1573, 1580<\/a>\u00a0(Fed. Cir. 1996) (the ambiguity of the prosecution history made it \"unhelpful as an interpretive resource\" for claim construction). Nonetheless, the prosecution history can often inform the meaning of the claim language by demonstrating how the inventor understood the invention and whether the inventor limited the invention in the course of prosecution, making the claim scope narrower than it would otherwise be.\u00a0<i>Vitronics,<\/i>\u00a0<a class=\"raw-ref\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/vitronics-corp-v-conceptronic-inc#p1582\">90 F.3d at 1582-83<\/a>;\u00a0<i>see also Chimie v. PPG Indus., Inc.,<\/i>\u00a0<a class=\"raw-ref\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/chimie-v-ppg-industries-inc#p1384\">402 F.3d 1371, 1384<\/a>\u00a0(Fed. Cir. 2005) (\"The purpose of consulting the prosecution history in construing a claim is to 'exclude any interpretation that was disclaimed during prosecution.'\"),\u00a0<i>quoting ZMI Corp. v. Cardiac Resuscitator Corp.,<\/i>\u00a0<a class=\"raw-ref\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/zmi-corp-v-cardiac-resuscitator-corp#p1580\">844 F.2d 1576, 1580<\/a>\u00a0(Fed. Cir. 1988);\u00a0<i>Southwall Techs., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co.,<\/i>\u00a0<a class=\"raw-ref\" href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/southwall-technologies-v-cardinal-ig-co#p1576\">54 F.3d 1570, 1576<\/a> (Fed. Cir. 1995)\". <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-378\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 378\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-379\"><a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/phillips-v-awh-corp-3\">Phillips v. AWH Corp.<\/a>, 415 F.3d \u00e0 1317-18. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-379\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 379\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-380\"><a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/liebel-flarsheim-company-v-medrad-inc\">Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad Inc.<\/a>, 358 F.3d 898, 911 (Fed. Cir. 2004); <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/tate-access-floors-v-interface-archit-res\">Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural Resources, Inc.<\/a>, 279 F.3d 1357, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2002); <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/apple-computer-inc-v-articulate-sys-inc\">Apple Computer, Inc. v. Articulate Sys., Inc.<\/a>, 234 F.3d 14, 24 (Fed. Cir. 2000). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-380\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 380\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-381\"><a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/becton-v-tyco-healthcare-grp\">Becton, Dickinson &amp; Co. v. Tyco Healthcare Group, LP<\/a>, 616 F.3d 1249, 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2010); <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/southwall-technologies-v-cardinal-ig-co\">Southwall Technologies, Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co.<\/a>, 54 F.3d 1570, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1995). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-381\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 381\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-382\"><a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/56\/330\/\">Winans v. Denmead<\/a>, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1853) <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-382\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 382\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-383\"><a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/339\/605\/\">Graver Tank &amp; Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co<\/a>, 339 U.S. 605 (1950). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-383\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 383\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-384\">\u00ab\u00a0if two devices do the same work in substantially the same way, and accomplish substantially the same result, they are the same\u00a0\u00bb. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-384\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 384\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-385\"><a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/520\/17\/\">Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. <\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/520\/17\/\">Hilton Davis Chemical Co.<\/a>, 520 U.S. 17. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-385\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 385\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-386\"><a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/535\/722\/\">Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.<\/a>, 535 U.S. 722 (2002). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-386\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 386\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-387\"><a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/339\/605\/\">Graver Tank &amp; Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co.<\/a>, 339 U.S. 605, 608\u201309 (1950) (\u00ab\u00a0The wholesome realism of [the doctrine of equivalents] is not always applied in favor of a patentee but is sometimes used against him. Thus, where a device is so far changed in principle from a patented article that it performs the same or a similar function in a substantially different way, but nevertheless falls within the literal words of the claim, the doctrine of equivalents may be used to restrict the claim and defeat the patentee\u2019s action for infringement\u00a0\u00bb); <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/sri-intern-v-matsushita-elec-corp-of-am\">SRI Int\u2019l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp.<\/a>, 775 F.2d 1107, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-387\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 387\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-388\">V. <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/roche-palo-alto-v-apotex\">Roche Palo Alto, LLC v. Apotex, Inc.<\/a>, 531 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2008) : \u00ab The reverse doctrine of equivalents is rarely applied, and this court has never affirmed a finding of non-infringement under the reverse doctrine of equivalents\u00a0\u00bb. Pour des applications, V. par exemple Precision Metal Fabricators Inc. v. Jetstream Sys. Co., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1704 (N.D. Cal.1988); Lesona Corp. v. United States, 530 F.2d 896, 905\u201306 (Ct. Cl. 1976). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-388\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 388\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-389\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/282\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 282(b)(2)<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-389\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 389\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-390\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/282\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 282<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-390\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 390\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-391\"><a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/diamond-scientific-co-v-ambico-inc-2\">Diamond Scientific Co. v. Ambico, Inc., 848 F.2d<\/a> 1220,1225 (Fed. Cir. 1988); <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/pandrol-usa-lp-v-airboss-ry-prod-inc\">Pandrol USA, LP v. Airboss Railway Prods., Inc.<\/a>, 424 F.3d 1161, 1166 (Fed. Cir. 2005). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-391\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 391\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-392\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/282\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 282(b)(1)<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-392\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 392\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-393\">37 C.F.R. 1.56(a), (b). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-393\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 393\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-394\">V. par exemple<a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/352\/457\/\"> United States Gypsum v. National Gypsum<\/a>, 352 U.S. 457 (1957) (prix impos\u00e9s), <a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/senza-gel-corp-v-seiffhart\">Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seiffhart<\/a>, 803 F.2d 661 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (ventes li\u00e9es). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-394\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 394\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-395\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/271\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 271(d)<\/a>: <em>\u00ab\u00a0<\/em>No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or contributory infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by reason of his having done one or more of the following: (1) derived revenue from acts which if performed by another without his consent would constitute contributory infringement of the patent; (2) licensed or authorized another to perform acts which if performed without his consent would constitute contributory infringement of the patent; (3) sought to enforce his patent rights against infringement or contributory infringement; (4) refused to license or use any rights to the patent; or (5) conditioned the license of any rights to the patent or the sale of the patented product on the acquisition of a license to rights in another patent or purchase of a separate product, unless, in view of the circumstances, the patent owner has market power in the relevant market for the patent or patented product on which the license or sale is conditioned\u00a0<em>\u00bb.<\/em> <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-395\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 395\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-396\">V. Tome 1, n\u00b0263. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-396\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 396\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-397\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/286\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 286<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-397\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 397\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-398\">V. Tome 1, n\u00b065. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-398\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 398\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-399\"><a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/547\/388\/\">eBay Inc. V. MercExchange L.L.C.<\/a>, 547 U.S. 388 (2006). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-399\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 399\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-400\"><em>Ibid.<\/em> <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-400\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 400\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-401\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/292\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 292(a)<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-401\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 401\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-402\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/35\/154\">35 U.S.C. \u00a7 154(d)<\/a> (\u00ab\u00a0<em>provisional rights<\/em>\u00a0\u00bb). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-402\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 402\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-403\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/uscode\/text\/28\/2201\">28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2201<\/a>. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-403\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 403\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-404\"><a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/300\/227\/\">Aetna Life Ins. Co.<\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/300\/227\/\"> v. Haworth<\/a>, 300 U. S. 227, 240 (1937). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-404\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 404\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-405\"><a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/coffman-v-breeze-corporations\">Coffman<\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/casetext.com\/case\/coffman-v-breeze-corporations\"> v. Breeze Corps.<\/a>, 323 U.S. 316 (1945). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-405\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 405\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-406\"><a href=\"https:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/cases\/federal\/us\/549\/118\/\">MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.<\/a>, 549 U.S. 118 (2007). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-406\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 406\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-407\">En l\u2019esp\u00e8ce, jug\u00e9 qu\u2019un licenci\u00e9 n\u2019a pas \u00e0 r\u00e9silier ou cesser d\u2019ex\u00e9cuter sa licence avant de placer sa demande de jgement d\u00e9claratoire d\u2019invalidit\u00e9 ou de non contrefa\u00e7on. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-407\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 407\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-408\">Les conditions d\u2019acc\u00e8s \u00e0 un jugement d\u00e9claratoire, notamment dans l\u2019hypoth\u00e8se d\u2019une licence, ont \u00e9t\u00e9 pr\u00e9cis\u00e9es par des d\u00e9cisions ult\u00e9rieures, V. M. Donovan, The Impact of MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc. and Its Progeny on Technology Licensing, 3 J. Bus. Entrepreneurship &amp; L. Iss. 1 (2009). <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-408\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 408\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-409\">V. par exemple H.R. 9, \u00ab Innovation Act \u00bb, qui proposait d\u2019imposer aux tribunaux de se prononcer sur la validit\u00e9 d\u2019un brevet d\u00e8s le d\u00e9but d\u2019une proc\u00e9dure pour \u00e9viter que les trolls de brevets ne puissent pas faire durer les proc\u00e8s pendant des ann\u00e9es sur le fondement de revendications invalides. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-409\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 409\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-410\">9 VSA \u00a7 4195 et suivants. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-410\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 410\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-411\">9 VSA, \u00a7 4197, qui dispose : \u00ab (a) A person shall not make a bad faith assertion of patent infringement.\r\n\r\n(b) A court may consider the following factors as evidence that a person has made a bad faith assertion of patent infringement:\r\n\r\n(1) The demand letter does not contain the following information:\r\n\r\n(A) the patent number;\r\n\r\n(B) the name and address of the patent owner or owners and assignee or assignees, if any; and\r\n\r\n(C) factual allegations concerning the specific areas in which the target\u2019s products, services, and technology infringe the patent or are covered by the claims in the patent.\r\n\r\n(2) Prior to sending the demand letter, the person fails to conduct an analysis comparing the claims in the patent to the target\u2019s products, services, and technology, or such an analysis was done but does not identify specific areas in which the products, services, and technology are covered by the claims in the patent.\r\n\r\n(3) The demand letter lacks the information described in subdivision (1) of this subsection, the target requests the information, and the person fails to provide the information within a reasonable period of time.\r\n\r\n(4) The demand letter demands payment of a license fee or response within an unreasonably short period of time.\r\n\r\n(5) The person offers to license the patent for an amount that is not based on a reasonable estimate of the value of the license.\r\n\r\n(6) The claim or assertion of patent infringement is meritless, and the person knew, or should have known, that the claim or assertion is meritless.\r\n\r\n(7) The claim or assertion of patent infringement is deceptive.\r\n\r\n(8) The person or its subsidiaries or affiliates have previously filed or threatened to file one or more lawsuits based on the same or similar claim of patent infringement (...):\r\n\r\n(9) Any other factor the court finds relevant (...)\u201d <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-411\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 411\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-412\">9 VSA, \u00a7 4198. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-412\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 412\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-413\">9 VSA, \u00a7 4199 (Enforcement; remedies; damages), qui dispose : \u00ab (a) The Attorney General shall have the same authority under this chapter to make rules, conduct civil investigations, bring civil actions, and enter into assurances of discontinuance as provided under chapter 63 of this title. In an action brought by the Attorney General under this chapter, the court may award or impose any relief available under chapter 63 of this title.\r\n\r\n(b) A target of conduct involving assertions of patent infringement, or a person aggrieved by a violation of this chapter or by a violation of rules adopted under this chapter, may bring an action in Superior Court. A court may award the following remedies to a plaintiff who prevails in an action brought pursuant to this subsection:\r\n\r\n(1) equitable relief;\r\n\r\n(2) damages;\r\n\r\n(3) costs and fees, including reasonable attorney\u2019s fees; and\r\n\r\n(4) exemplary damages in an amount equal to $50,000.00 or three times the total of damages, costs, and fees, whichever is greater.\r\n\r\n(c) This chapter shall not be construed to limit rights and remedies available to the State of Vermont or to any person under any other law and shall not alter or restrict the Attorney General\u2019s authority under chapter 63 of this title with regard to conduct involving assertions of patent infringement. (Added 2013, No. 44, \u00a7 6; 2013, No. 47, \u00a7 2, eff. May 24, 2013.)\u00a0\u00bb <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-413\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 413\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><li id=\"footnote-279-414\"><a href=\"http:\/\/www.statutes.legis.state.tx.us\/Docs\/%20BC\/htm\/BC.17.htm\">Tex Bus &amp; Com Code Ann \u00a7 17952<\/a>, Added by Acts 2015, Texas Acts of the 84th Leg. - Regular Session, ch. 856,Sec. 1, eff. 9\/1\/2015. La section 17.952 du Code de commerce prohibe les demandes en contrefa\u00e7on mauvaise de foi (Bad Faith Claim of Patent Infringement), et dispose :\r\n\r\n\u201c(a)\u00a0A person may not send to an end user located or doing business in this state a written or electronic communication that is a bad faith claim of patent infringement.\r\n\r\n(b)\u00a0A communication is a bad faith claim of patent infringement if the communication includes a claim that the end user or a person affiliated with the end user has infringed a patent and is liable for that infringement and:\r\n\r\n(1)\u00a0the communication falsely states that the sender has filed a lawsuit in connection with the claim;\r\n\r\n(2)\u00a0the claim is objectively baseless because:(A)\u00a0the sender or a person the sender represents does not have a current right to license the patent to or enforce the patent against the end user;(B)\u00a0the patent has been held invalid or unenforceable in a final judgment or administrative decision; or(C)\u00a0the infringing activity alleged in the communication occurred after the patent expired; or\r\n\r\n(3) the communication is likely to materially mislead a reasonable end user because the communication does not contain information sufficient to inform the end user of:(A) the identity of the person asserting the claim;(B) the patent that is alleged to have been infringed; and(C) at least one product, service, or technology obtained by the end user that is alleged to infringe the patent or the activity of the end user that is alleged to infringe the patent\u201d. <a href=\"#return-footnote-279-414\" class=\"return-footnote\" aria-label=\"Return to footnote 414\">&crarr;<\/a><\/li><\/ol><\/div>","protected":false},"author":1,"menu_order":2,"template":"","meta":{"pb_show_title":"on","pb_short_title":"","pb_subtitle":"","pb_authors":[],"pb_section_license":""},"chapter-type":[],"contributor":[],"license":[],"part":40,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.droitangloamericaindespi.com\/brevets\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/279"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.droitangloamericaindespi.com\/brevets\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.droitangloamericaindespi.com\/brevets\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/chapter"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.droitangloamericaindespi.com\/brevets\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"version-history":[{"count":126,"href":"https:\/\/www.droitangloamericaindespi.com\/brevets\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/279\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":628,"href":"https:\/\/www.droitangloamericaindespi.com\/brevets\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/279\/revisions\/628"}],"part":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.droitangloamericaindespi.com\/brevets\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/parts\/40"}],"metadata":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.droitangloamericaindespi.com\/brevets\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/279\/metadata\/"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.droitangloamericaindespi.com\/brevets\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=279"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"chapter-type","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.droitangloamericaindespi.com\/brevets\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapter-type?post=279"},{"taxonomy":"contributor","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.droitangloamericaindespi.com\/brevets\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/contributor?post=279"},{"taxonomy":"license","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.droitangloamericaindespi.com\/brevets\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/license?post=279"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}